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

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THE

MILITARY LIFE

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
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Ht. Gen.l Sir Arthur Wellesley K.B.

On Stone by G. J. Hamerton from a Picture painted for the Marquis Wellesley

London, Longman, Orme, & Co. Paternoster Row

Day & Haghe, Lith.rs to the Queen

THE

MILITARY LIFE

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

K. G. &c. &c. &c.

BY

MAJOR BASIL JACKSON,

AND

CAPTAIN C. ROCHFORT SCOTT,

LATE OF THE ROYAL STAFF CORPS.

VIRTUTIS FORTUNA COMES.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

LONGMAN, ORME, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS,

PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1840.

00141833

TO

LIEUTENANT GENERAL

LORD FITZROY J. H. SOMERSET,

K.C.B. K.T.S. K.M.T. &c. &c. &c.

MILITARY SECRETARY

TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING IN CHIEF,

AND THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGNS IN PORTUGAL, SPAIN, FRANCE,

AND FLANDERS,

AIDE-DE-CAMP AND MILITARY SECRETARY TO

FIELD MARSHAL

HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

THIS WORK

IS,

WITH PERMISSION, MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

BY

HIS LORDSHIP'S OBLIGED AND OBEDIENT

HUMBLE SERVANTS,

THE AUTHORS.

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OF

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ERRATA IN VOL. I.

Page 85. line 12. insert "*to*" after "*preparations.*"
136. line 2. from bottom, for "*west*" read "*east.*"
183. line 24. for "*for if ready*" read "*as if ready.*"
247. line 14. insert an † after "*expediency.*"
252. line 21. for "*Zeeland*" read "*Laalande.*"
265. line 20. omit "*de.*"
271. line 30. for "*translantic*" read "*transatlantic.*"
295. line 17. for "*differing*" read "*different.*"
295. line 18. after "*result of*" insert "*a contest between.*"

PREFACE.

It does not always follow that the opinion formed of an eminent individual by his cotemporaries is confirmed by that of posterity; but there can be little hazard in affirming that the Duke of Wellington must be recorded in British annals as the most illustrious man the empire has produced. His military fame rests on a broad and imperishable foundation, while as a statesman he has long stood foremost in general estimation.

Nothing is more surprising than the almost uniform success that has attended him throughout a varied and eventful career: as Midas by a touch converted all to gold, so did every thing prosper under the hand of Wellington. And although great and extraordinary acts have characterized his whole life, yet nothing connected with his Grace ought to excite a higher degree of admiration than the publication of his voluminous despatches and letters. To have permitted the appearance of a selection from those documents, would have been little in comparison, (setting aside their intrinsic value,) for we possess many collections of letters written by distinguished persons; but we should

search history in vain for a man who would have dared to give publicity to his correspondence, with so little reserve.

No individual ever before contributed so valuable a mass of materials for compiling not only the history of his own life, but that of the times in which he lived: for what are the Commentaries of Cæsar, of the great Frederick, or of Napoleon,—composed as they were long after the events and affairs they record had occurred, and when leisure was afforded to throw any colouring over them suited to existing circumstances, — compared to this *unique* collection of letters and documents, penned often on the spur of the moment, upon an infinite variety of subjects, during a long course of the most arduous services in which any man was ever engaged, and without any view to their future publication?

The service Colonel Gurwood has rendered by giving the "Despatches" to the world is inestimable; but unfortunately the cost of the work is so great as to place it beyond the attainment of readers in general, while at the same time its bulk is such as to deter many persons from perusing it; besides, a considerable number of the letters and documents it comprises are necessarily of a nature to interest few beyond the soldier or the politician.

These considerations have induced the authors of the present publication, to undertake a Life of the illustrious Duke, which, while based on the incontrovertible authority of his despatches, should have

the narrative amplified from various sources to which they have had access ; such as the private correspondence and journals of their brother officers and others, independent of the numerous histories, memoirs, &c. which are in print and open to all. And they may add, that the reader will find some new light thrown on the military operations during the brief campaign of 1815, derived from unquestionable authority ; and, further, that as regards the battle of Waterloo itself, they are enabled to correct an erroneous impression which has so long prevailed with respect to the amount and value of Prussian co-operation on that great day.

It may be proper to mention, that in the preparation of this work the authors have taken distinct portions of the Duke's career, and written upon them independently ; at the same time rendering each other mutual assistance, — the only practicable method of producing a joint work. The maps and plans — so essentially necessary for the perfect understanding of military history — have been drawn with the greatest care, under their own immediate superintendence ; and, in devoting their attention to this object, they have sought to render the maps as clear and intelligible as possible, by omitting all superfluous details and embellishments, which tend but to confuse the reader.

A lively curiosity was raised amongst all classes of the community by the publication of the twelve noble volumes of Despatches, which, however, for

the reasons already assigned, can only have been satisfied to a very limited extent. The authors of the present work — which is within the reach of all — entertain a hope, therefore, that the public generally will now seek to make themselves fully acquainted with the character and services of the Duke of Wellington; of whom Sir Walter Scott most truly said — "Europe has not seen such a man since Julius Cæsar."


MAP
of the SEAT of WAR
MYSORE
and the
MARHATTA STATES
INDIAN OCEAN
BAY of BENGAL
JYPOOR
MALWA
BERAR
SHYDABAD
MYSORE
CALCUTTA
BOMBAY
CEYLON
Dominions of Tiffoo Sultaun after the treaty of Jerongapatam 1792
Dt. of the Rajah of Mysore after the Capture of Jerongapatam
Marhatta Dominions previous to the War on 1803
Provinces ceded at the conclusion of the War

THE

LIFE

OF

FIELD MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

K. G. &c. &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

EARLY LIFE OF THE HONOURABLE ARTHUR WELLESLEY. — APPOINTMENT TO AN ENSIGNCY. — RAPID PROMOTION. — A MEMBER OF THE IRISH PARLIAMENT. — LANDS AT OSTEND. — SERVICE IN FLANDERS. — FAULTS OF THE ALLIES. — AFFAIR OF BOXTEL. — METEREN. — HARASSING RETREAT. — RE-EMBARKATION. — OBSERVATIONS ON THE CAMPAIGN.

No country ever had a more arduous struggle for existence than England, during that mighty contest which she so long sustained against the tremendous power of Napoleon; and, notwithstanding her great naval victories, it must be considered doubtful whether she could have maintained her own freedom, and — as she may justly boast of having done — rescued Europe from the grasp of that extraordinary man, but for the brilliant successes that attended her arms in the Spanish Peninsula. What this empire owes, therefore, to the genius and unshaken constancy of the Great Captain who achieved such glorious triumphs, and placed his country on the pinnacle of renown, who will presume to estimate?

CHAP. I. 1769.

Arthur, third surviving son of the first Earl of Mornington, was born in the year 1769.* After

* The family of Cowley, Cooley, or, as it is now written, Colley, was originally settled in the county of Rutland, whence it removed to Ireland in the reign of Henry VIII., who granted to Walter and Robert Cowley, of Kilkenny, gents., the office of clerk of the crown in chancery, during their respective lives.

Walter Colley aforesaid was appointed solicitor-general of Ireland the 7th of September, 1537 (29th of Henry VIII.), and some years afterwards was made surveyor-general of that kingdom. He left two sons.

Sir Henry Colley, knt., of Castle Carbery, the elder son, served in the parliament held at Dublin by Thomas Earl of Sussex, in 1559, for the borough of Thomastown, co. Kilkenny. He was knighted by Sir H. Sidney, who also called him to the privy council. In Sir Nicholas Malby's account of the government of Ireland, drawn up and sent to Queen Elizabeth (1579), wherein all the men of influence, both English and Irish, in the King's County, are ranked and distinguished, Sir Henry Colley is stated to be a man of power and name; "an English gentleman, seneschal of the county, who governs very honestly, but now is sore oppressed by the rebels, the Connors." By his wife, Catherine, daughter of Thomas Cusack of Cussington, co. Meath, lord chancellor of Ireland, he had issue three sons.

1. Sir George of Edenderry; which branch failed in heirs male at the third generation.
2. Sir Henry of Castle Carbery; ancestor of the Mornington family.
3. Jerome, or Gerald.

Sir Henry Colley, knt., was constable of the Fort of Philipstown and seneschal of the King's County, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth; and in June, 1561, was appointed provídore of her Majesty's army, an office of great trust and emolument. In 1576, he was knighted, and served for the borough of Monaghan in the parliament of 1613. He married Anne, daughter of Adam Loftus, archbishop of Dublin; and by her had issue two sons, Henry and Edward, and three daughters.

Sir Henry, who succeeded at Castle Carbery, married Anne, daughter and coheir of Christopher Peyton, esquire, auditor-general of Ireland. He died in 1637, leaving five sons and three daughters.

Dudley Colley, the eldest son and successor at Castle Carbery, was member for Philipstown in the first parliament after the Restoration, and was named one of the commissioners for executing the Acts of Settlement. He married, first, Anne, daughter of Henry Warren of Grangebegg, co. Kildare, esquire, by whom he had eight sons and seven daughters; and, secondly, Elizabeth, daughter of George Sankey, esquire, of Balenrath, King's County, and widow of Henry Bollard, esquire, of Dublin, by whom he had three daughters.

Of the eight sons of Dudley Colley, the eldest alone left male issue. His fourth daughter, Elizabeth, married Garret Wesley, or Wellesley, esquire, of Dangan in the county of Meath; of whom hereafter.

Henry Colley, esq., the eldest son, succeeded at Castle Carbery; he married Mary, only daughter of Sir William Usher of Dublin, knt., and died in 1700, leaving six sons and six daughters. The four eldest sons died in their infancy. Henry was the fifth; and Richard, afterwards Lord Mornington, the youngest. One of the daughters, Anne, married William Pole, esq. of Ballyfin, Queen's County; whose only

receiving the rudiments of his education at the public school at Eton, he was placed for some

son, William Pole, dying without issue, in 1778, bequeathed his estates to his kinsman William Wellesley, who, in consequence, assumed the name of Pole, and, in 1821, was created Lord Maryborough.

Henry Colley, esq. was member of parliament for Strabane ; and, in 1819, married the Lady Mary Hamilton, third daughter of James Earl of Abercorn. He died in February, 1723, leaving a son, who died on the 1st of March following, aged three years, and two daughters.

Richard Colley, esq., his brother, succeeded at Castle Carbery. He was some time previously auditor and registrar of the Royal Hospital near Dublin, and, in 1713, was appointed second chamberlain to the court of exchequer in Ireland. He served in parliament for the borough of Trim ; and, in September, 1728, assumed the name of Wellesley *, on succeeding to the estates of Garret Wellesley of Dangan, his first cousin, son of Garret Wellesley by Elizabeth daughter of Dudley Colley aforesaid. In July, 1746, he was elevated to the peerage by the title of Baron Mornington. He had married Elizabeth, daughter of John Sale, LL.D., registrar of the diocese of Dublin, and M.P. for Carysfort, by whom he had one surviving son and two daughters. He died in 1758.

Garret Wellesley, the second baron, was, in 1760, advanced to the dignities of Viscount Wellesley of Dangan Castle, and Earl of Mornington, county of Meath. He married Anne, eldest daughter of Arthur Hill, first Viscount Dungannon, and left issue —

Richard, the present Marquess Wellesley.
William, created Baron Maryborough.
Arthur, created Duke of Wellington.
Gerald Valerian, D.D., and a prebendary of Durham.
Henry, created Baron Cowley.
Anne, married, first, to the Honble. Henry Fitzroy, and, secondly, to Cullen Smith, esq.
Mary Elizabeth, who died unmarried.

* The eminent and very ancient family of Wesley, Wellesley, or, as it was originally written, De Welesley, is of Anglo-Saxon origin, and was founded in Ireland by one of the family, who, in 1172, accompanied King Henry the Second to that country in the honourable capacity of standard-bearer. For his military services on that occasion, he obtained large grants of land in the counties of Kildare and Meath.

From this distinguished individual descended William de Wellesley, who in 1334 was summoned to parliament as a baron of the realm, by the title of Baron of Noragh. His lordship was father to Sir Richard de Wellesley, who served the office of sheriff of Kildare in the year 1418 ; but the baronial dignity was not inherited.

Sir Richard married Johan, eldest daughter and eventually sole heiress of Sir Nicholas de Castlemaine ; by which alliance he obtained the lordships of Dangan, Mornington, Clonebreny, and several other manors.

Gerard de Wellesley, his son, succeeded ; from whom lineally descended Garret Wellesley, who espoused Elizabeth, daughter of Dudley Colley, esq. of Castle Carbery, by whom he had issue two sons, William and Garret.

William Wellesley dying without issue, was succeeded by his brother Garret, M.P. for the county of Meath, who married Catherine, daughter of Maurice Keating, esq. of Murraghmore, and died without progeny, bequeathing his estates to his cousin Richard Colley, esq. of Castle Carbery.

CHAP. I.

1787.

time under the tuition of the Rev. Henry Michell, A.M., Vicar of Brighton, — a gentleman of considerable literary attainments; from whose care he was removed to the military school at Angers in France, to study the profession of arms, where he must have acquired that perfect knowledge of the French language which proved of so much service to him in after life. In 1787, when eighteen years of age, he obtained an ensigncy in the 73d regiment of foot; and by a rapid promotion, not unusual for young men of rank in those days, speedily passed through the several intervening grades, and became lieutenant-colonel of the 33d regiment on the 30th of September, 1793 *; having in the course of this brief period served about three years and a half in the cavalry, by which he became acquainted with the movements and nature of this branch of the service. He is described to have possessed in early life the good will of his brother officers, owing to the frankness of his manners, together with an entire freedom from affectation and hauteur; while at the same time he was ever a great favourite with his superiors in military rank, from

---

Arthur, Duke of Wellington, fifth, but third surviving son of Garret Earl of Mornington, married, 10th April, 1806, the Honble. Catharine Pakenham, third daughter of Edward-Michael, second Baron Longford, and has issue —

Arthur, Marquess of Douro; born 3d February, 1807.
Lord Charles Wellesley; born 16th January, 1808.

The Duchess of Wellington died 25th April, 1831.

* His service was as follows: — Ensign in the 73d regiment, in 1787. Promoted to a lieutenancy in the 76th regiment, at the close of the same year. In January, 1788, he exchanged into the 41st regiment; and in June following was appointed to the 12th, or Prince of Wales's Light Dragoons. He served in the cavalry until June, 1791, when he obtained a company in the 58th regiment; but returned to the cavalry by exchanging into the 18th light dragoons in October, 1792. He was promoted to a majority in the 33d regiment on the 30th of April, 1793; and obtained the lieut.-colonelcy of that corps, by purchase, on the 30th of September in the same year.

the remarkable zeal he evinced for the service, as well as the strict attention he paid to his regimental duties. It is said that at this time he spent a large proportion of his leisure hours in studying the works of the best military writers.

The illustrious subject of these memoirs does not seem, either when a boy, or during the early stages of his career, to have shown any qualities beyond such as may be often remarked in active, intelligent, and high-spirited young men; and we may observe, that there is scarcely an instance on record of any great commander having exhibited that precocity of talent which sometimes excites our astonishment. Marlborough, Eugene, Frederick, and even Napoleon, —notwithstanding the efforts of his admirers to make it appear otherwise, — were undistinguished as schoolboys. Generals are not like poets, "heaven-born." The latter may "lisp in numbers;" but great captains, in addition to military genius, courage, firmness, self-command, and that undefinable something which gives power over the multitude, must possess military science, and a further knowledge not less essential, — that of mankind.

The Hon. Arthur Wellesley began his public life early, having sat in the Irish parliament for the family borough of Trim in the years 1791, 1792, and 1793. On the 10th of January in the last-named year, he seconded the address to the throne. We shall give a summary of his speech on that occasion, to show that he was early imbued with those high constitutional principles which have directed every act of his political life. He said, that

"At a time when political opinions were spreading throughout Europe inimical to kingly government, it behoved us in

CHAP. I.

1793.

a particular manner to lay before our gracious sovereign our determination to support and maintain the constitution. He took notice that, under the present reign, this country had risen to an unexampled prosperity. He said that the augmentation of the forces as mentioned in the speech had, from the circumstances of the times, become necessary. He reprobated in very severe terms the conduct of the French towards their king, their invasion of the territories of sovereign princes, and the irruption into the Austrian Netherlands. . . . . In regard to what had been recommended in the speech from the throne respecting our Catholic fellow-subjects, he could not refrain from expressing his approbation on that head. He had no doubt of the loyalty of the Catholics of Ireland; and he trusted that when the question should be brought forward respecting them, that we should lay aside all animosities, and act with moderation and dignity, and not with the fury and violence of partisans."

As many of our readers may feel a curiosity to know what were the Duke of Wellington's sentiments with respect to the Irish Roman Catholics at the age of twenty-four, we shall give an epitome of his speech upon a motion by Mr. Hobart for leave to bring in a bill for the further relief of his Majesty's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion. In the debate on the 25th of February, 1793, the Hon. Arthur Wellesley stated, that

"He had no objection to giving the Roman Catholics the benefit of the constitution, and in his opinion the bill conferred them in an ample degree; but the motion of the hon. gentleman * (Mr. Graydon) seemed calculated to promote disunion. With the bill as it stands the Protestants are satisfied, and the Roman Catholics contented; why then agitate a question which may disturb both? A gentleman had said that admitting the forty-shilling freeholders of the Roman Catholic persuasion to vote at

* Mr. Graydon had moved, that a committee be empowered to receive a clause to limit, in future, the value of freeholds entitling persons to vote at elections, without prejudicing the right of persons already entitled to vote.

elections would annihilate the Protestant establishment in Ireland, and he has founded this assertion on the supposition that the Roman Catholics will in voting be directed by their priests; but have not Roman Catholics, like Protestants, various interests and various passions by which they are swayed — the influence of their landlords, their good or bad opinion of the candidates, their own interests, and a thousand other motives? It appeared to him that they would not vote in a body, or as had been supposed, if the bill should pass in its present form; but if the motion of the hon. gentleman should be adopted, then indeed they would undoubtedly unite in support of Roman Catholic candidates."

His parliamentary career was soon interrupted by a call to attend his duties in the field. At this period (1793) H.R.H. the Duke of York was at the head of a British force serving on the Continent in conjunction with our allies, whose object was to stem, and, if possible, throw back, the torrent of republicanism, which had produced such fearful ravages in France, and threatened to burst all the barriers that opposed its progress throughout Europe. In May, 1794, the 33d regiment, under the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley, embarked at Cork, and landed in the following month at Ostend, whither it was quickly followed by a body of troops under the Earl of Moira, afterwards Marquis of Hastings: the reverses experienced by the allies in the Netherlands rendering reinforcements necessary; Lord Moira's force, which had recently returned to England, after an abortive attempt to land and support the French royalists in La Vendée, was promptly despatched thither.

The armies of the coalition, driven ignominiously from the soil of France, were at this juncture making a vain effort to maintain themselves in Hainault and Austrian Flanders; but the defeat

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of the Austrians at Fleurus, on the 26th June, 1794, decided the fate of those countries, and the allies fell back in all haste upon the Dyle.

The British army, which throughout the previous operations had nobly performed its part, and, notwithstanding the reverses which the allies had sustained, still looked up with confidence to the gallant young Prince to whose command it had been entrusted, was exposed to imminent danger in effecting this retrograde movement; having to penetrate between two hostile armies, each of greatly superior force. It accomplished this delicate task with inconsiderable loss, retiring by way of Renaix and Grammont upon Assche, and on the 9th July reached Malines, where it effected a junction with the corps of the Earl of Moira, which by a bold and masterly flank movement had advanced from Ostend to support the Duke.

The evacuation of Ostend had been decided on before Lord Moira left that fortress; and accordingly, on the 29th June (the day after that on which he commenced his march), its garrison, including the 33d regiment, embarked, and proceeded to the Scheld. Thus Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley was not engaged in the operations above alluded to, but, landing at Antwerp, joined the army of the Duke of York on the Nethe. And here it was, at but a very short distance from the last scene of his unparalleled career of victory, that his first essay in arms was made.

The prospect before the army at this time, was disheartening in the extreme. Without having suffered defeat, the British soldiers were involved in the general disgrace that had attended the operations of their allies; and it was evident to all, that

the disjointed efforts of the coalition could never prevail against the comparative unity of purpose and extraordinary enthusiasm of the republicans.

The policy of Great Britain's co-operating with her land forces — nay, even of her joining the European league against republican France — began now to be loudly questioned at home, according to English custom whenever measures do not prosper. It was urged that we were a maritime nation, and that the utmost extent of our assistance should have been limited to the employment of our fleets. Such was the origin of a question, only solved after twenty years of rapine and bloodshed abroad, and of painful doubt and trepidation at home; when at last tardy justice was done to the foresight and surprising energy of the illustrious William Pitt, at whose instances Great Britain threw down the gauntlet to republicanism, resolved to crush it or perish in the conflict. Thus did the genius of one man prepare the way for that tide of glory and success which ultimately raised his country to the summit of fame, of grandeur, and of wealth.

In the meantime disunion prevailed to a great extent among the allies, who could not agree upon any combined plan of operations; for while the Duke of York and the Prince of Orange were anxious to cover Holland, the Austrians sought to draw towards Cologne and Coblentz, with a view to securing their communications with Germany; besides, they were desirous of adopting a new line of operations which should be less favourable to the French.

At this period the allied armies occupied a widely extended defensive line, stretching from

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Antwerp by Malines, Louvain, and Tirlemont, to the vicinity of Namur: they thus formed a weak cordon of 70 or 80 miles in length, offering every advantage to the enemy, had he known how to turn it to profit. But the system of operating in masses was not then understood, and the French committed the great error of dividing their force into two armies, instead of penetrating the centre of the allied cordon and crushing with overwhelming numbers the right wing of the confederates; when their left must have made a hasty retreat on the Rhine.

On the 22d July the Duke of York abandoned Antwerp, and drew back his army towards Breda, where he established himself on the 4th of August. His Royal Highness continued in the vicinity of this fortress for some time, in order to enable the Dutch to victual, and place it in a proper state of defence — precautions which had been shamefully neglected.

At length, after a period of more than two months' comparative inactivity, the hostile armies began to think of stirring; and the Duke of York, with great judgment, resolved to quit the environs of Breda for the purpose of drawing towards his allies, who now guarded the line of the Meuse. This movement was, however, delayed by a project of the Prince of Orange to create a diversion in Zealand, which happily was not seriously entertained; and the Duke, after a few days' detention, put his troops in motion for Bois-le-Duc, and encamped on the 30th August behind the Aa, having his advanced posts on the Dommel: these were attacked on the 14th September at Boxtel, which post was carried with a considerable loss

to its defenders, consisting chiefly of Hessian troops.

As the position of the Duke's army could not be maintained so long as Boxtel continued in the enemy's possession, his Royal Highness determined to attempt its recovery; and accordingly on the 15th Lieutenant-General Abercrombie (afterwards so distinguished in Egypt) was ordered to march with the reserves for that purpose. But the enemy was found to be in such strength, that Abercrombie did not deem it prudent to persevere in his intentions; — a most fortunate decision, since he thereby avoided an encounter with the main body of Pichegru's army, which was then marching upon Oldenrode to attack the allies. In effecting its retreat before this vastly superior force, Abercrombie's column having experienced some delay, owing to the narrowness and bad condition of the road, the enemy's cavalry seized the opportunity to press on eagerly in pursuit, and some regiments of British infantry were thereby thrown into confusion; but, owing to the able dispositions of Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley with the 33d regiment, order was quickly restored, and the retreat continued without further difficulty.

The Duke of York, considering the great disparity of numbers (for at that time his army did not muster 20,000 fighting men, while the enemy's force was nearly double that amount), did not think it advisable to hazard a general action, and determined, therefore, to abandon the left bank of the Meuse; the passage of which river was effected on the 16th of September.

Protected by this river, the Duke hoped to be able to connect his operations with those of the

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Austrian general Clairfayt on the Roer, and extended his line for this purpose as far as Weel; but on the 1st of October he learnt that the French had carried all the Austrian posts between Juliers and Ruremonde, and that Clairfayt's army was falling back in disorder upon the Rhine, which river, in fact, it crossed at Mühlheim on the 5th. The left flank of the British army being thus completely exposed, a corresponding retrograde movement on its part became necessary; the Duke, therefore, withdrew to Nimeguen on the Waal.

Several sharp affairs took place while the army continued in the vicinity of this place; and on the 20th October the enemy made a general attack along the whole line of the allies. It was, as a celebrated military historian has observed *, an action between the bulk of the French army and the advanced posts of the allies; the result could not, therefore, be for a moment doubtful. The enemy, though resolutely opposed, were at all points successful. At the post of Druyten, which was defended with great obstinacy, the loss of the allies was particularly severe.

We shall not trace the disasters and miseries which attended the Duke's army throughout the severe winter of 1794-5, during which frequent and sanguinary contests took place with the enemy; but we may mention that Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley and the 33d regiment took an active share in this desultory and unimportant kind of warfare. On one occasion in particular (at Meteren) the promptitude and gallantry with which he brought up his regiment, repulsed the enemy, retook two

* General Jomini, Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution.

guns that had been captured, and then effected his retreat, called forth the admiration of the whole army; nor was the subsequent repulse of the enemy at Geldermansel, by his resolution and energy, less deserving of praise.

The Duke of York, finding that nothing further of any importance was likely to occur, resolved on returning to England; he therefore left the British troops under the immediate command of General Harcourt, though subject to the direction of General Walmoden as chief of the allied Anglo-Hanoverian force.

Other successes on the part of the enemy rendering a further retreat necessary, it was decided that the army should retire into Westphalia.

Great as had been the fatigues and sufferings of the army for the two preceding months, they were far exceeded by those it was called upon to bear during the remainder of this retreat. The route lay over a dreary, barren waste, on which the covering of snow was so deep that the roads could not be traced, even by those who were well acquainted with the country. The waggons with the sick could not proceed, owing to the deepness of the ruts; and in many instances these unfortunate beings were unavoidably left to perish. Scarcely a house or peasant's hut reared itself above the level of the cheerless flat that extended far and wide, to serve as a landmark; the miserable villages to which the worn-out troops looked for rest, shelter, and refreshment, were thinly scattered over the country, and often, when reached, afforded them but scanty shelter; the cold was intense; and a piercing wind, that drove before it a cutting sleet, came directly

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in the soldiers' faces*; and at the termination of the first night's march, the want of food, fuel, and shelter being superadded to their already intense sufferings, they became almost insupportable.

On the following day numbers of the men began to lag; and the column once lost sight of, the fast falling snow soon obliterated all traces of its march, and deprived the unfortunate stragglers of all chance of rejoining it: many of whom, giving way to the feeling of drowsiness, which under such circumstances is apt to creep over the benumbed and famished sufferers, lay down and closed their eyes in perpetual sleep. Such was the fate of hundreds, as we know from living testimony; whilst others, aware of the danger of yielding to this feeling, wandered over the wide expanse of snow, vainly seeking to recover the lost track of their comrades, until they dropped down from absolute exhaustion, and perished. The above is no imaginary picture drawn for effect and to excite sympathy for exaggerated miseries, but a correct though imperfect outline of what our soldiers then endured. The happy people of these favoured isles must not be led to suppose that actual service is much tinctured with *couleur de rose.* If soldiers sometimes reap a plentiful harvest of glory, at others they are exposed to extraordinary sufferings; and the number that fall by the hands of the enemy is usually small as compared with the enormous

* The late General Sir George Don, (then a lieutenant-colonel,) who served with marked distinction in these campaigns, used humorously to relate that, on one occasion during this retreat, his orderly dragoon rode up, and saluting him according to the strictest form of military etiquette, observed, "Please your Honour, your Honour's nose is freezing." This timely warning, he fully believed, saved him from the serious loss with which he was threatened; for so perfectly benumbed was he, as to be quite unconscious of his danger.

expenditure of life occasioned during active warfare by sickness and fatigue.

During this last act of the retreat, Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley commanded a brigade in the rear guard, and he acquitted himself of the arduous duties he had to perform in a manner that drew much commendation from all who had opportunities of noticing his admirable arrangements and conspicuous gallantry.

This inglorious expedition terminated by the re-embarkation of the British army at Brèmerlehe, on the Weser, in the spring of 1795.

In the course of a long and hazardous retreat, performed before an enterprising and elated enemy, — and the whole campaign, from the period of the battle of Fleurus, can only be considered as a retreat, — the spirit of the British troops, though depressed, had never been broken: their courage had shone forth on every occasion that it had been put to the test; while their patience under complicated miseries had been evinced by an abstinence from all acts of insubordination. In the midst of their sufferings, they had invariably carried off the sick and wounded: their feelings, though irritated by repeated disasters, and yet more by the conduct of the people in whose cause they were exposed to so much fatigue and privation, had never led them into the commission of those excesses which, under such circumstances, might have been expected to occur: the infamous decree promulgated by the regicide government of France* had not made

* The decree of the National Convention, issued in April, 1794, directing that no quarter should be given to the British troops.—H. R. H. the Duke of York, on the receipt of this sanguinary edict, addressed an order to the army which will remain an imperishable monument to his memory. "Remember," said this truly excellent and humane prince, "that mercy to the vanquished, is the brightest gem in the character of a soldier."

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them inhuman. In fine, to those who were aware of all that the British troops had done and endured, it was evident they had not degenerated since the days of Blenheim, of Ramilies, and Malplaquet; and that they only wanted another Marlborough to enable them to recover their now partially obscured fame. How it would have warmed the still stout hearts of those brave men, could they have known that there was *one* in their ranks destined, in a few brief years, to eclipse the glory of Marlborough, and trample in the dust the proud eagles of Imperial France, after they had been paraded in triumph through almost every capital in Europe!

In reflecting upon this campaign — so important in its results — we see nothing but a series of ill-advised and ruinous movements on the part of the allied generals; who very early began to evince that want of confidence towards, and jealousy of each other, which are the sure forerunners of disaster. The utmost we can say of our own force is, that on every occasion when it was brought in collision with the enemy, the valour of the soldiers was remarkable; but it formed a very insignificant portion of the armies of the coalition: its gallantry, therefore, however conspicuous, was not, neither could it have been, of any material weight in the general result of the contest.

As for the leaders, both of the French and of the allies, they showed themselves profoundly ignorant of the art of war. The battles of Turenne, of Marlborough, of Eugene, of Frederick, might have taught them that the mode of attacking or of defending a country is to keep armies massed and ready to overwhelm the foe whenever he may present a weak point for attack,

instead of scattering them over a great extent of country on the contemptible old *cordon* system. But the truth is, that not one of the leaders on either side at that period possessed a single particle of military genius; and thus they were totally incapable of perceiving wherein lay the secret of a Frederick's successes.

The national vanity of the French, led them to attribute to their own superior prowess and ability, the prosperous turn that affairs took, whereas their success was mainly due to the ignorance and misintelligence of the allied generals; while these, on the other hand, felt jealous of the superiority shown by the British in the preceding campaign. Then again, in England much disappointment was felt at the general failure; and, ignorant of the true causes that led to continued reverses throughout the campaign, orators talked of "a shade being thrown over the British army," and infected the people by their wordy nonsense. Thus, while those gallant fellows were suffering hunger, cold, disease, wounds, and death, in the service of their country, they were assailed at home with unmerited reproach.

We cannot close these remarks without adverting to the disgraceful fact, that after the battle of Fleurus, though the allied troops were superior in numbers to the French, yet no effort was made to try their fortune in another battle; but, on the contrary, they tamely allowed themselves to be driven ignominiously from place to place! But this was the fault alone of their commanders; the brave men under them were ready to fight — why then did they not strike one blow in defence of their honour? We have to thank General Jomini

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for recording that "*l'armée Anglaise gémissait elle même du rôle singulier qu'on lui faisoit jouer.*" He also pithily observes, in reference to those events, "that such occurrences are beneath all criticism, however severe."*

We have taken a brief review of this trying campaign — 1st, because Colonel Wellesley was engaged in it, and an account of his life must of necessity contain a summary of all the transactions in which he has taken part; 2ndly, in order to show not only what was the state and reputation of the British army, but also what the amount of military intelligence then general — or the state of warlike science at that period.

Little doubt can be entertained that the misconduct, and consequent disasters of the allied generals, afforded valuable lessons to such men as Wellesley and Abercrombie; for surely, even thus early, the conqueror at "Assye" must have been in advance of the Coburgs, the Pichegrus, and Jourdans. His powerful mind and justness of conception cannot have failed to point out clearly to him the true causes of the signal failure he witnessed; and while military etiquette and his strict views of proper subordination prevented him — so young and inexperienced an officer — from offering advice or attempting to direct his superiors in military rank, we can fancy him burning with shame and indignation, on finding himself an actor in such a contemptible frittering away of the honour and interests of the general coalition. No doubt he saw and deplored the evils that resulted from divided command, which, save in a few instances—

* Histoire Critique et Militaire, &c.

such as between men like Marlborough and Eugene — have rarely failed to produce misfortune.

In addition to the total absence of military science that characterized almost every operation at that time, Colonel Wellesley must have been alive to the very defective organization of the army in which he served; the staff, commissariat, medical department, — in short, every branch of the complicated machine an army presents, was sadly inefficient. He had also excellent opportunities of studying the character and military qualities of the troops of different nations; of drawing a comparison between others and our own; and of determining how far the peculiar attributes of Englishmen were calculated to render them real soldiers. This campaign of privations and sufferings further taught him that even the resources of a friendly country, however fertile, cannot at all times be depended upon for the support of an army; and that only by the strictest and most impartial justice, can a good feeling be kept up between foreign troops and the inhabitants of a country that becomes unhappily the seat of war: a lesson which probably contributed in no slight degree towards the success of his after operations both in India and Europe. In a word, Colonel Wellesley must at this period have laid up a store of valuable military knowledge, gained by a brief but sharp experience in the school of adversity; which, if it be not the most agreeable mode of acquiring instruction, has the great advantage of making a lasting impression.

CHAPTER II.

COLONEL WELLESLEY SAILS FOR THE WEST INDIES, AND IS DRIVEN BACK. — DESTINATION CHANGED. — LANDS AT CALCUTTA. — VISITS MADRAS. — EARL OF MORNINGTON. — TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF INDIA. — POSSESSIONS OF THE COMPANY. — THE MAHRATTAS. — TIPPOO SULTAUN. — POLICY OF THE BRITISH. — CAUSES OF THE WAR. — PREPARATIONS FOR HOSTILITIES. — MARCH OF THE ARMY FROM VELLORE.

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In the summer of 1795, Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley's regiment was ordered to be held in readiness to proceed to the West Indies. It embarked in the autumn of the same year; but a long detention was occasioned by adverse winds; and the fleet of men-of-war and transports, under the orders of Admiral Christian did not sail from Portsmouth for its destination until the middle of December. After having been six weeks at sea in most tempestuous weather, the fleet was dispersed in a violent storm: several of the vessels foundered; and those which escaped, in obedience to their private instructions, returned to Spithead, most of them in a very shattered condition. The 33d regiment was immediately landed and marched to Poole, where it remained during the rest of the winter.

In April of the following spring, the regiment again embarked; its destination being, however, changed to India. In consequence of severe indisposition, Lieutenant-Colonel Wellesley was unable to accompany his regiment; but he lost no time in following the moment his health was restored, and in September he succeeded in rejoining it

at the Cape; and, proceeding with it to Bengal, reached Calcutta early in 1797. He had obtained the rank of colonel in the army by brevet on the 3d of May, 1796.

We have reason to rejoice in this change of Colonel Wellesley's destination; for even he might have shared in the fatality that has so long attended our arms in the West. An accomplished writer*, in allusion to this circumstance, poetically observes,—"Thus a star which might have set early in the west in obscurity, and perhaps death, arose in the east with life and brightness."

Towards the close of the year 1797, the governor-general of India† having projected an attack upon the Spanish settlement of Manilla, the 33d was one of the regiments selected to compose the expeditionary force despatched for this purpose from the Bengal presidency; but on reaching Penang, where it was joined by the troops sent from Madras on the same service, orders were received recalling the different corps to their respective presidencies: Lord Hobart, the governor of Fort St. George, having represented to the governor-general, that he had just grounds to apprehend Tippoo sultaun of Mysore would take advantage of the absence of so many troops, to violate the treaty of 1792, and pour his forces into the Carnatic.

In obedience to these orders, the 33d regiment returned to Bengal, and shortly afterwards Colonel Wellesley proceeded to Madras on a visit to Lord Hobart, who was about to depart for England. The two months he was absent from his regiment

* Major Moyle Sherer, author of Military Memoirs of the Duke of Wellington.

† Sir John Shore, created Lord Teignmouth.

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were employed in examining the several military posts and establishments of the Madras presidency; and having gathered much useful information concerning the state of the Carnatic generally, he returned to Calcutta to await the arrival of his eldest brother, the Earl of Mornington, who had been appointed to succeed Sir John Shore as governor-general of India.

This high and important office could not have been entrusted to the hands of a man more eminently qualified to undertake its duties than Lord Mornington. At a very early age he had devoted himself with singular assiduity to the study of Indian history*; and his knowledge of the country he was now called to govern had become very extensive, from his having, in 1795, been appointed one of the commissioners for the affairs of India. But in addition to the advantage of a thorough acquaintance with Indian history and politics, his lordship possessed every qualification necessary for the weighty trust that had been confided to him, — extraordinary foresight and sagacity, great moral courage, a high sense of honour, a liberal mind, and above all a just confidence in his own abilities and judgment.

On his lordship's departure from England, there appeared little prospect that his talents and energy would be immediately called into active exertion. It was the general opinion that he would find India in a state of profound and settled peace; and that opinion, in which it seems his lordship fully parti-

* In his youth Lord Mornington had passed much of his time in the family of Archbishop Cornwallis, where he became intimately acquainted with Lord Cornwallis, the distinguished ex-governor-general of India; which, perhaps, gave the peculiar bent to his studies to which allusion has been made.

cipated, was confirmed by the reports which reached him from the different presidencies on his arrival at Madras. The utmost tranquillity prevailed, it is true, externally, throughout the entire Indian peninsula; and the suspicions of designs on the part of Tippoo which had occasioned the Manilla project to be abandoned, having been allayed, all fears of an approaching rupture had entirely subsided. Lord Mornington proceeded therefore to Calcutta, where he landed on the 17th May, 1798; and entering immediately on the duties of his arduous office, devoted himself to the regulation of the internal affairs of the country. His great penetration soon enabled him to detect an unsound foundation for that languid state of tranquillity which he perceived on all sides; and with the foresight and ability which characterized all the acts of that distinguished statesman, he speedily took energetic measures to meet, and even anticipate, the coming danger.

But before commencing a narrative of the events that soon followed Lord Mornington's arrival, and of the policy which directed his administration, it is requisite that we should take a rapid glance at the actual state of India — territorial as well as political — at the period of his assuming the duties of governor-general.

The possessions of the British East India Company, though considerably augmented by the valuable districts wrested from Tippoo in 1792, when the victorious army of Lord Cornwallis dictated the terms of peace under the walls of Seringapatam, were yet far from presenting the consolidated form and vast extent which they exhibit at this day. The several presidencies were at that time completely

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isolated, having extensive and powerful kingdoms interposed between them; while now, the Company's dominions stretch uninterruptedly from sea to sea across the wide peninsula, and northwards extend to the Himalaya Mountains.

In 1798, the comparatively insignificant territories of the Company — amounting, perhaps, to a tenth of its present empire — were divided, as now, into three distinct presidencies; namely, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. The presidency of Bengal consisted of the provinces of Bengal and Bahar, together with the district of Benares, all lying along the Ganges, and extending to about the distance of 500 miles from the mouth of that river; and a portion of coast country in the Bay of Bengal, denominated the Northern Circars; as also the district of Midnapour, in Orissa.

The government of Madras, or Fort St. George, contained what was termed the Jaghire, being an inconsiderable tract around Madras, and a strip of territory stretching along the Coromandel coast as far south as Negapatam, together with certain rights over the entire province of the Carnatic amounting almost to sovereignty. In addition to these, the Company held some districts near the Cavery river, adjacent to the Carnatic, which were ceded by Tippoo in 1792.

The government of Bombay contained the island so called, about twenty miles in circumference, having an excellent and capacious harbour, together with the larger island of Salsette.

The remainder of this vast country was ruled by a number of independent princes, several of whom were in alliance with the British. Of these the Nizam, soubahdar or supreme prince of the

Deccan, was the most closely connected with them. His sovereignty extended over the kingdom of Golconda, a portion of Berar, and Dowlatabad; as also over some provinces ceded by Tippoo in 1792, when by the treaty of Seringapatam that prince was deprived of half his territories, which were partitioned among the British, the Nizam, and their ally the Peshwah, of whom mention will presently be made. Hyderabad was the Nizam's capital, lying about 300 miles north of Madras.

Before mentioning the Mahratta states, it may be useful to notice the great divisions of India. Hindostan proper is that part situated north of the Nerbudda river, whose course is nearly east and west. The Deccan is that part between the Nerbudda and the Kistna. South of the Kistna are the Carnatic, Mysore, and Malabar. The Mahratta territories extended from Delhi in the north to the river Toombuddra in the south, comprising the provinces of Delhi, Agra, Ajmeer, Malwa, Guzerat, Candeish, Baglana, Beejapoor, Concan, Berar, and part of Dowlatabad. The whole population of the Mahratta empire was estimated at about forty millions, composed of different nations and tribes; of whom nine tenths were Hindus, and the rest Mohammedans.

The head of this vast empire was the Peshwah, having under him a confederation of princes, who in every thing but name were independent of his authority. His capital and residence was Poonah. Several of the Mahratta princes were in alliance with the Company.

At this period the most formidable enemy of the British was Tippoo, sultaun of Mysore, who having been stripped of half his dominions by the

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treaty of 1792, as already noticed, had brooded in silence over his disgrace, and cherished that implacable hatred to the English name, which he inherited from his father the celebrated Hyder Ali. This ambitious prince, whose whole soul was bent on revenge, had at his command a numerous and well-disciplined army, which, through the activity of French adventurers in his service, was daily improving in efficiency; his cavalry was brave and well horsed; his artillery effective, though clumsy in its construction; his infantry well appointed, and tolerably expert in European tactics; while the compactness and central situation of his kingdom gave him great advantages either for attack or defence.

The Nizam had proved himself a faithful ally of the British in the late war against the sultaun of Mysore; and, from the extent and fertility of his dominions, was a powerful prince. His army was numerous and well ordered; but owing to an extraordinary degree of supineness on the part of the British, he had suffered greatly from an aggression of the Mahrattas, which tended to weaken his confidence in their good faith and power to protect him. Another bad consequence of this neglect was, that a favourable opening presented itself to French intrigue, which was seized on with avidity; and the Nizam being persuaded to entrust the organization and command of his army to officers of that nation, eventually found himself under the control of a power from which he could not possibly extricate himself.

Another prince whom it is necessary to notice, from the position he took up a little before the second Mysore war, and who embarrassed in some

degree the measures of the governor-general, was Dowlut Rao Scindiah, a warlike Mahratta chief of considerable power; whose seat of government was at Ougein, in Malwa, but his court was generally in his camp.

We shall not dwell longer at present on the state of India, as we must advert to it again when we come to a description of the Mahratta war in 1803; and it is hoped that the above brief account will, with the aid of our map, which has been prepared so as to show at a glance the political divisions of the country, enable any one to understand the measures and military operations we are about to relate, and in which Colonel Wellesley took so distinguished a share.

Let us now proceed to take a review of the circumstances which brought on the second Mysore war; when it will be clearly seen that the new governor-general, so far from seeking any pretext for reducing the power of Tippoo, as some publications declare, did all that he possibly could, to induce the sultaun to remain at peace.

Notwithstanding that Tippoo's strength was so greatly reduced by the treaty of Seringapatam, he had contrived by superior management to recover his military force in an extraordinary degree; and having been assured of receiving powerful support from the French, he scarcely affected to conceal his project of attacking the British. Meanwhile, Lord Mornington, anxious to preserve peace, and in order that no just grounds for complaint on the part of the sultaun should exist, directed some commissioners, employed in Malabar under the Bombay government, to examine into a claim made by Tippoo to certain districts on the Malabar side,

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having previously given up the district of Wynaad, to which the sultaun had some right.

1798. Lord Mornington was fully apprised of his designs, and knew that his first object was to endeavour to stir up the native princes generally against the British. There was a movement too at this time by Zemaun Shah, of Cabul, who threatened Hindostan with invasion, which, though remote, required immediate attention, more especially as this prince was known to have had frequent intercourse of late with Tippoo. Scindiah too, the most warlike and enterprising of all the Mahratta chiefs, had been for a long time at the head of a formidable force in the vicinity of Poonah; and having usurped the whole authority of the Peshwah, a feeble and timid prince, gave great disquietude to the Mahrattas in alliance with the Company, as well as to the Nizam; so that, in the event of an attack upon the British from Mysore, both the Nizam and the Peshwah being occupied in watching Scindiah, would be unable to fulfil their defensive engagements with them.

The principle of our policy at the time of the Seringapatam treaty was to preserve the independence of Tippoo, and the balance between him, the Mahrattas, and the Nizam, by our superior influence and force; — a very pretty theory, and justly derided by Sir Thomas Munro at the time, whose opinion was that Tippoo should have been crushed, and Seringapatam retained, together with all the countries to the southward and westward of the Cavery. "If peace," says that eminent man, in one of his letters, "is so desirable an object, it would be wiser to have retained the power of preserving it in our own hands, than to have left it to

the caprice of Tippoo, who, though he has lost half his revenue, has by no means lost half his power."

This balance, such as it was, did not last long: it was speedily disturbed by various circumstances; and Tippoo, in 1798, had rendered himself far more powerful than either the Peshwah or the Nizam.

A matter which very early drew the attention of the governor-general was the footing that Frenchmen had obtained among the native princes. Our ally the Nizam had, as we have already said, a large force commanded and officered by Frenchmen, and French influence had very materially lessened our weight at Hyderabad.

Things were in this state when a proclamation of the governor of the Isle of France, Monsieur Malartic, revealed the projects of both Tippoo and the French. Two ambassadors from Tippoo were then at the island, and the proclamation appeared with their concurrence. One hundred and fifty officers and privates were raised in the island for the sultaun's service, who were subsequently landed at Mangalore, and received into his army with peculiar marks of honour and distinction. It shortly became apparent that he had entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French government; had collected a force avowedly destined to act against the British, and with the expressed hope of subverting their power in India. He had therefore violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between him and the allies.

The governor-general now resolved to obtain the concurrence of the Peshwah and the Nizam, in order that a demand of satisfaction should be

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made upon Tippoo; and he further determined to procure the dismissal of all Frenchmen from the service of the princes in alliance with the Company; having ascertained that Tippoo was in negotiation with the leading officers among the French in all parts, and that those in the Nizam's service were actually engaged to side with him, as also the troops under their direction. Fortunately Monsieur Raymond, a man of talent at the head of the Nizam's forces, died at this juncture, and there was no man of equal ability and influence to succeed him in the command. This great stroke of policy the governor-general effected with his usual vigour and address, procuring at the same time the admission of an increased British force into the Nizam's service; and an arrangement was made by which the French officers and men were to be conveyed to Europe at the Company's expense.

Lord Mornington still entertained a hope that war might be averted, notwithstanding Tippoo's infractions of existing treaties; but in the meantime he called upon the Nizam and the Peshwah to be prepared to afford the assistance stipulated for in the treaty with them: the amount of which, however, was not, owing to a strange oversight, duly specified in the official document.

The governor-general appears to have considered the state of India at this period as somewhat critical; but through the wisdom of his measures, and the ability of those persons on whom he depended for their due execution, he saw that there existed "no reason for alarm." Fortunately the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, between which some differences existed, were brought to a good understanding, in consequence of their com-

Marquess Wellesley's Despatches.

mon danger from Scindiah, who was at length induced to put his army in motion and retire towards his own territories; for the safety of which fears were entertained, as Zemaun Shah had penetrated to Lahore.

From a letter of Lord Mornington to General Harris, dated 18th July, 1798, we find that he was in possession of the fullest evidence of Tippoo's designs against the British power in India, and had therefore determined on attacking him on all sides without delay. In consequence of this decision General Harris * was ordered to prepare a force in the Carnatic, without avowing the purpose for which it was brought together. His lordship's proceedings at this time evince surprising ability and vigour. We are not, however, writing a history of the governor-general's administration, and shall not, therefore, dwell on the political affairs of the country under his able direction, but proceed at once to give an account of the arrangements in progress for the Mysore war. Yet we cannot here refrain from remarking how much there to admire in the straightforward diplomacy of the governor-general. His correspondence at this time does him infinite honor; and there is something truly English in the manly style of his letters, the perusal of which cannot fail to make a deep impression in favour of their most accomplished writer.

Having obtained full information of the measures contemplated by Tippoo, Lord Mornington proceeded with his usual vigour to anticipate them.

* This highly distinguished officer commenced his military career in the royal artillery. For his services in India he was raised to the peerage, in 1815, by the title of Baron Harris of Seringapatam and Mysore in the East Indies, and Belmont in the county of Kent.

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After penning a very able minute in the secret department, on the 12th of August, 1798, in which he entered at great length into the grounds and motives of his conduct, he ordered Lieutenant-General Harris, the commander-in-chief at Madras, to assemble a large force in the Carnatic. On the 8th November he addressed a letter to the sultaun, warning him against listening to the insidious arts of the French, and intimating that he was aware of their intrigues. The letter contained a firm, but still conciliatory, remonstrance against the late conduct of Tippoo; and concluded with a proposal to send an agent to his court, with a view of explaining the means by which the Company and its allies proposed removing, on their part, all existing causes for distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good understanding on the most durable foundations.

A month having elapsed without any reply being made to this communication, his lordship, on the 10th December, addressed a second letter to the sultaun; wherein, after briefly alluding to the contents of the former, he announced his intention of proceeding immediately to Madras, and requested that a reply might be sent to him there.

The sultaun, no doubt, must now have perceived that his danger was imminent; but delay being his great object, silence, he thought, was the surest way of obtaining it.: no answer was therefore returned.

Lord Mornington arrived at Madras on the 31st December; and finding no reply to his second letter awaiting him there, once more addressed a letter to Tippoo, dated the 9th January, 1799, recapitulating at some length the grounds of com-

plaint enumerated in his first letter, and detailing the whole of the sultaun's hostile proceedings. It terminated with a threat, that hostilities would be commenced, if a longer period than one day were suffered to elapse before an answer was returned, after it had reached his presence. CHAP. II. 1798.

We shall now show what preparations had been in the meantime going on for the approaching campaign. The 33d regiment had arrived from Bengal in September, 1798. In November, the greater part of the troops were assembled and encamped at Wallajahbad, under the orders of Colonel Wellesley, with whom the general superintendence remained until February following; when General Harris assumed the personal command of the army, which had moved to Vellore, distant only about 60 miles from the Mysore frontier. It exceeded 20,000 men, whereof 2600 were cavalry, and 4300 Europeans. The great attention Colonel Wellesley had devoted to the organization and discipline of this force, which was practised in combined field movements; and the admirable system he had adopted, whereby the bazaars were kept constantly well provided, attracted general notice and approbation; and on assuming the command, General Harris was so much pleased with all the arrangements, that he conceived it to be his duty to publish a general order conveying great commendation of the exertions of Colonel Wellesley during his temporary command. Tippoo having deigned no reply to Lord Mornington's letter of the 9th of January, and the difficulties inseparable from the equipment of so large a force having at length been overcome, the governor-general de- Gurwood.

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spatched, on the 3d of February, his commands for General Harris to enter the Mysore territory, and to march on Seringapatam. Orders were at the same time forwarded to Lieutenant-General Stuart, commanding the Bombay army, to co-operate in the attack on Tippoo's capital, by advancing simultaneously upon it from Cananore, a town on the Malabar coast, about 100 miles S.W. of Seringapatam.

The army of the Nizam had in the meantime moved from Hyderabad, and reached Chittoor, 20 miles N. of Vellore. It was commanded by Meer Allum, his highness's minister, and consisted of the British subsidiary force, 6500 strong, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple; and an equal number of the Nizam's own infantry, including a portion of the Sepoys*, lately officered by Frenchmen, but who, in conformity with the terms of a recent treaty, were now under British officers, and commanded by Captain Malcolm.† Besides which, the Nizam furnished a large body of cavalry, under Captain Walker.

General Harris moved forward from Vellore on the 11th of February, and on the 18th effected a junction with the Nizam's force. To give greater efficiency to this corps, as well as to gratify the Nizam and his minister-general, Meer Allum, who expressed a wish that the governor-general's brother should be appointed to command the Nizam's troops, the 33d British regiment was attached to it; and Colonel Wellesley took command of the whole, amounting to little less than 20,000 men. The force under General Harris consisted, there-

* Sepoy, a native soldier.

† The late Lieut.-General Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B.

fore, of near 40,000 men, and was in every respect a most efficient army. The Bombay army, under Lieutenant-General Stuart, consisted of 6400 fighting men, of whom 1600 were Europeans; and two other divisions, one of 5000 men under Lieutenant-Colonel Read, and another of 4000 under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, marched from the southern districts of the Carnatic and Baramahl to co-operate with General Harris.

The inactivity of Tippoo at this time, when the crisis of his fate was so near, contrasted strongly with the natural energy of his character and former renown as a warrior. It seemed strange that the man whose intrigues against the British power had stirred up its enemies even to the remotest parts of India, and who had kept up such an active intercourse with the French, by whom every support was promised, should now await his almost assured overthrow, in a state of apparent listlessness; but by this time the thunder of the "Nile" had been felt in the heart of Mysore, and the sultaun, until then buoyed up with hopes of the succours which the French had bound themselves by treaty to send him, saw those hopes in an instant destroyed. The glorious and most important battle of the Nile was fought on the 1st August, 1798. Lord Mornington heard of it towards the end of October, and on the 4th November addressed a letter to Tippoo, for the purpose of making sure that he had knowledge of that great victory, which was to him truly an "untoward event." From that period his hopes of French succours must have declined, notwithstanding a letter from Bonaparte, and other communications which reached him from Egypt. It appears, however, that he confidently trusted in

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being able to defend Seringapatam, (the fortifications of which he had been strengthening for several years at an immense expense,) until the filling of the Cavery should compel his enemies to withdraw from the siege.

On the 13th February, two days after the army had commenced its march, the governor-general received a letter from the sultaun acknowledging his lordship's communications, and replying evasively to the imputations they contained. He informed Lord Mornington, with singular effrontery, that he was about to proceed on a hunting excursion; but would receive Major Doveton (the officer proposed to be sent to him by the governor-general), if he came "unattended, or slightly attended."

Such paltry devices and evasions failed to have any effect on Lord Mornington. The sword was already drawn, and the scabbard flung away. No doubt the sultaun hoped that by thus agreeing at the eleventh hour to receive the governor-general's envoy, the march of the English army, which he knew was in readiness to advance, would be arrested; and possibly he may have imagined, that his hunting excursions, by furnishing him with an excuse for moving about from place to place, might enable him to defer receiving this agent for a few weeks longer; by which time he trusted that an ally who on a former occasion had saved his capital — the periodical monsoon — would come to his rescue, by putting a stop to all hostile operations: — but he deceived himself.

On the 22d of February the governor-general replied to Tippoo's letter, by stating that the sending Major Doveton to his court, could now

be attended with no good effect; and concluded his letter by referring him to the general charged with the military operations, to whom he had delegated full powers, should he feel desirous to open a negotiation for the cessation of hostilities.*

A formal declaration of war accompanied this letter, which was not forwarded to the sultaun until the army was about to pass the frontier of Mysore.

* The despatches of the governor-general prove that, up to the time of the army being put in motion, he would have remained at peace with Tippoo, on condition of the province of Malabar being ceded to the Company. It was a great object to deprive the sultaun of the power of communicating with the French by sea, and of receiving assistance from them.

CHAPTER III.

TIPPOO'S PLAN OF DEFENCE. — AFFAIR OF SEDASEER. — INVASION OF MYSORE. — ACTION AT MALAVELLY. — MARCH TO SERINGAPATAM. — DESCRIPTION OF THE FORTRESS. — AFFAIR OF POSTS. — INVESTMENT OF THE PLACE. — ACTIVE ZEAL OF COLONEL WELLESLEY. — STORMING OF SERINGAPATAM. — DEATH OF TIPPOO. — HIS CHARACTER.

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DISAPPOINTED in his specious endeavours to gain time by delaying the march of the British army, Tippoo resolved upon acting with vigour in the field. His central position, between the grand army approaching from the Carnatic and the force under Lieutenant-General Stuart, which had already moved from Cananore, suggested to him the plan of operations he ought to follow; namely, to fall suddenly on the nearer and weaker body, destroy it, and then face about to meet the main allied force.

The Bombay detachment, having left Cananore on the 21st February, reached the head of the Pondicherrum Ghaut on the 25th, and took post at Sedapore on the 2d of March; having a brigade composed of native troops stationed at Sedaseer, about eight miles to the front, under Colonel Montresor. The reason assigned for hazarding this small force within three or four marches of Seringapatam at so early a period was, that large supplies, collected in the district of Coorga, required protection; but the advance was premature.

On the 5th of March the troops posted at Sedaseer were surprised to observe an extensive encampment forming to the N.E. of Periapatam; and

among the tents was a green one, which seemed to denote the presence of the sultaun himself. Before the evening it was ascertained that the force in front amounted to at least 5000 men, and Colonel Montresor sent in consequence to beg that his brigade might be reinforced. Accordingly a battalion was ordered up to his support. CHAP. III. 1799.

Early on the morning of the 6th several massive columns were seen advancing along the open grounds from Periapatam towards the Sedaseer post; and about 10 o'clock they commenced a vigorous attack with a discharge of rockets, rushing forward at the same time with great boldness. At this critical moment a twelve-pounder gun, which had been planted to scour the road, could not be fired, owing to the cartridge having been rammed home shot foremost; and it was some time before this alarming blunder could be rectified by extracting the shot: the artillery-men and Lascars (native artillery-men) being drawn up in front of the gun, with the enemy close upon them, while the perplexing operation was going on. Journal of Major Price.

The attack was thus proceeding in front, when a large body of the enemy penetrated to the rear of the post, taking its defenders by surprise, and killing Captain Sholl and many of his Sepoys; but this isolated brigade, attacked both in front and rear, defended itself with the utmost gallantry against four times its numbers, and at length repulsed the enemy most effectually, after having maintained the action for several hours against such fearful odds. When a reinforcement at length arrived from the rear, the enemy had retired.

Tippoo's march from Seringapatam had been rapid, and his plans well conceived; but instead of

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dashing forward and taking the brigade at Sedaseer by surprise, he committed the unaccountable folly of halting to encamp in view of that post. He appears to have been well informed respecting the roads in its vicinity; and had he pushed forward under cover of the jungle, his attack would in all likelihood have prevailed over the weak brigade of gallant Sepoys who held it, and might even have afterwards defeated General Stuart's division in the rear. This officer, listening to the report of two hircarrahs*, avowedly from Seringapatam, seems to have been misled by their statement that the enemy's force consisted merely of 5000 irregular infantry, sent to protect 7000 Brinjarries†, who were collecting provisions for the capital.

Such was the discouraging commencement of the campaign for Tippoo, — foreboding little prospect of his being able to offer any effectual resistance to the main army of his enemies.

The army of Madras, under General Harris, entered the Mysore territory on the 5th of March, and its operations commenced by the reduction of several forts upon the frontier. Some of these forts surrendered without any resistance, and none of them were defended with spirit, although the sultaun had garrisoned and provided them for a different result.

The progress of the army, owing to its ample equipments in every department, particularly in that of the heavy ordnance necessary for the siege of Seringapatam, was unavoidably slow. Its movements were, however, but little impeded by the

* Messengers, — scouts.

† Itinerant dealers in grain, who supply armies with rice and grain, carried in bags on bullocks.

enemy. Considerable bodies of horse hovered about its line of march, but without any other effect than that of rendering the communication with the Company's territories extremely difficult. Some parties of horse also attacked the Nizam's contingent, but were received with great spirit by his highness's cavalry.

In the meantime, Tippoo, after waiting at Periapatam (whither he had retired after his defeat of the 6th) until the 11th, returned to Seringapatam on the 14th of March, and moved from thence immediately to meet the Madras army.

On the 24th of March, Lieutenant-General Harris had advanced to a position between Sultaunpett and Malavelly, having met with no considerable impediment from the enemy, who made their appearance in force on that day, but did not attempt to disturb the British army. On the 27th, when on its intended encamping ground near Malavelly, Tippoo, who was posted in an elevated situation, opened a distant cannonade, which creating little annoyance was at first disregarded; but after a short time Colonel Wellesley formed his corps, which was on the left, and advanced towards the enemy, supported by the cavalry under General Floyd, with the purpose of compelling them to retire, while General Harris in person directed the movements on the right. The enemy kept up a constant fire of rockets and field pieces as the British advanced, which, however, did little execution; and the action speedily became general along the whole line. Seeing a favourable moment for making an impression on the enemy, Colonel Wellesley sent to the general, proposing to turn their right flank; which being approved of by

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General Harris, he formed his force in *échellon* of battalions, and moved forward, supported by Floyd's cavalry. To meet this attack a body of 2000 of Tippoo's best infantry advanced with great steadiness, reserving its fire until within sixty yards of the 33d regiment, when its musketry opened. This was replied to by a volley from Colonel Wellesley's regiment, and the irresistible British charge, accompanied by the ominous British cheer. The enemy did not stand a moment; and General Floyd, seizing the opportunity afforded by their confusion, rode in amongst them with his brigade of cavalry. Their right was completely turned; and Tippoo's army retired with precipitation, leaving about 2000 upon the field. The British loss was inconsiderable.

After the action of the 27th the army moved to a position four miles S. W. from Malavelly, as if still purposing to force its way to Seringapatam by the direct road; but on the following morning it marched by its left to Sosilay, and crossing the Cavery by a good ford which the reconnoitring parties had fortunately discovered, got upon a road that leads from Trichinopoly to the capital of Mysore, along the southern bank of the river. Colonel Wellesley with his corps and the cavalry covered this flank movement, and remained on the left bank of the Cavery until the rest of the army had passed the river. He then crossed, without experiencing any interruption from the enemy.

This change of route completely disconcerted the sultaun, who, imagining that his footsteps would be followed, had calculated on having yet many opportunities of retarding the advance of the British upon his capital. He now, however, found

it necessary to take immediate steps for its protection, seeing that they might very easily reach it before him, if he was not quick in his movements. Sending, therefore, his infantry and artillery with all speed to Seringapatam, he crossed with his cavalry to the southern bank of the Cavery, with the view of watching the progress of his enemies, and attacking them, should any favourable opportunity present itself. But he had the mortification of witnessing the steady advance of our army, without, (from his want of artillery,) being able to throw any impediments in its way.

Besides the obvious advantage thus gained by quitting the northern side of the river, the British army derived others of perhaps equal importance; for it now found itself in a country which had not been laid waste by the enemy; its junction with the Bombay army was greatly facilitated; and the necessity of forcing a passage over the Cavery close to Seringapatam avoided. But the advance, though almost unopposed, was tedious in the extreme, owing to the difficulty of getting the heavy battering train forward; and it was only on the 5th of April that the army was enabled to take up its ground before Tippoo's proud and hitherto unconquered capital.

Seringapatam is situated on an island nearly three miles and a half in length (west to east); and towards its centre about one and a half broad. The fortress, whose *enceinte* forms an irregular four-sided figure, stands at the western, or, with reference to the course of the river, upper extremity of the island, occupying, with its outworks, a space of nearly a mile square. On the west and south sides of the fortress the defences were multiplied to a great extent; and since the attack of

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Lord Cornwallis in 1792, a line of intrenchments had been carried quite across the island from the *daulet baug*, or rajah's garden, situated on its northern side, to the Periapatam gate, which opens on the river from the south side of the city. The other two fronts of the place—namely, the northern and western, or more correctly south-western — were altogether undefended by outworks, and the base of their lofty, towered walls was washed by the Cavery.

The river here runs in a wide rocky bed, and at the dry season is shallow and sluggish, becoming only a deep and rapid stream a few miles below the city. In the rainy season, however, it rushes down with great impetuosity, rendering the fortress quite unattackable on the sides it washes. The walls of these two fronts, though strongly built and lofty, had been planned without the advantage of European science, except at the N.W. angle, where a bastion of modern construction, furnished a fire which swept along the whole extent of the two long and irregular fronts; but otherwise their flanking defences consisted merely of musketry fire from projecting square towers. General Harris determined, therefore, to silence the fire of this bastion, and make his approaches against the S.W. front of the fortress, instead of attacking the northern side, which had been selected by Lord Cornwallis in 1792. Thus Tippoo's increased means of resistance to the north were rendered useless, and all his plans of defence disconcerted by the judicious measures of General Harris. For this purpose the army took post with its left towards the river, by which and a deep *nullah*, or water-course, it was doubly protected on that flank; and extending two miles in an eastern

direction, rested its right on some rising ground opposite the village of Sultaunpettah. Colonel Wellesley's corps was thrown back to cover the right and rear of this position; the approach to which was, however, rendered difficult by the broken nature of the ground. The army was thus drawn up parallel to the south-west front of the place, and distant from it about two miles.

The water-course which has been mentioned, served to conduct a stream from a higher level of the Cavery, to irrigate the sultaun's garden, situated at the eastern end of the island. Running in the first instance along the low ground bordering the river, this aqueduct was directed straight upon the fortress; but on arriving within 1700 yards of the walls, it turned suddenly to the eastward, and describing a very winding course, reached the village of Sultaunpettah, where it again resumed its original direction, and thus ran along the whole front of the British position. It presented a formidable obstacle, as well from the depth of water it contained as from the circumstance of its being retained by a high wall on the side next the city, and thus served as an excellent outwork to the enemy. There were also several villages and *topes** along its course, which afforded facilities to the sultaun's troops to annoy the camp with rockets, &c. It became therefore an object, on every account, to dislodge the enemy from these posts without delay; and two attacks for that purpose were ordered to take place after sunset on the day the army arrived before the fortress.

* Tope, a grove; a thicket. The Sultaunpettah tope was of betel, a shrub from which charcoal is made; and was intersected with ditches cut to irrigate the plantation, which rendered an attack more difficult.

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One column, composed of H. M.'s 12th regiment, and two battalions of Sepoys with guns, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, was ordered to attack a ruined village in front of the centre of the British position; whilst the other, led by Colonel Wellesley, and consisting of the 33d regiment and a native battalion *without guns*, was directed to drive the enemy from a tope situated to the left of the village of Sultaunpettah. We shall here insert a short letter, which is remarkable as being the first of Colonel Wellesley's that appears in the celebrated Despatches.

"*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut.-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief.*

Camp, 5 April, 1779.

"My dear Sir,

"I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines and show it to me. In the meantime I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

"Upon looking at the tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah you have the tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.

"I am, my dear Sir,

"Your most faithful servant,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"*Lieut.-General Harris.*"

We beg attention to the latter paragraph of this note, for a reason that the reader will immediately perceive.

The above note shows that the ground had not been properly reconnoitred; and certainly the guns were sent with the wrong column of attack, since the bayonet is the only weapon to drive an enemy out of houses, whereas grape and cannister may be advantageously employed to clear topes. The night was so dark that, to use General Harris's own words, in allusion to an expedition on which General Baird had been engaged the preceding evening, "he missed his road coming back, although one would have thought it impossible: no wonder night attacks so often fail."* He might safely have added to his private journal, from which the foregoing is extracted, that they are *sure* to fail if the enemy be not taken by surprise; and that, scarcely could have been expected in the case before us, considering the importance of the post, the proximity of the enemy, and the well-known watchfulness of eastern troops against a night attack. The present one, consequently, was unsuccessful; for, on approaching the tope, the 33d was assailed by such a hot fire of musketry and rockets, that, added to the badness of the road, the darkness of the night, and the ignorance of the locality, the greatest confusion ensued, and the men retired in considerable disorder.†

* This extract from the private diary of Geneal Harris evidently alludes to Colonel Wellesley's attack, the ill success of which had just been communicated to him.

† A fuller account has been given of this affair than it, perhaps, deserves, from the circumstance of many absurd stories having been circulated respecting it. There are, however, no grounds whatever for supposing that General Harris cast any blame on Colonel Wellesley, or on the 33d regiment. In his private diary he observes, "Altogether,

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Colonel Shawe's attack was more successful, as he obtained possession of the ruined village; but the enemy still stood firm behind the aqueduct.

A more vigorous attack upon the whole line of the enemy's advanced posts having been ordered for the following day, Colonel Wellesley was intrusted with the general direction. He accordingly advanced against the Saltaunpettah tope with a strong force, consisting of the 33d regiment, the Scotch brigade, and three battalions of Sepoys, with four guns; when the enemy, shaken by the fire of the artillery and *threatened in flank*, retired in all haste. At the same moment Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe sallied forth from the ruined village he had kept possession of during the night, and forced the aqueduct. A third column, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace against another of the enemy's posts, was equally successful.

Possession of the tope was therefore eventually obtained, without a direct attack upon it, and nearly in the manner suggested by Colonel Wellesley in his note to General Harris, when he said that by gaining "possession of the bank of the nullah you have the tope as a *matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former.*"

The army had thus secured a strong and connected advanced line along its whole front, from the river to the village of Sultaunpettah; thereby obtaining, in fact, a ready-made first parallel* whence to commence its approaches against the fortress.

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circumstances considered, we got off very well." Indeed, from his well-known character for sincerity, candour, and honour, had he thought censure merited, it would have been to blame himself; for, in our opinion, he most deserved it, for ordering prematurely a night attack.

* Parallels are wide trenches excavated in front of a besieged fortress, to shelter the troops who are employed in protecting the batteries and

General Floyd was now detached with the greater part of the cavalry, to cover the advance of the Bombay army from Sedaseer; which the enemy's horse sought every means of harassing and retarding on its march.

On the 9th of April the sultaun addressed a very laconic note* to the British commander-in-chief, wherein, with his habitual disregard for truth, and the most barefaced effrontery, he asserts his own invariable adherence to treaties, and asks the cause of the present hostilities: — he who but a month previously, and long before the declaration of war had been issued by the governor-general, had crossed his own frontier to attack the Bombay army at Sedaseer! General Harris simply referred him to the letters of Lord Mornington, as containing every explanation that was requisite.

On the 16th the Bombay army arrived, and took up its ground on the left bank of the Cavery. The entire force of General Harris assembled before the fortress amounted to 36,000 men, of whom 8700 were Europeans.

The siege was henceforth prosecuted with the utmost gallantry and perseverance, the commander-in-chief himself directing all the details of the various operations; and the frequent letters which

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workmen, and also to form secure roads for the besiegers: the earth thrown out forms a bank or parapet to cover them from the fire of the place. In a *regular* attack it is usual to have three parallels, the most distant being about 600 yards, and the nearest about 50, from the *advanced* works of the place.

* "*Tippoo Sultaun to General Harris.*

"The Governor-General, Lord Mornington, sent me a letter, the copy of which is enclosed." (The letter was that which accompanied the declaration of war.) "You will understand it. I have adhered firmly to treaties: what then is the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and the occurrence of hostilities? Inform me."

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passed between him and Colonel Wellesley, as well as the attention paid to the various suggestions thrown out by the latter, show how high an opinion must have been entertained of his judgment. The extraordinary zeal and unwearying activity of Colonel Wellesley are amply proved by the numerous reports made to the general commanding during the progress of the siege. Nothing, indeed, appears to have escaped his vigilant observation; and on his watchfulness mainly depended the security of the camp from the attacks of the enemy's horse.

The following extracts from notes written to General Harris will prove the minute attention he paid to the important duties of the siege*: —

"6th April, 1799.

"I find that by moving Malcolm's corps to the rear a little, and by an arrangement of my posts on my right and my rear, I shall be able to protect Meer Allum, the Bringarries, the park and the cavalry, from any attempts that may be made by horse and rocket boys, which alone seem to me to be destined to annoy us in that quarter.

"I shall now go out and see what support I can give to my post at Sultaunpettah, and I will report to you on my return."

"7th April.

"You were talking yesterday of looking at these posts this afternoon; and, if you have an inclination, I will go with you at any hour you may appoint. I think I can show you a situation where two embrasures might be opened in the bank of the nullah with advantage, and that would add to the strength of the post."

"7th April.

"The body of cavalry has passed our right flank, and seems inclining rather to its left. It appears more like a line of march than a body intended for a *coup de main*, as

* Gurwood, Despatches.

there are with it bullocks and baggage of different kinds. At all events, it can do our right no harm; as, excepting by the high road which Malcolm's corps will cover as soon as it shall have moved, no cavalry can approach us."

"7th Apr.

"I have drawn back the battalion, as the foragers are come in, and the cavalry have disappeared. As soon as Schoey's brigade shall have taken up its ground, we shall have four field pieces at least bearing upon that road, when I shall have an opportunity of looking at it again."

On the 20th April a battery was opened on the north side of the Cavery, to enfilade the front, against which the attack was directed; and Tippoo, alarmed apparently at the advantage thereby attained, made another attempt to arrest the progress of the siege by negotiation. He now wrote to General Harris, requesting him to nominate commissioners to confer on the terms of peace; understanding that he was furnished with full powers to do so. In reply to this overture, the British commander transmitted the preliminary articles of the only treaty of peace that would be acceded to. They were, that Tippoo Sultaun should cede one half his territories in perpetuity to the allies; should pay two crore* of rupees to indemnify them for the expenses of a war provoked by his restless ambition, want of good faith, and determined hostility; should renounce the alliance of France for ever, and dismiss every native of that country from his service; should receive ambassadors from each of the allies; and lastly, give hostages for the performance of these conditions.

Tippoo was not yet sufficiently intimidated to

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* A rupee is worth 2*s.*; a lac is 100,000; a crore is 100 lacs, or a million sterling.

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accede to these propositions: a dearth of corn was already felt by the besiegers, and probably he still hoped that the rainy season would set in and save him from ruin. A furious sortie, made two days after the receipt of this ultimatum, was the only answer he vouchsafed to return. The attack was directed against the Bombay army, encamped on the left bank of the Cavery, against which a column of 6000 men, headed by Lally's French corps, advanced with much resolution; but though the assailants persevered in the attack with great bravery, they were eventually repulsed at all points, and with considerable loss.

The approaches against the S.W. front of the fortress were carried on without encountering any great impediments until the 26th, when General Harris, finding the working parties were much annoyed by the musketry fire kept up from a line of intrenchments of which the enemy still retained possession, about 400 yards in advance of the walls, determined to dislodge them. For this purpose a heavy cannonade was opened upon the enemy's works, under cover of which two columns of attack, under the direction of Colonel Wellesley, advanced to the assault, and the enemy were driven from their intrenchments at the point of the bayonet. This success induced the sultaun to make another and last effort to gain time by negotiation. He sent therefore, to request that his ambassadors might be received to treat of peace, but was informed in reply, that the final terms, to which alone the allies would agree, having already been communicated to him, the operations of the siege could not for an instant be suspended; nor would his ambassadors be even received, unless part of the

specie demanded, together with the required hostages, were first sent to the allied camp.

Tippoo seems to have considered the terms too hard; and, trusting to the chances of war, abstained from all further intercourse with the besiegers. Indeed he had now rejected his last chance of obtaining terms of any kind; for the governor-general having signified his desire, that "the power and resources of Tippoo Sultaun should be reduced to the lowest state, and even utterly destroyed, if the events of the war should furnish the opportunity," General Harris considered that the progress made in the siege justified his seeking to carry into effect the wishes thus expressed; and the sultaun's fate was sealed.

On the morning of the 30th of April the first breaching battery was opened upon the S. W. bastion of the fortress; and on the evening of the 3d of May, the breach being pronounced practicable, an assault was planned for the following day. The troops to be employed were posted in the trenches before daybreak on the morning of the 4th, in order that no unusual stir in the camp might lead the enemy to expect an attack. The moment chosen for the assault was the middle of the day, when it was supposed that the besieged would be least on the alert. The following letter from Colonel Wellesley to General Harris details the last operations of the siege.

"7 a. m. 3d May.

"We did all our work last night, except filling the sand-bags, which could not be done for want of tools. I shall have them filled in the course of this morning; and there will be no inconvenience from the delay, as it was not deemed advisable last night to do more than look for the ford, and it is not intended to do any thing to it until the night before it is to be used.

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"Lieutenant Lalor, of the 73d, crossed over to the glacis,— I believe on the left of the breach. He found the wall, which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, seven feet high, and the water (included in those seven feet) fourteen inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Lieutenant Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept up upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our working party was in front of the five-gun battery, from which alone we could fire, as we repaired the other.

General Baird claimed the post of honour, and was entrusted with the command of the storming division. He divided his force into two columns, which after carrying the breach were ordered to file to the right and left along the ramparts, and dislodge any of the enemy who might attempt to offer further resistance. The right column, commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke *, consisted of the flank companies of the Scotch brigade and Meuron's regiments, H. M.'s 73d and 75th regiments, and fourteen companies of Sepoys. The left column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, was composed of six flank companies of the Bombay army, H. M.'s 12th and 33d regiments, and ten companies of Bengal Sepoys. The whole amounting to 4400 men, of whom 2500 were European troops.

A reserve, consisting of Meuron's regiment and four battalions of Sepoys, was stationed in the advanced trenches, under the command of Colonel Wellesley.

The brilliant result of these dispositions justified the commander-in-chief's reliance on the valour and steadiness of the troops. At one o'clock both columns issued from the trenches, and advancing

* The late Lieut.-General Sir John Sherbrooke

as rapidly as the nature of the ground would permit, made their way across the rocky bed of the Cavery, regardless of the fire from a long line of works, and, rushing up the breach, planted the British colours on its summit in ten minutes from the time the troops left the trenches.* The enemy had made a gallant resistance, and still continued to defend themselves; but no steps having been taken to isolate the breach by interior retrenchments, our troops experienced little difficulty in obeying the orders they had received to file off right and left to sweep the ramparts. But the enemy vainly attempted, by availing themselves of the towers and traverses, as also at the palace of the sultaun, to withstand the fury of the conquerors.

At the moment of assault Tippoo was dining. On receiving the intelligence, he washed his hands, seized his scimitar, and proceeded in all haste to the post of danger; but the breach was already won. He endeavoured to rally a portion of his terror-stricken troops, disputing the ground inch by inch, and setting an example of the most heroic valour—the madness of despair. Perceiving at length the hopelessness of further resistance, he mounted his horse and rode slowly, as if uncertain what course he should pursue, towards a covered gateway which led into the city. He had already crossed a bridge over the interior ditch of the place, and was entering the sally-port, when he was wounded by a musket shot. He pressed onwards; but the crowd

* "The moment was one of agony; and we continued, with aching eyes, to watch the result: until, after a short and appalling interval, we saw the acclivity of the breach covered with a cloud of crimson; and in a very few minutes afterwards, observing the files passing rapidly to the right and left of the summit of the breach, I could not help exclaiming, 'Thank God, the business is done!'" — *Journal of Major Price; Bombay Army.*

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of fugitives collected at this point was so great that he could not proceed. The murderous fire of the British, now advancing from both directions towards the archway, soon choked up the passage with the bodies of the dead and dying, and the sultaun's horse received a wound which brought him to the ground. Tippoo's attendants disengaged him from his dying charger, and placed him in a palanquin; but to remove him was impossible, every outlet being closed. The British troops now bore onwards to clear the gateway, and, attracted by the richness of the sultaun's habiliments, one of the soldiers seized his golden sword-belt; when the indignant sultaun, gathering his little remaining strength, grasped his scimitar, and making a cut at the spoiler, wounded him in the knee. The soldier, quite unconscious of the magnitude of the prize within his reach, retired a few paces, raised his musket, and, taking deliberate aim, shot the sultaun through the temple, who fell back lifeless in his palanquin. His body, despoiled of the glittering ornaments which had caused his death, was thrown upon a pile of gory corpses, — undistinguished unhonoured, unregretted.

It was at first imagined that Tippoo had taken refuge in his palace, and was still concealed within its precincts; but on proceeding to make a search for him, the killadar, or governor of the palace, assured General Baird that the sultaun had been badly wounded, and that he would probably be found in a gateway at the north side of the fortress. Thither a party instantly proceeded, furnished with torches; but so encumbered was the place with the bodies of the dead and dying, that the remains of the sultaun could not for a length of time be discovered. After

dragging out a great number of bodies, his was at last found half-naked, and recognized by the killadar: the features were not distorted, but presented an aspect of stern composure; the body was still warm, and the appearance of life so strong that Colonel Wellesley and Major Allan, who had been aiding in the search, could scarcely believe him to be actually dead. The corpse was then taken to the palace, where it was exposed to view during the whole of the following day, in order that no doubt might remain of the sultaun's death; and in the evening he was buried with military honours, in the cypress garden, by the side of his father.

His sons had previously surrendered themselves in fear and trembling, dreading that the same barbarous indignities formerly inflicted on General Baird* by Tippoo would be visited on them; but that brave man carried no resentment beyond the grave, and received the sons of his cruel enemy with the courtesy and commiseration due to their rank and misfortunes, giving them the most solemn assurances that they had nothing to fear. They were then escorted to the camp, and treated with the utmost kindness and attention.

Thus fell the Mysore empire, which had been rendered truly formidable by the military genius and enterprising boldness of Hyder Ali, the father of Tippoo; so long the dread, not only of the surrounding native princes, but even of the British themselves.

Tippoo Sultaun appears to have been a cruel, treacherous, vindictive, and superstitious tyrant; possessed of little real military talent, notwith-

* General Baird had been kept, during three years, a prisoner at Seringapatam. He was, with many others, *chained* in a confined place, where most of his companions in misery died.

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standing the figure he made in former wars. On the recent occasion, when both his fame and political existence depended on the energetic measures he should oppose to the invasion of his dominions, he did nothing worthy of the reputation he possessed. During the siege, instead of exerting himself, and animating his troops in the defence, by setting an example of activity and conduct, he sank into a contemptible state of despondency; and his principal officers were afraid to disturb his listless musing when seated behind a cavalier*, where he passed most of his time; they even concealed from him that a breach had been made: this was communicated to him by one of his servants, who added that it would soon be practicable. The intelligence seemed to rouse him, and he resolved to see it. After looking at it, he shook his head, but said nothing, and resumed his old station behind the cavalier, where he remained, sullen and buried in thought, as if conscious that his doom was now fixed; seldom making any inquiries about what was going on, and driving away with an angry answer whoever came to ask him for orders. He spent the last morning of his life with a Hindoo astrologer, whom he desired to consult the heavens; the auguries being unfavourable, he had recourse to some foolish ceremony as a charm against misfortune.

Gleig's Life of Sir T. Munro.

Sir Thomas Munro, from whose letters we have gathered the above particulars, further says, "Cruelty and deceit were the two great engines of his policy; not that kind of deceit which attempts to overcome by cunning; but downright lying. He perhaps never made a promise, nor entered into an engagement, without considering in the same

* Cavalier, an elevated rampart in the interior of a fortification.

instant how it was to be broken. The cruel punishments which he frequently inflicted on the most groundless suspicions, put a stop to all private correspondence in his dominions: his nearest relatives even did not venture to write to each other, but sent verbal messages respecting their health or affairs. He had murdered all his English prisoners not restored at the end of the last war; and it would have been death for any man to be known as one who could speak or read English. Intercepted correspondence gave him no insight as to our intended movements: we found most of the intercepted letters of the late and former war lying unopened, so that we might have saved ourselves the trouble of using a cypher."

Such details, resting on excellent authority, are highly valuable. The imagination is prone to clothe with a false lustre the actions and deeds of princes who have rendered themselves remarkable by warlike exploits; and the idea of a gallant monarch, whose diamond-decked turban dazzles a host of foes, while his gleaming scimitar deals death around, falling at last, after the most heroic efforts,—determined not to survive defeat,— forms truly a very captivating picture, which requires to be sobered down to something like the reality.

The truth is, that Tippoo, notwithstanding the splendour that surrounded him, was nothing more than a ruthless and wayward barbarian, totally unworthy of the reputation he had acquired; and who only met the fate he deserved, and could not avert. His army, which had always been considered numerous and well-appointed, does not seem to have exceeded 30,000 men, of regular troops, and those by no means in the state of order

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and discipline that was expected. That they were not very formidable in the field was shown by the repulse of some six or eight thousand, the flower of his army, by 2000 Bombay Sepoys at Sedaseer; and again in his futile endeavour to stop the invading force at Malavelly. The defence of his capital — and this may be said without any disparagement to the brave victors — was far from such as might have been looked for from the warlike renown of Tippoo, the abundant resources at his disposal, and the strength of his army.

The gallant conquerors did not gather a harvest of barren glory in this short but eventful campaign; a profusion of gold and diamonds ornamented their laurels. The immense booty found in the palace was shared on the spot by the captors, and furnished a solid recompence for the labours they had undergone.

We must not omit to mention that the whole of Tippoo's correspondence with the French, previous to the late war, was found amongst the records, as also the offensive and defensive alliance against the English; hatred to whom was the ruling passion of his heart, the mainspring of his policy, the fixed and fundamental principle of his councils and government. Papers were likewise found, which proved that his embassy to Zemaun Shah, his intrigues at Poonah and Hyderabad, and his correspondence with Mons. Raymond, all tended to one end — the expulsion of the British from India. We cannot blame him, — they were his greatest enemies; but as little are we disposed to find fault with the full measure of retributive justice administered by the bayonets of the British grenadiers at Seringapatam.

Marquis Wellesley's Despatches.

We have been induced to dwell at some length on the operations of this campaign, which was not only of signal importance in itself, but eventually led to consequences little contemplated at the time, and unparalleled in history: the destruction of Tippoo's power, and subsequent division of his territories, laid a foundation for the gradual extension of British dominion throughout the vast peninsula of India, and ultimately seated a company of English merchants on the throne of the Great Mogul!

CHAPTER IV.

COLONEL WELLESLEY IN COMMAND OF SERINGAPATAM. — HIS ACTIVE MEASURES. — PARTITION OF TIPPOO'S DOMINIONS. — DHOONDIAH WAUGH. — COLONEL WELLESLEY IN THE GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE. — TAKES THE FIELD AGAINST DHOONDIAH, WHO HAD BECOME FORMIDABLE. — ACTIVE OPERATIONS TO PUT HIM DOWN. — DEFEAT AND DEATH OF THAT EXTRAORDINARY MAN.

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THE services of Colonel Wellesley and the reserve not having been called for during the assault, he was necessarily forced to remain an inactive but eager spectator of the contest. He entered the city immediately after the breach was carried, and exerted himself to repress the fury of the soldiery; who, maddened by excitement, and thirsting to avenge the deliberate murder of thirteen of their comrades who had recently fallen into Tippoo's hands, gave way to all those excesses which usually follow a successful storm; — horrors which the infuriated men seem on such melancholy occasions to revel in like so many demons; setting their officers and all the restraints of discipline at defiance; rapine, violence, and bloodshed reign uncontrolled.

General Baird having requested to be relieved, the command devolved on Colonel Wellesley, who used all his endeavours to restore order amongst the troops. He writes to General Harris, at midnight, "I wish you would send the provost here, and put him under my orders. Until some of the plunderers are hanged, it is vain to expect to stop the plunder." He writes again, "Things are better than they were, but they are still very bad; and until the provost executes three or four

people, it is impossible to expect order, or indeed safety. There are at this moment Sepoys and soldiers belonging to every regiment in your camp and General Stuart's in the town."

On the 6th he says, "Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers."

"It is absolutely necessary that you should immediately appoint a permanent garrison, and a commanding officer to the place; till that is done the people will have no confidence in us, and every thing must be in confusion. That which I arrange this day my successor may alter to-morrow, and his the next day; and nothing will ever be settled. A garrison which would be likely to remain here would soon make themselves comfortable, although it might be found convenient hereafter to change some of the corps sent in; but those daily reliefs create much confusion and distrust in the inhabitants; and the camp is at such a distance, that it is impossible for the officers or soldiers or Sepoys to get down their dinners."*

The effect of Colonel Wellesley's salutary measures and personal influence were immediately perceived; but it could not be expected that the tumult and disorder created in an extensive city by a successful assault would immediately subside; nor, indeed, was tranquillity fully restored until some of the plunderers had been executed. By his great activity, coupled with severity in

* Gurwood's Despatches.

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extreme cases, Colonel Wellesley at length succeeded in quelling the riot and disturbance. A general confidence soon prevailed throughout the city; and such of the inhabitants as had quitted it during the first alarm, and had remained in the open fields, felt reassured, and returned to their homes and ordinary occupations; and, to the astonishment of every one, in the short space of three days, the bazaars were supplied with provisions and merchandise of every description, giving Seringapatam more the appearance of a thriving emporium for trade, than of a recently beleaguered fortress, which had just suffered that climax of human inflictions — a successful assault.

General Harris duly appreciated the service rendered by Colonel Wellesley; and feeling satisfied that he could not confide the complicated duties, whether of a civil, military, or political nature, connected with the office of commandant, to an officer better qualified to fulfil them, appointed him to that post, and established a permanent garrison in the place. The functions exercised by the commandant were of a very important character; no less than supplying Tippoo's authority, and governing the country. With this disadvantage, however, that the sultaun's death dislocated the whole social fabric of Mysore; but Colonel Wellesley's vigour of mind and habits of business speedily enabled him to set the machine of government once more in motion.

The complete subjection of the whole kingdom was the immediate consequence of the fall of Seringapatam, and death of Tippoo. A commission was nominated by the governor-general to carry into effect his arrangements for the settle-

ment of the conquered countries: the officers composing it were Lieutenant-General Harris, Colonel Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonels Close and Kirkpatrick, and the Hon. Henry Wellesley, with Captains Malcolm and Munro as secretaries.

In apportioning the different provinces of the Mysore dominions to the allied powers, a considerable extent of the late sultaun's territories lying towards the Deccan was allotted to the Nizam. A large tract on the N.W. frontier along the course of the Toombuddra was made to the Peshwah * (although he had taken no direct part in the war), with the view of increasing his means of resisting the encroachments of Scindiah; and as the true policy of the East India government and its allies pointed out the necessity of depriving the dynasty of the usurper Hyder Ali of the means of again exciting the native princes against them, and of encouraging the intrigues of France, so it also dictated the prudence of forming a new principality for an heir of the deposed rajah †; whose family, thus raised from humiliation and indigence to wealth and power, might be expected to feel equally bound by gratitude and self-interest to continue in firm alliance with its benefactors. Nor could it be doubted that a change from the oppressive rule of their Mohammedan tyrants to the milder government of their ancient native princes, would be pleasing to the great mass of the population of the country, which consisted chiefly

* Through the influence of Scindiah and the other Mahratta chiefs, the Peshwah was deterred from accepting the tract of country thus allotted to him; which was eventually divided between the Nizam and the E. I. Company.

† The rajah deposed by Hyder Ali, the father of Tippoo, on his usurpation of the throne of Mysore.

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of Hindus. A large portion of Mysore, equal to about one half of the late sultaun's dominions, but considerably more extensive than the territory which the former rajahs had ever possessed, was formed, therefore, into a principality for the young Kistna Rajah Oodiaver, grandson of the deposed rajah; and the ancient town of Mysore was fixed upon as his seat of government.

The portions of the Mysore territory which fell to the share of the East India Company were, the province of Canara, — a long strip of coast, extending from the 12th to the 15th parallel of latitude, and bounded to the east by the chain of Ghauts; and the wide tract of country lying S.E. of Seringapatam, on the right bank of the river Cavery, containing the districts of Coimbatoor and Daraporam, with all the territory lying below the Ghauts between the Company's possessions in the Carnatic and those in Malabar; thus securing an uninterrupted tract from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, together with the entire sea-coast of the kingdom of Mysore, and the base of all the eastern, western, and southern Ghauts. To these were added the fortress and island of Seringapatam. The increase of yearly revenue arising from these important acquisitions amounted to upwards of two millions and a half sterling; besides a sum of nearly equal amount obtained by a subsidiary treaty with the new rajah of Mysore.

The eminent service Lord Mornington had rendered his country, by the vigour and wisdom of his measures, was acknowledged by his elevation to a marquisate; and the brilliant success, due to the talents and judgment of General Harris in the

direction of the military operations, was rewarded with a baronetcy.

The families of the late sultaun and of Hyder Ali were removed from Seringapatam under the direction of Colonel Wellesley, by whose judicious arrangements this delicate task was effected without exciting the slightest commotion *; and on the termination of the duties with which the commission had been charged, that portion of the conquered country which fell to the share of the East India Company was formed into a separate government, and entrusted to the direction of Colonel Wellesley, which put him thenceforth in direct communication with the Supreme Council.

The administrative talents he had now an opportunity of displaying, both in his civil and military capacities, very soon gained him the confidence of the Indian government and the gratitude of the conquered people. The inhabitants returned to their deserted villages and resumed their peaceful occupations; and under the protection of British justice the country assumed a healthy aspect, forming a striking contrast to the decay it had exhibited under the blighting sway of its Mohammedan sultauns, whose implacable hostility to the British, by keeping it in a constant state of ferment and uncertainty, dried up the springs of industry, and destroyed all confidence in the permanency of its institutions.

The tranquillity of the country suffered, however, a brief interruption from the predatory incursions of a notorious adventurer named Doondiah Waugh; a reckless brigand, who had formerly infested the territory of Mysore by plundering various parts of the country at the head of a numerous body of

* Vellore was selected for their residence.

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followers; but having at length fallen into the hands of Tippoo, he turned Mohammedan, and was employed in the sultaun's military service. Tippoo, however, discovering some treachery on the part of Doondiah, had him put in irons and confined at Seringapatam. On the capture of the fortress, this dangerous freebooter had been imprudently released from the dungeon where he had long been kept; but no sooner was he at liberty than he resumed his former vagabond mode of life, and collecting a considerable number of houseless wanderers like himself, — no difficult matter to accomplish at that period,—he made a sudden inroad into the province of Bednore, laid that fertile country under heavy contributions, and committed the most inhuman atrocities.

A force composed of a corps of light cavalry and some native infantry hastily collected at Chitteldroog, near the scene of Doondiah's depredations, proceeded under Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple in quest of the freebooters; whilst another detachment, led by Colonel Stevenson, moved against them from the eastward. Doondiah, however, succeeded in effecting his escape, though not without experiencing some loss in his flight; and crossing the Toombuddra, took refuge in the Mahratta country, which his pursuers had strict orders not to enter.

On the return of General Harris to Madras in the month of September, Colonel Wellesley was appointed in general orders to the command of the troops above the ghauts *; in which command he was confirmed shortly afterwards by the governor-

* Ranges of mountains that divide the table-land of the Deccan and Mysore from the low and flat country bordering the sea.

general. He proceeded without loss of time to visit every part of the extensive territory under his jurisdiction, making himself thoroughly acquainted with the topography of the country, its resources, and the feelings of its inhabitants; turning his attention to the improvement of its defences, the development of its resources, and the reorganization of its civil and military establishments.

Throughout the whole of the valuable series of letters addressed during this period to the various government officers and others under his control, his consideration for the comfort and convenience of the troops, his disposition to oblige, his readiness to forward the interests of those whom he considered deserving of reward, and his reluctance to attach blame without the most convincing proofs of culpability, are very conspicuous; whilst the kindness of tone adopted in his intercourse with those under him, whatever their degree, cannot but have endeared him to every one with whom he came in contact. These amiable qualities were in most cases duly appreciated; but sometimes the most conciliatory conduct, the most impartial judgment, will not satisfy those who imagine they have a grievance. And Colonel Wellesley, even thus early in his long and arduous career, seems to have found such to be the case; for in a letter addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Harris of the 74th regiment, after expressing the pleasure it afforded him to learn that some measure which had been taken with regard to his corps had given satisfaction, he proceeds to say *, "It rarely hap-

* Gurwood's Despatches.

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pens (particularly in this country) that it is in the power of an officer in command to please those who are under his orders; and when he is so fortunate, it is to be attributed as much to their good disposition as to any efforts he may have made for that purpose."

The above just and characteristic observation should be borne in mind by all readers of military history. It is part of a soldier's duty to endure hardship, for there are cases when it is unavoidable; but certainly no commander ever showed greater consideration for the comfort and well-being of his troops than the distinguished subject of these memoirs, whatever disappointed persons or the malevolence of party feeling may have advanced to the contrary.

The command which had been confided to Colonel Wellesley was not only very extensive, but one of great trust and difficulty. The inhabitants of Mysore were decidedly favourable to the new order of things; but the intrigues of the adherents of the late reigning family, and of various petty rajahs who found their power and authority on the wane, as well as of Scindiah and other Mahratta chiefs, kept the northern frontier in a constant state of excitement. Many of these soon proceeded to acts of open hostility; and Doondiah, like the vulture, sought the scene of strife, lured by a prospect of prey. It required every exertion on the part of Colonel Wellesley, with his small and scattered means, to be prepared at all points to meet, anticipate, and repel numerous acts of aggression from the neighbouring powers; but the penetration with which he forestalled all their designs, the celerity with which the movements of

his troops were executed, the skill with which his combinations were planned, and the rapidity with which disaster was repaired, are admirably exemplified in the course of his correspondence; and though on a small scale as regards the number of troops and resources at his disposal, yet the masterly disposition of his forces, and the scientific combination of his operations, require only to be attentively followed on a map (the peculiarly difficult nature of the country being understood) to convince us that he who planned them possessed no ordinary military talent.

So conspicuously, indeed, had the military genius of Colonel Wellesley manifested itself, that on all sides he seems to have been regarded as the only person capable of averting the danger that threatened not Mysore alone, but the Company's possessions in the Carnatic and Canara. The different authorities learnt therefore, with a feeling of alarm, that Colonel Wellesley had, at this critical moment, been selected for the command of an expedition about to proceed against the Dutch settlement of Batavia.

Lord Mornington, in offering this command to his brother, left it open to him to accept or decline it; observing, however, that it was one likely to gain him some credit, and to be attended with great pecuniary advantages. The prospect thus held out must have presented no slight temptation to a soldier not overburthened with riches; but, with an utter disregard for all selfish considerations, Colonel Wellesley unhesitatingly left it with Lord Clive (the governor of Madras) to decide whether it would be detrimental to the public service and convenience that he should be removed from his

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present command, (though only for a time,) to be employed on this distant service. It could not therefore but have been highly gratifying to him to learn by a letter from Lord Clive, written some days before his own was penned to his lordship, that

"He had deemed it his duty to represent to Lord Wellesley, that it would not be possible for him (Colonel Wellesley) to quit his command even for a few months without the greatest detriment to the affairs of Mysore;" concluding his highly flattering letter in the following words:—"I have no hesitation in recommending in the strongest terms, and in requesting you, if I may be permitted so to do, to remain in a situation which I have long felt, and still feel, that you fill with singular advantage to our own country as well as to Mysore; a situation in which, for the prosperous settlement of our new acquisitions, integrity and vigilance of conduct are indispensable; in which your acquired knowledge and experience, especially in the event of active operations, must give you the advantage over other men; and in which I should find it not only difficult, but impossible, to replace you to my satisfaction."*

Colonel Barry Close also, an officer of high reputation, well acquainted with the affairs of India, and who from his situation as adjutant-general to the army in the field, and now resident† at the court of Mysore, must have had the best opportunities of judging of the military talents displayed by Colonel Wellesley, thus expresses himself on the same occasion:—

"I cannot prevail on myself to look forward to the various uncomfortable consequences that would follow your vacating the command here."‡

* Gurwood's Despatches.

† A person possessing the confidence of the Indian government usually resides at the court of each native prince in amity with the English, under the name of resident; he is a kind of ambassador, and generally exercises considerable influence over the prince and his councils.

‡ Gurwood's Despatches.

The whole correspondence, indeed, to which this affair led, cannot be perused without exciting the most unqualified admiration of the straightforward disinterested course adopted by Colonel Wellesley; a line of conduct, in fact, by which every action of his public life has been guided, and which cannot be better described than by his own words on this occasion, viz. —

"Lord Mornington, in his letter to me, seems to think that it will be advantageous to me, and, from the importance of the object to England, one from which I may derive some credit; but *I feel all that entirely out of the question*, and I leave to Lord Clive to decide according to his sense of the *public convenience*."*

This correspondence took place in the latter end of May, 1800. The offer of the command of the troops destined for Batavia was declined; and Colonel Wellesley having now received authority to cross the Mahratta frontier if occasion required it, took the field in person against Doondiah Waugh, who, at the head of a considerable force, had reentered and devastated the provinces bordering the Mysore frontier.

The adversary against whom Colonel Wellesley was now about to proceed was, as he justly observes in one of his letters to Lord Mornington, "a despicable one;" but nevertheless for the tranquillity of the country, particularly of the East India Company's newly acquired possessions, it was absolutely necessary that his destruction should be accomplished. Great difficulties attended the enterprise; for, in the first place, Doondiah's knowledge of the country, the nature of his force (which consisted

* Gurwood's Despatches.

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entirely of cavalry and light artillery), and his system of maintaining his troops by contributions, gave him great facilities for outmarching and baffling his pursuers; and, on the other hand, if shelter were afforded him by the court of Poonah and the Mahratta chiefs, "matters might take a serious turn." The Polygars, Nairs, and Moplars * were also in arms on all sides of the rajah of Mysore's dominions, and his army was full of dissatisfaction and discontent.

To understand all the difficulties of the enterprise in which Colonel Wellesley was now engaged, it is necessary to describe with some degree of minuteness the country about to become the scene of his operations, and of which Doondiah, profiting by the weakness of the court of Poonah and the imbecility of that of Hyderabad, had rendered himself if not the absolute master, at all events the terror and the scourge. It consisted principally of the territories which, wrested from the sultaun by the treaty of Seringapatam and the war just concluded, had been allotted to the Peshwah, and was cut up amongst numerous petty rajahs, whose mutual jealousies and perpetual quarrels rendered them an easy prey to the rapacious bandit whom it was now the object of the East India government to put down. Bounded to the north by the dominions of the rajah of Kolapoor, to the east by those of the Nizam, and on the west by the lofty chain of the ghauts, it offered a very accessible frontier to the south, where it joined the territories of the rajah of Mysore.

* Different tribes of natives: the first, scattered over various parts of the country, considered themselves independent of all governments; the others, settled in different parts of Malabar.

This wide and level tract is intersected by numerous rivers, which render it peculiarly well calculated for defensive warfare: of these the two principal streams are the Kistna, which takes its rise in the ghauts to the westward of Sattarah, and flows in a S.E. direction into the Deccan; and the Toombuddra, which irrigates a part of Mysore, and then turning eastward forms a junction with the Kistna, about 90 miles to the southward of Hyderabad; and to the space between these rivers — which may be described as a triangle of which the chain of ghauts is the base, and the point of confluence of the two streams the apex—the military operations were entirely confined.

Several minor streams, which also take their rise in the ghauts, intersect this dooab*, or intermediate space, flowing towards one or the other of these two principal rivers: of these the Werdah empties itself into the Toombuddra, and the Malpoorba and Gutpoorba fall into the Kistna. The whole of these streams are passable during the dry season, but after rains they rise very suddenly; and at the time of Colonel Wellesley's operations, they could only be crossed by means of boats, for bridges there were none.

The constant wars and disputes between the petty chieftains amongst whom this country was divided, added to the depredations committed by the "*king of the two worlds*†," had well nigh dried up its scanty sources of supplies; so that for almost every thing of which the army might stand

* Dooab, an Indian term to signify a portion of country situated between two large rivers which flow into each other; as those between the Ganges and Jumna, and between the Kistna and the Toombuddra.

† The title assumed by Doondiah.

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in need, it was necessary that it should be independent of the resources of the country now become the seat of war; a circumstance which, from the bad arrangements of those entrusted with the important duty of collecting the supplies, rendered it a matter of extreme difficulty to combine the movements of the scattered forces placed at Colonel Wellesley's disposal with any degree of certainty: so that, in addition to his duties as commander of the troops, he was saddled with those of commissary and paymaster-general, and sometimes even with that of chief engineer.

Colonel Wellesley took the field towards the latter end of May, and put his troops in motion from various points, in order to concentrate at Hurryhur on the Toombuddra, to which important post he had already sent a reinforcement. He proceeded in person to that point by way of Serah and Chitteldroog; but learning on his route that Doondiah had obtained possesion of Savanore, wrote immediately to Colonel Maclean (who was in the Nizam's territories) to cross the Kistna, and move up between that river and the Toombuddra, so as to be ready to act in concert, whenever the enemy's movements should enable him to decide upon his own plan of operations. Colonel Wellesley arrived at Chitteldroog the day after writing this letter (8th June); and from information he had gathered on the march, was most anxious to reach Hurryhur and cross the Toombuddra, in order to prevent Doondiah throwing himself upon and plundering Bednore; but an unfortunate delay in forwarding and storing supplies at Chitteldroog, detained him at that place until the 12th of June. On the 14th he reached Hurryhur; and now found the river so

swollen that it could be passed only in boats, and of these none had been collected, although orders to that effect had been given many weeks previously. He succeeded, however, by means of those he could lay hands on, in passing over a regiment of cavalry and a battalion of infantry, with four guns, by the 16th, on which day he was joined also by a battalion of the Bombay army from Goa; but it was not until the 23d that all his troops had crossed.

On the 18th some of Dhoondiah's horsemen had advanced to reconnoitre Colonel Wellesley's force, but decamped on some guns being opened upon them; and a few days afterwards, in consequence of a rumour that a large body of the enemy's cavalry had been despatched to cut off a regiment of the Bombay troops on its march from Hullihall to join the army, Colonel Stevenson was sent with two regiments of cavalry and their guns, for its protection.

On the 26th Colonel Wellesley had an interview with the vakeel* of Goklah, a Mahratta chief, who commanded the forces of the Peshwah who was sent to concert their movements for attacking Dhoondiah; his highness having consented that Goklah should cross the Malpoorba and move southward upon Darwar, as soon as the English army was ready to effect the passage of the Werdah and move northward upon Savanore. By this arrangement, it was hoped that Dhoondiah could not escape from both armies; and as the vakeel represented his master's forces to amount to 15,000 men, with eight guns, Colonel Wellesley considered

* Vakeel, a native envoy or agent.

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that Goklah must be quite a match for any thing the enemy could bring against him.

On the 27th Colonel Wellesley, moving towards the Werdah, arrived before the fort of Rannee Bednore, which he instantly attacked and captured without the loss of a man: the garrison, consisting of 500 men, having fired on the cavalry as it approached the fort, was nearly all put to the sword. A halt of some days was made at this place, to enable the cavalry to clear the country of the enemy's parties; and Colonel Stevenson, who had returned from his successful expedition against Dhoondiah's horse, was again detached with some infantry and a regiment of cavalry, to obtain possession of the post of Mussoor, situated towards the ghauts, on the left of the army.

It was here ascertained that Dhoondiah had been at Hoobly and Misserycotta levying contributions; whilst report said, that Goklah, without waiting for Colonel Wellesley's intimation of being ready to cross the Werdah, had passed the Malpoorba with the intention of giving the enemy battle. The British commander therefore thought that Dhoondiah would either make a dash at Hullihall, where the battalion which had moved from Goa to join him was still shut up, or if the report of Goklah's movements were true, which he doubted, fall upon that chief's army. The event proved the correctness of his judgment.

"What a pity it is," he wrote to Colonel Close from Rannee Bednore on the 30th June, "that I cannot move on for want of grain! My troops are in high health, order, and spirits; but the unfortunate defect of arrangement in the poor man at Chitteldroog, previous to my arrival, has ruined everything .... If I had been able to reach the river (Toombuddra) one day sooner, I should have been across before it filled: the delay in crossing was about ten days."

All which delay would have been avoided had his suggestions been attended to.

On the 3d of July, Colonel Wellesley was at length enabled to move forward to within a short distance of Havery, where he learnt that on the 30th of the preceding month Goklah had been attacked and totally defeated by Dhoondiah, and that the remnant of his army had sought refuge under the walls of Hullihall, pursued by the enemy. He advanced to the Werdah as quickly as circumstances would permit, reached that river on the 6th, and made immediate preparations to throw a bridge across, the stream being so swollen that all the fords were impassable.

At the same time that the construction of the bridge was going forward the troops were employed in throwing up a redoubt on the right bank of the river, to command the passage, as well as to serve for a depôt in which to store the supplies coming up by this the principal line of communication of the army with the Mysore territory.

Whilst engaged in these undertakings, which necessarily occupied several days, a native came to Colonel Wellesley and proposed for a certain sum of money to deliver the country for ever from the depredations of the dreaded Dhoondiah. The East India government had authorized the commander of the forces to offer a reward for the brigand, "dead or alive;" but the circumstances of the war had not yet, in Colonel Wellesley's opinion, afforded him a favourable opportunity for making this publicly known: he refused of course to entertain the man's proposal, for reasons which cannot be better given than in his own words; — viz.

"To offer a public reward by proclamation for a

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man's life, and to make a secret bargain to have it taken away, are very different things: the one is to be done; the other, in my opinion, cannot by an officer at the head of the troops."

On the 10th of July the greater part of the army had crossed the Werdah; but in the hurry of the camp followers to get over, the bridge was damaged, which occasioned a slight delay in the passage of two regiments of cavalry that were still on the right bank of the river. Understanding that Dhoondiah was approaching with the intention of attacking the English army, this delay was vexatious. Colonel Wellesley pressed forward, however, to Savanore as soon as possible, and occupied that place on the 12th; proposing, if Dhoondiah was serious in his intention of fighting, to avail himself of the temporary security Savanore would afford his baggage, by leaving it there while he made "a dash at him." On the 13th Dhoondiah advanced with his whole force to within two coss (about four miles) of Savanore; but after examining the British camp from a hill, he returned with great haste to Hoondgul. Colonel Wellesley was not apprised of this reconnoissance until the enemy had retired; but being now certain of his movements, he threw his baggage into Savanore on the morning of the 14th, and marched in the lightest order possible, and with five days' provisions, to Hoondgul. He there learnt that Dhoondiah, after his forward movements on the 13th, had made a sweep round towards Darwar, having marched on that day no less than eighteen sultauny coss (thirty-six miles), and that in fact his advance had been made merely to cover and conceal the direction chosen for the retreat of his baggage. The fort of Hoondgul, in which he had left a gar-

rison of 600 men, was stormed on the same evening, and carried with but trifling loss.

On the 15th the army marched eastward to Luckmasier, and on the 16th to Sirhitty; which place was invested by a body of 4000 troops belonging to the dessaye of the neighbouring fort of Dummul. The siege was immediately raised; but the necessity of returning to Savanore for the baggage prevented the retreat of Dhoondiah being pushed further: he in the meanwhile had retired into the jungles of Dummul, with great loss of reputation in the eyes of his adherents, who began to desert him in numbers. Thus, although Colonel Wellesley had not succeeded in coming up with Dhoondiah, yet his forward movement had been productive of good effects; for while it impressed the petty chieftains with a respect for the British troops, which fixed them in their allegiance, and secured the communications and supplies of the army; the rapid retreat of Dhoondiah, without the least attempt at resistance, had dispirited his own immediate followers, composed of those vagabonds, so numerous in India, who quit the standard of an unfortunate leader as readily as they join that of a successful one.

Colonel Wellesley still hoped, by the advance of Colonel Bowser's column from the Kistna*, to be able to "run down" his adversary; he wrote, therefore, to press the march of that officer upon the rear of Dhoondiah, and at the same time sent to request that the remains of Goklah's army should join him at Savanore, the road between Hullihall

* Colonel Bowser had joined and taken the command of Colonel Maclean's force, already mentioned as operating on the side of the Nizam's territory.

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and that place being now open. The army reached Savanore on the 18th, and on the following day was joined by Goklah's cavalry; but in consequence of the severity of the weather, by which nearly half the bullocks of the army were destroyed, it was only on the 23d that it could resume its offensive operations: on that day it moved forward to Luckmasier, where it was ascertained that Dhoondiah had broken up his camp and gone off in a N. W. direction towards the Malpoorba, and, as it was generally supposed, to seek refuge with the rajah of Kalapoor.

On the 25th, the army reached Sirhitty; on the march to which place it was joined by Chintmoney Rao with a force of 1500 horse. The following day it proceeded to Dummul, a strong and well-built stone fort, garrisoned by 1000 men, of which it was necessary to obtain possession, in order to secure the communications of the army. It was immediately attacked and carried by escalade with very small loss, and that occasioned by the breaking of one of the ladders through the eagerness of the troops to mount to the assault.

Colonel Wellesley did not find Colonel Bowser here, as he had expected; he learnt, however, that he was at Copaul, two days' march to the S. E., and sent orders for him to advance immediately to Dummul. The army did not await his arrival, but marched in pursuit of the enemy, who, it was ascertained, lay encamped near Soondootty, with the view of covering the passage of his baggage across the Malpoorba at Manowly, a fort belonging to the rajah of Kalapoor, situated on the left bank of the river, to the N. W. of Darwar.

Colonel Wellesley arranged a plan to attack, in

conjunction with Colonel Bowser, both Dhoondiah and his baggage at the same moment. Colonel Bowser did not, however, arrive at Dummul until the 28th, and was yet two marches in rear of the main body, which, to be nearer at hand to watch and take advantage of the enemy's proceedings, moved on the 29th to Allagawaddy, where it was only fifteen miles from Dhoondiah's camp at Soondootty, and twenty-six from Manowly. Here Colonel Wellesley intended to halt until Colonel Bowser should arrive at Nurgoond, which he expected would be on the 31st; but Dhoondiah decamped from Soondootty on getting notice of his adversary's proximity, and dividing his force into three columns, directed their march upon Doodwar, Jellahaul, and Manowly.

On hearing that the enemy were stirring, Colonel Wellesley moved instantly upon Hoogundoor, where he ascertained the direction taken by the column with the baggage. This, as the one he was most likely to come up with, and whose capture would inflict the greatest loss on the enemy, he forthwith continued in pursuit of; and on the same evening (30th July), after accomplishing a march of twenty-six miles, he found it encamped on the right bank of the Malpoorba, opposite the fort of Manowly. Never was there a more complete surprise, for the British cavalry was upon the enemy before they had time to make any disposition for defence, or even to mount their horses: they were driven into the river, a disorderly crowd, the whole being either sabred or drowned; and the camp, containing, their families, baggage, and cattle, fell into the hands of the victors. Dhoondiah's artilliary had previously been passed over to the left

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bank of the Malpoorba; but on the following morning a party of Europeans swam across the river and secured the guns, six in number. These, in the first instance, were given to the Mahrattas, but were afterwards destroyed on finding that they had neglected to take possession of the fort of Manowly; since, through their dilatoriness, the rajah of Kalapoor's troops, by whom it had been abandoned on the first alarm, had recovered from their panic, re-occupied it, and closed the gates.

On the 1st of August Colonel Wellesley reached Soondootty, where he halted a day to refresh his troops, who had been marching every day since the 22d July. Dhoondiah, meanwhile, had brought back from the eastward the troops he had detached in that direction, and with his whole force proceeded along the right bank of the Malpoorba to gain the jungles of Kittoor and Soonda, at the sources of that river. Colonel Bowser's corps, reinforced by a regiment of cavalry, and now placed under the orders of Colonel Stevenson, was directed to follow the enemy's track along the bank of the Malpoorba, whilst Colonel Wellesley proceeded with the rest of his force towards Kittoor, keeping at a distance of about fifteen miles from the river. The Mahrattas were on the look-out between the two corps, and to the left of Colonel Wellesley's column as far as Darwar.

The army arrived at Kittoor on the 5th of August. In the meantime Dhoondiah had pushed on to the westward, in order to get round the sources of the Malpoorba, and place that river between him and his pursuers. Colonel Stevenson was directed to follow him, while the main body halted to make bamboo boats for the passage of

the stream at Sungoly (six miles from Kittoor), it being necessary, in contemplation of a further advance, to open a more direct communication with Hurryhur by the bridge on the Werdah, than that round the sources of the Malpoorba; which would, moreover, have been liable to frequent interruption from the torrents that after heavy rains rush down from the neighbouring mountains with great violence. The sick and wounded were left in Hullihull, at which place supplies were ordered to be collected as expeditiously as possible. A letter written at this period to Major Munro will show what attention Colonel Wellesley was obliged to pay to the provisioning his troops. The latter portion of this letter contains some valuable remarks on the political state of the surrounding countries, and the policy most advisable to be pursued with respect to them. We give it entire.

"Camp at Hoobly, 20th August, 1800.

"My dear Munro,

"I have received your letter of the 14th. My state of supplies is as follows: — I have 1200 loads in the grain department, and 1500 full brinjarries in camp. I am told that I have 5000 between the Werdah and Malpoorba; and as the head man has not deceived me lately, I believe it. Besides that, 3000 brinjarries left me at Kittoor on the 5th, in order to fill along the borders of Soonda, Savanore, and Darwar. There are 5000 brinjarries full, who are following the Nizam's camp; but some of them, I believe, have only jowarry.*

"Now for my consumption. It is impossible to say exactly what it is, when every body can get as much rice as he can eat; as Mahrattas, Moguls, and all, go to the same bazaar on one day, and to different bazaars the next, and it is not practicable to form any rational estimate.

* A coarse Indian grain: it grows to the height of nine or ten feet; the straw is used as fodder for cattle.

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"The fighting men of the Company's troops, to whom alone I allow rice in times of scarcity, consume eighty loads a day, including those of Bowser's detachment. Thus then, as long as rice is produced at all in the bazaars, that is to say, while we are in a country which produces rice, I allow about 100 loads of brinjarry to be sold; or, if the country is plentiful, I allow still more. When rice was not to be got in the country, as was the case between the Werdah and Toombuddra, and indeed till we came to Kittoor, I allowed none to be sold by the brinjarries, excepting to the grain department; and I issued it to the troops at the rate of half a seer gratis. They then consumed eighty bags per diem.

"At this rate of consumption, I have now in camp some thirty-three days' rice; and between the rivers Lord knows what. It is, however, very clear that I am now in no want, and that I am not likely to suffer any.

"The brinjarries I look upon in the light of servants of the public, of whose grain I have a right to regulate the sale as I may find most advantageous to its interests; always taking care that they have a proportionate advantage. But, besides these, there are another set of people who have attended my camp: these are dealers from Mysore, of whom I have kept no account. They come and sell their grain, and go off again; and till we arrived at Kittoor, the rice they brought was all that was sold. Of these, I am told, there are many upon the road at this moment.

"I look forward in future to the following sources of supply: — first, a few hundred loads at Hullihall, suppose five hundred; secondly, when the season opens, two thousand one hundred loads, for which I will make the brinjarries go to the Seedasheegur river; thirdly, as much more from Canara as you can let me have.

"You see, by the state of my supplies, that I can wait till the ghauts are practicable for bullocks; and I must beg of you to let me know the road, and the name of the place to which I shall send upon the Seedasheegur river, and the districts to which you would wish my brinjarries to go in future.

"My ideas of the nature of the Indian governments, of their decline and fall, agree fully with yours; and I acknowledge that I think it probable that we shall not be able to establish a strong government on this frontier. Scindiah's influence at Poonah is too great for us; and I

see plainly that, if Colonel Palmer * remains there, we shall not be able to curb him without going to war. There was never such an opportunity for it as the present moment; and probably by bringing forward, and by establishing in their ancient possessions the Bhow's † family under our protection, we should counterbalance Scindiah, and secure our own tranquillity for a great length of time. But I despair of it; and I am afraid that we shall be reduced to the alternative of allowing Scindiah to be our neighbour upon our old frontier, or of taking this country ourselves.

"If we allow Scindiah to be our neighbour, or if the country goes to any other through his influence, we must expect worse than what has passed — thieves of all kinds, new Dhoondiahs, and probably Dhoondiah himself again. If we take the country ourselves, I do not expect much tranquillity.

"In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Mahrattas, we increase this evil. We throw out of employment, and of means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies; at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionably decreased.

"Upon all questions of increase of territory, these considerations have much weight with me, and I am in general inclined to decide that we have enough; as much, at least, if not more, than we can defend.

"I agree with you that we ought to settle this Mahratta business, and the Malabar rajahs, before the French return to India; but I am afraid that to extend ourselves will rather tend to delay than accelerate the settlements, and that we shall thereby increase, rather than diminish, the number of our enemies.

"As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country, I put them out of the question. They are the

* Colonel Palmer was the British resident at Poonah.

† A Hindoo title.

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only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with, — if indifference constitutes that character.*

"Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

The rajah of Kalapoor having despatched his vakeel to the British commander to assure him that Dhoondiah would not be suffered to enter his territories, the situation of the robber-chief was now very critical; for he had by this time been hunted out of the jungles at the foot of the western ghauts, and driven into a perfect *cul-de-sac*, from whence, so long as the rivers that hemmed him in continued full, escape appeared impossible. On his right hand, flowing to the eastward, was the impassable Malpoorba; on his left, the equally impracticable Gutpoorba; before him ran the broad Kistna, into which the other two rivers discharge themselves; while at his back a victorious enemy pressed in pursuit. It was evident, therefore, that he must either hasten forward to the lower part of the Gutpoorba, seek to effect a passage over it, and afterwards the Kistna, in order to throw himself amongst the polygars of Solapoor, or double back into the Dooab, whence he had just been driven, by recrossing the Malpoorba some distance down the stream.

To prevent the accomplishment of this latter project, Lieutenant-Colonel Capper, with a brigade of infantry and two corps of Mahratta horse, was directed to descend the Malpoorba and take post at Jellahaul on its southern bank, with a view to stop him should he attempt to pass that stream; while Colonel Wellesley, with the main body, by

* Gurwood's Despatches.

vigorously pressing his adversary thus enclosed by the two rivers, hoped to be able to come up with him ere he could throw a bridge across either. Colonel Stevenson was ordered, therefore, to hasten along the right bank of the Gutpoorba, whilst the main body, after accomplishing the passage of the Malpoorba at Sungoly, should move down the left bank of the latter river, their Mahratta allies sweeping the country between them.

It was not until the 23d of August that Colonel Wellesley had completed his bridge and passed all his troops and *matériel* across the Malpoorba. Tedious as was this delay, it had nevertheless been the means of saving him a long march round the sources of that river; and by pushing on rapidly he yet entertained sanguine expectations of coming up with the enemy before he should be able to extricate himself from his perilous situation. Fortune, however, had not yet entirely forsaken Dhoondiah: the Malpoorba fell so suddenly on the 24th of August, that he was enabled in the course of the night and following day, to effect the passage by a ford at Boodeyhaul, near its confluence with the Kistna, whence he directed his march towards the Nizam's frontier.

The Mahratta cavalry had been ordered by Colonel Wellesley to push on to the precise point where Dhoondiah crossed, and Colonel Capper entreated them to obey the orders they had received, promising to follow himself with all expedition: but neither command nor persuasion was of any avail; for so great was their dread of Dhoondiah, that they would not stir from their camp. Had they gone to the place as ordered, he could not have passed there, and must have returned to seek

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another ford higher up the river, and would then have fallen into Colonel Wellesley's hands. Immediate steps were taken to continue the pursuit. Accordingly Colonel Stevenson's division crossed the Malpoorba at Boodeyhaul on the 28th, and Colonel Wellesley's force at Jellahaul on the 29th.

Considering it probable that Dhoondiah would now endeavour to cross the Toombuddra, and throw himself upon the Mysore territories lying on the right bank of that river, or perhaps even ascend that stream without crossing it, and fall upon the communications of the English army in the Savanore country, Colonel Wellesley, after making the alteration in his line of supplies called for by this unlooked-for change in the direction of his operations, determined to move on with all speed to Kanagherry; while Colonel Stevenson should proceed along the Kistna towards Deodroog, to prevent Dhoondiah from communicating with his ally the rajah of Soorapoor, the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry being pushed forward between the two corps.

In pursuance of this plan, Colonel Wellesley's corps reached Kanagherry, and Colonel Stevenson's Moodgul, on the 7th of September. By these judicious movements, Dhoondiah was again forced into a *cul-de-sac*. On the 8th Colonel Wellesley proceeded on with cavalry only, leaving his infantry at Nowly, and reached Yepulpurry the next day; while the infantry moved to Chinnoor, about fifteen miles in the rear. On the 9th Dhoondiah left Mudgherry, about twenty-five miles S. W. from Raichore, and proceeded towards the Kistna; but seeing Colonel Stevenson's camp, he returned immediately, and encamped that evening between

Yepulpurry and Bunnoo. Colonel Wellesley had early intelligence of his situation; but the night was so bad, and his horses were so fatigued, that he could not move. After passing an anxious night, he marched in the morning, and fell in with Dhoondiah's army, consisting of about five thousand horse, at the village of Conahgull, moving westward, with the intention of passing between the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry, and Colonel Wellesley's force. Dhoondiah drew up, however, in a very strong position, as soon as he perceived his enemy approaching, and stood with apparent firmness. Wellesley, who had but one method of dealing with Indian armies, namely, to "dash at them," whenever an opportunity offered, put himself at the head of his small but gallant force, consisting of the 19th and 25th British, and 1st and 2d regiments of native cavalry, and in a single impetuous charge, broke and dispersed Dhoondiah's formidable band with considerable slaughter; their leader being amongst the slain. After pursuing its scattered remains for a brief space, he returned to attack the camp; and got possession of the elephants, camels, baggage, &c. The Mogul and Mahratta cavalry soon arrived, and were despatched to destroy the fugitives.

It appeared that Dhoondiah had been misled by intelligence he received from the killadar of Chinnoor, who had written to say that Colonel Wellesley was to be at Nowly on the 8th, and at Chinnoor on the 9th; thus was he entirely ignorant of his indefatigable pursuer being so near.

The freebooter's body having been recognized among the dead, was fastened on a gun attached to the 19th dragoons, and brought into camp.

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On the following day, Colonel Stevenson came up with the remainder of the enemy's baggage near Deodroog, and captured their only two remaining guns, together with a number of camels, bullocks, brinjarries, &c.* Their object had been to pass the Kistna, and go to Soorapoor.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 13.†

In his official report of Stevenson's proceedings, Colonel Wellesley does ample justice to the merits and exertions of that officer; generously attributing the opportunity afforded him of destroying the enemy's army to his judicious movements.

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* "Among the baggage was found Salabuth Khan, a son of Dhoondiah, an infant of about four years old. He was taken to Colonel Wellesley's tent, and afterwards most kindly and liberally taken care of by him. Sir Arthur, on his departure from India, left some hundred pounds for the use of the boy in the hands of Colonel Symmonds, the judge and collector at Seringapatam. When Colonel Symmonds retired from service, the Hon. Arthur Cole, the resident at the court of Mysore, took charge of him, and had him placed in the rajah's service. He was a fine, handsome, intelligent youth. Salabuth Khan died of cholera in 1822." — Gurwood.

† The publication of a new edition of volumes 1 2, and 3 of the "Despatches" with an altered arrangement, has induced the authors of the present work to give the date of the letter or other document referred to in Colonel Gurwood's compilation, instead of the volume and page.

CHAPTER V.

OBSERVATIONS. — COLONEL WELLESLEY DIRECTED TO REMAIN IN THE MAHRATTA COUNTRY. — CONDITION OF THE PESHWAH AT POONAH. — INFLUENCE OF SCINDIAH. — BRITISH TROOPS ORDERED TO RETIRE. — COLONEL WELLESLEY ORDERED TO MADRAS, PREPARATORY TO ASSUMING THE COMMAND OF AN EXPEDITION. — TRINCOMALEE. — COLONEL WELLESLEY ACTS UP TO THE SPIRIT OF A COMMUNICATION FROM THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT. — SAILS FOR BOMBAY. — GENERAL BAIRD APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE EXPEDITION TO THE RED SEA. — ILLNESS OF COLONEL WELLESLEY. — RETURNS TO MYSORE.

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THE destruction of a mere marauding adventurer may, without due consideration, appear a trifling affair to have been dwelt upon with such minuteness; but besides that the harassing operations described in the preceding chapter were the first that Colonel Wellesley directed in person, the warfare was one upon the result of which most important consequences depended; for, had Dhoondiah's aggression been attended with any degree of success, the embers of that latent hostility to British influence which were scattered over the whole Mahratta empire would have been raked together, and have sent forth a flame which might have involved the whole Indian peninsula in one vast conflagration: — Scindiah, Holkar, with other ambitious and powerful native princes, were anxiously awaiting the effect of Dhoondiah's enterprise to determine the course they should pursue; he was, in fact, pushed forward, like the first pawn in a game of chess, to open the conflict, and prepare for the advance, at the right time, of more important pieces. On the

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impression he might be able to make, and on the vigour with which he should be opposed, depended altogether their plans for continuing the warfare, either by affording him direct support, or by devising fresh projects of attack in another quarter.

Colonel Wellesley saw, from the first, that the only way of quieting the country, and of keeping the native princes professing friendly feelings towards the British East India Company, firm in their alliance, was by displaying the utmost decision and vigour in pursuing unremittingly the daring insurgent until he had effected his destruction. It was not Dhoondiah alone that he was determined to put down, but a system of exaction and spoliation, which by keeping the entire country in a constant state of agitation and alarm, tended to bring British protection into disrepute.

In the course of the miniature war that followed, Colonel Wellesley's prompt and judicious measures, seconded by his surprising activity, enterprise, and perseverance, merited the high encomiums which were passed upon his conduct both by the supreme government and that of Madras, and inspired a wholesome dread of British power, which had its effect on the turbulent and disaffected Mahratta princes.

His task accomplished, Colonel Wellesley was preparing to return into the Mysore territory, when he received orders from government to remain for the present in the Mahratta country; the proceedings of Scindiah at the court of Poonah being such as to give just cause for suspicion that a blow was meditated against the independence of the Peshwah, and it was feared the withdrawal of the British troops from the Savanore country would be

the signal for that restless and ambitious leader to seize upon the provinces recently detached from the kingdom of Mysore, and which had been offered to that prince.

By referring back to Colonel Wellesley's letter to Major Munro, of the 20th August, it will be observed that he foresaw the difficulties likely to arise in the settlement of those frontier provinces, and felt that the extension of the Company's "territory and influence exceeded its means." He was even then fully aware of the obstacles that would present themselves to the establishment of a "strong frontier," and the danger to be apprehended from Scindiah.

The object contemplated by keeping a British force within the Mahratta frontier was, that it might be at hand to defeat the projects of Scindiah, who not only had made himself master of the power and resources of the Peshwah, but, as was rumoured, had gone so far as to impose restraint upon the person of his highness. This Prince was represented as being desirous of freeing himself from his humiliating state of dependence, and Colonel Wellesley was therefore furnished with authority to march to his assistance, should application be made for the Company's intervention. But, as it was considered possible, considering the complete control exercised by Scindiah over the Peshwah, that it might not even be in his power to make this appeal, Colonel Wellesley's private instructions authorized him to act without waiting for a call, should either of two events occur, — namely, the actual imprisonment of the Peshwah, or his flight from Poonah.

The English commander, in contemplation of an

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advance upon the Peshwah's capital, was very solicitous to obtain an order from his highness for the fortress of Darwar to be given up to him, the possession of which would ensure the safety of his communications with Mysore whilst engaged in this forward movement; and at the same time he was not less anxious to be empowered by the governor of Madras to march at once to the Kistna, a favourable opportunity having offered for striking a blow at Scindiah, by cutting off a force he had pushed across to the southern bank of that river; for the stream being still at the full, this corps (the native armies being always destitute of bridge trains) was placed entirely at the mercy of the British.

In the hope of receiving such authority, or of being called upon to advance towards Poonah, Colonel Wellesley established himself at Dummul on the 25th September, and made arrangements for obtaining possession of Darwar, should it be necessary, whether the Peshwah consented to give it up to him or not.

The Peshwah seems, however, to have been as distrustful of the Indian government as he was fearful of Scindiah, and would not consent to the adoption of any course that might bring matters to a crisis. He hoped to attain his ends by procrastination and deceit; and indeed it appears probable, viewing the insincerity and pusillanimity of his character, that he trusted the government would afford him assistance unasked; so that if the attempt to relieve him from Scindiah's thraldom failed, he should be able to disavow all participation in the proceedings of the British.

Tempting as was the opportunity, Colonel Wel-

lesley would not be led into the commission of an act which might have called in question the good faith of the Indian government, and given great jealousy to the other Mahratta princes. His instructions peremptorily directed that the army was to advance on Poonah, only in the event of one of two given contingencies, — namely, the flight or confinement of the Peshwah. The occurrence of the first of these cases would have been obvious to every one, but of the other some doubts might be entertained; and it was evident that he was not then imprisoned, as his intercourse with the British resident continued; and if not absolutely shut up, no watching, however strict, could prevent him from making known his wishes: and since he had not desired the proffered support, it was clear that the British commander could not, without violating his instructions, force it upon him.

Such was the argument of Colonel Wellesley, who would not suffer his own judgment and inclination to betray him into any measures at variance with the commands of the government; although he looked forward with the utmost confidence to a favourable result of the threatened warfare, and was aware of the advantage of commencing hostilities with a decisive blow, such as he had projected. The wiliness of Scindiah, and imbecility of Baajee Rao*, deferred for a time the impending collision.

On the 3d of October, Colonel Wellesley drew towards Hoobly, still anxiously waiting to hear the result of the intrigues carrying on at Poonah; but

* The name of the Peshwah. Rao signifies prince.

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he soon perceived that Scindiah had so entangled the Peshwah in his toils, as to hold him in complete subjection, without appearing to exercise restraint; and on the 30th of the same month, he unexpectedly received orders to withdraw his whole force from the Mahratta country, and take possession of certain provinces lying on the right bank of the Toombuddra, which, by a treaty recently concluded with the Nizam, had been ceded to the East India Company. While on the march he received further instructions, directing him to break up the army, by sending only a portion of it to the ceded districts, and despatching the rest to invade the Wynaad; being himself ordered at the same time to repair to Madras, to confer with Admiral Ranier relative to a proposed attack on the Isle of France.

In compliance with these instructions, he sent a force into the ceded districts under Lieutenant-Colonel Moneypenny, and despatched the remainder of his troops into the territory of Mysore; proceeding himself to Seringapatam, and thence to Fort St. George.

On the 19th December he appointed his staff, and shortly after sailed for Ceylon to take the command of a force assembled at Trincomalee, destined, according to circumstances, to proceed either to the Mauritius or to Egypt.

At this period, events which had taken place in Europe created some anxiety both at home and in India. The disastrous termination of the struggle which the Austrians had maintained against the French in Italy and Germany, caused apprehensions to be entertained that the enterprising genius of Bonaparte would lead him to direct his attention

immediately towards relieving the French army in Egypt, and probably to the following up such effort by an attack on our possessions in India; and supposing him to have such views, it was very certain that a naval armament, if despatched from France in the autumn of 1800, might reach the Red Sea early in the following year.

These considerations had decided the governor-general to relinquish the long-projected attack on Batavia, and to select Trincomalee as the most eligible station for assembling H.M.'s squadron and the expeditionary force; leaving their ulterior destination to be determined according to circumstances.

An attack on the Isle of France was a favourite project of Lord Wellesley, who considered the force brought together at Trincomalee under Colonel Wellesley, amounting to 5000 men, partly native troops, as adequate to the reduction of that island.

"It is difficult to conceive," he writes to his brother, "the anxiety I feel for the success of this enterprise against the Isle of France. I look upon it, however, to be certain. Great jealousy will arise among the general officers in consequence of my employing you; but I employ you, because I rely on your good sense, discretion, activity, and spirit; and I cannot find all those qualities united in any other officer in India who could take such a command."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Dec. 1.

In the meantime the destination of this expedition had transpired; and Colonel Wellesley, conceiving that in all probability the object of the armament would become known to the enemy, and that they would in consequence be prepared for defence, and having further ascertained that the

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strength of the French on the island was greater than had been supposed, wrote to apprise the governor-general of all these circumstances.

Matters were in this state when Colonel Wellesley received from the governor of Madras a copy of a despatch addressed to the Marquis Wellesley by Mr. Dundas, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, acquainting him that Sir Ralph Abercrombie was to proceed up the Mediterranean, to attack Alexandria, and co-operate with the Turkish army, in order to expel the French from Egypt; and it was considered expedient that a force should be sent from India (a measure originally proposed by Lord Wellesley) to act in the manner most conducive to this essential object, from the side of the Red Sea. A squadron of men of war under Sir Home Popham was immediately to sail for the Cape of Good Hope, take a regiment from thence, and proceed on to Mocha, which port was named as the general rendezvous of the expedition from India.

As the secretary of state's despatch authorized the execution of these orders, provided a force were ready, without waiting for the governor-general's directions, Colonel Wellesley found himself called upon to decide on a question which involved considerations of great moment. He felt satisfied that on receiving the original despatch, Lord Wellesley must hasten to execute the orders it contained: there was no disposable force in India but the one under his command; he knew that the monsoon, which favoured a voyage to the westward, was drawing near its termination; he was aware that a month must elapse before he could receive instructions from Calcutta. Under all these circumstances,

he resolved on conducting the expedition to the Red Sea. It then became a question whether to proceed thither direct, or by way of Bombay. Having consulted Captain Malcolm*, the senior naval officer on the station, who gave as his opinion that to touch at Bombay would not materially retard the expedition, he determined on taking that route. He had two objects in going to Bombay: one, that the ships might obtain a supply of provisions, which could be obtained nowhere else; the other, that the governor-general's final instructions might reach him overland ere he sailed for Mocha.

Having fixed the line of conduct it was expedient for him to pursue, under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, Colonel Wellesley wrote to lay his arrangements before the governor-general, and to request his lordship would send whatever instructions he might have to give, overland, to meet him at Bombay; and at the same time he wrote to the governor of Bombay, to inform him of his intention of visiting that place on his route, in order to revictual the fleet; that provisions, money, &c. might be in readiness on his arrival.

The expedition sailed from Ceylon after a short detention, to await the arrival of a store-ship; and had proceeded as far as Cape Comorin, when Colonel Wellesley received a despatch from the governor-general, dated 24th January, announcing to him that his lordship had determined to carry into effect the attack formerly planned against Batavia, and had appointed Major-General Baird to command the expedition; adding, that in the event of its success, a portion of the force under Colonel

* The late Vice-Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm, G.C.B.

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Wellesley was to proceed against the Isle of France.

It was evident that when this letter was penned the governor-general had not received the despatch from England directing him to send a force to the Red Sea. Colonel Wellesley had cause, therefore, to congratulate himself on the decided step he had taken, — a step by which so much time had already been saved; and accordingly he did not hesitate to proceed on to Bombay. He sent a letter, however, to Trincomalee to await the arrival of General Baird, who he concluded would be appointed to command the expedition to the Red Sea, acquainting him with his movements, and recommending him to follow without delay to Bombay.

On arriving at that place on the 23d March, he was disappointed to learn, by a letter from Lord Wellesley, that the propriety of his acting upon Mr. Dundas's letter of the 6th October, without waiting for the governor-general's directions, was questioned.

Colonel Wellesley's high qualities of judgment, decision, energy, and temper had now been exercised in no ordinary degree. The transmission of a copy of Mr. Dundas's despatch from Madras having been accompanied by no instructions or recommendations from Lord Clive, governor of that Presidency, it had rested entirely with Colonel Wellesley to determine whether any and what steps should be taken previously to the arrival of orders from the governor-general: great responsibility remained, therefore, upon him. A man of ordinary character would have shrunk from incurring the chance of blame, and would have sought

to shelter himself under many plausible reasons which might have been assigned for delay, until a communication should be received from Calcutta. He, on the contrary, only saw what measures the public service demanded; and fearlessly acting up to the spirit of Mr. Dundas's despatch, set sail at once from Ceylon, confident in the soundness of his views, and under the hope that Lord Wellesley's approval of his conduct would soon reach him. He felt at the same time no less confident in his own ability to conduct the important enterprise, which he then thought was to be left to his guidance. What then must have been his mortification to learn off Cape Comorin that he was to be superseded in the command; — and still further to find, on arriving at Bombay, that he was called upon to defend the measures he had pursued!

In an official letter to the governor-general, Colonel Wellesley entered upon a review of all the circumstances connected with the step he had taken of carrying the force under his command to Bombay; which must at once have removed every doubt from Lord Wellesley's mind on that subject, even had he been disposed to persist in questioning the propriety of the measure. But in a private communication to his brother, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, who was with the governor-general at Calcutta; after expressing a hope that his official letter would be found to convey a satisfactory explanation of his conduct, he proceeds to lament that he had ever been concerned in the expedition; which he should consider as most unfortunate for him in every point of view. He continues, —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 23.

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Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 23.

"I was at the top of the tree in this country: the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, which I had served, placed unlimited confidence in me; and I had received from both, strong and repeated marks of their approbation. Before I quitted the Mysore country, I arranged the plan for taking possession of the ceded districts, which was done without striking a blow; and another plan for conquering Wynaad and reconquering Malabar, which I am informed has succeeded without loss on our side. But this supercession has ruined all my prospects, founded upon any service that I may have rendered.

* * *

"I put private considerations out of the question; as they ought, and have had, no weight in causing my original appointment or my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in which I have been treated by government upon the occasion. However, I have lost neither my health, spirits, nor temper in consequence thereof.

"But it is useless to write any more upon a subject of which I wish to retain no remembrance whatever."

With every feeling for the disappointment experienced by Colonel Wellesley in being deprived of the command of a fine force which was expected to act on a theatre to which the eyes of Europe had been long directed, and against an enemy whose prowess stood so high as that of the French, we cannot fully espouse his cause in this instance. He had been early informed, in a letter from the governor-general, dated 21st December, that in the event of a force being sent to the Red Sea, either Sir James Craig or General Baird, or both, would probably be employed; and he must therefore have been in some measure prepared for what afterwards took place. It is true that Baird was, in the first instance, appointed when the governor-general had resolved on resuming the project against Batavia; but even then, the force to be employed was much greater than that to whose command Colonel Wellesley had been originally appointed. We may

Gurwood. Despatches, &c.

reasonably presume that he was vexed to find the propriety of the step he had taken in sailing to Bombay called in question, after the zeal, energy, and great moral courage he had shown; and that he felt this more than the supercession. However it may have been, we are convinced that the irritation in a mind like his could only have been momentary, and that his calmer judgment must have acquiesced in the decision of the governor-general, that an expedition of increased strength demanded the employment with it of a general officer, and that he could not leave so large a force under the command of Colonel Wellesley without manifest injustice to all the major-generals in India, and a violation of the principles upon which military command is based. We must admire Lord Wellesley's delicacy and sense of justice on this occasion.

After some short stay at Bombay, and the transports having been amply provisioned, Colonel Wellesley, deeming it necessary that no time should be lost in making the intended diversion in favour of Sir Ralph Abercombie, purposed proceeding on to the Red Sea without waiting for General Baird, who, he was informed, might not be able to get round Ceylon for many weeks. In communicating this intention to his brother, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, he says,

"My former letters will have shown you how much this will annoy me; but I have never had much value for the public spirit of any man who does not sacrifice his private views and convenience when it is necessary." Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 25.

But after writing the letter from which the above passage is taken, on the 25th March, Colonel Wellesley was taken suddenly ill, which prevented

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his carrying this plan into execution; and on the 30th General Baird arrived and assumed the command.

Colonel Wellesley still entertained the intention of following, should he not be able to accompany the expedition; for, alluding to the officers of his staff, who had been with him through the Mysore country, he says, "I have seen enough already to be certain that if I do not go matters will be uncomfortable;" and in addition to this reason, the governor-general, in communicating his entire approval of the course he had adopted in leaving Ceylon and proceeding to Bombay, had expressed a wish that he should accompany General Baird: still the choice was left with him either to go or not, as he might think proper. It appears that although Lord Wellesley was anxious for his brother to take part in the Egyptian expedition, yet he was induced, at the solicitation of Lord Clive, who was impatient for his return to Mysore, to leave the matter optional with Colonel Wellesley.

His protracted illness, and the remedies to which he was obliged to have recourse, forced him eventually to relinquish the idea of proceeding to Egypt. This decision he communicated in a letter to General Baird, dated Bombay, 9th April; an extract from which will show what were his feelings on the subject.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. April 9.

"I do this, I assure you, with reluctance, notwithstanding I think it very probable that I shall soon hear of your being recalled; however, considering that circumstance, and the bad state of my body, and the remedy which I am obliged to use*, I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment.

* A course of nitrous baths.

"As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived regarding going upon the expedition were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment.

"I need not enter further into this subject than to entreat you will not attribute my stay to any other motive than that to which I have above assigned it; and to inform you, &c."

These sentiments, equally honourable to General Baird, who had inspired them, and to Colonel Wellesley, can only be fully appreciated after a consideration of all the circumstances that had recently taken place, and which were calculated to excite and perpetuate a baneful jealousy; but such men as Baird and Wellesley were above all paltry feeling, — their sole desire was to act honourably towards each other, and beneficially with regard to the public service.

A memorandum upon "the operations in the Red Sea," accompanied the letter from which we have above quoted, drawn up by Colonel Wellesley in a very able manner. It exhibits extraordinary knowledge of the topography, condition, and resources of the country; of the policy to be observed towards the natives; of the situation, prospects, and intentions of the French; with a consideration of other matters relative to the state of Egypt at that time, detailed with the accuracy of a person who might have been supposed a recent traveller through the country, — and this at a period when it was very little known.

In alluding to his present circumstances in a letter to Colonel Champagné, he says:—

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Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 11.

"I believe you know that I always thought that General Baird had not been well used when I was called to the command; but I do not think it was proper that I should be disappointed more than he was in order that he might have no reason to complain. However, this is a matter of little consequence to anybody but myself, therefore I say no more on the subject.

"Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation, but said that he should regret my doing so; and for this reason, and because I saw in the General (Baird) the most laudable intention to allow me to render him the services I could, I determined to proceed upon the expedition. I was, however, seized with a fever, and a breaking out all over my body; and here I am (at Bombay) under a course of nitrous baths for a cure. When I shall be well, God knows; but, in the meantime, I cannot join the armament.

"I see clearly the evil consequences of all this to my reputation and future views; but it cannot be helped, and to things of that nature I generally contrive to make up my mind."

On the 11th of April Colonel Wellesley announced to Lord Clive his intention to avail himself of the governor-general's permission, and place himself again under his lordship's orders; and towards the latter end of that month he resumed his command in Mysore.

Whatever foresight a man may possess, however great his wisdom, the bounds which circumscribe the reach of those high qualities are confined. Little did Colonel Wellesley imagine that his disappointment in not having the command of the Egyptian expedition was preparing the way for those great successes which awaited him in the Deccan. It is fair to presume that he would not have remained undistinguished had fortune carried him into Egypt instead of Baird; but we have reason to rejoice that instead of what is problematical, we possess a certainty—the substance instead of a shadow; that we have to recount

a series of military operations which placed the illustrious subject of these memoirs on a level with the greatest masters in the art of war; and to show how his scientific combinations led at length to the most signal triumphs ever achieved by our arms in India, by which vast portions of that magnificent country became subject to British power.

Colonel Wellesley now devoted himself assiduously to the organization of the civil and military administration of the Mysore territory. He visited the several provinces, and made himself thoroughly acquainted, from personal observation, with their situation and wants. Numerous abuses, which had crept in during the latter part of Tippoo's reign, when his faculties seem to have been so entirely devoted to one all-absorbing object — revenge on the British, — were corrected*; in a word, the countries flourished, their inhabitants saw and appreciated the advantages of a new order of things; and the government of the Company, as administered by Colonel Wellesley, produced general confidence, and a thankfulness that the tyrannical rule of a barbarous and cruel despot had given place to the more mild and agreeable sway of justice and reason.

* Nothing can show in a stronger light the extraordinary versatility of this great man's talents than the following anecdote, which we give upon unimpeachable authority. In the year 1815, some officers of the 34th regiment were dining at the hospitable table of the Hon. Arthur Cole, then resident in Mysore, when he mentioned the recent discovery amongst the records at Seringapatam of a long memorandum upon finance and coinage; which last had been debased during the latter years of Tippoo's reign, and thereby caused great mischief throughout the country. Commenting upon the Duke's paper upon these subjects, Mr. Cole stated that every observation it contained had been borne out by the test of practice; and that the surprising foresight of his grace, when dealing with subjects so foreign to the usual studies of military men, had ever excited his astonishment.

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Colonel Wellesley's real benevolence was evinced by his bearing towards the natives, whom he conciliated in a surprising degree; and he gained no less their affection by the study of their habits and prejudices, than he commanded their respect by his moderation and justice.

An extensive hiatus occurs in Colonel Wellesley's correspondence at this period, which is not accounted for by Colonel Gurwood; and we can only lament that it is not in our power to give any details respecting Colonel Wellesley's proceedings during nearly eighteen months that he was engaged in the highly important employment of regulating the affairs of the Mysore provinces. That his civil duties at this time did not solely occupy his thoughts, is proved by a very able and elaborate memorandum upon the value of Seringapatam to the Company in a military point of view, which we must pass over, although with reluctance; merely observing, that he proves incontestably that the possession of that fortress, and its maintenance as a strong-hold, were essential to the strength and interests of the British in Mysore.

Foreseeing that a war with the Mahrattas was soon to be expected, Colonel Wellesley occupied himself in drawing up a "Memorandum upon operations in the Mahratta territory." The length of this able paper precludes us from giving it insertion; and we greatly regret that our limits will not admit of our doing so, as no abstract can possibly convey any idea of its merit. He therein recommends that military operations should commence when the rivers fill, which happens generally about June. When full, they prevent, in a great measure, the movements of Mahratta troops, which are

principally composed of cavalry. "As the rivers are not fordable,—as there are no bridges, and no means of passing them excepting by basket boats, which it is difficult and might be rendered impossible to procure, the fulness of the rivers operates as a barrier." Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 1.

He then proceeds to show with what facility a British army may pass the rivers, provided they have good pontoons. His next consideration is the state of the country after heavy rains, — the effect they have on the roads,—the difficulty of moving heavy wheel carriages. The produce of the Mahratta country is considered; want of rice, which must be brought from Mysore or from Canara; the Mysore territory to be looked to for sheep and bullocks; forage every where abundant; means of defending the country trifling; Darwar the only place not liable to be easily taken by assault. He then furnishes a plan for operations; points out the most eligible situations for establishing posts; decribes a method by which Darwar might be taken by a *coup de main*, &c. &c.

Such able documents, the result of personal experience and observation, are of great value; and though circumstances have wonderfully changed in the political state of India since they were penned, the statistical and military information therein embodied will remain a lasting memorial of Colonel Wellesley's active attention to subjects of so much importance, while his recorded opinions cannot fail to be of service so long as we shall retain dominion over our Indian empire.

Colonel Wellesley continued undisturbed in the exercise of his important civil employments until 1802, when the political horizon began to darken

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in the direction of Poonah; and the first of a series of measures was entered upon early in the following year, which eventually led to the celebrated Mahratta war, in the conduct of which Colonel Wellesley burst forth in an enlarged sphere of action, as not only a consummate general, but likewise a most able politician. Our admiration has been in a greater degree excited by the study of the masterly manner in which his military operations were carried on through this glorious war, than by any of the brilliant campaigns during his after career in Europe; and we would entreat our readers to throw off that apathy with respect to transactions in India which prevails so generally in England, at least so far as to believe that great actions performed upon that remote theatre redound not less to the glory of our arms than if the scenes of victory lay in France or Spain. We beg of them also not to be alarmed at an array of Indian nomenclature. Ahmednuggur and Gawilghur do not, it is true, possess the euphony of Fuentes d'Onoro and Talavera de la Reyna; but the scenes of British exploits, however harsh their names, must still sound musical to British ears; and, provided a due attention be afforded to the relation on which we are about to enter, it is our opinion that a powerful interest will be excited amongst our countrymen respecting warfare in the East, at the period now under consideration.

CHAPTER VI.

ACCOUNT OF THE MAHRATTA EMPIRE. — POLICY OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT. — HOLKAR DEFEATS THE PESHWAH'S FORCE. — FLIGHT OF THE PESHWAH. — A BRITISH ARMY ASSEMBLED AT HURRYHUR. — GENERAL WELLESLEY ENTERS THE MAHRATTA TERRITORY.

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A SKETCH of the territorial and political divisions of India, at the period under consideration, was given in the Second Chapter; and it now becomes necessary to continue it, in order that the reader may have a general knowledge of the state of the Mahratta empire previously to perusing an account of General Wellesley's * celebrated campaign in the Deccan.

The vast empire of the Mahrattas stretched, as we have elsewhere stated, from Delhi in the north to the Toombuddra in the south, and in width extended nearly across the Indian peninsula. It was founded by the warlike and enterprising Sevajee, who flourished in the time of Aurungzebe (17th century), and was originally one of those petty warrior-robbers of whom India has at all times been so prolific. The descendants, however, of that celebrated chieftain, abandoning themselves to sensual gratifications, resigned the reins of government into the hands of their prime minister, styled the Peshwah; and, like the succession of caliphs in Spain, and Merovingian kings of France, soon sank into insignificance; while the ministers, becoming all-powerful, rendered their office heredi-

* He obtained the rank of major-general on the 29th of April, 1802.

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tary. The rajah of Sattarah (title of Sevajee's race) still continued to be acknowledged as head of the Mahratta empire; although the Peshwah, acting in his name, had usurped all his authority, and established himself at Poonah with regal state. To secure the attachment of the principal military chiefs of the empire, Bajee Rao, the second who held the office of Peshwah, granted them extensive tracts of country in jaghire *; but these ambitious dependants speedily followed the example of the first Peshwah; and though still owning allegiance to the rajah of Sattarah, or rather to the Peshwah, who kept him a prisoner in his palace, exercised independent authority in their respective dominions; going so far as not only to wage war among themselves, but even against the acknowledged head of their confederacy.

The four great feudatory jaghiredars, who, with the Peshwah, now governed the Mahratta states, were,—

1. The celebrated DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH, who ruled over an immense tract of territory, extending from the Indus to the Nerbudda; comprising the Punjaub (country watered by the five branches of the Indus), Agra, Delhi, and a large portion of the dooab between the Ganges and Jumna.† Ougein in Malwa was his capital.

2. JESWUNT RAO HOLKAR, who possessed a portion of Malwa, and whose capital was the ancient city of Indore, near Ougein.

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* Jaghire, a grant of territory from a sovereign prince to a subject; whence jaghiredar, the holder of a jaghire.

† Madajee, the uncle of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, possessed himself of the person of Shah Allum, the Great Mogul; and added to his hereditary dominions all the country between Delhi and the Indus, together with the dooab between the Ganges and Jumna.

3. ANUND RAO GUICKWAR, who held the fertile province of Guzerat.

4. RAGOJEE BHOONSLAH, rajah of Berar, whose capital was Nagpoor.

Each of these princes maintained a formidable army; that of Scindiah was estimated at 40,000 disciplined troops, divided into brigades, and commanded by European officers, chiefly French. He was unquestionably the most powerful of the Mahrattas, and continued to preserve that ascendency over the councils of the Peshwah, which his predecessor, Madajee Scindiah, had established.

Fortunately for the East India Company, jealousy, suspicion, and anxiety prevailed to a great extent amongst these powerful chieftains, which prevented their confederacies from being attended with any favourable results to themselves, and disposed them individually to lend at all times a willing ear to the overtures of their enemies, whenever any thing seemed likely to be gained by a change.

It will be remembered that the Peshwah took no part in the late war against Tippoo, being then under the control of Scindiah, who carried on a secret correspondence with the sultaun of Mysore; but his vacillating disposition, and the natural distrust of a Mahratta, combined with a salutary dread of British power, prevented an alliance between them. But, although the Peshwah furnished no assistance to his allies the British in the late Mysore war, yet in the division of Tippoo's dominions a portion had been offered to him, on condition of his reviving the alliance between the Mahratta empire and the Company on a basis calculated to render it secure and efficient; but this proposal, like those of a similar nature made to

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Scindiah himself in an amicable spirit, was rejected.

The destruction of Tippoo, and the consolidation of the alliance between the East India Company and the court of Hyderabad, had left no antagonist to the British among the native states of India, excepting the Mahratta power; and, unconnected with any European ally, the Mahratta states could only become formidable to the British government in the event of an actual union of the feudal chiefs of the empire under an efficient sovereign power, or of a revolution which should unite the command of the resources of a large portion of the Mahratta territory in the hands of an active and enterprising chief.

Marquis Wellesley's Notes, iii.

To preclude, therefore, a union of the Mahratta states was the policy of the British; and no proceeding appeared so likely to effect this purpose as that of receiving into an alliance with the Company those of their chieftains who should feel disposed to enter into subsidiary engagements with the Indian government. Accordingly, a treaty of alliance was formed with the Guickwar, chief of Guzerat, which attached him to the Company's interests, and secured for the latter an important territorial establishment in that maritime province. Lord Wellesley, at the same time, exerted every effort of policy to lessen French influence in the Deccan; justly considering that Scindiah's hostile feeling towards the English, at a moment when the Mahratta empire was in so disturbed a state, presented France with a favourable opportunity for prosecuting her views upon India; particularly as that powerful chieftain could not but be supposed to have a bias towards our great rival, since not only was his regular

infantry in the Deccan officered to a great extent by Frenchmen, but he had likewise an efficient army in the vicinity of Delhi under the command of a French officer, Monsieur Perron.

At this time (June, 1802) Scindiah was in the province of Malwa, carrying on hostilities against Holkar, who, jealous of the complete control exercised by the former over the affairs of the Peshwah, had increased his army, and improved its efficiency by the employment of European adventurers to discipline it. Ineffective operations had been already carried on during several months, when Holkar, suddenly changing his plans, crossed the Nerbudda and advanced upon Poonah : an action shortly afterwards took place near that city between his army and that of the Peshwah, aided by a body of Scindiah's troops under Suddasheo Bhow, which terminated in the total defeat of the latter; and the imbecile Peshwah fled immediately to the maritime province of Concan. On the day of the battle he sent his minister to the British resident, soliciting the aid of a subsidiary force, and expressing a desire to form a general defensive alliance with the Company. His propositions were at once acceded to by the resident, and the agreement was subsequently ratified by the governor-general; accompanied by an assurance that the government would use all justifiable means for the restoration of the Peshwah's authority. Colonel Collins was at the same time sent to Scindiah, with a view to including him in the engagement settled with the Peshwah.

25th October.

Lord Wellesley considered this crisis of affairs as affording a most favourable opportunity for the establishment of British influence in the Mahratta

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empire, without the hazard of involving the Company in a contest with any party. Holkar's power possessed no solid foundation, and there could be little doubt that Scindiah would endeavour to repair the disgrace of his troops in their recent defeat; a continuance of the contest would impair the resources of both parties, and afford to the British government an opportunity of interposing its influence and mediation for the restoration of the Peshwah's just authority, under terms calculated to secure our relations with the Mahratta empire. Holkar's object was to obtain possession of the person of the Peshwah, and secure his own ascendency to the exclusion of Scindiah's power; but on the escape of the Peshwah, he placed the son of Amrut Rao on the musnud of Poonah; merely, however, investing him with the office of prime minister, while he himself usurped all the authority of the state.

Such being the position of the Mahratta powers, it was considered indispensably necessary that a strong British army should be immediately assembled on the southern frontier of their territories, for the protection of the Company's possessions, as well as those of the Nizam and rajah of Mysore. Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, seeing the necessity of acting with promptitude, collected a force of 19,000 men at Hurryhur, in November, 1802, under the orders of Lieut.-General Stuart. The Bombay presidency, likewise, prepared a body of troops for service; and the subsidiary division at Hyderabad was held in readiness to take the field.

On the 28th of November, Lieut.-Colonel Close, the resident at the court of the Peshwah, left Poonah, and proceeded to Bombay. About the

middle of December the Peshwah arrived at the island of Bassein, and was immediately waited upon by Colonel Close with a draft of the definitive treaty of alliance proposed to be concluded. After much discussion, it was signed, sealed, and delivered on the 21st of December, 1802, at Bassein; and on the 18th of March, 1803, the Peshwah received the counterpart of the treaty, ratified by the governor-general in council.

Meanwhile the subsidiary force stationed at Hyderabad, composed of two regiments of native cavalry, six battalions of sepoys, and two companies of artillery, amounting to about 8368 men, marched from that city at the close of the month of February, and halted on the 25th of March at Perinda, on the western frontier of the Nizam's dominions, situated at the distance of 116 miles from Poonah. This force was accompanied by 6000 of the Nizam's disciplined infantry, and about 9000 cavalry.

The governor-general, during the progress of the events that followed these transactions, was most ably served by the several residents and agents employed at the different native courts, — men who, by their talents and zeal, did honour to his selection. Lieutenant-Colonel Close was at Poonah; Lieutenant-Colonel Collins with Scindiah; Major Kirkpatrick with the Nizam at Hyderabad; Mr. Webbe, first at Mysore, and afterwards with the rajah of Berah; Major Malcolm, who accompanied Major-General Wellesley to Poonah, and then became resident at Mysore. These, with the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Mr. Wilks, and Major Munro, who were employed in the Deccan and Mysore, formed, to use Colonel Gurwood's felicitous illustration,

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that galaxy of worth which shone so conspicuously in the government of India under Lord Wellesley.

The principles which guided the governor-general's policy at this period were, to maintain peace with the Mahratta states while establishing British influence amongst them; and to preserve internal tranquillity in the British possessions and those of our allies. To further these views, he was desirous to see the Peshwah restored to the musnud of Poonah; but if it should appear that a decided opposition to this measure was to be expected from the other Mahratta chiefs, Lord Wellesley was determined not to persevere in that object. The re-establishment of the authority of this prince under British protection was, however, of great importance, as it would prevent either Holkar or Scindiah from possessing any dangerous influence at Poonah; and moreover, it had now become certain that Ragogee Bhoonslah, rajah of Berar, had also put forth a claim to supreme authority over the Mahratta empire.

Having thus rapidly passed in review the situation of all the interested parties at this juncture, we shall now show that General Wellesley had been far from unoccupied during the last four months, although we have necessarily lost sight of him while setting before the reader the various political occurrences of the period; without an explanation of which, neither the military operations that speedily followed, nor even the objects sought to be attained by putting a force in motion under the orders of General Wellesley, could possibly be understood.

On the 12th of November, 1802, General Wellesley received notice that an army would probably

be assembled on the Toombuddra. This was sufficient: he knew that stores of provisions must be immediately formed — arrangements made for the supply of cattle and sheep — guns and ammunition moved to a convenient station — brinjarries apprized that their services would be required, and that they must load and await orders to move — 3000 carriage bullocks to be got ready — the sale of gram * to be stopped — paddy † to be beaten out — together with numerous other matters requiring attention, before an Indian army can be got ready to take the field. He kept a careful journal of all his proceedings at this period; from which it is plainly to be seen that he was the life and soul of all the preparations going on. In a letter, dated Seringapatam, 1st January, 1803, to Colonel Close, who was then at Bassein with the Peshwah, he sketched out a plan of operations, supposing the object that of marching to Poonah in order to reinstate the Peshwah. The letter concluded by showing how amply Mysore had contributed to the supply and equipment of the army to be assembled on its frontier. General Wellesley, it appears, had raised 8000 bullocks before any had been obtained at Madras: he had caused the gram agent-general to be supplied with 7000 loads; and each cavalry regiment, when arrived at the frontier, had 500 loads; while 6000 loads were ready for their consumption during their stay there. A depôt of 7000 loads of rice was formed at Hurryhur. Arrangements had been made for 32,000 loaded brinjarry bullocks to meet General Stuart at the back of the Chittledroog hills by the end of

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 1.

* Gram, a kind of pulse used for horses and cattle.

† Paddy, rice in its husk.

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January; 60,000 sheep, in different flocks, were assembled between Sera and Chittledroog; and lastly, a body of Silladar horse*, amounting to above 5000, had been raised.

In these preparations General Wellesley received very able assistance from Purneah, the dewan or prime minister of Mysore, formerly chief of finance under Tippoo. This man rendered many and valuable services throughout the succeeding operations, and was the only native in the exercise of authority connected with the transactions of that period whose conduct was guided by the principles of honour and good faith!

The above details will prove to our "gentlemen of England who sit at home at ease," that the duties of a general are not confined to directing the movements of troops and fighting battles. In fact, those comprise not a tithe of the arduous occupations of a commander in the field: the feeding of his soldiers, the equipment of every branch of his army, the maintaining it in a state of efficiency, the prevention of sickness, preservation of order and discipline, are a few of the never-ceasing calls upon his time, attention, and temper, which demand a constant exercise of activity of mind, watchfulness, self-command, and, more than all — patient endurance.

On the subject of forming stores and preparing supplies, we find also a long letter to Mr. Duncan, governor of Bombay, written on the 20th of January, which would do credit to Sir Robert Kennedy, or any talented commissary-general. We pass over such letters with reluctance; but whatever may be our own admiration of the great talent

* Horsemen bearing arms, and finding their own horses and equipment.

they evince, we are aware that the general reader cannot be expected to feel an equal interest in them.

A memorandum of General Wellesley's shows how carefully he had observed the state of the rivers wherever his operations had led him. He describes the Malpoorba, the Werdah, the Toombuddra, the Cavery, and the Cabbany as not filling till between the 15th and 20th of June*, which he had proved by an experience of four years. The rains, he observes, set in to the southward before they begin to the northward; it is therefore to be supposed that the rivers which rise in the hills to the southward will fill first.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Feb. 14.

General Wellesley marched from Seringapatam early in February for Hoonelly, where he was directed to remain until further orders should be received. In the meantime it became known that the main body of the army was to continue within the Company's territories, while a large detachment should enter the Mahratta country; and General Wellesley having been consulted by General Stuart respecting the composition and strength of such a detachment, he took the opportunity offered, when furnishing the information required, to urge his desire to be actively employed in the following modest manner: —

"If you should take the command of it (the detachment) yourself, I hope you will do me the favour to allow me to accompany you in any capacity whatever. All that is known of that country and its inhabitants, in a military point of view, was learned when I was in it; and I shall do

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 3.

* Most of the inferior rivers in India contain very little water during the dry season, and are fordable: their state is, consequently, a point of much importance with reference to military operations.

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every thing in my power to make myself useful to you. If you should not think proper to take command of this detachment yourself, and in consideration of the information which I have had opportunities of gaining of that country and its inhabitants, and the communications which I have constantly held with its chiefs, you should be pleased to intrust it to me, I shall be infinitely gratified, and shall do every thing in my power to forward your views."

It was the governor-general's opinion that the advance of the whole of the force assembled at Hurryhur to Poonah, was a measure of too much hazard to the tranquillity of the Company's possessions, and not justified by the prospect such a step held out of a more speedy accomplishment of British objects: he therefore directed that only a portion of that force should proceed into the Mahratta territories, and co-operate with those chiefs on the southern frontier who were attached to the Peshwah's cause; and that the remainder should continue on the Mysore frontier, ready to support the advanced corps and at the same time watch over the tranquillity of the British territory.

Major-General Wellesley had recently joined General Stuart at Hurryhur, and Lord Clive knew too well the value of his services in the field to neglect him on the present occasion. Accordingly, in a letter to General Stuart of the 27th February, he directs that the force to be detached from the main body of the army should consist of not less than 7000 men; adding, "The practical experience obtained by Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley on the immediate theatre of the intended operations, combined with the personal intercourse established between that officer and the Mahratta chiefs on the frontier, and supported by the great ability uniformly manifested by that officer in various si-

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Feb. 27.

tuations of difficulty, render me solicitous that he should be selected for the command of the advancing detachment."

The following are the heads of instruction furnished by Lieutenant-General Stuart to Major-General Wellesley: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 9.

"1. To encourage the southern jaghiredars to declare in favour of the Peshwah's cause; to employ every means to reconcile their mutual animosities, and to induce them to unite their forces with the advancing detachment for the purpose of re-establishing his highness's government.

"2. To proceed to Meritch and form a junction with the Peshwah; or, should that measure be deemed unadvisable on the part of his highness, with such of his chieftains and troops as may be able to meet you there.

"3. To open a communication and form a junction with the subsidiary force, under Colonel Stevenson, and the contingent of his highness the Nizam.

"4. To proceed eventually to Poonah, and establish an order of things in that capital favourable to the return of the Peshwah, and the attainment of the ends of the late treaty."

Colonel Stevenson had received orders to approach the Mahratta territory, and was expected to be at Perinda on the 16th March.

The corps under the command of Major-General Wellesley marched from Hurryhur on the 9th March; and crossing the Toombuddra at Havanoor on the 12th, proceeded towards Poonah.

The British army was invariably well received after it crossed the frontier; its communication with the rear remained free and open; its camp continued to be well supplied with every thing the country afforded; and so great was the influence of General Wellesley, that his passport was the only one to which any attention was paid. He was anxious to be joined by Goklah, and numerous chiefs who pretended to remain in allegiance to

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the Peshwah. Fearful of exciting great jealousy in the minds of the chiefs by the possession of Darwar, the great strong-hold of the country, he was of opinion that it ought not to be meddled with; and on being informed that Bappojee Scindiah was much alarmed in consequence of a report that the British purposed to attack the fort, General Wellesley sent to inform him that he intended to molest no one who did not interfere in his measures, hinting at the same time that the Peshwah's orders must be obeyed; and he did this, lest it should be necessary hereafter, for any body of British troops to attack this fort in order to put the Peshwah's officer in possession of it.

The state of the rivers, and an adequate supply of boats for crossing them, were objects to which General Wellesley gave great attention. From an able memorandum drawn up during his march, we find that he recommended the use of the common country basket boats, covered with double skins of leather, which could be made with ease in all parts of the country; and being desirous of having a permanent establishment of boats upon each of the principal rivers, he wrote to Purneah to request that twenty might be prepared at Hurryhur for crossing the Toombuddra, and the same number at Anawooty and Chandergooty, to be floated down the Werdah for the passage of that river at Deogerry. He purposed further to have forty of these boats got ready at Hullihall, to be carried to the Gutpoorba and the Kistna; the total number required being 300, or 60 for each of the five principal rivers. He likewise made arrangements for the protection of the boats at the several stations.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 20.

General Wellesley now reaped the fruits of his administrative labours in Mysore; as the division he commanded was entirely supplied from the flourishing resources of that country. In one of his letters to the governor-general, he deprecates any change in its system of government, which he was of opinion would immediately affect the supplies drawn from thence. But Lord Wellesley was fully aware how much the judicious arrangements of his brother had tended to produce the great benefits already experienced; and anxious to ensure a continuance of the same advantages, resolved upon continuing General Wellesley in the military command of Mysore, notwithstanding his absence in the field, and issued instructions accordingly to Lord Clive: adding, that if any officer should have been appointed to succeed him in the command previously to the receipt of his despatch, "his excellency in council directs that the command in Mysore should be restored to Major-General Wellesley immediately upon the receipt of those instructions." No higher compliment than this could possibly have been paid to the talent and energy he had shown. And here we must be permitted to remark on the tact with which Lord Clive managed to throw the command of the advancing force, and with it the virtual direction of all political transactions and military operations, into the hands of the only general officer in his government possessed of the necessary qualities to bring the important affairs in which he was likely to be engaged, to a satisfactory termination. Indeed, the prompt and able measures of his lordship were remarkable throughout the whole period of his service in the high office he held; and it is but

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. April 4.

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just to state that much of the success which attended our warlike proceedings at that time in India was due to his discrimination, promptitude, and firmness.

On approaching Darwar, General Wellesley was visited by the son of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of that fortress, who brought with him the most positive assurances from his father of fidelity to the Peshwah, and of a determination to do every thing in his power to forward the service on which the British troops were employed. On the 24th of March, a sirdar, who commanded a thousand horse, entered the camp, and was received in due form: he promised to obey all orders the general might give him in the Peshwah's cause, excepting to pay for straw and wood.

Uncertain of Holkar's movements, General Wellesley did not think it advisable that Colonel Stevenson should quit his position at Perinda: that chieftain was now reported to have gone towards Ahmednuggur and Chandore. Many petty chiefs belonging to the Peshwah's territories had joined the British army with their troops, and more were desirous to do the same under favourable conditions. For instance, we find a certain Appah Saheb, having in his service 3000 Pindarries *, formerly in Tippoo's army, to whom he gave no pay, and who subsisted by plundering the rajah of Kalapoor; but the influence of General Wellesley having produced a cessation of hostilities among all the chiefs around, those 3000 Pindarries could no longer pay their predatory visits to that rajah's territory; and as their dismissal from Appah Saheb's service would probably be followed by their

* Pindarries, bands who existed by plundering.

engaging with Holkar or some of his chiefs, and thus increase the number of that description of troops which had always been found to do our armies most injury, it was desirable that they should be retained by Appah Saheb, and have some provision made for their support. The British general therefore recommended the step which was taken, of having them hired by the Peshwah.

General Wellesley was now anxious to ascertain the intentions of the Peshwah relative to joining his own forces in the neighbourhood of Meritch; and wrote to Colonel Close upon that subject, strongly urging the necessity of the measure. He lamented that the Peshwah could not be prevailed upon to make some offer to Holkar; as, in the event of that chieftain's being brought to listen to any overtures, it would prevent him from making an attempt upon Colonel Stevenson or the Nizam's contingent; and might also prevent him from concluding an alliance with Scindiah: while a further advantage would be gained, namely, that of allowing time for the two British corps to approach each other, and preclude all possibility of disaster; for Stevenson's corps not being strong enough alone, or even when reinforced by the Nizam's troops, to give battle to the enemy, the general would not permit that officer to stir until his own corps should be at hand to afford him protection.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 23.

While uncertain with respect to the movements of Holkar, General Wellesley was compelled to act cautiously, for fear of compromising Stevenson's force; but as it was of the utmost importance, in the actual posture of affairs, that he should lose no time in reaching Poonah, he came to the decision of moving directly on Jejoory, while Stevenson

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should march to Gardoon on the Beemah, so as to arrive there on the day that his own corps would be at Jejoory; his purpose being, to move afterwards by his left on Poonah, and advancing Stevenson's division either to Jejoory, or in front of that place, on the Beemah, to leave the Nizam's troops at Gardoon. Such was General Wellesley's plan, in the event of the intelligence of Holkar's march northward being confirmed; but if that chieftain should remain near him, it would be necessary to alter it, so far as to unite Colonel Stevenson's troops and those of the Nizam with his own, or to bring them within a march of him on his right; or, lastly, for them to proceed towards Poonah by the direct road from Gardoon, while he should move on that place from Jejoory. There was still another case to be considered, — that of Holkar posting himself (should he not have gone northward) so as to threaten to impede the junction of the two British corps. Such a disposition of his force would oblige General Wellesley to move towards Colonel Stevenson at Perinda, before he proceeded to Jejoory. But, in any of these cases, he hoped to reach Poonah about the 20th of April; and should there be nothing to fear from Holkar, it was his intention to approach the ghauts, for the twofold object of opening the communication with Bombay, and providing for the Peshwah's safety on his journey from Bassein.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 30.

At this period General Wellesley's proceedings required the utmost degree of circumspection. He was then near the Kistna, approaching Erroor, and still 150 miles from Poonah. Colonel Stevenson, at Perinda, was about 116 miles west of Poonah, and distant nearly 150 miles from Erroor. The

political state of affairs rendered the presence of the British in force at the Peshwah's capital urgent; and although General Wellesley felt himself strong enough to cope with Holkar, he was anxious to secure the safety of Stevenson's division, which was entirely deficient of European troops, and he did not know whether any confidence could be placed in those of the Nizam.

The reader may not object to our pausing for a brief space in our account of the military operations, for the purpose of making him acquainted with the country through which the British forces were marching.

The country from the northern frontier of Mysore, as far as the city of Aurungabad, a distance of about 600 miles, is no where crossed by lofty hills, although not wholly flat. The southern Mahratta territory, which is watered by the tributaries of the Kistna and Godavery, possesses a deep, rich, and well irrigated surface of black mould, from which the intensity of the sun's rays draws forth an astonishing growth of vegetation. The finest crops may be seen waving over extensive districts, such as can only be exceeded by those of the yet more fertile provinces adjacent to the Ganges. Considering the wretched governments that have ruled this part of the Deccan for ages, the quantity of land under tillage was surprising. In the dry season, the surface of the ground contracts, so as to form wide fissures sufficient to engulf sheep and even larger animals.

There are few places of any strength in the lower part of the Deccan; Darwar and Balgaum are, however, respectable fortresses, and would require caution in attacking them. Most of the towns, and

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many villages, are enclosed by mud walls and ditches: the walls are formed by successive broad and thick layers of a very adhesive mud, which, hardened by the sun, present an almost perpendicular face, varying in height from ten to forty feet, according to circumstances. The style of these native forts is that of long curtains flanked by round towers; there are frequently two enclosures, the outer one serving as a fausse-braie. In the mountainous districts, and in those plains out of which hills rise abruptly, hill-forts abound, of a character so formidable that had they been garrisoned by disciplined troops, their capture would often have occasioned great loss.

There extend over these provinces immense spaces covered with jungle, or low wood, and long grass: in the higher and gravelly situations, the latter is parched by the sun until it becomes as susceptible of ignition as tinder. Fires are therefore of frequent occurrence, particularly during warfare, and the country for miles may be seen blazing fiercely. In bamboo jungles this is attended with an extraordinary effect, as the air contained in the tubes between the joints, expanding with the heat, bursts its case with a loud report, producing the effect of independent musketry firing. It is customary, when an army has to encamp on ground covered with long and dry grass, to set it on fire before the troops arrive, to prevent the occurrence of accidents to the artillery magazines.

The roads in these districts, and indeed throughout India, are mere tracks, and often impassable during the wet season for guns or heavy carriages. In dry weather they try the strength of wheels and axles, particularly where they traverse the

courses of rocky mountain torrents, or run along the beds of rivers. The great heat too assists in the destruction of wood-work; so that a march of 400 or 500 miles will sometimes ruin half the gun wheels of an army. The country being entirely unenclosed, columns of troops when marching either keep the road, or move over the face of the uncultivated parts, as they find most convenient.

An army moving in India presents a sight which can be equalled in no other part of the world. The fighting men, with their, at all times, indispensable trains of artillery, and carriages containing ammunition and stores of every kind, certainly do not constitute a tenth of the vast swarm in motion. The authorized and necessary followers connected with the artillery, commissariat, bazaar, and medical departments, are very great; but the wives and families of the native soldiers, and the multitude of hangers-on of one description or another, swell the non-combatant but *devouring* mass to an enormous amount: these, with their heavy-laden ponies and half-starved dogs, remind the Englishman of those picturesque nomade groups so often met with in his own happy country; so much so, that following in the rear, or being on the *reverse* flank of an Indian army, he might imagine that all the gipsies who wander over Europe had united and returned to the East. Then again a few elephants, and many camels, carrying tents and baggage, with some 15,000 or 20,000 brinjarry bullocks loaded with bags of grain, extend the vast procession over many miles of distance.

The official trains and baggage commonly move in a line parallel to the columns of troops, on their

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reverse flank; the hordes belonging to the camp and bazaar follow in their steps; the whole being brought up by the rear guard. Companies of Sepoys are occasionally interspersed between the tail of the columns and the rear guard. When the enemy's horse are hovering about, the rear guard is furnished with light artillery; and cavalry piquets are thrown out on the flanks to protect the huge moving mass.

The independent native troops, with their spears, prancing steeds, and picturesque costumes, added greatly to the *effect* of a march. Asiatics are fond of the "pomp and circumstance" of war, and in this respect contrast strongly with the quiet and orderly bearing of British troops; whose fire awaits the moment of action ere it blazes forth, and never evaporates in foolish vanities and trifling.

On the 31st of March, General Wellesley's force reached the camp of Erroor, on the north bank of the Kistna, where it halted for two days, in order to establish a field hospital, which the deficiency of carriage for the sick among the native corps rendered necessary. On a general muster of the cattle, &c. belonging to the army, it was found that notwithstanding their having performed a long march from Seringapatam in a short space of time, and in an unfavourable season, they were still in a very efficient state. All the supplies were abundant, owing to the foresight which provided magazines at Hurryhur and Hullihall previous to the commencement of operations. The general, in a letter to the commander-in-chief, draws a deplorable picture of the condition of the surrounding country at this period. For nearly three years there had been unceasing contests for power and plunder

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. April 1.

amongst the various petty chiefs in the districts bordering on the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba. By his influence they had now laid aside their mutual animosities, and several of them had been induced to join his army with their troops; thus relieving the oppressed country from their exactions and plundering,—a rare instance of military operations proving advantageous to a community.

The following observations from the pen of Major Malcolm, an eyewitness, will be read with interest: —

"The march of a British force through this distracted country has had the happy effect of reconciling its contending chiefs, and of giving confidence to its oppressed inhabitants; and the union of all ranks in a sentiment of respect for the English name has occasioned an abundance of supplies of every description, which will enable the detachment to leave the banks of the Kistna with more provisions than it did those of the Toombuddra. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. April 3.

"The discipline and conduct of the English troops who have before served in this quarter have, no doubt, contributed much to this favourable general impression. But the confidence and respect of every class in the provinces to the south of the Kistna is in a very great degree personal to the Hon. Major-General Wellesley: to the admiration which the Mahratta chiefs entertain of that officer's military character, and the firm reliance which the inhabitants place on his justice and protection, the extraordinary success which has hitherto attended the progress of this force must be principally attributed."

General Wellesley was at this time strengthened by the junction of Goklah and several influential chiefs, with their forces, as below; viz. —

	Horse.	Infantry.
Appah Saheb	2500	1000
Bappoo Goklah	3000	1500
Bappoo Vittell	300	
Appah Dessaye	300	100
Vakeel of Kittoor Rajah	100	100
Bappoo Scindiah	150	100
Total	6350	2800

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Continuing his march northward, General Wellesley reached Meritch on the 3d of April, when there no longer appeared any doubt that Holkar had gone off, as had been reported; and it was ascertained that he had left two of his chiefs, Futty Sing Maunia and Meer Khan, to observe the movements of the British. General Wellesley immediately sent Kawder Nawaz Khan, a native chief, with a letter to the former, recommending that he should draw off his troops to the northward of Poonah. Learning, however, that Futty Sing, who had been immediately in his front, had moved to the eastward, with the intention, as was supposed, of joining Meer Khan, the general resolved on marching towards Colonel Stevenson; intending, should the enemy hang about the Beemah, to go to Punderpoor, from which place he expected to be able to direct Stevenson's movements with a view to the junction of the two corps.

On the 5th of April the British force was at Hingengaum, 20 miles N.E. from Meritch; and General Wellesley deemed it advisable to direct Colonel Stevenson to march towards Punderpoor, unless he should have received any intelligence of Holkar's return from the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, or of his threatening the Nizam's territories to the northward. He was desired to leave the Nizam's troops within the territories of his highness, unless he should think it necessary to have them with him; and in this case they were not to cross the Beemah. The general's letter terminated his instructions on this occasion as follows:—"I must request you to preserve the most strict discipline among your troops when in the Mahratta territory; and that you will take

measures to make them pay for every thing. We have got on by these precautions."

We may observe, that by attending strictly to them he was enabled to get on *at all times*. They are wise maxims, which all commanders would do well to bear in mind: by adhering to them, not only would they do much towards ensuring success in their operations, but war, the never-ending scourge of mankind in one quarter or another, would, by their enforcement, be deprived of half its terrors. When we follow in the track of an army over a country abandoned by its inhabitants, and where desolation and destruction reign on all sides, we require no further proof of the want of true wisdom in the commander, as well as of a lack of discipline among his troops.

Futty Sing's move to the eastward having relieved the chiefs assembled on the Kistna of all fears for their own territories, General Wellesley was enabled to advance, accompanied by them, towards Punderpoor. Holkar was reported to have been on the 20th of March about eight or ten coss from Ahmednuggur, and moving northwards.

As a specimen of the general's employment, we quote a few lines from a letter he wrote to General Stuart at this time: — "Every thing here goes on well. The brinjarries have had a little dispute with their mutaseddee *, which has given me some trouble; but after sitting up a great part of last night with them, I have settled it to the satisfaction of all parties." Gurwood. Despatches, &c. April 4.

Futty Sing and Meer Khan made overtures about this time to forsake, with their followers, the

* Mutaseddee; accountant, chief clerk, or secretary of brinjarries.

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service of Holkar: the former was desired to transmit his propositions to the Peshwah, and that in the meantime he should go off with his troops to the northward of Poonah, and there await the Peshwah's orders. The negotiations with these leaders produced no result, and it is therefore unknown whether the offers they made then and afterwards were sincere, or only intended to answer some temporary purpose.

General Wellesley's attention was frequently directed to the preparation of boats for the passage of the rivers when full. In a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Munro*, he requests that officer to have twenty basket boats made in the ceded districts; the dimensions he lays down are, diameter ten feet, and depth three feet—to be covered with double leather; the leathers to be sewed with thong, and of such a size as to cover the gunwales of the boats all round.

The object of General Wellesley was now to approach the Beemah, in order to form a junction with Stevenson's corps; and although he found that Futty Sing and Meer Khan were in full march to the northward, he still deemed it advisable to continue to move towards the Beemah, being desirous to communicate immediately with Colonel Stevenson, and form such an arrangement of their force as should provide for all probable events. He advises Colonel Close that he expected to be at Poonah on the 23d or 24th of April, and recommends the Peshwah to leave Bassein on the 20th, so as to arrive at the ghauts about the 27th or 28th, by which time he should himself have taken pos-

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. April 7.

* Collector in Canara.

session of Poonah and advanced towards the ghauts in readiness to cover the Peshwah's march, in the event of the enemy returning from the northward with an intention to impede it. He states that his army was in "good marching trim;" and if able to keep his cattle alive, he should not, after reaching Poonah, fear any confederacy that could be formed. CHAP. VI. 1803.

The perverse conduct of the Peshwah occasioned General Wellesley no little embarrassment at this period. With subordinate chieftains bearing but little affection to his person, he ought to have adopted a course of conciliation, knowing, as he must, how much their enmity would operate to his own prejudice, as well as fetter the efforts making in his behalf by the British commander. Appah Saheb, one of the principal chiefs, had even signified his intention to take leave of the army when it should arrive at Poonah, as he could not meet the Peshwah.

General Wellesley's intimate knowledge of all the details belonging to a branch of the service with which few officers have any acquaintance, was shown in a memorandum he now addressed to Mr. Duncan, the governor of Bombay, from whom he was desirous to obtain a pontoon equipment. In the paper he drew up on this occasion, after pointing out that when a force should be stationed at Poonah there would be a complete chain of British posts across the peninsula, of which Bombay was the point of support, and that a junction of the corps at Hyderabad and Poonah with what Bombay could afford, would effectually oppose the invasion of the Deccan by any of the powers of Hindostan, provided means were taken Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 11.

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to prepare a moveable pontoon train for the formation of bridges across the rivers; he then states where such boats as would serve for the purpose might be obtained, specifies the most convenient dimensions for the boats, and furnishes every detail connected with their efficient equipment as a serviceable pontoon train, with all the technical minuteness of an engineer officer. He subsequently shows that the European method of carrying the pontoons in those days, would not answer in India, and points out the best way of transporting them in that country.

It would do many of our young officers good to reflect on the attention paid by the future arbiter of thrones, to objects which, in the necessary division of labour an army presents, do not fall within the province of a cavalry or infantry officer; since occasions will sometimes occur, when the exigencies of the service may require that a man shall step out of his own particular branch and become an engineer or an artillerist: then is observed the difference between a mere regimental officer and the useful soldier; between the man of sense and spirit, zealous in the discharge of his duties, and the dull machine whose ideas are bounded by the books of regulations and field exercise.

The British army was now marching through a country which had been completely exhausted by the depredations of Holkar's undisciplined hordes; not a stick had been found standing after passing Meritch; the villages were entirely destroyed in consequence of the houses having been pulled down for fire-wood; all the grain and forage had been consumed; the whole of the population had fled,

and a vast expanse of fine fertile country was become a temporary waste. The havoc committed by those wholesale plunderers was dreadful, and the consequent misery of the wretched and starving inhabitants who had been driven from their homes, was extreme.

When we contemplate the peaceful security enjoyed at the present day by the harmless population of those provinces under the paternal rule of the East India Company, and compare it with the frightful state of anarchy, bloodshed, and rapine which marked the period of 1803, and times anterior to that, it must surely be admitted that the extension of the Company's power and dominion has been eminently favourable to the establishment of tranquillity and happiness, in regions which for ages had been suffering under misrule, violence, and never-ceasing strife.

CHAPTER VII.

JUNCTION OF THE BRITISH CORPS. — POONAH. — ARRIVAL OF THE PESHWAH. — ADVANCE FROM POONAH. — POLICY OF SCINDIAH AND THE RAJAH OF BERAR. — GENERAL WELLESLEY INVESTED WITH EXTRAORDINARY POWERS. — DECLARATION OF WAR. — CAPTURE OF AHMEDNUGGUR. — ACTIVE OPERATIONS.

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On the 14th of April, General Wellesley was encamped at Sarhatty upon the Neera, where he expected to have been joined by Colonel Stevenson; but in consequence of the baggage of the latter having taken a wrong route on the previous day, the junction was not effected till the 15th near Akloos, about eight miles from the Neera, and 70 S. E. from Poonah. The great heat had by this time taken effect on the wheels of the gun and other carriages, which, with the badness of the roads, traversing the rocky beds of rivers, and rough banks of nullahs or water-courses, had caused many to become seriously damaged. They were, however, patched up, and by unremitting attention on the part of the general, no delay arose in the movements of his troops; but in order that his artillery might be placed in a thoroughly efficient state at Poonah, he wrote to request that the governor of Bombay would have forty new wheels prepared.

When the junction of the two corps was thus effected, Holkar was known to have marched on Chandore, and Futty Sing and Meer Khan, after falling back as the British advanced, having united their

forces and retired towards Poonah, there remained no longer any obstacle to the march of General Wellesley upon that city. Strong rumours had long prevailed of a confederacy likely to be formed amongst the Mahratta chieftains; and he was desirous that the questions of such confederacy, and whether the British would have to contend with it, should be brought to a speedy decision, chiefly for the following reasons: — 1st, Because if there was to be a war, he could carry it on with advantage during the rainy season, on account of the facility with which his army would be able to cross the rivers, owing to the provision of boats already made. 2dly, The British force was better prepared to commence operations than were the Mahrattas. 3dly, It was of importance to ascertain the views and intentions of the Peshwah.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 15.

To bring the question of peace or war to a test, General Wellesley was anxious that the Peshwah should desire Scindiah to recross the Nerbudda into his own territories. In the event of his compliance, and at the same time retaining the British minister in his camp, the general was of opinion that the army ought to be broken up; taking care, however, so to dispose of the troops as to have their services at command whenever they might be required.

The corps under Colonel Stevenson having been strengthened by the 94th regiment, termed the Scotch Brigade, that officer was directed to ascend the Beemah river to a point near its confluence with the Moolamoota; leaving, however, the Nizam's troops within their own frontier opposite Gardoon.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 16.

Repeated intimations had been received from

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Colonel Close that Amrut Rao intended to burn Poonah; and the Peshwah now sent to request the British general to detach some of his own chiefs with their troops, in order to provide for the safety of his family. Such a measure would not have attained the object, as even if the chiefs could have been prevailed upon to go to Poonah, their force was not equal to prevent Amrut Rao's design. But anxious to avert so dreadful a calamity, General Wellesley wrote a civil letter to Amrut Rao, announcing his approach, and informing him that he should take measures to ensure the safety and tranquillity of the city on his arrival there. He trusted that his letter might draw an answer, and that a vakeel would be sent by Amrut, whom he hoped to amuse with a correspondence until he should be able to put in execution a project he had formed for saving Poonah. Accordingly, on the evening of the 19th, when his camp was still about 40 miles from that city, he suddenly ordered the cavalry to mount, and, followed by a battalion, moved all night with great celerity; and had not a detention of several hours occurred in getting the cavalry guns through the Bhore ghaut, he might possibly have surprised Amrut in the place. But this chief receiving intelligence of the approach of the British, evacuated it without effecting his purpose; and General Wellesley's rapid march (no less than 60 miles in 30 hours) saved the city from the threatened destruction.

Thus was the army marched to Poonah, without any step having been taken by the Mahratta princes to impede its progress, notwithstanding the threats they had held out; and General Wellesley found himself in force at a point from which nothing could

drive him, and where he would gain strength daily, while they had not yet settled their own differences, nor agreed upon any measures against the British. Thus too, in the event of hostilities, would the seat of war be removed to a distance from the Company's territories, while the preparations made were such as to ensure its speedy and successful termination. General Wellesley was further of opinion that the decided step of advancing to Poonah could alone have saved the Nizam's dominions from invasion by Holkar's people; who having, like a swarm of locusts, laid the country completely bare, must have been compelled to seek the means of subsistence within the Nizam's frontier.

Some repose was necessary for the troops after their long and fatiguing march; and the gun carriages having been greatly injured, artificers were set to work immediately to repair, as well as the means would admit of, the damage sustained. The cattle also having suffered very much, General Wellesley deemed it advisable to move towards the hills on the 26th, for the convenience of obtaining forage, when he received advice that Holkar had made a move towards the Nizam's frontier, and was on the 21st at a station about 16 miles from the Godavery river, within a short distance of his own, of the Nizam's, and of Scindiah's territories. He subsequently crossed the Nizam's frontier near Aurungabad, and created some anxiety for the safety of that city, as well as for the fort of Dowlutabad.* Under these circumstances, General

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 26.

* One of the strongest forts in India, situated on the Nizam's northern frontier.

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Wellesley thought it necessary that Colonel Stevenson should collect the Nizam's army and the subsidiary force at Gardoon, and make three or four marches to the northward, in order to be ready to succour Dowlutabad, and protect Aurungabad, if necessary. By this advance of Colonel Stevenson, the two corps would be so situated as to be able to combine their operations, should Scindiah unite with Holkar either to force the British troops from Poonah, or to invade the Nizam's territories. But the chief object of the British general was to replace the Peshwah in authority at Poonah; and he would not allow any movement of Holkar, or other considerations, to divert him from this purpose.

General Wellesley moved his camp to Panowullah, 10 miles N. W. from Poonah, on the 28th of April, where he halted, as his march from that city created so much alarm amongst the inhabitants that several of the principal families were leaving the place; and the ladies of the Peshwah's family, who had been desired by his highness to descend from Sevaghur, were afraid to venture in.

Notwithstanding the fears entertained at Hyderabad, (where the resident seems to have taken unnecessary alarm,) General Wellesley was of opinion that a combination of the Mahratta princes would not be effected. He penetrated thus early the character of Holkar, who looked more to his personal interest than to any enlarged political objects; and it was clear from the conduct of his principal dependants, such as Futty Sing, Meer Khan, and Amrut Rao, all of whom were at that moment carrying on intrigues for the purpose of securing advantages to themselves by abandoning their master, that they had little confidence in the sound-

ness of his views, or in the policy of his proceedings. CHAP. VII.

Trusting that the Peshwah would be at Poonah by the 2d of May, General Wellesley was induced to authorize Colonel Stevenson to quit the Beemah and move to the relief of Aurungabad, which city was threatened by Holkar's troops. He now awaited with much anxiety the arrival of the Peshwah, occupying the long interval of repose occasioned by his unseasonable delay, in making active preparations for a forward movement. At length the Peshwah, who had left Bassein on the 27th of April, attended by Colonel Close, and escorted by a division of more than 2000 men under Colonel Murray* of H. M.'s 84th regiment, arrived in the vicinity of Poonah, and took up his abode at a village between that city and the camp, to wait for a lucky day on which to re-enter his capital. The propitious day, however, did not arrive till the 13th, when he made his entry in state, and remounted the musnud with all due ceremony. 1803. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 30.

Colonel Murray having remained beyond the ghauts in order to obtain possession of the fort of Carnallah, the killadar of which had refused to deliver it up to the chief charged with authority from the Peshwah to command it, General Wellesley showed by his instructions to that officer how much he was desirous to impress the natives with a sense of British superiority in arms. On that occasion he signified to Colonel Murray his wish to have the fort attacked without breaching its walls; observing, however, that such attacks are not certain Gurwood. Despatches, &c. May 7.

* Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir John Murray, who was employed on the eastern coast of Spain.

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in their issue, unless they can be made on more than one point at the same time, and under cover of a heavy fire of musketry on the defences, assisted by an enfilade of the parts attacked, if possible. In ordering that an example should be made of the garrison in the event of resistance (which was directed in this instance), the general was only anxious to avoid the necessity of being often obliged to attack such petty places, which always causes delay, and sometimes severe loss. Thus, although it may seem cruel to issue such a mandate, still, in the end, it is often productive of a moral effect, particularly in a country like India, calculated to spare much unnecessary effusion of blood, and thereby to serve, paradoxical as it may at first sight appear, the cause of humanity. The fort in question was subsequently given up without an attack.

Advice was now received from Colonel Collins, dated 1st and 2d May, who was with Scindiah at Burhampoor, that this chieftain was about to meet the rajah of Berar near Oomrawooty, a place within the Nizam's frontier; and that Scindiah had declared, in a letter to the governor-general, his right to demand choute (tribute) from this part of the Nizam's territories. Colonel Collins had, therefore, announced his intention to withdraw from Scindiah's court, if he purposed crossing the Nizam's boundary to meet the rajah of Berar.

General Wellesley immediately apprised Colonel Stevenson that those chiefs were in motion, and warned him of the possibility of their attempting an enterprise upon Hyderabad.

At this time General Wellesley felt that the public service required some paramount authority on the spot; for the several residents being inde-

pendent of all control save that of the government, did not always act in consonance with his views. He therefore stated to the governor-general the necessity of investing some person with power to settle all matters in that quarter. He now had thoughts of running down to Bombay, having been disappointed at the little progress made in the preparation of a pontoon equipment, respecting which he had pressed Mr. Duncan, the governor of that presidency, so strongly; but finding his presence at Poonah could not be dispensed with, he relinquished this design.

In his interviews with the Peshwah at this time, General Wellesley acquired the confidence of that prince, who promised all the aid in his power towards the expected operations; but the duplicity and weakness of his character counteracted all the British general's efforts, who saw that no dependence could be placed in his professions.

Through the exertions of the British commander, zealously seconded by the officers under his command, the army had now attained a state of great efficiency; by his foresight and excellent arrangements, its supplies had hitherto been ample, and there was every expectation that they would not fall short during active operations. On the 14th of May, writing to his brother the Hon. Henry Wellesley at Calcutta, he says, "I have got a fine army in excellent order; and I think that this combination or confederacy, with which we are threatened, will find that we can march as well as fight." Gurwood. Despatches, &c.

All was still conjecture with regard to the intentions of Scindiah, the rajah of Berar, and Holkar, although there were strong grounds for suspecting that they contemplated forming a confederacy

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against the British; but the restoration of the Peshwah, who had been joined by a numerous body of jaghiredars and sirdars *, together with the powerful support of the English, would, it was imagined, deter the other Mahratta princes from proceeding to extremities. Besides, the rivers were about to fill, and crossing them would be dangerous, if not impracticable, to the native armies, but safe and easy to the British troops. The Bombay division under Colonel Murray having joined on the 19th of May, every thing was in readiness for a movement in advance.

At length, finding that Scindiah showed no disposition to withdraw his army, and that nothing but vague professions were to be obtained from that chief and the rajah of Berar, General Wellesley thought it advisable to bring matters to a crisis by moving his army towards the Godavery. Accordingly, he marched from Poonah on the 4th of June; but was deficient in cavalry, owing to the Peshwah's non-fulfilment of his engagements, and the refusal of his vassals to proceed, in consequence of not having received their sunnuds † according to the promises he had made. The rivers being expected to fill in a few days, the general was anxious for the boats constructed at Bombay to arrive. Many of his letters, written at this period, show that he had much difficulty in getting the persons upon whom his supplies depended, to do their duty; the brinjarries too, particularly those belonging to Poonah, failed him. On the 14th of June the army had reached Angah, about twenty miles S. of Ah-

* Sirdar, a leader, a captain.
† Sunnud, patent; authority for holding land or office.

mednuggur, while Colonel Stevenson was ordered to move towards Aurungabad.

The British army now encountered great difficulty in obtaining supplies, partly owing to the exhausted state of the country in which it was moving, but chiefly through the negligence and apathy of the Peshwah and his officers, who took no steps to ensure the subsistence of a force which was employed in his service; the activity, however, of its commander enabled him to surmount every difficulty. He had at this time every reason to be dissatisfied with the Peshwah, whose disinclination to British alliance was manifest, and who was in daily communication with Scindiah's durbar, and even with Holkar, of which the British resident had no knowledge whatever. In a letter to the former, he desired him pointedly to remain where he was; whereas he knew that the requisition of the governor-general, and the only event which could ensure peace, was his recrossing the Nerbudda.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 20.

Upwards of two months had now been passed in tedious and fruitless negotiation. On the part of Scindiah and the rajah of Berar, it had long been evident that procrastination was resorted to, in the hope that Holkar might be brought into a confederation with them; and Scindiah, or his ministers, had induced Colonel Collins, the resident, to believe that an alliance actually existed between that chieftain and Holkar, by which falsehood they had gained time. We forbear to enter into more minute detail respecting the occurrences at this period, as our readers would derive little gratification from their perusal. Suffice it to say, that the straightforward course pursued by General Wellesley was met by nothing but Asiatic evasion, and even di-

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rect falsehood. He announced to the Mahratta princes that he was ready to march back and break up his army, on condition that Scindiah should return into his own territories beyond the Nerbudda, and the rajah of Berar retire to his capital, Nagpoor. In short, every effort was made to avert the necessity of proceeding to hostilities, but in vain.

A change, however, was about to take place. On the 18th of July, General Wellesley received a despatch from the governor-general, dated 26th of June, wherein powers of the most extensive nature were delegated to him; Lord Wellesley having at once concurred in his brother's suggestion that an authority ought to exist near the scene of operations. The impulse given to the hitherto languid march of affairs was felt in a moment. Finding himself armed with entire control over all matters political and military, the arbiter of peace or war — in a word, possessing supreme authority over all concerns connected with Hindostan and the Deccan, he lost no time in exercising the powers with which he was invested. Scindiah and the rajah of Berar were immediately made acquainted, through Colonel Collins, with the new position in which General Wellesley was placed; while that officer was requested to call upon those chiefs to separate, and to send their troops to their usual stations; and further to inform them that if they refused compliance, he was directed to withdraw on the following day from Scindiah's camp.

On being pressed by Colonel Collins to agree to General Wellesley's proposals, or to name whatever terms they were willing to accede to, the chiefs made an offer to withdraw their combined force to Bur-

hampoor, a city on the Taptee river, about 60 miles from their present camp (near Julgong), provided the British troops were marched back to their usual stations — meaning Madras, Seringapatam, and Bombay. This, could so absurd a proposal have been assented to, would not only have left those chiefs masters of the entire Mahratta country, but would have been at variance with the original demand made by General Wellesley, which specified that Scindiah should recross the Nerbudda, and the rajah return to Nagpoor. On the rejection of this proposition by Colonel Collins, they offered to march back to their respective capitals, provided the British army should commence a retrograde movement on the same day. Colonel Collins, who had been only detained in Scindiah's camp by the heavy rains, which had rendered the roads impassable for the guns of his escort, consented that the letters said to contain this last proposal of the chieftains should be transmitted to General Wellesley. They were accordingly sent off; but when received, were found to comprise nothing beyond the terms at first rejected by the resident. Colonel Collins then left their camp; and General Wellesley, seeing the maintenance of peace was hopeless, informed Scindiah on the 6th of August, from his camp at Walkee near Ahmednuggur, that the proposition made by him and the rajah was inadmissible. "I offered you peace," he wrote, "on terms of equality, and honourable to all parties: you have chosen war, and are responsible for all consequences."

When war was thus declared, the effective force under the command of General Wellesley amounted to nearly 43,000 men. He had with himself about 10,000 regulars, composed of his

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Majesty's and the Company's troops; 2400 cavalry, belonging to the rajah of Mysore; and about 3000 Mahratta horse. The British regiments were the 19th light dragoons, and 74th and 78th regiments of infantry.

Colonel Stevenson had the Nizam's subsidiary force, amounting to near 8000, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and about 16,000 cavalry and infantry of the Nizam's troops; the Scotch brigade (94th regiment) comprised the whole of his European troops. About 1800 men, with some artillery, were left at Poonah for the protection of that city.

About a month prior to the commencement of hostilities, a portion of the force under the command of Lieutenant-General Stuart had been ordered by Lord Clive to recross the Toombuddra; both his lordship and General Stuart being apprehensive that, in the event of a renewal of war with France, a French armament might land in the Carnatic. Considering, therefore, the unprotected state of that province, Lord Clive had, with General Stuart's concurrence, ordered a division of the army to return to the Carnatic, while the remainder was stationed near Moodgul in the Dooab.

On this occasion Lieut.-General Stuart waived with a very good grace his right to assume the command of the army in advance; and in a letter to the governor-general pays the following just tribute to the talents and merit of General Wellesley: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 8.

"The experience gained by Major-General Wellesley during his former operations in the Mahratta territories, the extensive knowledge and influence which he has acquired in the present campaign, and his eminent military talents, enable him better than any other officer to prosecute with success the service which he has hitherto conducted with

so much ability; and I have chosen to relinquish the gratification which I should derive from the command of an army, probably destined to undertake very distinguished services, in order to continue that important charge in the hands of the officer best qualified in my judgment to exercise it with advantage to the public."

A few days previous to the commencement of hostilities, and before General Wellesley moved to Walkee, the forces on both sides were posted as follows:—The corps under the immediate command of the general was at Sangwee, upon the Seenah, about twenty miles S.E. from Ahmednuggur; in which fort was a garrison belonging to Scindiah. The Nizam's army, including the subsidiary force, the whole under Colonel Stevenson, was at Aurungabad. Colonel Murray, with two battalions of native infantry, was at Poonah.

The Mahrattas were thus disposed:—Holkar's army was on the north bank of the Taptee, and that chief showed no disposition to join Scindiah and the rajah.

Scindiah was encamped at Julgong with 18,000 horse, eleven battalions (each 700 strong) of infantry, and 150 guns.

The rajah of Berar, with 20,000 horse, 6000 infantry, and forty guns, was united with Scindiah.

General Wellesley's plan of operations was to attack Ahmednuggur with his own corps, in order to secure the communications with Poonah and Bombay. Having finished that operation, and crossed the Godavery, he then purposed, if possible, to bring the enemy to action. Meanwhile a Bombay division would attack Baroach in Guzerat, where Scindiah had a garrison; after which the troops in that province were to be collected ready for such ulterior operations as General Wellesley

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might consider advisable, all the troops detached from Bombay having been placed under his direction.

Having decided upon commencing hostilities, General Wellesley sketched out a series of measures for the defence of Guzerat, and of the districts depending upon Surat, which he despatched to the governor of Bombay, accompanied by every military detail respecting the points to be defended; specifying the amount of force to be employed, the several forts to be garrisoned, and the number of men required for each. He also wrote the following characteristic letter to the officer commanding at Baroda, in Guzerat: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 6.

"Sir,

"Upon the receipt of this letter, you will commence your operations against Dowlut Rao Scindiah's fort of Baroach.

"You will not suffer these operations to be interrupted or delayed by any negotiation whatever. You will send the governor of Bombay a copy of the report which you will transmit to me of the measures which you will have adopted in consequence of this order.

"I have the honour to be, &c."

Violent rains, which rendered the roads impassable for guns, detained General Wellesley three days at Walkee. Being able to move on the 8th of August, he sent a messenger to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, requiring him to surrender his fort. General Wellesley had long contemplated an attack upon this place — one of the strongest forts in that part of India, and in excellent repair. The pettah or town, which stood near the fort, was encompassed by a lofty wall having towers at intervals to furnish a flanking fire. The pettah and fort resembled therefore, in some respects, a European fortress with its citadel. The garrison consisted of a body

of Arabs — excellent troops for defending a place; a battalion of Scindiah's regular infantry, and some horse. On arriving in the neighbourhood of the pettah, General Wellesley offered cowle or protection to the inhabitants, which was refused. Orders were immediately issued to attack the pettah simultaneously at three points. The piquets of the infantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th regiment, forming the first column, under Lieut.-Colonel Harness, proceeded to the left. The centre attack was under Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, and composed of eight companies of the 74th regiment and 1st battalion of the 8th native infantry; while Captain Vesey led the right, consisting of the two flank companies of the 74th and the 1st battalion of the 3d regiment of native infantry.

The attack was made with great gallantry under a heavy fire from the Arabs. The ladders were planted, and the summit of the wall speedily gained; but then an unexpected difficulty presented itself: there was no rampart, and the soldiers, therefore, had neither ground on which to stand, nor any means of descending into the place. Meanwhile the Arabs kept up a very destructive fire from the towers, and defended them with the utmost obstinacy. At length they were driven from the wall and towers; but establishing themselves in the houses of the town, continued to make a vigorous defence. At this time Scindiah's infantry sallied out upon the assailants, while a party of Arabs actually charged the grenadiers of the 78th; but after a brisk and gallant contest the British remained masters of the place, with the loss of between twenty and thirty killed—among whom were three officers —and upwards of 100 wounded.

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An anecdote relative to a well-known officer will not be uninteresting in this place. General Wellesley, who was a close spectator of the attack, noticed a young officer of the 78th, who having with great gallantry led his men on to the attack, was thrust from the top of the wall by the enemy, and fell, as the general supposed, severely wounded, if not killed by the tumble. In a moment, however, he was again on his legs, and seen mounting to the assault, having sustained but slight injury from his fall. Next morning he was sent for by the general, who offered him a situation on his staff. Lieut. Colin Campbell *, whose gallantry thus gained him a valuable friend, continued, save during a very short interval, with his distinguished patron from that day to the termination of the Duke's military service in 1818, and was present at every general action in which his grace commanded in person. The town being carried, on the following day the ground near the fort was examined; and in the evening Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, with five companies of the 74th regiment and the 2d battalion 12th N. I., seized a position within 400 yards of it, on which in the course of that night a battery for four guns was raised. This opened at daylight on the 10th with such effect as to induce the killadar to desire that the firing should cease, in order that he might send a person to treat for his surrender. "Tell him," said General Wellesley, "that I shall not cease firing until I have taken the fort, or he shall have surrendered it; but

* Lieut.-General Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.—Some of Sir Colin's brothers were less fortunate: two of them—one a captain, the other a lieutenant in the 74th regiment—fell at the storming of the fort of Panjalumcourchy during the operations against the Polygars in 1801; and a third was killed at the battle of Assye.

I am ready to listen to whatever he is desirous to communicate." Early on the 11th, two vakeels were sent out with a proposal to surrender the fort, on condition of the killadar being allowed to depart with his garrison, and that his private property should be respected.

Although the proposal was assented to, it was five in the evening before the hostages arrived in camp, without whose presence the general refused to stop the fire from the batteries. On the morning of the 12th, the killadar marched out with his garrison of 1400 men, and the British troops took possession of the fort.

The acquisition of Ahmednuggur was of great importance to the future operations, as the fort not only served as a depôt and point of support, but from its situation covered Poonah, and secured the communications with that place and Bombay.*

Having appointed a garrison to the fort, and made other arrangements, General Wellesley moved towards the Godavery, determined to have an action with the enemy as soon as possible. Desirous to infuse a little of his own spirit into those around him, he writes to Colonel Stevenson, "In my opinion, the best thing you can do is to move forward yourself with the Company's cavalry and all the Nizam's, and a battalion, and dash at the first party that comes in your neighbourhood. You will either cut them up, or drive them off." Again, "Keep the infantry collected in a central situation, and let all your supplies collect upon them. If you adopt this

* Ahmednuggur, which has ever been celebrated as one of the most important forts in that part of India, was, in former times, the seat of a dynasty of sultauns; and in the reign of the Emperor Akbar, it resisted the forces of that monarch for *above two years*.

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plan, and succeed in cutting up or in driving to a distance one good party, the campaign will be our own."

The Mahratta chiefs were probably not aware that at this moment General Lake was advancing in Bengal towards Scindiah's northern territories, while those of Holkar were likely to be threatened in rear by a force from Bombay operating in Guzerat under General Wellesley's instructions, which only waited the declaration of that chieftain in favour of Scindiah, to advance upon Indore and Ougein, and thereby cause Scindiah and Holkar to feel alarmed for their capitals.

It was now reported that Scindiah and the rajah had sent their infantry to the rear for safety, and intended to carry on a predatory war with cavalry only; a project which General Wellesley ridicules in a letter to Colonel Collins. He says,

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 15.

"A system of predatory war must have some foundation in strength of some kind or other. But when the chiefs avow that they cannot meet us in the field; when they are obliged to send the principal strength of their armies upon which the remainder depend to a distance, lest it should fall into our hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature if they suppose that their lighter bodies will act, and still less of the British officers if they imagine that, with impunity, they can do the smallest injury, provided only that the allies, who are to be first exposed to their attacks, are true to their own interests."

General Wellesley's army crossed the Godavery at Toka* on the 21st of August.

There is a tone of confidence in the letters of General Wellesley which must strike every body. Doubt and fear are words of which he made little

* The army was passed over this wide river in wicker boats covered with skins, which were made by the troops.

use throughout his voluminous correspondence. Thus when sending instructions at this time to Colonel Murray, who had taken command of the troops in Guzerat, he says, "*As soon as Baroach shall be taken*, I recommend that you should collect your troops in a station in front of Baroda, north of Nerbudda." The fort of Baroach was breached, and afterwards carried by storm in the most gallant manner, on the 29th of August, by detachments of his Majesty's 61st and 86th regiments, with some Sepoys, under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Woodington. The Arabs again showed themselves valuable soldiers, as the garrison, composed entirely of that people, defended the fort with great determination.

It was fortunate that the government of Bombay had at this time the assistance of General Wellesley's advice, otherwise the small force at its disposal would have been parcelled out into several weak detachments, and its power thereby completely neutralized. We find that on the 22d of August he addressed a long and very able letter to the secretary of that government, in which he lays down a plan for military operations in that quarter according to just military principles. The following are extracts from this letter: —

"To disperse the troops in three different divisions, to make head against the three expected attacks, will not answer. None of the divisions can be strong enough to act with vigour; the consequence must be that the whole country will be plundered; and very possibly some misfortune may happen to one of the divisions, which might give the enemy a permanent settlement within it. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 22.

* * * * * *

"These are my sentiments upon the plan of operations for Guzerat. I can have but little local knowledge of that country, and Major Walker must have much; but I object,

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upon military principles, to the separation of our small forces in that quarter, and to undertaking many distinct operations with inadequate means. If the honourable the governor in council should think it proper to adopt the suggestions of Major Walker, they must be carried into execution; and I hope that I shall not be considered responsible for the consequences."

Nothing can exemplify more strongly the mischief of employing *civil* governors in situations where they have power to interfere in warlike measures, than the embarrassments occasioned during this war by the governor of Bombay. From first to last Mr. Duncan contrived to thwart the general commanding in the field in a variety of ways, owing entirely to his ignorance of military matters and prejudice. In a letter addressed to Major Shawe at Calcutta, General Wellesley writes on this subject, —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 24.

"I do not like our situation in Guzerat. We have plenty of troops for the defence of that province, but they are not organized or commanded; one party being under the command of a committee, consisting of a collector, a judge, and Colonel Callander; and the other under that of Major Walker: they are not equipped or provided. I have proposed a plan to Mr. Duncan for the organization and equipment of the troops, and for the general defence of Guzerat. But although he cannot disapprove of it, it interferes with all his little prejudices, plans of operation, Mooluck-geery, conquests in Kattywar, &c. &c.; and I see plainly that it never will be carried into execution as it ought; and that, in fact, it will be thwarted. Under these circumstances, I had serious thoughts of writing to the governor-general to request him to relieve me from the command in Guzerat; but I have refrained from doing so, and shall persevere as long as I can.

"What do you think of Mr. Duncan and Major Walker doubting whether Anund Rao's* troops, and even the subsidiary force, should go on the expedition to Baroach (which, by the by, after all I believe they have not sent), as the Guickwar government was in "close alliance" with Dowlut Rao

* The chief of Guzerat; the Guickwar.

Scindiah? Then they have their troops scattered in companies in ten thousand different directions. They have three complete regiments of Europeans and parts of three others in those countries, but none collected; and they have neither provisions, ammunition, cattle, magazines, nor any one equipment that the troops want."

At length, finding the governor of Bombay perfectly impracticable, (for he disapproved of General Wellesley's plan and sought to throw all the responsibility of its execution upon him,) he adresses a letter to Mr. Duncan, of which the following is an extract: —

"I certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public service. But the measures in question are of a general nature, and have been recommended as being applicable to our military situation in the Attavesy and Guzerat. You, who must have a better knowledge of the local circumstances of those districts, are of opinion that they are not, and you object to them in principle as well as in detail. I should be presumptuous indeed if, after such an opinion, I were to persist in ordering the adoption of these measures, and I should well deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that may happen.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 29.

"At the same time I have to observe to you, that the communication between me and the troops in those provinces is necessarily very long; that circumstances may render it longer, and may prevent it entirely; and therefore I request that you will be so kind as to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to act for the public service without reference to me."

Meanwhile Colonel Stevenson's corps, which was posted near the Dewal and Badowly ghauts, had kept Scindiah and the rajah of Berar in check, their forces remaining between the Adjuntee ghaut and Burhampoor. But on the 20th and 21st of August, they made a move to the eastward, in order to induce Stevenson to march in the same direction: not aware of their design, he fell into their views; passed Jaffierabad, and thus left the

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ghauts free for the enemy, who returned to the westward on the 22d, and ascending the Adjuntee ghaut on the 23d and 24th with a large body composed of cavalry only, penetrated into the Nizam's territory, with the object of crossing the Godavery, should that river be fordable, and thence proceeding to Hyderabad. General Wellesley, who had moved upon Aurungabad after crossing the river at Toka, having heard on the 27th of the enemy's march to the southward, passed to the eastward of that city on the 30th, and marched with all haste in a S.W. direction towards the Godavery, in order to prevent their passing that river. This rapid movement disconcerted them; and although the river was fordable, they hesitated to cross, knowing it would speedily rise, and that if, in consequence of General Wellesley's activity, they were unable to execute their project on Hyderabad, their retreat northward would be cut off.

General Wellesley had at length succeeded in rendering his army capable of moving with a celerity hitherto unknown in India: long marches were frequently performed at the rate of three miles an hour. Personally, he was remarkably alert, and being endowed in an extraordinary degree with a "mens sana in corpore sano," was able to endure great fatigue both of body and mind. He has been truly described, as "gifted with a frame well calculated for the sustaining of all fatigues, and a sound and vigorous constitution." And the talented writer from whom we quote the above, thus depicts his personal appearance: — "General Wellesley was a little above the middle height, well limbed, and muscular; with little encumbrance of flesh beyond that which gives shape

Major Sherer. Memoirs, &c.

and manliness to the outline of the figure; with a firm tread; an erect carriage; a countenance strongly patrician, both in feature, profile, and expression; and an appearance remarkable and distinguished: few could approach him on any duty, or on any subject requiring his serious attention, without being sensible of something strange and penetrating in his clear light eye. Nothing could be more simple and straightforward than the matter of what he uttered; nor did he ever in his life affect any peculiarity or pomp of manner, or rise to any coarse weak loudness in his tone of voice. It was not so that he gave expression to excited feeling." All who have had the good fortune to approach the noble original will at once recognize the striking likeness of the above portrait,—sketched by a master hand. Let us add a few touches. With the vast responsibility resting at this time on General Wellesley—the multiplicity of calls on his time and attention, occasioned by an extensive correspondence, which regulated distant affairs; the presence of formidable enemies; the necessity of conciliating and overawing doubtful friends; — who, we ask, reflecting on the situation in which he was placed, would not imagine him to have betrayed some anxiety of mind—shown outward signs of busy thought within? On the contrary, not a man in his army seemed more devoid of care. Full of animation and urbanity, no reproving look checked the joke or suppressed the laugh of those about him. "Come away," he would call out; and off he went at full speed after his gallant greyhounds, who commonly obtained much of his attention during a march; and, game abounding, the general and any officers

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not required to be with their regiments, who felt disposed to enjoy the coursing, were able to beguile the time by this exhilarating sport.

With an astonishing facility of getting through business, aided by a rapid pen, he found leisure for every thing; and, the ordinary hours of employment past, was ready to give his opinion on the shape and qualities of a dog or a horse, with all the acumen of a connoisseur. If we add, that he was temperate in his habits, particularly as regards what are termed the pleasures of the table, enough will have been said. We fear not to have the correctness of these details impugned: they came from one who often shared his tent at the period now under consideration.

But, returning to the Godavery, had General Wellesley shown less activity and decision after penetrating their design, the Mahratta chieftains might have crossed the river, and got so far in advance as would have enabled them to reach and plunder Hyderabad before the British could have been up to prevent it: but the great and unexpected celerity of General Wellesley's movements disconcerted their project of obtaining a good start, and they prudently retired, without having done any material mischief. They seized, however, the persons of some of the principal inhabitants of the towns near which they passed, and detained them as securities for the payment of contributions levied upon certain districts. Upon hearing of this, General Wellesley wrote to Bombay and Poonah, desiring that some families and individuals—subjects of Scindiah—residing at those places might be arrested and retained, as a measure of retaliation.

The enemy's force in the field being wholly

composed of cavalry, the British general could do no more than watch it with attention, and be in readiness to counteract their purpose, should they resume the plan of making an irruption in force upon the Nizam's dominions with the object of plundering Hyderabad. Colonel Stevenson was directed to move from the vicinity of Jaffierabad towards the enemy; and he accordingly marched upon Jalnapoor, which lies about forty miles east of Aurungabad, when, finding that the enemy had gone to the southward, he attacked and carried that fort on the 2d of September.

Still attentive to the enemy's movements, General Wellesley continued at Rackisbaum, close to the Godavery, during the 3d and 4th. On the 5th and 6th, he marched eastward along the bank of the river, ready to move on Hyderabad, should the enemy resume their original plan of crossing the Godavery, (which still remained fordable,) and proceeding to the Nizam's capital.

Some troops belonging to the Begum Sumroo, who were sent to aid the confederates, being now at hand, the enemy made a move to the northward to facilitate their junction with the main army; this was soon after effected, the campoos or brigades of the Begum having ascended the Adjuntee ghaut and evaded Stevenson's corps. It is remarkable that at no time could General Wellesley get near the enemy; while they entertained no such respect for Colonel Stevenson, who was frequently disturbed, even in his camp, by their predatory parties.

We may here take occasion to mention that the British commander ascertained about this time, fully to his satisfaction, that the present war was

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urged upon Scindiah by the rajah of Berar, who knew from the exhausted state of Scindiah's and Holkar's territories, in consequence of the armies having lived upon them so long, that if no war took place the troops must have gone into his own dominions for the means of subsistence.

It might be asked why General Wellesley deemed it necessary to move on Hyderabad in the event of the confederates proceeding thither, when Major-General Campbell with a strong division was stationed at Moodgul? The answer is, that Wellesley conceived it probable that should Campbell march for the protection of the Nizam's capital, Holkar might seize the opportunity his absence from Moodgul would present, to push southward, pass Poonah, and invade the territories of the Company, or those of the rajah of Mysore. A glance at the map will show the danger that such a movement by Holkar would occasion. General Wellesley's plan at this juncture was to send Stevenson to make an incursion into the rajah of Berar's territories, with the view of attacking the fort of Gawilghur, and afterwards proceeding to the rajah's capital, Nagpoor, should his inroad not have the effect of diverting the allied chiefs from their purpose of going to Hyderabad. It will be seen presently what considerations prevented the immediate execution of this project. We think there can be no doubt that the confederates really contemplated an attempt on the Nizam's capital; why otherwise did they leave the whole of their infantry beyond the ghauts? And there can be as little doubt that they were disconcerted, and compelled to relinquish their plan, in consequence of the British general's great activity.

We can perceive at this period that General Wellesley began to doubt the propriety of detaching Stevenson into the rajah's territories. Reports were current that the Nizam's cavalry serving under him was not to be depended on. He had inspired the enemy with little awe, as was very apparent; nor does he seem to have had the necessary confidence in his troops, without which operations rarely prosper. We find, therefore, General Wellesley desirous to beat the enemy in the field previous to sending Stevenson into Berar. Besides, there was at this moment some prospect of bringing them to action, as their infantry was now coming forward; a proof that they had changed their plans.

We have at this time an instance how much General Wellesley valued truth and justice as a matter of policy, independent of higher considerations. Futty Sing, one of Holkar's chiefs, who, it will be recollected, was in treaty for the transfer of himself and troops to the Peshwah, was suspected of treachery, and seized by Meer Khan, another of Holkar's leaders, who kept him a prisoner. An agreement was, however, subsequently entered into between the person who had charge of Futty Sing and the British authorities in Guzerat, by which he was to be delivered up to them on payment of a specified ransom. An attempt having been made by Major Walker to obtain possession of Futty Sing's person previous to paying the ransom, General Wellesley animadverted very strongly on the impropriety and dangerous tendency of such a proceeding; concluding with the following just observation, "If we lose our character for truth and good faith, we shall have but little to stand upon in this country."

CHAPTER VIII.

BATTLE OF ASSYE. — OPERATIONS CONTINUED. — TRUCE WITH SCINDIAH. — BATTLE OF ARGAUM. — CAPTURE OF GAWILGHUR. — PEACE WITH THE RAJAH OF BERAR AND SCINDIAH.

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GENERAL WELLESLEY remained upon the Godavery until the 20th of September, when he moved towards the enemy, who by that time had been joined by a large body of infantry in addition to the campoos of the Begum Sumroo. The confederates, it was ascertained, were encamped near Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad. On the 21st, Stevenson's corps being near, General Wellesley had a conference with that officer at Budnapoor, in which it was arranged that a combined attack should be made on the enemy upon the 24th.

A tract of hilly country lying between Budnapoor and Jaulna having to be passed, the corps separated; that of General Wellesley pursuing a road which led in an eastern direction, while Stevenson's force followed a route to the westward. This separation was necessary, — first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; and secondly, because it was possible if one road were left open, the enemy might seize the opportunity of passing by it to the southward, and thus delay, if not altogether avoid, the action which General Wellesley was so desirous to bring on. Besides, there was little risk in thus moving by different

routes, when the nature of the country is considered; for the enemy's immense force of cavalry could not avail them amongst the hills, and either of the British corps was deemed of sufficient strength to cope singly with their infantry. Thus it appeared there was no danger to be apprehended from advancing in separate columns, while a twofold object was secured by the measure. The utmost distance between them during the subsequent march was twelve miles.

The enemy, as we have already noticed, were said to be at Bokerdun; and General Wellesley regulated his march so as to encamp at Naulniah on the 23d, where he calculated his distance from Bokerdun would be about twelve or fourteen miles. On reaching Naulniah, the common hircarrahs of the country reported that Scindiah and the rajah of Berar had moved off that morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but remained still in camp; not, however, at Bokerdun, as had been before represented, but near the village of Assye, which was only six miles from where the British had halted. It now appeared that, without any purpose to deceive, the hircarrahs had misled General Wellesley with regard to the situation of the enemy, who, though in the district of Bokerdun, were encamped between that village and Assye.

Having no reason to doubt the correctness of the intelligence received at Naulniah, the British general resolved to march at once, and attack the enemy's infantry. Despatching, therefore, a messenger to apprize Colonel Stevenson of his intention, and with an order for his corps to advance immediately, General Wellesley marched towards

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Assye, leaving his baggage at Naulniah with a sufficient guard. Taking the 19th dragoons and three regiments of the regular native cavalry, he hastened on to reconnoitre, and soon obtained a sight of that enemy who had hitherto so carefully eluded him. But instead of infantry only, the whole combined army of Scindiah and the rajah was before him. The rising ground whereon he stood commanded a view of the entire encampment, which extended over a space of some miles, between Bokerdun and Assye: swarms of cavalry covered the plain before him, while to his right the infantry stretched towards the latter village. Along the enemy's front flowed the seemingly impassable Kaitna, between high and rugged banks, which received its tributary the Jouah a short distance beyond the enemy's left, the two streams joining at an acute angle. Thus they occupied the whole of the plain for a distance of several miles, between the Kaitna and the Jouah, excepting a triangular space of some extent beyond their left flank; the whole of their vast train of artillery was with the infantry.

The enemy's position was formidable, and the situation of the British critical. It was impossible to form a junction with Colonel Stevenson; and if it had been possible, the delay might have counterbalanced the accession of force. General Wellesley paused to consider how he should act in this unexpected emergency. Before him, it was true, lay an immense army; but how was it composed —who were its leaders—was it trained to manœuvre and act as one great body—could mutual confidence be supposed to subsist between the chiefs and their troops—had the former any confidence

in themselves — what would be the moral effect of his declining to attack an enemy who had always sought to avoid him? These or similar reflections must have rushed across the British general's mind as he sat on horseback surveying the mixed multitude spread over so large a space in his front, with that calm look and composed demeanour which every one must have remarked who has seen him in the battle-field. What occupied his thoughts during those anxious moments he alone can tell — of no one did he ask advice, and none presumed to proffer any. All those around him waited in nervous expectation; — they knew that the enormous mass before them could not number less than 50,000 combatants, of whom 10,000 were disciplined infantry, officered by Europeans, chiefly Frenchmen. This body alone would have been a formidable force for their own little band to attack; but besides this well-organized body, the enemy had full 10,000 irregular infantry, and upwards of 30,000 horse!

To attack such an army, so strongly posted, and supported by more than 100 pieces of artillery, with a mere division, numbering but 4500 men *, of whom only 1700 were Europeans, required all the nerve of a Wellesley; and yet, when his resolution to fight, which flew like wildfire through their ranks, became known to all, it seemed as if not a man doubted the result: so un-

* General Wellesley had with him upwards of 5000 irregular horse, composed of Mogul, Mysore, and the Peshwah's troops; but they could not be trusted for an attack, and therefore were not taken into action. They kept a large portion of the enemy's cavalry at bay, however, and by guarding the ford at Peepulgaon secured the British army from attack on its left flank and rear.

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bounded was the reliance on their general, so great the confidence in their own disciplined strength.

General Wellesley formed his plan of attack as quickly as he had his resolution to give battle: he determined to assail the enemy's infantry, which, as we have said, constituted exclusively their left wing; the effect of which would be not only to neutralize the whole of their numerous cavalry, but to reduce the field of battle to a confined space, where each of his flanks resting upon a river, the immense numerical superiority of the enemy could not be employed to surround him. Circumstances favoured this masterly project: the road by which he had been marching led to Peepulgaon, a village situated on the right bank of the Kaitna, and somewhat lower down the stream than where the enemy's left extended. At this place the only ford in the vicinity by which guns could pass the river presented itself, and by it General Wellesley determined to cross.* On first approaching the enemy, he came in front of their right; it was now therefore necessary to move to their left, beyond which, as we have already observed, lay the village of Peepulgaon. In the meantime a body of the enemy's horse had passed the Kaitna, and advanced to within a mile of the British cavalry, when they threw out some skirmishers, who were checked by a party of the latter.

Leaving the British cavalry under Colonel

* Some accounts of this battle which we have seen, give General Wellesley great credit for sagacity in detecting the situation of the ford, stating that, from the circumstance of two villages existing, one on either bank, directly opposite each other, he concluded the ford must lie between them. It may be relied on, that he knew of the situation and nature of the Peepulgaon ford long before he approached the enemy that day. It was on the high road.

Maxwell to observe the enemy's horse, General Wellesley rode towards his infantry, and directed them upon Peepulgaon, covered in this movement by his Mysore cavalry and that of the Peshwah. For some time the enemy were unconscious of his object; but having at length perceived that their left flank was threatened, they effected a change of front. The right of their new position rested upon the Kaitna, and its left on the village of Assye and the Jouah, their infantry being in two lines; the second, thrown back from Assye at a considerable angle with the first line, which was covered by the artillery, thickly placed along its front; but fortunately they did not occupy the ford, or the intention of General Wellesley to cross at that point would have been frustrated. The enemy opened their artillery on the leading British column as it approached the ford, but the range was too long for the fire to produce any effect. The river was passed without difficulty, and the troops formed on the other side, exposed to a hot cannonade from the most advanced guns.

On finding the Mahrattas had changed their front, General Wellesley altered his plan of attack; for their left, resting upon Assye, round which village cannon was thickly planted, had become the strongest flank: he determined therefore to manœuvre by his left, and attack the right of the enemy's infantry, in order to push it upon the Jouah. By this time his own infantry was formed in two lines; the first consisted of the piquets, two battalions of Sepoys, and the 78th Highlanders; the second of H. M.'s 74th regiment and two Sepoy battalions; in the rear was Maxwell with the British cavalry. The Peshwah's and Mysore

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horse was left on the other side of the river to observe and keep in check the Mahratta cavalry. Thus 4500 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were all that passed the Kaitna!

General Wellesley led himself the attack against the enemy's right, and the troops moved forward with much steadiness and determination, exposed to a tremendous cannonade, which did great execution: the noise seemed like a continuous roll of thunder. Meanwhile the officer in command of the piquets forming the right of the first line, forgetting, or having mistaken his orders, led directly towards the village of Assye, notwithstanding the tremendous fire that greeted his approach, instead of holding back, and allowing the left wing to precede him in the attack: the consequence was that most of his men were swept off, and the 74th regiment, which had been ordered to support the piquets, following on, likewise sustained at this moment a very heavy loss. A body of Mahratta horse, taking advantage of their disordered ranks, moved round the village of Assye, and charged them with considerable effect. This being observed by Colonel Maxwell, he dashed forward with his dragoons, and drove the Mahratta cavalry across the Jouah with great slaughter.

While this was going on upon the right flank, General Wellesley had been advancing with his left. The few guns he had were speedily rendered useless, many of the gunners and bullocks having fallen under the heavy cannonade. He therefore ordered them to be abandoned; and directing his troops to charge with the bayonet, they rushed forward, and were soon masters of the enemy's guns in that quarter; and, pushing on, drove their in-

fantry towards the Jouah. A simultaneous effort being made by the piquets and 74th regiment, the enemy gave way at Assye; but, unlike ordinary Mahratta troops, Scindiah's French infantry retreated in tolerable order, and once they even attempted to rally; but Wellesley gave them no time, and the battle was his own.

The victors were in hot pursuit when a circumstance happened, unique in the history of battles. Numbers of the Mahrattas would not fly from their guns, and had been either sabred or bayoneted; others threw themselves to the ground, and lay as if dead: these, encouraged by the presence of some broken infantry who had assembled near Assye, rose up and commenced a fire upon the rear of the British. Hearing this cannon, some battalions of the enemy halted and faced their pursuers; they, however, were once more driven off by a charge of the brave Maxwell, who here closed his career, being killed by a musket shot.

The Mahratta horse, who had been hovering round the British during the battle, but save on the occasion we have mentioned near Assye took no part in it, now drew near, for if ready to snatch victory yet from the gallant Wellesley. The moment was somewhat critical; for the elated victors, having lost their order in the eagerness of pursuit, and become separated into small bodies, were now between two fires. Luckily the 78th regiment remained together; and General Wellesley putting himself at its head, and taking with him what he could collect of the 7th native cavalry, charged the Mahrattas who had possession of the guns, and slew or dispersed the whole: in this operation the general's horse was killed by a cannon shot. Thus terminated this hard-

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fought battle. There was no pursuit of the flying enemy, as the British cavalry were in no condition for further exertion.

The battle of Assye presents one of the most extraordinary instances of successful daring in the annals of our own or of any other country. It was not a contest between a numerous body of mere Indian hordes and disciplined British troops. Scindiah's regular infantry, under French officers, was a most formidable force; the guns were admirably served, and the field was well disputed. But the event justified General Wellesley's attack: he knew that good troops without a leader are like a body without the soul. Rightly did he judge that what the French term "morale" could not exist in the mass before him; that of mutual confidence there was none. On the whole, we are bound to pronounce upon this battle, that the attack, though daring, was proper; the execution of the bold conception masterly; and we presume to assert that the history of the illustrious victor does not contribute a brighter page towards his fame, than that which records the justly celebrated battle of Assye.

One hundred pieces of artillery, and seven stand of colours, were the trophies of the victory; but the moral effect it produced was incalculable. The native princes saw that it was impossible for them to contend with British troops in the field, and all confidence was thenceforth destroyed even in their best disciplined troops, on whom such hopes had rested. "There is something extremely sensitive in the Indian mind, which is acted upon with extraordinary force by whatever is strange or unexpected. Such displays of valour they never fail to exaggerate, attaching to them a mysterious efficacy, which par-

takes deeply of the supernatural. It was on the field of Assye, perhaps, that the spirit of India was vanquished; and Hindostan, after that fatal day, was viewed by its people as having passed into the hands of invincible conquerors."*

The enemy had 1200 left dead on the field, and at least 4000 wounded. The loss of the British was 365 killed and 1481 wounded; amounting to about two fifths of the whole force engaged.

Colonel Stevenson, who did not receive General Wellesley's orders until the evening, marched immediately with part of his troops towards Bokerdun; but getting entangled in a nullah during the night, could not arrive at that place until eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. The enemy, who had passed the night about twelve miles from the field of battle, hearing of Stevenson's approach, fled immediately across the ghauts by the Adjuntee pass. After his harassing night march, he was in no condition to pursue them; and General Wellesley was glad to avail himself of the surgeons belonging to his force to dress the wounded soldiers; he therefore detained Colonel Stevenson until the 26th, on which day he marched after the enemy.

General Wellesley was now embarrassed by his numerous wounded men. Dowlutabad, a strong fort belonging to the Nizam, was the nearest place of security; but the killadar refused to admit them. Finally, he resolved upon placing them at Adjuntee, which, though a fort of little strength, would, he trusted, be sufficient to afford them protection. He constantly visited the poor fellows, spoke kindly to them, and supplied from his own private stores

* Historical and Descriptive Account of British India.

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whatsoever could conduce to their comfort or alleviate their misery; and none more than the rough soldier can appreciate the word of sympathy, or the act of kindness.

The general was anxious to follow, and be ready to support Colonel Stevenson; for the gallant bearing of Scindiah's infantry in the recent battle had impressed him with a higher opinion of native troops than he had before entertained; and as that chieftain had been joined by some brigades of disciplined infantry which were not present at Assye, he feared that Stevenson's corps alone would not be strong enough to oppose them. On the 5th of October a letter arrived from Scindiah's camp, written by a person in his confidence, proposing that a British officer should be sent thither for the purpose of negotiating terms of peace between the allies and the confederated Mahratta chieftains. This artful proposal was declined by General Wellesley, who was well aware of the purposes to be answered by the presence of a British officer in their camp. In reply he stated that he was willing to receive, and treat with the respect due to his rank, any person whom the Maharajah (Scindiah) might think proper to send, and should lose no time in taking his wishes into consideration.

General Wellesley, whose camp was at Adjuntee on the 8th of October, having learnt that Scindiah and the rajah had left Burhampoor (whither they had retired after the battle of the 23d), and after first marching westward with some field pieces taken from that place, had then turned to the south, with an intention, it was said, of passing the Casserbarry ghaut, determined to take the same direction. He was of opinion that by marching upon Asseerghur,

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and eventually upon Nagpoor with his whole force, the war might be speedily brought to a termination; but on the other hand, such was the weakness of the Nizam's government and that of the Peshwah,—so deplorably were they deficient in soldiers on whom any dependence could be placed,—so miserably garrisoned were their forts, that, were he to move northward, the enemy might get possession of some important place belonging to the Nizam, levy contributions on his territories, perhaps move down as far even as Poonah, and to a certainty stop all supplies intended for the British army. These considerations induced the British general to move southward himself, and send Stevenson forward to the Taptee. The following is extracted from a letter written from his camp at Phoolmurry, sixteen miles north of Aurungabad, on the 11th of October, to Major Malcolm:—

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Oct. 11.

"I agree in opinion with you regarding our defensive operations. But none of that kind will answer long, unless mixed with a little offensive.

"I have made a dash down here upon a defensive principle; the enemy, with all their horse and some infantry and guns, which they have drawn out of Burhampoor, having threatened to pass to the southward by the Casserbarry ghaut. But it is only a threat, and I believe I have stopped them already. At the same time, I have taken advantage of the terror created by our late success to push forward Colonel Stevenson upon Burhampoor, and even Asseerghur, if the beaten campoos which are refitting there should retreat to the Nerbudda, which I think they will. These two movements must relieve the Peshwah and the Nizam from the invasion; and I think it possible that they may bring propositions for peace.

"I have lost sight of Holkar entirely. My last accounts of him were that he was gone to plunder Ougein. It has been said since that he is gone to the northward."

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In a letter to Colonel Stevenson, written on the 12th, giving him instructions how to act, the following passages occur, which show General Wellesley's views as regards fighting against Indian armies: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Oct. 12.

"Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access; for which the banks of the numerons rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well your may have intrenched it; but when you shall hear that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage, and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march: they will not have time to form; which, being but half-disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have chosen for the battle: a part of their troops only will be engaged; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory. Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground.

"There is another mode of avoiding an action, which is to keep constantly in motion; but unless you come towards me, that would not answer. For my part, I am of opinion that after the beating they received on the 23d of September, they are not likely to stand for a second, and they will all retire with precipitation. But the natives of this country are rashness personified; and I acknowledge that I should not like to see again such a loss as I sustained on the 23d of September, even if attended by such a gain."

Colonel Stevenson having entered Burhampoor on the 15th of October without opposition, levied a contribution, for which he was authorized by General Wellesley, of upwards of three lacs of rupees, and immediately afterwards commenced operations against Asseerghur. On the 18th he

attacked and carried the pettah, and commenced the siege of the fort, which was, however, surrendered on the 21st without firing a shot. At this time the rajah of Berar, having separated from Scindiah, had moved towards the Godavery, and thus afforded occupation to General Wellesley, who was determined to disappoint his projects, whatever they might be. Hearing of a convoy, consisting of 14,000 bullocks, which was advancing from the Godavery, protected by a small force, the rajah, who was not far to the eastward of Aurungabad, detached 5000 horse on the 31st of October to intercept it; these were repulsed with great gallantry by the escort under Captain Baynes, and after this the rajah moved in an eastern direction along the Godavery. It was unfortunate that General Wellesley was obliged to order his movements so as to be at hand to protect the convoy coming from the south, upon whose safe arrival depended his ability to conduct ulterior operations of consequence, as a favourable opportunity presented itself for destroying the rajah's horse between the 29th and 31st.

On the 7th of November an ambassador from Scindiah arrived in General Wellesley's camp, but unprovided with the necessary powers to treat. After much delay and many conferences, a truce was at length agreed upon on the 22d; the principal article of which was, that Scindiah should take up a position with his army in the territories of the rajah of Berar, twenty coss (40 miles) to the eastward of Ellichpoor, in which case the British troops were not to attack those in his service. In the correspondence at this time it is curious to observe how thoroughly General Wel-

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lesley seems to have penetrated the views and wishes of Scindiah, as well as the designs and objects of his ministers. In the meantime he strongly doubted the intention of Scindiah to fulfil the main condition of the truce—that of moving to Ellichpoor; we therefore find him, in a communication to Colonel Stevenson, dated from the foot of the Rajoora ghaut, 25th November, who had previously been directed to re-equip his division for a siege from the stores of Asseerghur, and then proceed to the attack of Gawilghur, desiring him to attack Scindiah, should that chieftain not comply with the agreement to move east of Ellichpoor and be within his reach.

General Wellesley finding that the rajah of Berar continued the movement towards his own territories, descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th of November, in order to support and cover Colonel Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur and Berar. Scindiah, who had shown no disposition to conform to the terms of the late agreement, was encamped at Sersooly, about four miles from the camp of Manoo Bappoo, brother to the rajah of Berar, whose force lay at Parterly. Scindiah's force consisted entirely of cavalry; but Manoo Bappoo, besides cavalry, had with him the greater part, if not the whole, of the rajah's regular infantry, and a large proportion of artillery. Scindiah's vakeels were urgent that General Wellesley should not attack these troops; but he informed them that there existed no suspension of arms with Ragojee Bhoonslah*, nor any with Scindiah till he should comply with the terms of his agreement; and that

* The name of the rajah of Berar.

he would certainly attack the enemies of the Company, wherever he might find them. On the 29th General Wellesley arrived at Parterly, where he was most opportunely joined by Colonel Stevenson, who had halted the day before at Huttee Andorah to enable him to co-operate in the attack of the enemy. The armies of both chiefs had decamped; but from a tower at Parterly a confused mass could be perceived about two miles beyond Sersooly and Scindiah's recent camp, which was concluded to be their armies in movement.

The troops having marched a great distance on a very hot day, General Wellesley did not think it proper to pursue the enemy; but in a short time bodies of horse approached, with which the Mysore cavalry skirmished; and on going forth to push forward the piquets of the infantry to support the cavalry and to take up the ground of encampment, the general could distinctly perceive a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plain immediately in front of the village of Argaum, and about six miles distant.

An attack was determined on, although the day was far spent. The troops were instantly formed in a single column, and marched towards the enemy. Scindiah's heavy body of cavalry was on the right; next to which stood the rajah's infantry and guns, flanked on the left by the Berar cavalry; a swarm of Pindarries and other light cavalry hovered upon the extreme right. Their line extended above five miles, having the village of Argaum with its extensive gardens and enclosures in rear, and in front a plain much intersected with water-courses.

General Wellesley formed the whole of his infantry in a single line, nearly parallel to that of the

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enemy, the cavalry being in the rear, and constituting a second line. The British right was somewhat advanced, in order to press upon the left wing of the enemy. A brisk cannonade having opened unexpectedly from some heavy guns which were concealed by trees, part of the native infantry — and the same troops who had behaved most heroically at Assye — were seized with a panic, turned, and actually ran off; but luckily General Wellesley was at hand, and able, after a short time, to rally them; but for this the consequences might have been most serious.* After this untoward circumstance had been repaired, the troops advanced in the greatest order. On getting near the enemy's left, the 74th and 78th regiments, forming the most advanced part of the line, were charged by a large body of Persian cavalry in the service of Berar, which for some time maintained a fierce combat with the British infantry. They were all destroyed. At the same moment Scindiah's horse, willing to avenge the defeat of Assye, bore down — a tumultuous mass — upon the left wing; but it was received with such steadiness by a battalion of the 6th native infantry, that it quickly wheeled about and retired in confusion and with great loss. The British pressed forward; when the enemy's infantry, having no inclination to await a charge, gave way, and the whole army went off in disorder, leaving in the hands of the victors all their cannon,

* The story current in the Madras army respecting this affair, and the correctness of which we see no reason to doubt, is, that the general on perceiving the panic, and that the men were running away, instead of seeking to check them at the first moment, turned and ran with them for a few hundred yards; but suddenly stopping, when he imagined the men to be out of breath, he faced about, laughed heartily as if it was a good joke which had been carried far enough, and succeeded, without difficulty, in re-establishing order.

amounting to thirty-eight pieces, together with the whole of their ammunition.

The cavalry pursued the fugitives for several miles by moonlight, killing a great number, and capturing many elephants, camels, and much baggage. A heavier loss would have been sustained by the enemy, had daylight continued a little longer, as the obscurity of night shrouded them from observation in their flight. Next morning the general despatched his irregular horse to harass their retreat, and to secure all the advantages possible from the victory. In this battle the Mogul and Mysore cavalry were brought into action, and fought bravely; that of the Peshwah was not engaged. A force under Amrut Rao*, who had recently joined General Wellesley's army in consequence of a compact, was some miles in the rear, and could not be present at the battle.

The troops underwent great fatigue, having been under arms from six in the morning until twelve at night, with the weather exceedingly hot and oppressive. The British loss only amounted to 46 killed and about 300 wounded; that of the enemy exceeded 2000.

On this occasion it was an agreeable surprise to General Wellesley when he found the enemy drawn up to receive battle. The extraordinary temerity, amounting to folly, of Scindiah was unaccountable; and proved him to be fickle, wayward, and unworthy of the task he had undertaken, — that of chief leader in a war like the one in which he was engaged. After suffering so signal a defeat as that of Assye, when a powerful army most strongly posted was

* The same who commanded Holkar's rear guard at Poonah.

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unable to stand against half the British force assembled at Argaum, it was ruining himself, and a wanton sacrifice of his combined troops, to await an attack which could have but one result.

The next operation was against Gawilghur, a strong fort belonging to the rajah of Berar. Both divisions of the army arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th of December, where an hospital was established for the wounded.

The fort of Gawilghur stands upon a lofty eminence, in a range of mountains between the sources of the Poorna and Taptee; it consisted of an inner and complete fort of considerable size, protected on one side (the southern) by a steep and inaccessible rock, while massive outworks of great height, and provided with towers, covered the body of the place to the north-west and north. To native armies such a fortress would seem impregnable; but European science has long divested the towering strong-holds we find in India and elswhere, of their ancient reputation, and transferred the idea of strength to the low, unassuming, and, to the inexperienced eye, unsuitable sites chosen in preference by modern engineers.

The army marched from Ellichpoor on the 7th of December; but the investment was only completed after a series of the most laborious services; the heavy ordnance, stores, &c. having to be dragged by hand over mountains and through ravines, for nearly the whole distance between that place and Gawilghur, (thirty miles) along roads made for the purpose by the troops themselves,—a most arduous task. Colonel Stevenson opened a fire on the 13th from two batteries raised on the Labada, or northern side; and General Wellesley

attempted to form a breach near the southern gate, or at all events draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. *

On the night of the 14th, practicable breaches were effected in the outworks on the northern side, and General Wellesley prepared to storm them. All being in readiness, the troops assaulted the fort at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 15th. The outworks were gained without difficulty, but the fort itself not being breached, could only be carried by escalade: this was gallantly done by Captain Campbell and the light company of the 94th, who got in, opened the gate for the rest, and the fort was in possession of the British. The enemy had a numerous and well-armed garrison; but such was their astonishment at the boldness and celerity of General Wellesley's proceedings, coupled with the terror his name inspired, that the resistance was feeble, although numbers fell at the gates, prompted by individual bravery to dispute the entrance of the assailants. The loss of the British was one officer and thirteen men killed, and two officers and sixty men wounded.†

* "A heavy gun had been directed to be conveyed by night to an important point, and its transportation over the most rugged mountain so long baffled all endeavours that the artillery officer, in despair, reported the accomplishment of it to be impossible. '*Impossible, sir!* exclaimed Colonel Wallace, who had all his life maintained the most rigid adherence to obedience,—'*impossible! let us see!*' He then called for a light, pulled the instructions from his pocket, and having read them, said, '*Oh, no! not impossible: the order is positive.*' The result evinced the efficacy of the order; and also afforded another proof that implicit obedience, when accompanied by devoted zeal, will in general overcome every difficulty." — *Gurwood. Despatches, &c.*

† When General Wellesley entered the fort, his first inquiry was for the killadar, and he went immediately to his house: his son, a fine lad of nine or ten years of age, said he did not know where he was; that he had gone out about two hours before, and had not returned. The poor fellow was ignorant of his fate, perhaps; but when order was sufficiently restored to admit the inhabitants who survived to venture out, a search was made, and his body, with that of Beny Sing, was found

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The rajah of Berar lost no time, after this blow, in sending an ambassador to treat for peace. The articles were speedily settled, and the treaty signed by General Wellesley; who nevertheless moved towards Nagpoor, knowing that he should thereby quicken the rajah's decision. His purpose was answered, and the rajah's ratification obtained with unusual despatch. On this occasion the British and their allies obtained all his territories westward of the Wurda, and those also lying to the southward of the hill on which are situated the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur; it was, however, stipulated that the latter place should be restored to the rajah when the ceded countries were taken possession of by the allies.

On the 23d, the day on which General Wellesley received the rajah's ratification of the treaty, Scindiah's two principal ministers arrived at the British camp; and notice was given them on the same day that the truce would be considered at an end after the 27th of December. They, however, thought proper to accede to the victor's terms of peace on the 28th; and Scindiah, vanquished on every side*,

amidst a heap of slain near the gateway. These two men, of good Rajpoot families, had determined to die in defence of their trust; and, according to the custom of their country, to save their wives and daughters from destruction, by putting them to death before they went out to meet their own. From some cause unknown to us, this was but imperfectly performed: of twelve or fourteen women, but three, I think, were dead when our men discovered them; and three or four more lay bleeding, having received two or three cuts or stabs with a knife or dagger. Probably, these Rajpoots entrusted this shocking duty to hands more humane than their own. General Wellesley visited them, and ordered every respect and care to be shown to them. Beny Sing and the killadar, however personally brave, do not seem to have been able to frame any regular plan for the defence of the inner wall, or to have infused much of their own spirit into their sepoys: the former is said to have killed or wounded two or three of our men before he fell."—*Journal of Major-General Sir Jasper Nicholls, K.C.B. Gurwood. Despatches, &c.*

* General Lake had defeated Scindiah's leaders in the north, and destroyed his power in that quarter.

his armies destroyed, his guns and matériel all captured, and finally deserted by the rajah of Berar, saw no alternative, and therefore yielded to the conditions of his conqueror, — purchasing peace by the sacrifice of his fairest territories. By this advantageous treaty the British gained those fertile provinces comprising the Dooab, or country between the Jumna and Ganges, together with extensive districts beyond the latter river, including Agra and Delhi: the person of the Great Mogul, who had long been in Scindiah's power, was transferred to the E. I. Company, along with those cities. Baroach and the rest of Scindiah's maritime territory in Guzerat fell also to the British, to the Nizam, and the Peshwah.

Thus terminated this splendid campaign, the operations of which were conducted throughout with consummate wisdom, and were attended with corresponding success. To us, who have followed General Wellesley step by step — who have weighed and carefully considered every march, every transaction, every letter, every publication connected with a war not only glorious, but which led to such solid advantages, it is a matter of most unfeigned regret that it has been impossible to awaken attention in England to Indian affairs, however momentous. Few, save such as are connected with that country, know aught distinctly of its divisions, its products, its inhabitants, or its governments. Most persons, perhaps, are aware that our Eastern empire was founded by the great Lord Clive, and that a surprising series of wise measures, surpassing all that we know of in other parts of the world, either in ancient or modern times, have secured to England this, her most important possession; but, fewer

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still know any thing of the details of the proceedings by which such extraordinary advantages have been gained: they possess a glimmering of the general outline, but the filling in of the picture that alone can excite any real interest escapes them entirely. The events in Europe that followed the French revolution, the wars, invasions, battles, overthrow of states and dethronements of monarchs, kept attention rivetted to affairs nearer home. Besides, remote occurrences, such as those in India, affect us little more than if such occurrences had happened at a distant period as to time. It seems as if all the interest attached to them evaporates during a four months' voyage.

General Wellesley had now established himself in public opinion as an officer of the highest talents, and a politician of consummate ability. In India, notwithstanding the great achievements of General Lake, all who had opportunities of estimating the respective merits of these two distinguished commanders gave the first rank to the victor of Assye. Nevertheless, so little was the home government able to appreciate the full value of General Wellesley's services, that the order of the Bath only was conferred upon him, while General Lake was rewarded by a peerage and a considerable pension. Both generals received the thanks of parliament.

We have yet before us a whole volume of General Wellesley's correspondence and writings while in India, untouched. Must we sink the period of nearly two years that elapsed between the close of the Mahratta war and his return to England in 1805, because it contains no stirring accounts of battles and sieges? We fear that his wisdom in government and negotiation, as exemplified in the

less brilliant though equally important services with those we have been recording, will have but little interest with the generality of our readers; and must endeavour therefore to glide through that period as rapidly as we can, touching only upon such passages in the conduct and measures of the illustrious subject of our history as may seem to call for some degree of attention; and this more with a view to making known his real character and the value of his services, than with any hope of interesting the reader in Indian affairs.

CHAPTER IX.

CONTRIBUTION LEVIED AT BURHAMPOOR. — POPULARITY OF GENERAL WELLESLEY. — SCENE IN SCINDIAH'S DURBAR. — WELLESLEY'S OPINION OF THE PESHWAH. — DESTRUCTION OF A BODY OF FREEBOOTERS. — HOLKAR. — FORT OF GWALIOR. — ARMY OF THE DECCAN BROKEN UP. — GENERAL WELLESLEY AT CALCUTTA. — RETURNS TO MADRAS. — RESOLVES TO GO TO EUROPE. — ADDRESSES. — SAILS FROM MADRAS.

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THE Mahratta war concluded, General Wellesley's attention was engaged in seeing the stipulations of his treaties fulfilled, and in settling affairs connected with the districts of which he was to take possession. As usual, the Mahratta chiefs had recourse to all the low trickery and falsehood usual amongst Asiatics; but little did their art avail against a man so penetrating and straightforward as Wellesley. Alluding to a claim set up by the rajah of Berar, he writes to the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had been appointed resident to that prince's durbar:

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 7

"It is impossible to frame a treaty of peace in such a manner as to find in it a decision of all questions which can arise between the parties concerned; particularly when the parties have frequently been at war, and have preserved a recollection of a variety of contradictory claims arising out of the events of their wars, which they are ready to bring forward on all occasions.

"But there are certain principles which supply the defect of all instruments of this description, and enable us to decide upon the scope and meaning of the different articles of the treaty, and to apply them to cases not in contemplation when the treaty was made.

"One of these principles is, that the meaning of an article of a treaty shall not be construed in a sense directly the reverse of the principles and basis on which the treaty of peace was negotiated."

It has been mentioned that Colonel Stevenson

was directed, when marching towards Burhampoor, to levy a contribution on that city; this was done, and General Wellesley had thereby been enabled to pay his army. He was now greatly annoyed to find the propriety of that measure questioned by the governor-general. This affair is alluded to chiefly as furnishing an instance of the high principle that directed the Marquis Wellesley, who would not suffer even the suspicion of a spot to remain on his own fair fame, or upon the honour of the country that reaped the benefit of his distinguished services.

In replying to the question raised respecting this contribution, after stating the amount of the demands on his military chest, and showing that no adequate provision had been made by the government to meet them, General Wellesley observed; that having been entrusted with the conduct of an extensive service, his duty to the governor-general required that he should omit nothing which could tend to ensure its success; and it would have been no excuse to him, nor to the world, if he had been obliged to give it up for want of money. He then shows that, without the sum levied at Burhampoor (upwards of three lacs of rupees), and the produce of the sales of property captured at Asseerghur, he would not have been able to pay the troops in December. At the present time even, he was greatly embarrassed for funds; so that unless money should arrive from Poonah or Hyderabad, there would be no resource for the ensuing month but the value of the plate captured at Gawilghur.

We may in this place observe, that no public functionary ever acquired more popularity among the natives of India, or exercised greater influence over them, than General Wellesley. They never

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would believe that he was not in the Company's army. Unaccustomed to receive from officers in the King's service those marks of attention to their interests and wishes of which mankind generally are so sensible, and none more so than the people among whom he was serving, they very naturally concluded that a person who could speak their language, and sought in every way to gratify and conciliate them, must be an officer whose interests lay in India. What a covert rebuke to British officers lies here! It is greatly to be regretted that so little pains are taken by men — second to none that ever lived in honour and good feeling — to secure, by a little exercise of amenity, the good-will of the inhabitants of those countries in which they may be serving. We commonly carry things with much too high a hand, and thereby provoke but too frequently their dislike and enmity.

The hard service of the late campaign began now to show its effects upon the health of General Wellesley; and we find him in a letter to Lord Wellesley, dated the 21st January, mentioning his ailments; notwithstanding which, he announces that he is about to cross the Godavery, to try and surprise some banditti who infested the Nizam's frontier. The same letter gives an explanation of the cause which led to the battle of Argaum; namely, the non-fulfilment of the conditions of the armistice by Scindiah. His reason for attacking the enemy at the close of day was to prevent their drawing off in the night, and obliging him to fight a more desperate battle in a position chosen by the enemy under the guns of Gawilghur.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 21.

A postscript to this letter contains an account of a ludicrous scene that disturbed the gravity of Scin-

diah's durbar on the occasion of Major Malcolm's first official visit as resident. It is as follows: —

"Malcolm writes from Scindiah's camp, that at the first meeting Scindiah received him with great gravity, which he had intended to preserve throughout the visit. It rained violently; and an officer of the escort, Mr. Pepper, an Irishman (a nephew of old Bective's by the by), sat under a flat part of the tent, which received a great part of the rain that fell. At length it burst through the tent upon the head of Mr. Pepper, who was concealed by the torrent that fell, and was discovered after some time by an 'Oh, Jasus!' and an hideous yell. Scindiah laughed violently, as did all the others present; and the gravity and dignity of the durbar degenerated into a Malcolm riot—after which they all parted upon the best terms."

The general had now much trouble to enforce the stipulations of the late treaty against the opposition of the Nizam's chieftains, who never could be brought to act with principle and good faith. The Mogul chiefs were as bad; and he was obliged to do all but attack the troops left in Burhampoor, before the latter would withdraw from that city. But the Peshwah gave him more annoyance than any; there was no possible way of making him act rationally. In short, those princes and their chief adherents seem to have been, one and all, totally devoid of the smallest particle of good principle; and it would appear that the same disregard of truth and honesty pervaded every grade of society in those *rotten* countries. Is it too much to imagine that an all-wise Providence may have blessed the British arms with so large a share of success, in order to open the way for a moral renovation in those degraded provinces, preparatory to the introduction of the light of truth, which is now overthrowing the unholy rites and superstitions of that benighted race?

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Writing of the Peshwah, General Wellesley in a few lines lets us completely into his character:—

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 26.

"I certainly have a bad opinion of the Peshwah: he has no public feeling, and his private disposition is terrible. I have no positive proof that he has been treacherous, but I have strong suspicion of it; and I know that since he signed the treaty of Bassein, he has done no one thing that has been desired, either with a view to forward his own interest, or the views of the alliance, or the common safety during the war.

"It may be asked, will you leave a fellow of that kind in possession of the government? I answer, I have no remedy; I cannot take it for the British government, without a breach of faith, and another war."

The proposed expedition to surprise and cut up a numerous body of freebooters, as already mentioned, was now undertaken. Cowle had been offered to the chiefs, on condition of their dismissing their troops and coming to his camp within five days. Finding they did not arrive according to agreement, General Wellesley put in motion a detachment composed of cavalry and infantry towards Perinda, from his camp, which was some miles south of the Godavery, on the morning of the 4th of February. Arriving at Sailgaon near Perinda, after a march of twenty miles, he learnt that the enemy had broken up from their camp at Vyerag, and approached nearer to Perinda, and were then only about twenty-four miles distant. The general marched again the same night, with an intention to attack their camp at daylight on the morning of the 5th.

Unfortunately the badness of the road prevented the arrival of the detachment at the point specified until nine o'clock, when the enemy were found to have struck their camp and gone off to the rear. The general, however, was not to be easily baffled;

so, taking a body of cavalry, he followed in pursuit. The enemy formed up a large mass of horse to cover the retreat of their guns and baggage; these were defeated and dispersed, and the whole of the guns, ammunition, bazaars, and baggage fell into the hands of the British. The enemy had a strong force, but wanted the talents of a Dhoondiah Waugh; otherwise General Wellesley might have had a second edition of the celebrated hunt after that wary freebooter. It was fortunate that the British troops were at hand for this service, as these marauders were the terror of the country, and had recently defeated a body of the Nizam's troops, and thus provided themselves with some artillery. The band too was rapidly increasing.

One remarkable circumstance attended this expedition: it was, that the greatest march the illustrious subject of these memoirs ever made throughout his long military career was on this occasion; the troops having moved sixty miles between six in the morning of the 4th and twelve at noon on the following day, when the business was over. Such celerity might well create astonishment amongst even Mahrattas.

The general began to think that the gallant troops under his command, who had marched and fought so completely to his satisfaction during a period of twelve months, required some repose. Since the battle of Assye, in September of the preceding year, they had not halted more than one day in any place, save at the siege of Gawilghur; for Wellesley, like Napoleon, had discovered that the secret of success in warlike operations lay in the legs of his soldiers.

Among all the letters comprised in the twelve

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noble volumes published by Colonel Gurwood, there are none which excite so deep an interest as those addressed to Sir John Malcolm. We can see that this distinguished officer possessed the general's entire confidence, and was the only person to whom he wrote with perfect unreserve. Thus, in a letter dated the 11th of February, 1804, we find him alarmed lest the governor-general should overstep the bounds prescribed by good faith, in his desire to secure all the advantages possible from the late treaties. His words on this occasion are remarkable. "I think that the moderation of the governor-general, which in any other man would pass current for ambition, induces him rather to adopt the principles of the commissioners in Cuttack, and to increase as much as possible the limits of the provinces, and the number of people to enjoy the benefits of the tenth article of the treaty of peace."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Feb. 11.

In the same letter he afterwards says, —

"In fact, my dear Malcolm, I see very clearly that I have made two very good treaties of peace; but I have not influence to carry them into execution in any of their stipulations; and there is no person about the governor-general to take an enlarged view of the state of our affairs, and to resist the importunities of the local authorities to force on the treaties a construction which will tend to the increase of their own petty power and authority."

If any evidence were required to settle our minds with respect to the duplicity, meanness, treachery, and inimical feeling of the Peshwah towards the English, his benefactors, it is furnished in a letter from General Wellesley to the acting resident at Poonah, dated the 17th of February, wherein nine specific acts of misconduct and treachery are enumerated as matters of which he had a perfect knowledge. His highness figures in that letter as a curious

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Feb. 17.

specimen of baseness of the lowest description in a sovereign prince.

Having remained for a short time upon the Beemah, and finding that all the freebooters had disappeared, the general went to Poonah. His correspondence at this time shows how profoundly he looked into all circumstances either intimately or remotely relating to the condition and prospects of the countries ruled by the Peshwah and the Nizam. Alluding to extensive ramifications of the freebooter system, and the consequences to be feared from it, he draws a melancholy picture of the state of society in those parts at that time. In every village there were from twenty to thirty horsemen, who, having been dismissed from the service of the state, had no means of living excepting by plunder. There was no law, no civil government, nor any army to keep the plunderers in order. No revenue could be collected; nor, indeed, could the inhabitants be induced to cultivate their land without the protection of an armed force. To this state of anarchy a large portion of the country of the Nizam and the Peshwah was reduced.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Feb. 26.

He then goes on to show how the extension of the British arms increases the evil; for, finding themselves protected, the princes and chieftains disband their forces, in order to employ the money which would go to pay their troops, to defray the expenses of luxury and debauchery. Men thus thrown out of employment must plunder or starve. The greater part of India having been subjected, or brought under British influence, the whole country, it was feared, would become a prey to this system, unless a remedy could be applied. The principal measures recommended by General Wel-

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lesley were, to force the allies to keep up their military establishments, and to furnish them with no assistance in carrying on their internal government excepting to oppose formidable rebellions. This was an evil long foreseen by the general, as his correspondence proves.

The division of the army which had been immediately under the command of General Wellesley throughout the late successful operations, now thought it a convenient time to testify the admiration and respect which his conduct, both public and private, had so universally inspired. The following letter was written to him by direction of the committee that had been appointed to carry into execution the wishes of the officers: —

"*To Major-General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, commanding the Division of the Army in the Deccan.*

"Sir,

"The officers who served with the division of the army under your immediate command in the Deccan are desirous of presenting you a pledge of their respect and esteem; and to express the high idea they possess of the gallantry and enterprise that so eminently distinguish you, they request your acceptance of a golden vase of the value of 2000 guineas, on which it is proposed to record the principal event that was decisive of the campaign in the Deccan.

"In conveying to you this mark of their esteem, they sincerely add their wishes for your future welfare and prosperity; and their hopes that when the public claims on your talents allow you repose, this vase may give pleasure to your social hours, in bringing to your remembrance events that add so much to your renown.

"We have the honour to be, Sir,
With great respect,
Your faithful and obedient servants."

(Signed by the several commanding officers and heads of departments.*)

* The signatures to the above letter were as follows: — W. Wallace, lieut.-colonel, commanding 5th brigade; J. M. Chalmers, lieut.-colonel,

To this very flattering communication, General Wellesley made a suitable reply; in which he gave due credit to the ability, zeal, and disciplined bravery of the troops, during the recent successful operations.*

The Peshwah, whose jealousy and dislike of the British seem to have been increased by the great services they had rendered him, now gave General Wellesley much occupation. It was requisite that he should be brought into the views of the governor-general, which were quite in accordance with his own interests; but such were his blindness and obstinacy, that argument and entreaty alike failed to make any impression upon him. In a letter to Major Shawe, the general thus writes of him: — "The Peshwah is callous to every thing but money and revenge: he will call upon the British government to gratify the latter passion, but he will make no sacrifices unless to procure money." A conference, however, with the ministers of this despicable prince, together with General Wellesley's influence at Poonah, served to remove the principal obstacles

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 7.

commanding 4th brigade; J. Kennedy, lieut.-colonel 19th dragoons, commanding 1st brigade of cavalry; J. Fortnam, major, 19th dragoons; J. Colebrooke, captain, and officers, 5th regiment native cavalry; —— Davidson, lieutenant, and officers, 4th regiment native cavalry; R. Huddlestone, major, and officers, 7th regiment native cavalry; William Cunningham, deputy quartermaster-general, and officers of the general staff; James Limond, captain, and officers of artillery; J. Swinton, major, and officers, his Majesty's 74th regiment; A. Adams, lieut.-colonel, and officers, his Majesty's 78th regiment; J. R. Chalmers, lieut.-colonel, and officers, 1st battalion 2d native regiment; P. H. Vesey, captain, and officers, 1st battalion 3d native regiment; Joseph Hill, lieut.-colonel, and officers, 1st battalion 4th native regiment; William Horrocks, lieut.-colonel, and officers, 1st battalion, 8th native regiment; P. Dallas, major, and officers, 1st battalion 10th native regiment; A. Macleod, lieut.-colonel, and officers, 2d battalion 12th native regiment; W. Hedland, captain, and officers, 1st battalion of pioneers; J. Johnson, captain, and officers, of engineers.

* A service of plate, with an appropriate inscription, was afterwards substituted for the gold vase.

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to an amicable arrangement of affairs. Having at length put matters in a proper train, and being desirous to transact business with the Bombay government, he took the opportunity, being so near, to proceed to that presidency, and arrived there about the 10th of March.

We have lost sight of Holkar for a considerable time, but are reminded of that wary chieftain by a letter from General Wellesley to General Stuart, the commander-in-chief, dated Bombay, 17th March. He therein speculates on what may be Holkar's proceedings, and is inclined to believe it would be necessary soon to attack him. The general seems to have foreseen the war which afterwards was waged against that chieftain, who could no longer exist in Hindostan, without coming in contact with the British; so completely had his army, if it may be so denominated, destroyed every thing throughout the provinces wherein it had of late subsisted. The general deprecates such a measure as sending troops from the Deccan into Hindostan (north of the Nerbudda); and he observes — "If the troops go north of Chandore, fifty Holkars will start up in all parts of the territories of the Peshwah and of the Soubah of the Deccan (the Nizam); and it would be a most difficult operation to get through the hills between the Nerbudda and the Taptee. But we may establish a communication, through them, between the troops operating on the frontier of Guzerat and those about Chandore."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c Mar. 17.

Ibid.

While at Bombay, General Wellesley received the compliment of an address from the British inhabitants of that settlement, upon his recent successes; from which we shall extract a paragraph, to show how highly those persons, who were so near

the scenes of his triumphs, and whose interests were bound up in a greater or less degree in the result of the military operations and civil negotiations carried on at their threshold, appreciated the services of General Wellesley.

"But it is not in your military career alone that we have observed the effects of an active, able, and determined mind. The difficult negotiations which you carried on with two hostile powers, while at the same moment your attention was occupied by the operations of the field, do the greatest honour to your talents as a statesman, and display a happy union of military science and political skill." Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 14.

This address, coming from the inhabitants of a presidency whose government had throughout the whole course of the late operations embarrassed General Wellesley, not only by failing to furnish in some instances the support it had promised, and which he had a right to expect, but actually thwarted his objects by its presumption and folly, must have been very gratifying to him.

On the 14th of February, 1804, a treaty of alliance had been concluded with Scindiah by Major Malcolm, which gave great satisfaction to General Wellesley, as securing the tranquillity of the possessions of the Company and those of their allies.

The fort of Gwalior in Hindostan had occasioned much discussion; both Scindiah and the governor-general claimed it under the late treaty, and General Wellesley was very apprehensive that, in his desire to secure so important a fort, his brother might be induced to interpret the treaty rather too favourably towards his own views and wishes. In a long letter to Major Malcolm, who was with

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Scindiah, he discusses the question, and differs in his conclusion from the opinion of the governor-general. We shall extract a paragraph from this letter, which shows the high principle of General Wellesley: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 17.

"I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the advantages and honour we gained by the late war and the peace; and we must not fritter them away in arguments, drawn from overstrained principles of the law of nations, which are not understood in this country. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else."

A subsequent letter to Major Malcolm shows how deeply he deplored the conduct of the Indian government on the Gwalior question. The following is an extract from that letter: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 30.

"My dear Malcolm, we shall have another war; and the worst of it will be, that all these questions will not bear inquiry. It is not even denied that the treaties were signed many days after the treaty of peace was known at Cuttack. But all this is nothing: the previous *verbiage* is thought sufficient to bind us; as if the signing of a treaty was not that which concluded and bound the parties; and as if, in the treaty of peace with Ragojee (the rajah of Berar), we had not so far insisted upon this point as to continue our operations till he had ratified his treaty.

"I declare that I am dispirited and disgusted with this transaction beyond measure; however, I can say no more on it. The orders are called final; but my public letters, written in February, show my opinion of it."

During his stay at Bombay, General Wellesley received a communication from the governor-general, announcing that he had been solicited by the British inhabitants of Calcutta to make known to him their resolution to present him with a sword

of the value of 1000 pounds, "as a testimony of the sense which they entertained of the services rendered by him to the East India Company, and to his country." General Wellesley expressed his sense of the honour conferred on him by the British inhabitants of Calcutta, in a suitable reply.

Early in May, General Wellesley received an intimation from the governor-general that hostilities were to be commenced against Holkar; and he was directed to co-operate with, and support the operations of the commander-in-chief.* In consequence of this intelligence, General Wellesley left Bombay about the middle of the same month, after having issued the necessary instructions to officers and others, which the occasion called for, and rejoined the army near Poonah. It was immediately supplied with clothing and equipments ready for the field.

The intended operations from the Deccan against Holkar were rendered difficult, if not altogether impossible, owing to a famine which prevailed over that part of India; and the governor-general, finding that he had been compelled to retire from the north-western frontier of Hindostan, by which our possessions in that quarter were relieved from the apprehension of danger, was induced to suspend, for the present, all active measures against that chieftain; and in consequence of this decision, the army under General Wellesley was ordered to be broken up, and he himself was directed to proceed to Bengal. He accordingly made arrangements for marching to Seringapatam, whence he purposed

* General Lake.

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repairing to Madras, in order to confer with Lord William Bentinck, the recently appointed governor of that presidency.

Sensible that he had performed services which entitled him to reward, General Wellesley seems to have been feelingly alive to the neglect he experienced from the government at home; and, doubtless, the consciousness of possessing talents which would distinguish him in any sphere, rendered him anxious to bring them forward on a field where they would stand some chance of being justly appreciated: he had, therefore, turned his thoughts towards Europe. With much reason he considered himself as slighted by the King's government, in not having been placed permanently on the staff of India after the services he had performed up to the advance to Poonah, which were known at home; whereas another general officer had been appointed to the staff in that country, to the prejudice of his just claims.

On the 24th of June, General Wellesley resigned the high political and military powers vested in him by the governor-general on the 26th of June in the preceding year, and immediately afterwards commenced his march towards Mysore. Passing by Darwar, the killadar, Bappojee Scindiah, showed an extraordinary instance of respect to General Wellesley by inviting him to an entertainment in the fortress; and it was a subject of surprise with every one, not excepting the killadar himself, that the general by accepting the invitation should have put such confidence in him; who, in remarking afterwards that he had not taken advantage of it, said, "For I am still a Mahratta!" Probably the British general thought, like Charles XII. when he visited

Dresden, and was actually in the power of Augustus, who might have detained him a prisoner,— "Pooh," said the Swedish monarch on this observation being made to him, "he would not have dared."

A letter written to Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, who was then commanding the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, contains such valuable advice, that we shall make an extract from it. General Wellesley says —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 28.

"I believe that, in my despatches, I have alluded to every point to which I should wish to draw your attention, excepting one, which I will mention to you — that is, the secrecy of your proceedings.

"There is nothing more certain than that of one hundred affairs ninety-nine might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests; but the misfortune is, that where the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept secret as a matter of course upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables observing men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it out; and it may be depended upon that whenever the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public view.

"For this reason secrecy is always best; and those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs, are in the habit of never making public any business of any description that it is not necessary that the public should know. The consequence is, that secrecy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public matters; and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not as they may think proper.

"Remember that what I recommend to you is far removed from mystery: in fact, I recommend silence upon the public business upon all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity of mystery upon any."

How much is contained in these few remarks so simply and clearly expressed. The maxim here inculcated was not new; the value of secrecy in

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public affairs has been insisted on at all times, from that of Solomon to the present day; but what strikes us as admirable, is the reasoning introduced for the purpose of impressing the truth forcibly on the mind of the person he was addressing. But throughout the volumes of despatches, practical wisdom shines forth in every letter; and a most useful manual might be formed by a judicious selection from the thoughts and maxims which pervade every page, flowing naturally and freely in illustration of all kinds of subjects, evidently without an effort on the part of the writer; who merely sought to convey his own ideas to the minds of others in a manner at once clear and concise.

At Seringapatam, General Wellesley was received with enthusiasm by the inhabitants, who begged to present him with an address. It was as follows: —

"We, the native inhabitants of Seringapatam, have reposed for five auspicious years under the shadow of your protection. We have felt, even during your absence, in the midst of battle and of victory, that your care for our prosperity had been extended to us in as ample a manner as if no other object had occupied your mind. We are preparing to perform, in our several castes, the duties of thanksgiving and of sacrifice to the preserving God, who has brought you back in safety; and we present ourselves in person to express our joy.

"As your labours have been crowned with victory, so may your repose be graced with honours! May you long continue personally to dispense to us that full stream of security and happiness which we first received with wonder, and continue to enjoy with gratitude; and when greater affairs shall call you from us, may the God of all castes and all nations deign to hear with favour our humble and constant prayers for your health, your glory, and your happiness!"

Towards the end of July, General Wellesley reached Madras, where he passed several days previous to embarking for Calcutta, at which place he

arrived about the middle of August. We are compelled to pass without notice a vast number of transactions relative to the settlement of the provinces on the western side of India; as they could be of little interest to the general reader, further than as displaying on innumerable occasions the extraordinary application to business of General Wellesley, as also the confidence reposed on all sides, in his talents and justice.

News arrived at Calcutta about this time (August) that Colonel Monson, who had pushed forward with a detachment of the Bengal army into Malwa against Holkar, had retreated to Rampoora after an action with that chief, in which some loss had been sustained; while at the same moment Colonel Murray, who had advanced from Guzerat, also retired with loss. In a letter to Major Malcolm, General Wellesley condemns Monson. He says —"At all events, both parties appear to have been afraid of Holkar, and both to have fled from him in different directions.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 24.

"I do not think that the commander-in-chief and I have carried on the war so well by our deputies as we did ourselves."

Colonel Wallace, who seems to have stood high in General Wellesley's estimation, received on the occasion of Colonel Monson's disasters, a letter from his patron full of excellent advice cloaked under a criticism of Monson's operations. The general likewise addressed a long communication to Colonel Murray containing his opinions, formed after considerable practice, of the method of conducting warfare against Mahrattas.

Thus did General Wellesley seek to imbue others with military talent from the rich mine of his own

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genius; and could precept with example render men worthy to command, there would have been no lack of leaders on the western side of India; for, whether present or absent, his thoughts and actions were fervently devoted to whatever could forward the service in which he was engaged.

During his stay at Calcutta, he drew up several valuable papers, having reference to treaties and other matters in which he had taken part. Amongst these, we find a long and most statesmanlike memorandum on the treaty of Bassein*, which is a masterly résumé of all proceedings relative to the Mahratta powers, from 1792 up to the period of that treaty. It is succinct, luminous, and complete; and places before us the views and measures of the several crafty Mahratta chieftains in a very satisfactory manner. Had we such able commentaries on treaties in general, how greatly the value of what is called history would be enhanced!

As we are not writing a history of India, we forbear to do more than mention that General Wellesley also furnished the governor-general with memoranda on various important subjects;—viz. on Scindiah's government—on the freebooter system in India—on the military establishments of India—on regulating the supplies of an army in the Deccan—on the army under the commander-in-chief in his operations against Holkar; with others of minor importance, but all giving evidence of astonishing application to business, with vast powers of mind. These documents let us at once into the political state and resources of India at that period, and suggest sound measures of policy for the guidance of the government.

* With the Peshwah.

General Wellesley sailed for Madras in the middle of November, furnished with a renewal of the great military and political powers vested in him during the recent war against Scindiah and the rajah of Berar; which, it will be recollected, he resigned when at Poonah after the cessation of hostilities. He landed at Madras on the 21st of November, and reached Seringapatam on the 30th. Passing by Arcot, he paid a visit to his "old friends" the 19th light dragoons and the 4th regiment of native cavalry, which had been sent into the Carnatic. Mentioning the circumstance he says, "I sent them into the Carnatic, because I was aware that they required rest, and I knew that the men had not seen their families since the corps marched with the grand army to Seringapatam in February, 1799."

That General Wellesley possessed, even in an unusual degree, the most kindly feelings, is evidenced by a letter he wrote at this time to a Major Campbell, who had served on General Stuart's staff: it is expressive of an anxiety to serve him or any of that officer's friends; and acknowledges, in a manly and honourable style, the obligations he lay under to him.

General Wellesley was on the point of marching for Poonah, when an attack of illness detained him at Seringapatam; and, at the same time, intelligence arrived of the success of Generals Lake and Fraser against Holkar, which induced him to think that the prosecution of his intention to proceed northward would be no longer necessary.

For an account of the war against Holkar in Hindostan, the vacillating conduct of Scindiah, and the behaviour of the rajah of Berar, the reader

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is referred to the numerous histories relating to the events of that period.

The objects to be attained by General Wellesley's presence in the Deccan, were to prevent Scindiah and the rajah of Berar becoming parties in the war against the Company; and, if possible, to march a corps of cavalry to join the troops acting in Malwa under the orders of Colonel Murray. It was, however, the opinion of the governor-general that the defeat of Holkar's army would render it unnecessary for General Wellesley to go there; or to remain, should he hear of its defeat after his arrival. He now, therefore, determined to delay his projected march northward, until he should see the impression which General Lake's success against that chieftain would make upon the durbars of Scindiah and the rajah of Berar.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 4.

Intelligence was soon after received, which induced General Wellesley to believe that both Scindiah and his quondam confederate would remain at peace with the British. Other circumstances also concurred to make him decide that his presence in the Deccan was not indispensable; and he therefore resolved not only to relinquish the plan of going thither, but to hasten his long contemplated departure for Europe.

It was not without feeling a considerable degree of doubt and hesitation, that General Wellesley came to this decision. He knew that all classes of the people looked up to him, and that it would be difficult for another officer to take his place: he also knew that his presence would give great facility to the settlement of many points connected with the provinces of the Deccan. But he was

likewise aware that these matters were not momentary; and whenever he should depart, the same inconvenience would be felt in an increased degree, even for years to come; and as he did not purpose spending his life there, he saw no reason, whatever might arise, for remaining a moment longer than the governor-general should continue in India. He did not conceive that the court of directors or the King's ministers had any claim upon him, strong enough to induce him to do anything so disagreeable to his feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to stay for a great length of time in that country.

He complains of having received nothing but injury from the court of directors, although he had served the Company in important situations for many years, under all the governments, and had been in communication with all the political residents and many civil authorities, without there existing an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of his acts; or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or civil authorities with whom he had acted or been in communication! Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Jan. 4.

He had never been sanguine in his expectations that military services in India would be valued as highly as similar services performed in other parts of the world; and felt keenly, as already noticed, the neglect with which his own had been treated, when a general officer was sent out from England to be placed upon the staff of India; which, but for the death of General Fraser, who had recently fallen in battle against Holkar, would have rendered him a supernumerary; a proceeding that caused much comment in the army.

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Had General Wellesley conceived that his services were absolutely necessary for the security of the British empire, or to ensure its peace, he would not have hesitated to remain for years; but he justly considered that neither the King's government, the court of directors, nor the public, had any right to ask him to stay in India, merely because his presence in a particular quarter would be attended with convenience.

There was another point, too, in which he thought the question of his departure ought to be viewed; namely, whether, in the situation of affairs in India at that time, it might not be desirable for some one to explain in England the causes of the late increase of the military establishments, and to correct many erroneous notions which were entertained, and circulated there, upon this subject.

Such were the grounds detailed in a letter to Major Shawe for the governor-general's information, written on the 4th January from Seringapatam; which concludes by stating that the writer was in no hurry to carry his views into execution; and that in the event of any solid necessity arising for his going into the Deccan, he should not be remiss in his duty, but that he would not allow himself to be drawn thither by mere suspicions and unfounded surmises.

The governor-general appears to have entered into the feelings and views of his brother; and as affairs continued quiet in the north, General Wellesley determined, after obtaining permission from the commander-in-chief in India, to leave Seringapatam for Madras, early in February; and on the 24th of the same month, he resigned once more the extraordinary political and military powers

which he had exercised on all occasions with such moderation, and with so much benefit to the Indian government and its allies. On the 25th, a notification arrived of the order of the Bath having been conferred upon him for his distinguished services.

No native of India had given such satisfaction to Sir Arthur Wellesley as Purneah, dewan of the rajah of Mysore; who had governed that country for the infant prince, from the time of his unexpected elevation to the musnud in 1799. This man, by a zealous discharge of his duty towards the country over which he ruled, and an active co-operation with the British, supplying their wants on all occasions that they took field, acquired the esteem and friendship of Sir Arthur; who wrote to him from Madras, in terms which do honour both to himself and the dewan. He recommends him to persevere in the laudable path which he had hitherto followed; to make the prosperity of the country his grand aim; to protect the ryots and traders; to allow no man, whether vested with authority or otherwise, to oppress them with impunity; and, lastly, to do justice to every man. The letter ends with a request that Purneah would take under his care the son of Dhoondiah Waugh, who, it will be remembered, was captured when an infant, on the day that his notorious father perished.

Sir Arthur Wellesley's letters give numerous proofs how warmly he interested himself to serve officers who distinguished themselves by their zeal, courage, and ability. Amongst these, an officer, already noticed for his gallantry at the siege of Ahmednuggur, and who had served on Sir Arthur's staff from the period of that event, drew from him

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a very strong recommendation to the governor-general in a letter to Major Shawe.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 6.

"Upon my departure from hence, I am exceedingly anxious about the fate of my brigade-major, Lieutenant Colin Campbell, of the 78th regiment. . . . . To my certain knowledge he lost two brothers in the campaign against the southern Poligars, and a brother and a cousin (Colonel Campbell's son) in the battle of Assye. I did not know him by name when I saw him distinguish himself in the storm of Ahmednuggur, and I immediately appointed him my brigade-major; and in the battle of Assye he had either two or three horses shot under him, and ever since he has rendered me most important assistance. . . . . But in the meantime, I should be much flattered and obliged, and I am convinced it would be satisfactory to the army, if the governor-general would take him into his family."

Previous to his departure from Madras Sir Arthur Wellesley received numerous addresses from various civil and military bodies; all indicating unbounded admiration of his extraordinary talents and eminent services, affection towards his person, and extreme regret at his departure.

On the 5th March, a grand entertainment was given by the civil and military officers of the Presidency of Madras to Sir Arthur Wellesley; and a few days afterwards, he embarked for England in his Majesty's ship Trident.

CHAPTER X.

RETURN OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO ENGLAND.—STATE OF EUROPE AT THAT PERIOD. — HE PROCEEDS TO THE NORTH OF GERMANY.— IS APPOINTED TO THE COLONELCY OF THE THIRTY-THIRD REGIMENT. — RETURNS TO ENGLAND.—HIS MARRIAGE.—PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT RELATIVE TO MARQUIS WELLESLEY'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.—SIR ARTHUR DEFENDS HIS BROTHER'S CONDUCT. — SUMMARY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS ON THIS SUBJECT.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived in England in the month of September, 1805; an epoch fraught with the most painful interest: the unwarrantable intervention of the French emperor in the affairs of Switzerland and Holland; his assumption of the crown of Italy, and various ill-concealed projects of aggrandizement, having again forced Sweden, Russia, and Austria, to join Great Britain in the attempt to set bounds to his restless ambition, and to restrict France to limits compatible with the independence of the other nations of Europe. Prussia, wavering between the prospect of gain and the dread of punishment, hung back from joining the coalition; and the minor states of Germany, with the vain hope, as far as regarded themselves, of averting the scourge of war, also announced their intention of maintaining a strict neutrality.

In the course of the following month, the British ministry came to the tardy determination of sending a force to the north of Germany, to attempt, in conjunction with a Swedish army led by Gustavus the Fourth in person, and a Russian corps under Count Tolstoy, to recover possession of Hanover, and at the the same time cause a diversion in favour of the allied

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Austro-Russian army, then endeavouring to make head against the French emperor on the banks of the Danube. It was also hoped that the support afforded by this force would encourage the cabinet of Berlin to join the coalition against France.

Sir Arthur Wellesley was appointed to the staff of the army to be employed on this service, which sailed from the Downs under the command of General Don on the 2d of November; but the rapid and brilliant successes of the enemy during the short but eventful campaign of 1805 — the result equally of Napoleon's masterly combinations and the treason or cowardice of General Mack — soon made it evident that no good could arise from this ill-timed diversion; and the decisive battle of Austerlitz having fixed Prussia in her timid system of neutrality, the attainment of the objects for which the British expedition was sent to the north of Germany became altogether impracticable; and after remaining there for some months, very critically situated, it returned to England early in the spring of 1806.

On the 30th of January of that year, Sir Arthur had been appointed to the colonelcy of the 33d regiment, of which he had for so long a period been the lieut.-colonel; and immediately on his landing in England, he was placed on the staff of the Sussex district, and shortly afterwards was returned to serve in parliament for the borough of Newport.

Previous to his departure for India, Sir Arthur had been under a matrimonial engagement to the Hon. Catharine Pakenham, daughter of Lord Longford; his union with whom took place on the 10th of April: soon after which the renewal of the attacks made in parliament upon Marquis Wellesley,

relative to his administration of the government of India, called Sir Arthur to take his place in the House of Commons, to repel the aspersions cast on his brother's character.

As the duty of defending his noble relative devolved, in the first instance, principally upon Sir Arthur, we should deem it necessary, if only for the full development of his manly, straightforward, and honourable bearing on this occasion, to enter somewhat at length into this particular portion of his senatorial career; but the hope that the transcendent services of the noble Marquis, which (as far as they had connection with those of the illustrious subject of these memoirs) we have slightly sketched in the preceding chapters, may have excited a feeling of interest on the part of our readers for that distinguished individual himself, furnishes us with an additional inducement to enter more fully into the parliamentary proceedings having reference to his conduct in India, than we should otherwise feel disposed to do.

Even so far back as the year 1802, certain papers had been laid before parliament relative to Marquis Wellesley's conduct towards the nabob of the Carnatic: but nothing had resulted from them, and the repeated requests made to the noble marquis to retain the governor-generalship of India (contrary to his expressed wish) sufficiently showed the degree of importance attached by the home government to these calumnious charges. But on the 23d of June, 1805, Mr. James Paull, a gentleman who had recently returned from India, moved for certain papers connected with Lord Wellesley's administration of India generally; which he followed up in the succeeding session (22d April,

Cobbett's Parl. Deb. vol. v. 562.

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1806) by bringing a "first charge" against the noble marquis.

1806. Cobbett's Parl. Deb. vol. vi. 851.

Mr. Paull admitted that he came forward as a volunteer in this matter, but declared that he had assumed the task on public grounds alone. "Before he had determined to do so, he had applied to that body (the East India directors) whose treasures the noble marquis had so profusely squandered, whose orders he had uniformly transgressed, and whose authority he had so totally disregarded; but they had declined the proceeding."

After some further preliminary remarks, the hon. gent. proceeded to read the several heads of charge against Marquis Wellesley, wherein it was set forth that—

"On his arrival in India, in violation of the oath he had taken, he had disregarded the authority of his employers; disobeyed their instructions; assumed to himself a despotic power, turned his back upon the true interests of the Company; and without their permission, and contrary to their instructions, for the gratification of his own caprice, with the most flagitious profusion and for corrupt purposes, had squandered the money of the said Company to an enormous extent..... That in consequence of the said wanton profusion, the Company had become saddled with a debt nearly treble in amount to that with which it was burthened when he assumed the governorship..... That when he first arrived in India, every part of the Company's affairs wore an aspect of prosperity: it had therefore only remained for him to have acted with ordinary vigilance, and to have followed the example and system of his predecessors. Instead of which, the said Marquis Wellesley, by wantonly and profusely increasing the public expenditure, did not only squander all the ordinary means in hand, but all the additional money he could raise by loans and additional taxes, supporting a wanton and profuse style of living, unparalleled in the case of any former chief governor of that country..... Keeping in pay, unnecessarily, a large army of irregular troops at an ernormous expense, &c. &c. &c."

The charge further stated, that —

"The wars against Tippoo in 1799, and against the Mahrattas in 1803, had no share in causing the Company's pecuniary embarrassments; since the revenue of the provinces that became tributary to the East India Company by the treaty of Hyderabad, had increased their income above 544,000*l.* a year: but that those embarrassments arose from the unexampled prodigality and wanton profusion of the marquis in various ways."

These "various ways," the hon. gent. entered into with considerable minuteness; and concluded by moving, "that the charge be ordered to lie on the table."

The motion having been seconded, Mr. Secretary Fox observed, that Mr. Paull had laid before the house a serious charge against Marquis Wellesley, unsupported by any documents. He understood the hon. gent. had none; and therefore moved, "that the debate be adjourned until that day week, when, if the documents upon which the charges were founded were not forthcoming, the house would decide what further steps it would then be right to take."

Several hon. members were of opinion, considering the enormous expense which had already attended the printing of papers called for in a vain search after evidence, that the charge should not be entertained at all. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, rose and stated—

"That he did not object to the motion before the house, but could not help saying a few words upon the manner in which the noble marquis, who was the object of the charge, had been frequently held up as a public delinquent. The house would recollect *how often that noble marquis had been thanked by the house, and by the court of directors, for those measures, many of which were now brought forward as matters of charge.* The hon. gent had not laid any ground for his charge, much less had he produced any evidence in sup-

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port of it. 'The service in which he had himself been employed enabled him to speak to some of the facts contained in the charge. He could say, therefore, that there was no foundation for several of them. Some of the facts were misrepresented, and others were wholly destitute of any foundation. An hon. director (Mr. Robt. Thornton, who had previously spoken) had said, that he had in his pocket a paper which would prove many of them. If so, why did he not move for the production of that paper? If the hon. gent. had really any such paper in his pocket, and could produce it, he was ready to meet it . . . . . He confessed that he could easily conceive the delicacy of the situation in which the house had been brought by the course that had been adopted by the hon. gent. He could conceive that it might be a question with the house whether in justice it could receive a charge without any proof offered in support of it. He felt it also due in justice that some inquiry should be made. On this ground he supported the motion of the Rt. Hon. Secty. (Mr. Fox). He did not wish to press the house to any precipitate judgment; but hoped it would consider the feelings of his noble relation, and come to such a decision as would lead to a speedy and full discussion of the whole case."

Mr. Rose* appositely observed, in continuing the debate,—

"That it would be right to consider how far it would be fair, with respect to Marquis Wellesley, *to have a libel, without any evidence adduced in support of it, put upon the journals of the house;* which would be the case, if they were to give countenance to the charge by adjourning the present debate to a future day."

After a lengthened debate, Mr. Paull obtained leave to withdraw his motion for the present.

On the 28th of April, although still unprepared with the necessary documents, Mr. Paull again reverted to the subject, moving that his charge against the Marquis Wellesley be printed.

In the course of a long discursive speech, he observed, in allusion to the part Sir Arthur Wellesley had taken in the former debate—

* The late Rt. Hon. Geo. Rose.

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1806. Cobbett's Parl. Deb. vol. vi. 932.

"I wish, at present, to throw no reflection on the character of the hon. the Knight of the Bath (Sir A. Wellesley), on whose courage none can be thrown; but I think he has not consulted what was due to his fair fame, or his prudence, or to the situation in which he himself stands, in becoming, in this stage of the discussion, in which he had so large a share, the defender of measures declared worthy of impeachment in this house; and, to say the least of it, in which the hon. but indiscreet Knight of the Bath was an accessary to many of the facts and proceedings stated as most culpable, most reprehensible, and deserving of the most severe punishment. Has the Mahratta war ever yet been justified? Has the Marquis of Wellesley been exonerated from the breach of the laws of his country?"

* * * * * *

Sir Arthur did not permit this most unwarrantable attack upon himself, still less the sneering allusion to the distinction his splendid services had so well earned, to betray him into an angry reply; but after several other members had spoken, he observed, with reference to the *motion before the house*, that —

"The practice of parliament in such cases had already been shown to be, that the evidence should generally, if not always, precede the charges; and he saw no necessity for deviating from that rule on the present occasion, though he admitted that every case should stand upon its own peculiar merits. The charge of the hon. gent. against his noble relative was, for squandering the money of the East India Company in unnecessary purposes of personal splendour; but the papers hitherto produced (those of Oude) applied to charges of which, as yet, he (Mr. Paull) had given no notice. * * * * * * * * * *

"As to the observation, that he himself was implicated in some of the proceedings, his short reply was, that what he did in India was in obedience to the orders he received; and for the manner of that obedience, and its immediate result, he was ready to answer either to that house, or to any other tribunal in the realm."

Mr. Paull, perceiving that the sense of the house was against him, again withdrew his motion; but

CHAP. X. 1806. some days after, having moved for more papers to be furnished on which to frame his charges, Sir Arthur observed —

May 8. "That the more speedily the subject of the charges against his noble relation could be put at issue, the more satisfactory would it be to that noble lord and to all his friends; but at the same time he thought it highly necessary that all the papers moved for by the hon. gent. should be laid on the table and considered by the house, before it came to any decision whatever as to the mode of further proceeding."

On the 28th May, Mr. Paull at length brought forward his article of charge against the Marquis Wellesley, which had reference to the conduct of the noble lord towards the nabob vizier of Oude. It was of extraordinary length, and of a most comprehensive character; directly imputing to Lord Wellesley not only every species of public delinquency, but almost every description of depravity that could brand with infamy the reputation of a private individual.

Cobbett's Parl. Deb. vol. vii. 366. In substance it amounted to this,—that the Marquis Wellesley had, in the month of November, 1801, when governor-general of India, without due authority from the East India Company, and by a system of the vilest deceit, hypocrisy, fraud, and falsehood, taken upon himself to persuade the nabob vizier of Oude to cede in perpetuity to the East India Company, one half of his principality. And the charge concluded with stating that Marquis Wellesley having, by means of his extortions and other acts of oppression and tyranny, excited certain zemindars and rajahs to resistance, he had caused their mansions and retreats to be surrounded, attacked, and plundered; and the said rajahs, their

adherents, relations, vassals and servants; to be barbarously slain; "thus finishing in violence and murder that which in fraud and perfidy he had begun," &c.

After the charge had been read, Sir Arthur (who did not object to its being printed) asked when the hon. gent. would proceed upon it; and in reply to the answer of Mr. Paull, "in three weeks," observed, in reference to the late period of the session, and to the fact of a general notice having been given twelve months before, that such a delay appeared quite unnecessary.

"He took that opportunity of stating, with regard to what had fallen from an hon. gent. (Mr. Whitshed Keene), namely, that 'the charge described the princes of India as if they were European sovereigns, whose territories were guaranteed in order to preserve the balance of Europe,' that he (Sir Arthur) knew no distinction of right with respect to the princes of India and the princes of Europe. In his defence of Lord Wellesley, far from assuming such a distinction, he should show that his noble relation had neither invaded a right nor violated a treaty."

The charge was eventually ordered to be printed, and to be taken into consideration on that day three weeks — 18th June.

On the 3d of June, however, the matter was again brought under discussion, by Lord Temple's moving, pursuant to previous notice —

"'That a specific day be named for taking into consideration the charges of high crimes and misdemeanors against Marquis Wellesley, laid upon the table by an hon. member on the 28th of last month;' observing, in allusion to the heinous nature of the charges preferred against the noble marquis, and more especially the last, that of murder, that 'in justice to the accused it became absolutely necessary a speedy investigation should take place.' He named, therefore, the 18th June; 'when, if the hon. gent. (Mr. Paull) had then any motion to submit upon the subject, he would

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have an opportunity of doing so; if not, he (Lord Temple) should propose a motion on the subject.'"

Mr. Paull, in reply, instanced the most unjustifiable delay which had been allowed to take place in Mr. Burke's proceedings against Mr. Hastings; and Lord A. Hamilton, in defending Mr. Paull's conduct on the present occasion, observed —

Cobbett's Parl. Deb. vol. vii. 511.

"That he did not conceive the charge of murder was put by the hon. gent. in the way it had been imputed; and considered that in bringing forward the charges then lying on the table of the house, and every tittle of which he (Lord A. Hamilton) conceived to be warranted by the documents already brought forward in support of them, Mr. Paull was quite justified in applying the atrocious epithets he had used to the Marquis Wellesley."

"Sir Arthur Wellesley rose to express his surprise at the declaration of the noble lord (A. Hamilton); namely, that he thought the charges against the noble marquis, his relation, borne out by the documents already laid upon the table; and more especially as the hon. gent. (Mr. Paull) had said, only the moment before, that he could not sustain those charges without several other documents which he had moved for, and also the examination of witnesses at the bar. It was very extraordinary, therefore, that the noble lord should pronounce so decidedly upon the truth of charges (which, however, remained to be proved) that his hon. friend, who brought them forward, declared he was not able to sustain without much more evidence. With respect to the charge of murder, however, it was one of too foul and atrocious a nature to be suffered to go forth unexplained, or remain as a stain upon the character of his noble relation, without placing the circumstances upon which it was founded in a proper point of view. There were certain officers, called zemindars and rajahs, resident in that part of the nabob's territory which was ceded to the Company in 1801, and rendered liable to pay certain annual tributes, in the way of land tax, upon that territory. The first year's tribute they did pay, he believed, regularly; and the regulations of the Company, which were the laws of the country, were promulgated and established in that territory; but upon the second payment being required, instead of complying with the law, they combined

to resist it. They assembled together their armed forces, under the chief command of an officer named Amas Ali Khan; they retired to their forts; they set the laws at defiance; they refused to pay any tribute; and it was found necessary by the governor-general, in support of the laws, to reduce those men by force. So formidable were they, that it required the whole of the Bengal army, with the commander-in-chief at its head, to effect this service. They were attacked in their forts, and, in the course of their obstinate resistance, some persons fell, — some blood was spilt; and this was what the hon. gent. imputed to the noble marquis as a murder. It was an act of public power done in support of the laws of the country, like what would have been done against any class of British subjects in similar resistance to the laws passed by that house; and the house would judge how far it was just to describe such a measure by the epithet of murder."

This satisfactory statement clearly showed the character of the charges brought against the noble marquis, and Lord Temple's motion was put and carried by a large majority. In accordance with this vote, on the 18th of June the house, on the motion of Mr. Paull, resolved itself into a committee to consider the charge against Marquis Wellesley relative to his conduct towards the nabob of Oude; and on that and the following day several witnesses were called in and examined; amongst others Lord Teignmouth, who was questioned by Mr. Paull as to the course he would have followed in certain cases in which the conduct of Marquis Wellesley was arraigned, and as to the opinion he entertained of certain acts of that noble lord; also as to his construction of different treaties, particularly that concluded between the Company and the nabob of Oude in 1798.

These questions as to the opinion of an ex-governor-general of India concerning the acts of his successor, would at any time, and under any circumstances, have appeared irrelevant and incon-

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clusive; but as the treaty to which the latter related was lying on the table of the house, those relating to it, could not but seem preposterous in the extreme, and accordingly a long discussion as to their utility ensued.

Parl. Deb. vol. vii. 780.

On the 20th of June, previous to resuming the inquiry into the "Oude charge," Mr. Paull moved, "that the first article of charge against Marquis Wellesley be printed:"—the printing of it having on a former occasion been disallowed in consequence of there being no evidence in support of it before the house; an objection which, that hon. gent. stated, no longer existed.

Sir Arthur Wellesley opposed the motion.

"'It was extraordinary,' he observed, 'that the hon. gent. should now move for printing the charge, which three months since the house, by its vote, had ordered to be printed and afterwards rescinded that vote. The printing at that time, when there was a prospect the charge might have been taken into consideration in the course of the present session, would have been perfectly fair and reasonable, compared with such a measure at this late period, when there was no probability this subject could be taken into consideration, and when the charge, if printed, would not be for the consideration of the members of that house, but for the purpose of going forth to the whole country as one of the most heavy aud criminal charges against his noble relation that ever had been brought against any man in a public situation; when afterwards it would depend entirely upon the discretion of the hon. gent. whether he should move the house to take it into consideration next session or not. He objected also to such a proceeding in point of order, no previous notice having been given of the motion now before the house.'"

Mr. Paull withdrew his motion in consequence of this irregularity, but persisted in the course he had purposed adopting by giving notice that he should renew his motion on the Thursday following.

The house then resumed its consideration of the "Oude charge," when several other witnesses were examined, whose evidence went directly to disprove the allegations affecting the character of Marquis Wellesley in regard to his conduct towards the prince of that country. Amongst these Mr. Cowper, who had been a member of the supreme council at Bengal during the years 1798, 1799, and 1800, being asked, "Whether the line of conduct pursued by Marquis Wellesley was not on the whole calculated to promote the British interests in India, and to protect the dominions of the nabob of Oude," replied, "In the highest degree." And on being further asked, "Whether any other governor-general he had heard of, had more frequently or more confidentially consulted the opinion of the government council than Marquis Wellesley," his answer was, "None."

Parl. Deb. vol. vii. 785.

Another important witness maintained that the presence of troops was necessary in the ceded provinces to collect the revenues; and a third, Major Ouseley, who had been for several years the resident at Lucknow (the capital of Oude), and had possessed the advantage of an intimate acquaintance with the nabob, completely disproved the assertions that he had been harshly or tyrannically treated, that the splendour of his state had suffered any diminution, and that his spirits had been depressed on account of the changes introduced by Marquis Wellesley.

On the consideration of the "Oude charge" being resumed on the 23d of June, Captain Salmon, who had filled the important situation of auditor of military accounts in India, was the only witness whose evidence bore materially on the subject.

Ibid. 800.

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On being questioned as to whether the fraudulent intention imputed to Marquis Wellesley in the charge, of fabricating unjust accounts to impose upon the nabob, had really been entertained by him, and whether any instructions to that effect had been given to him by Marquis Wellesley, his reply was, "that the general instructions of Lord Wellesley were, to make up the charges of the troops furnished to the nabob vizier on principles *rather favourable* to his highness."

Parl. Deb. vol. vii. 925.

The consideration of this charge did not again occupy the attention of the House of Commons until the 6th of July, when Lord Temple moved the order of the day for a committee of the whole house upon it; justifying himself from the charge of taking the matter out of Mr. Paull's hands from that gentleman's evident indisposition to bring it to a decision. "All he asked on the part of his noble friend (Marquis Wellesley) was what the meanest, even the most guilty individual of the community, would be entitled to in a court of justice; namely, a speedy decision on the merits of his case."

This gave rise to an acrimonious debate; in the course of which Mr. Canning, in his accustomed forcible language, observed—

"He could not agree that an accuser, however founded or unfounded his charge might be, should have the power of procrastinating the vexation of a great and approved servant of the public, by multiplying and subdividing his charges so that the sole reward of a life spent in the service of the public would be an anxious, uncertain, and interminable state of responsibility."

"Mr. Paull, in reply, protested that he had not the most distant wish for delay (although he had allowed a fortnight to pass without calling upon the house to proceed with the charge he had brought forward); and that

if the remaining papers for which he had moved were produced respecting six British regiments in India, and which would furnish proofs of the most exorbitant and inconceivable extortion upon the nabob of Oude, he would be ready to go on with the charge next day, or in a week, just as the house should choose."

"Sir Arthur Wellesley declared, that nothing could be more opposite to the wishes and feelings of himself or his noble relation, than that the house should decide upon this charge without having before it all the testimony the hon. gent. wished to adduce; but as he had reason to believe the documents which he had mentioned as the cause of delay really were not in the India House, and had never been returned from India, he hoped, if the house should be satisfied of that fact by those who were competent to give information upon the subject, that it would no longer defer its decision."

After the debate had continued some time longer, Lord Temple said he should not persist in calling upon the house to resolve itself into a committee that night; but gave notice that he should do so on the Friday following (13th July).

Mr. Paull, however, declined pledging himself to proceed with the "Oude charge" this session; but, on the following day (7th July), brought forward a "supplementary charge against Marquis Wellesley, with respect to his treatment of the zemindar of Sassnee and others."

Parl. Deb. vol. vii. 938.

"Sir Arthur Wellesley stated, that he did not object to the printing of this charge; but would take the opportunity to request the hon. gent. to inform him whether it was his intention to bring forward any motion upon it in the course of the present session. He had conceived it necessary for him to attend the house regularly, in expectation of such a motion; but having professional duties to perform, he should be glad to know whether it was necessary for him to continue this constant attendance."

"Mr. Paull expressed his anxiety to come to a decision on the Oude charge, if possible, in the present session; and pledged himself to make a motion at the commencement

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of the next session, should he not be enabled to do so in this."

1806.

Parl. Deb. vii. 1060.

On the 10th of July, on the "India Budget" being brought under the consideration of the house, Sir Arthur Wellesley in a most clear and comprehensive speech laid before the house a detailed statement of the finances of India; evincing a most thorough acquaintance with the subject, and proving most satisfactorily, with reference to the Marquis Wellesley's administration, that whilst, during the constant and unavoidable wars in which the East India Company had been engaged from 1798 to 1803, the debt had necessarily been augmented, yet that, exclusive of the increase of yearly revenue by territorial acquisitions and subsidies, every other branch of the revenue had been gradually increasing from the period of Lord Wellesley's arrival in the country; that the state of public credit had considerably revived — the interest on the British paper money having been reduced from 12 to 10 per cent.; that the general commerce of the country was equally improved; and, in fine, that under Lord Wellesley's administration, the annual revenue of India had been increased from eight to fourteen and a half millions sterling.

Sir Arthur's able speech on this occasion had, no doubt, considerable weight upon the minds of such members of the house as were open to conviction, with respect to the *animus* with which the charges against Marquis Wellesley had been framed; they were not, however, again brought under the consideration of the House of Commons during the remainder of the session, and towards the close of the year 1806 the parliament was dissolved.

Mr. Paull did not succeed in obtaining a seat in the House of Commons at the ensuing election; but on the 12th of January, 1807, Lord Folkestone gave notice of a motion for the reprinting of all the papers relating to the Oude charge; and on the 26th Feb., Sir Thomas Turton, pursuant to notice, moved for the reprinting of certain papers, which had been laid before the house in the years 1802 and 1803, relative to transactions in the Carnatic during Lord Wellesley's administration of the government of India; and afterwards, in alluding to the deposed nabob of that country, Omdut al Omrah, stated "he could prove that the unhappy prince had perished in a dungeon."

Parl. Deb. vol. viii. 433.

"Sir Arthur Wellesley said, he was disposed to pursue the same line he had adopted last session, and was therefore willing to accede to every motion for papers that could enable the house to decide upon the whole case. But it was his opinion that *all* the papers should be reprinted; and with that view he should feel it his duty to move as well for those omitted by the hon. baronet as for any others that might be necessary for the elucidation of the transaction. He wished the house to consider the situation of his noble relation with this charge hanging *six years* over him. It appeared by the papers that the court of directors had sent out instructions to take possession of the Carnatic at the commencement of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and *not to restore* it to the nabob. It was extraordinary, therefore, that a charge should be brought for a transaction commanded and approved by the court of directors, and sanctioned by his Majesty and by act of parliament."

"Sir Arthur Wellesley subsequently took occasion explicitly to deny that the prince, as had been stated by the hon. baronet, was imprisoned in a dungeon, or died by any other than natural causes. He thought it became a gent. of the hon. baronet's profession to be more cautious in making such charges."

On the 1st of July, the conduct of Marquis Wellesley was again brought under the consideration of

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the house by Sir Thomas Turton giving notice of a motion for "certain papers relative to the Polygars."

Parl. Deb. ix. 751 *.

"Sir A. Wellesley professed his anxiety that this measure should at once be brought forward and decided, and again begged the house to consider the long period during which the noble marquis and his friends had been kept in suspense. For no less than six years had this question been under the consideration of the house, and, according to the manner in which those who undertook to manage it proceeded, it might be six years more before they arrived at a final issue; during which his noble relation and his friends were to be agitated by perpetual discussions, or rather by perpetual abuse."

The session closed without any further steps being taken to bring these charges under the consideration of the House of Commons; and before proceedings were resumed in the following session, Sir Arthur Wellesley's professional services were called for on the Copenhagen expedition. Not, however, to interrupt the chain of parliamentary proceedings during this, to him, painfully interesting period, we will briefly state the conclusion at which the House of Commons arrived, relative to the charges brought against his distinguished brother in the following session, ere proceeding to notice the auspicious re-opening of his own brilliant military career.

Parl. Deb. vol. x. 410.

"On the 9th February, 1808, Lord Folkestone moved that the papers presented to the house in January, February, March, June, and July, 1806, and in February, 1807, relative to the affairs of Oude, be taken into consideration on Monday, the 22d inst."

But on the day named, finding it necessary to make some alterations in his projected resolutions, the 9th of March was eventually fixed for taking them into consideration. On both these occasions Sir

Arthur spoke, as he had on every other, deprecating delay; but thenceforth he took no further part in the debates that ensued.

On the 9th of March, Lord Folkestone brought forward his charges against Marquis Wellesley in reference to his conduct to the nabob of Oude, which were comprised in 12 resolutions. The first resolution having been read, a long debate ensued, which was continued, by adjournment, on the 15th March, when the house divided; the numbers being,

For the resolution - -	31
Against it - - -	182
Majority - -	151

It was then moved by Sir J. Anstruther —

"That it appears to this house that the Marquis Wellesley, in carrying into execution the late arrangements in Oude, was actuated by an ardent zeal for the public service, and by the desire of providing more effectually for the prosperity, the defence, and the safety of the British territories in India."

This motion was carried by the same majority.

Sir Arthur having been appointed secretary to Ireland when the Portland administration came into office in April, 1807, spoke on various subjects connected with that country during the session of that year; and on the 10th of July, "moved for leave to bring in a bill for the suppression of insurrection in Ireland, and to prevent the disturbance of the peace in that country."

"An act, he observed, had been passed by the Irish parliament in 1796, to prevent unlawful assemblies, and to authorize the lord-lieutenant, on a report of the magistrates, to proclaim any county where disturbances existed.

Parl. Deb. ix. 751*.

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That law required all persons in such counties to keep within their dwellings between the hours of sunset and sunrise, and gave to the magistrates the power of sending persons who should be found to offend against it on board his Majesty's navy. The act had proved effectual for the suppression of the insurrection, as appeared from the acknowledgment of the leaders of the insurrection before a committee of the Irish parliament. But though such a law might be necessary, it was the duty of that house *to guard against the abuse of the powers which it gave.* The bill he proposed to bring in contained the same provisions as the insurrectionary act, with respect to the power of the lord-lieutenant to proclaim disturbed counties, and the authority of the magistrates to arrest persons who should be found out of their dwellings between sunsetting and sunrising; but in order to prevent hardships to the subject, the bill required that persons so arrested should be tried at the quarter sessions by the magistrates and assistant barrister, assisted by a king's counsel, a serjeant sent down for that purpose."

Shortly after bringing this bill forward, Sir Arthur gave up the secretaryship for Ireland, having been appointed to the command of a brigade of the army secretly preparing to be despatched to Copenhagen under Lord Cathcart.

CHAPTER XI.

EXPEDITION TO COPENHAGEN.—COURSE ADOPTED WITH REGARD TO DENMARK JUSTIFIED BY THE CONDUCT OF THE OTHER EUROPEAN POWERS.—INVESTMENT OF THE DANISH CAPITAL.—SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY EMPLOYED ON A DETACHED COMMAND.—HE DEFEATS A DANISH FORCE AT KIOGE.—CAPITULATION OF COPENHAGEN.—RETURN OF THE ARMAMENT TO ENGLAND.—SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY RESUMES HIS DUTIES IN PARLIAMENT, AND AS SECRETARY FOR IRELAND.—ANECDOTE.

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1807. June 25.

THE close alliance which bound France and Russia together, after the celebrated interviews between Napoleon and Alexander at Tilsit, having led the latter power to acquiesce in the famous declaration directed by the French Emperor against the commerce of England, commonly known as the "Berlin Decree," it became evident that all the minor states of Northern Europe would thenceforth be obliged to bend to the will of these two mighty potentates, and that the whole remaining maritime strength of Europe would eventually be directed to effect the destruction of Great Britain.

It followed as a natural consequence of this alliance between France and Russia, that the neutrality of Denmark would not under any circumstances be longer permitted; but possessing, as that country did, a formidable fleet of line-of-battle ships, it would have been preposterous, considering the ambitious character of the confederate emperors, and the total want of principle of the stronger of the two, to suppose so honourable an act of forbearance would for one moment be entertained.

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The English ministry, well aware of this, and receiving intimation of negotiations that were pending to obtain possession of the Danish fleet, and seeing also that the French army, already occupying Hamburg, Lubeck, and Travemünde, had but to cross the Danish frontier, and in a few days overrun Holstein and Jutland, should neither the threats nor promises resorted to in the course of the negotiations be availing; determined, by a vigorous adoption of the political principles lately introduced by the great powers of Europe, to anticipate their designs, by taking measures to follow up an immediate declaration of war by the seizure of the Danish fleet.

This energetic act occasioned much blame to be thrown on the British ministry, both at home and abroad. In England, it was denounced as a measure affecting the national honour, and opened therefore a wide field for the declamation of their political adversaries; and as the course adopted could only be justified by exposing the sources whence the secret information on which they acted had been derived, it was very generally unpopular, and might, indeed, have cost ministers more than their places, had success not attended the expedition sent to execute their wise resolves.

But, however justly the British cabinet may have laid itself open to animadversion at home, by thus departing from the chivalrous rules of honour that had generally regulated the political conduct of England; yet none of the great powers of Europe had the slightest right to heap the obloquy they did upon its proceedings, for no one of them could come forward with clean hands as England's accuser. The iniquitous partition of Poland in-

volved three of them in everlasting disgrace; — the unprincipled conduct more recently manifested by France and Austria towards the ancient republic of Venice, showed that no sense of justice would arrest them in their ambitious designs;—the nefarious jobbing about Hanover, though merely evincing deep duplicity on the part of France, yet, in the forcible words of Mr. Fox, "stamped the conduct of Prussia with the most abject servility and odious rapacity."*

We may add, that Napoleon, notwithstanding the grandiloquent professions of political integrity put forth on all occasions in his proclamations, &c., ever acted on the rule, that *expediency* was to set aside the whole code of laws which until then had guided nations in their mutual relations. In proof of this, it will suffice to mention, that the scientific movements which in 1805 led to the surrender of Ulm and the destruction of the army of the Archduke Ferdinand, were based on, and entirely owe their success to, a violation of the neutral territories of Würtemburg and Anspach; and that the decisive battle of Jena, which in the following year laid Prussia prostrate at the feet of the French Emperor, was the result of a similar unprincipled breach of the established laws of nations; the French troops having entered the

* Early in 1806, Prussia, then in alliance with England, agreed with France to exchange her principalities of Anspach, Bayreuth, Berg, &c. for Hanover! France, on the other hand, at this very same period, was carrying on negotiations for peace with England, making the restitution of Hanover one of the leading articles!

† He even graciously permitted the petty princes, his allies, to adopt this principle, when subservient to his own views; and accordingly the King of Denmark, by a declaration dated 9th September, 1806, annexed Holstein to his other dominions as an integral part of the Danish monarchy, and declared it for ever separated from the German empire, and to owe no allegiance but to himself.

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Prussian territories, and possessed themselves of various important strategical points, which rendered their success almost certain, several days before Napoleon issued his declaration of war.

Was England alone, therefore, to regulate her conduct by laws which every other nation of Europe repudiated? The answer to this question readily suggests itself, if we do but ask what steps we ourselves should take to avert impending danger, if all the laws which now afford us protection and redress in civil life, were set at defiance?

The determination to obtain possession of the Danish fleet was consequently an act forced upon the British ministry by the unprincipled conduct of our enemies; and instead of the obloquy it called forth, praise rather is due for the temporary sacrifice they made of popularity, by the energy they displayed under most peculiarly trying circumstances. How much more justly would they have been blamed, had a Russo-Danish fleet of forty sail of the line issued from the Baltic in 1808, and threatened the shores of Great Britain! Might not the French Emperor, possessed of such fresh naval means, have been tempted to resume his long-cherished and unwillingly-abandoned project of invading England, instead of imprudently engaging in the Spanish war, or subsequently exposing his army to the rigour of a Russian winter? Who can say from what miseries the energetic resolve to attack Copenhagen may not have saved our country?

It was hoped, nevertheless, that by despatching an overwhelming force on this service, the Danes, seeing the inutility of resistance, would not con-

sider their honour tarnished by the surrender of their fleet without an appeal to arms; particularly as the most solemn pledges were offered of restoring it at the conclusion of the war. The Danish sovereign turned, however, a deaf ear to all the arguments of the British diplomatist sent to his capital to persuade him to accede to our demands, and perhaps the simulation of resistance offered, was the most politic course he could pursue, since it afforded his rapacious neighbours no pretext for depriving him of his crown; of which, doubtless, he would have been stript, had he given up his fleet without resistance. The armament despatched to Copenhagen consisted of a fleet of twenty-seven sail of the line, commanded by Admiral Gambier; and 20,000 troops, partly composed of a force which had been for some time serving in Sweden, under Lieut.-General Lord Cathcart. Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, as we have before noticed, was appointed to the command of a brigade.

The secrecy with which this expedition was prepared and sent to sea, caused the utmost surprise, not only throughout Europe, but even in England. A squadron under Admiral Keats had been sent forward to cut off the communication between the island of Zeeland and the rest of the Danish territories; and negotiations had been opened with the Prince Regent of Denmark, in the hope of avoiding hostilities; but every attempt to bring about an amicable adjustment having failed, no course but that of coercion remained open. Accordingly the whole fleet being now assembled in the Sound, the army commenced disembarking on the 16th August, and on the following day the

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investment of the Danish capital was effected with but trifling resistance.

The preparations for bombarding the city were carried on with great activity, and with but slight interruption from the besieged; but a considerable force of the enemy having been collected on the western side of the island of Zeeland, apparently with a view to act upon the rear of the English army, a corps composed of the reserves, eight squadrons of cavalry, the royal horse artillery, and some light artillery of the German legion, was despatched under Sir Arthur Wellesley to cover the army in that direction, and seek an opportunity of dispersing the enemy ere he should gain strength.

On the 26th of August this force marched to Roskilde Krœ, and on the following day moved in two columns to attack the enemy in front and rear at Kœnerup. The Danes, however, had retired to Kioge; whereupon Sir Arthur, having ascertained their strength, and obtained information as to the nature of the country, determined with his characteristic energy to move forward and bring them to action. Major-General Linsengen, with a part of his force, forming the right wing, moved accordingly to Roskilde on the 28th; and having ascertained that the enemy still stood firm at Kioge, the attack was fixed for the following morning.

General Linsengen was accordingly instructed to cross the Kioge river by the bridge of Little Sellyas (about three miles above Kioge), and advance along the southern bank of the stream to turn the enemy's left flank; while Sir Arthur, with the remainder of his force, moved along the great

road bordering the sea from Copenhagen to Kioge, to attack their position in front.

Both divisions broke up, and marched on the morning of the 29th, according to the plan concerted. On approaching Kioge, Sir Arthur found a line of three or four battalions of regular infantry drawn up in front of the town and rivulet, having cavalry on both flanks, and the right of the position strengthened by a field work. A large body of infantry was also formed, apparently in second line, beyond the town, on the southern bank of the river. The enemy immediately opened a cannonade upon the cavalry patroles of the British army, which Sir Arthur now formed in one line, with its left resting on the sea; placing his cavalry (two squadrons of hussars) on the right.

As the enemy had given some indications of a movement to their left, and Sir Arthur had received no communication from General Linsengen, and consequently was uncertain whether he had succeeded in passing the rivulet, he thought it advisable to make his attack at once, and in an echellon of battalions from the left, covering the movement by the 1st battalion of the 95th regiment (rifle corps*) advanced in skirmishing order, and by the fire of the artillery.

The attack was led by the 92d, and supported by the 52d and 43d (light infantry) regiments, and was made with great intrepidity. The enemy quickly retreated to the entrenched work in advance of the right of their position, making a disposition of their cavalry upon the sands, to charge the 92d in flank while it moved forward to attack

* Now the Rifle Brigade.

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the field work. This demonstration induced Sir Arthur to move his small body of hussars from the right to the left flank, and to throw the 43d into a second line to support the 92d; which regiment now advanced, carried the enemy's intrenchment, and drove them into the town in great disorder, where they were "followed immediately in the most gallant style by Colonel Reden and his hussars and the 1st battalion of the 95th regiment, and afterwards by the whole of the infantry."

Sir A. Wellesley's official letter to Lord Cathcart.

Upon crossing the rivulet, General Linsengen's corps was discovered, some distance off, upon the right flank. Its passage of the stream had been delayed by the partial destruction of a bridge; otherwise scarcely a man of the Danish army could have escaped. The whole of Sir Arthur's force now joined in pursuit of the enemy, who fell back rapidly on Herfolge. Here General Oztroken, the second in command of the Danish army, who had joined it the preceding night with four battalions drawn from the island of Zeeland, attempted to rally the fugitives; but being attacked by the hussars and 95th, he was compelled to surrender with 400 men.

The results of this affair, wherein, as Lord Cathcart observed in his official despatch, "Sir Arthur had distinguished himself in a manner so honourable to himself and advantageous to the public," were the total dispersion of the Danish force, and the capture of 1500 men and fourteen pieces of cannon.

On the 1st of September, all the batteries being completed and ready to open upon Copenhagen, the governor, General Peyman, was summoned to surrender the Danish fleet, and spare a further ef-

fusion of blood; but the answer not being satisfactory, the bombardment commenced on the following morning from both the fleet and land batteries. The fire was kept up with such vivacity and effect, that in a short time the town was set on fire in various places; and on the evening of 5th, the destruction of the whole city being threatened, the Danish general sent a flag of truce, requesting a cessation of hostilities, to afford time to arrange terms of capitulation. This request was not, however, complied with, until the surrender of the fleet had been agreed to, when hostilities ceased; and on the 6th, Lord Cathcart recalled Sir Arthur from his detached command, to conduct the negotiation with the Danish authorities, in conjunction with Sir Home Popham and Lieut.-Colonel Murray; and "those officers having insisted on proceeding immediately to business," the capitulation was drawn up on the same night, and possession taken of the citadel by Lieut.-General Baird on the following day.

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Lord Cathcart's despatch.

Sixteen line-of-battle ships, fifteen frigates, five brigs, and twenty-five gun boats, besides several vessels on the stocks and a prodigious quantity of naval stores, were delivered up to our fleet; and on the 20th of October, the troops being all re-embarked, the expedition returned to England.*

Sir Arthur Wellesley resumed his parliamentary duties on the opening of the session of 1808; and, as we have before noticed, took part in the early debates of that year relative to the conduct of

1808.

* Lord Cathcart was created a viscount and Admiral Gambier a baron, in acknowledgment of their services; Lieut.-General Harry Burrard, second in command, and Major-General Blomefield, commanding royal artillery, were rewarded with baronetcies.

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Marquis Wellesley in his administration of the government of India; he resumed also the post of secretary for Ireland, and was consequently often called upon to address the house on matters relating to that country.

It would far exceed the proposed limits of this work, to give even a summary of his various speeches; which, indeed, could afford but little interest to our readers, even if given at length, unless accompanied by a similar report of those of the other members who took part in the different debates. We shall refrain, therefore, from taking further notice of Sir Arthur's parliamentary career, than to observe, that the force and perspicuity of his language, his equanimity of temper, and gentlemanlike bearing in debate, caused his opinions, without the aid of eloquence, to be listened to with marked attention, and to be held in estimation even by his political opponents; and that those of all parties who could appreciate the comprehensive, statesmanlike views he took of every subject brought under discussion, saw, thus early in his senatorial career, that he was one day destined to shine scarcely less conspicuously as a legislator than as a general.

As an official man, he was distinguished by extraordinary punctuality and assiduity, by great firmness of purpose and rapidity of decision, and by peculiar urbanity and friendliness of manner; though, from the proper value he set upon his own time and that of those under him, his method of transacting business may occasionally have appeared somewhat *brusque.**

* It is related of His Grace that, soon after his appointment to the office of master-general of the ordnance (1818), having to select an

England, however, at this juncture, stood more in need of generals to command her armies in the field, than of legislators to direct her councils, — the insatiable ambition of the French Emperor (but too willingly seconded by that quenchless thirst for military force which, in the absence of hereditary distinctions, pervaded all ranks in young France) having again afforded a field whereon the energies of Great Britain could be put forth to check him in his boundless projects of aggrandizement; and this time, fortunately, England trusted solely to her own resources, her own troops, and her own generals, to carry her through the impending contest.

Before turning, however, to the glorious pages of the Peninsular war, it will be necessary to cast a glance at the state of Europe at this gloomy and unpromising period ;—a period when the armies of

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officer of the corps of R. Engineers to fill a post requiring considerable scientific attainments, he determined to take the opinion of the late Dr. Hutton as to the qualifications of one who had been recommended to him for the vacant situation; justly considering that the Doctor, having been for many years the director of the studies at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, must have had good opportunities of judging of the abilities of those who, it may be said, had passed through his hands. The learned professor was accordingly summoned to attend his grace at a given hour. The Doctor, though an eminent mathematician, was prone to make long speeches; and getting a hint by some means or other, of the Duke's object in sending for him, prepared an appropriate exordium for the occasion. Having, therefore, culled a few flowers of rhetoric, and placed them in array with geometrical precision, he proceeded to the appointed interview with the utmost punctuality. The Duke was equally punctual; and after his usual brief salutation, proceeded at once to the point. "I have given you the trouble of coming here, Doctor, to ask if ——— is fit for ———?" The learned professor having made a profound bow, resumed his wonted perpendicular position, and clearing his throat with a preparatory hem! commenced his well-concocted speech :— "No man more so, my Lord Duke ....." "That is quite sufficient, Doctor," interrupted his grace," taking up his hat. "I know how valuable your time is ; mine, just now, is equally so,— I will not, therefore, detain you longer."

The Doctor withdrew with another bow; rather disappointed at the cutting short of his harangue, but highly gratified with the compliment paid to his judgment.

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the most powerful nations of the Continent had been successively swept away by the irresistible legions of the French Emperor; when the most ancient dynasties lay crouching at the feet of the mighty upstart who displaced and distributed crowns as if they were mere military playthings; a period, in fine, when that man would have been deemed insane who should have foretold that the comparatively petty and generally contemned army of England, was about to dissolve the spell which had hitherto chained victory to the imperial eagles of France, and strike a fatal blow at the root of Napoleon's scheme of universal empire.

CHAPTER XII.

STATE OF EUROPE AT THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1807. — NAPOLEON'S DESIGNS ON PORTUGAL AND SPAIN. — DEGENERATE STATE OF THOSE TWO NATIONS. — GODOY. — THE SPANISH ARMY. — FRENCH TROOPS. — SYSTEM OF NAPOLEON. — TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU. — INVASION OF PORTUGAL. — FLIGHT OF THE ROYAL FAMILY TO BRAZIL. — PORTUGAL ANNEXED TO FRANCE. — ALARM AT THE COURT OF MADRID. — TUMULTS AT ARANJUEZ. — ABDICATION OF CHARLES THE FOURTH IN FAVOUR OF HIS SON. — THE FRENCH OCCUPY MADRID. — CHARLES PROTESTS AGAINST HIS ABDICATION, AND IMPLORES THE MEDIATION OF NAPOLEON. — DUPLICITY OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR. — HE DECOYS THE WHOLE OF THE ROYAL FAMILY TO BAYONNE. — CESSION OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN TO NAPOLEON. — TUMULT AND MASSACRE AT MADRID. — INSURRECTION THROUGHOUT SPAIN. — THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE DECLARES WAR AGAINST FRANCE. — REPULSES OF THE FRENCH. — BATTLE OF RIO SECO. — JOSEPH BONAPARTE ENTERS MADRID. — BATTLE OF BAYLEN. — CRITICAL POSITION OF JUNOT IN PORTUGAL. — PROCEEDINGS OF THE FRENCH IN THAT KINGDOM PREVIOUS TO THE ARRIVAL OF SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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At the conclusion of the year 1807, though the prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France seemed as far distant as at any period since the sword had left its scabbard, yet an arena wherein the two great rivals could thenceforth measure their strength appeared no longer attainable: England, by the possession of the Danish fleet, having removed all chance of her maritime supremacy being disputed; and the peace of Tilsit seeming to have rendered Napoleon equally omnipotent on the Continent. No one of the European powers, in fact, appeared capable of offering further resistance to his decrees. Austria, next to England, the sternest and most determined enemy of revo-

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lutionary France, humbled by the occupation of her capital and the fatal battle of Austerlitz, had maintained a strict neutrality since the peace of Presburg, which followed those events. Her exhausted treasury and dispirited army rendered this course, in a great measure, compulsory; but, smarting from the sting of humiliation, although thus beaten down, she still looked forward to the coming of a day of retribution.

Prussia, after the presumptuous attempt to measure swords single-handed with the conqueror of Ulm and Austerlitz, had sunk into utter insignificance; the miserable day of Jena having proved to the world that her army, though preserving the tradition of the glories of Rosbach and Leuthen, was, in reality, composed of the troops and led by the generals of Valmi and Landau.

Russia, though she had several times stept boldly forward to assist the more immediate neighbours of republican France to repel her ambitious encroachments, was too far removed from the seat of war ever to be in time to counteract the rapid movements of Napoleon. Her army, led by Suwaroff, had obtained some marked successes over the French during his absence in Egypt; but since that period victory had invariably abandoned her colours; and Napoleon's affected generosity, after the hard-fought battles of Eylau, Ostralenka, and Friedland, had so charmed the Emperor Alexander that, like Faust under the influence of Mephistophiles, he was worked upon to participate in acts which, whilst affording momentary gratification to his ambition, were but snares spread to lure him more surely to destruction. Thus these two ambitious potentates entered into a secret compact to divide

between them the European continent; and in conformity with this arrangement, whilst Alexander was hoodwinked with the promise of being allowed in due time to possess himself of Constantinople, Napoleon (secure, as he fancied himself, from interruption by the sop thus offered to the "Emperor of the North") proceeded, with the Çzar's concurrence, to carry into effect his nefarious project of seizing upon Spain and Portugal.

Of all the Continental powers, those two degenerate nations seemed the least likely to offer resistance to the will of the mighty Napoleon. The former, at the outbreak of the French revolution, had armed in common with the other monarchies of Europe to resist the dissemination of the dangerous principles of democracy; and, in justice to her armies be it said, they had offered a far more respectable resistance to the republican enthusiasm of the French legions, than those of much higher repute amongst the European states. Indeed, whilst led by Ricardos and Ventura-Caro, marked successes had attended their operations; the soil of France was trodden by victorious Spaniards, and the fortress of Bellegarde taken. But favouritism, that bane of honour, patriotism, and every virtue, placed the command of the Spanish armies in other hands: reverses quickly followed, until the worthless Godoy, fearful of losing his ill-gotten power, concluded the ignominious treaty of Basle; which, whilst it gave him the dishonourable title of Prince of the Peace, made the Bourbon sovereign of Spain "clasp hands with the murderers of his kinsman."

July 12. 1795.

From that time, Spain had been dragged at the chariot wheels of the French conqueror. The imbecile Charles, flattered at being styled the inti-

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mate ally of the great Napoleon, seemed perfectly unconscious their friendship was that of the giant and the dwarf. National vanity induced Spain to participate in this delusion; and not until she had expended every dollar in her treasury, sacrificed some of her richest colonies, sent her fleets to meet destruction at St. Vincent's and Trafalgar, and despatched her best troops to the north of Europe on the requisition of her "faithful ally," did she discover that all the benefits resulting from their alliance had been grasped by her greedy friend, and that not even a share of the honour fell to the lot of the party which had made such enormous sacrifices.

All good Spaniards were at length convinced, and thoroughly ashamed, of the state of dependance to which their country had been reduced; but, helpless as her condition had now become, prudence dictated that Spain should afford no pretext for Napoleon to enact the part of the wolf towards the lamb that wished to slake his thirst at the same stream as that at which his natural enemy was drinking.

It was, however, the misfortune of the unhappy Charles to be ill-advised in every important action of his life; and under the influence of some strange infatuation, the eve of the battle of Jena — when Austria even did not dare to make a move to avert the fate of Germany — the cabinet of Madrid issued a proclamation calling the Spanish nation to arms! But for this act of insanity, the Spanish monarchy might, possibly, have been suffered to linger on in the hands of the degenerate Bourbons; for Spain, in her fallen state, afforded Napoleon greater advantages, perhaps, than if she had been governed by a minion of his own, and had sent

her troops to swell the ranks of his army; since, by means of the neutrality of Portugal, he was enabled to extort from Spain large sums drawn from her transatlantic colonies; whilst even Portugal herself willingly paid heavy contributions to the French government for permission to continue neutral. From the moment, however, that the imprudent call to arms was made, the subversion of the Bourbon dynasty of Spain was determined upon. Napoleon pretended to be satisfied with the preposterous excuse offered, when the vain hopes raised by the act of Prussian quixotism had been dispelled; namely, that the call to arms was occasioned by a threatened invasion of the Moors! To use his own favourite expression, "the pear was not yet ripe:" Russia had to be humbled ere he could securely turn south to wreak his vengeance on the incautious monarch who had presumed to show symptoms of defection when his danger seemed imminent, but who now again servilely deprecated his anger.

Napoleon, however, was too great an adept in the Machiavellian school of policy, to effect by force what could be accomplished by deceit: though Machiavelli himself would have been startled at the monstrous act of perfidy planned by the Corsican to effect his purpose; for the political annals of the civilized world would be searched in vain to furnish a similarly infamous combination of fraud, falsehood, flattery, and compulsion, as that by which Napoleon Bonaparte succeeded in drawing within his grasp the wretched royal family of Spain.

To one so utterly devoid of all honourable feelings, this, as well as his ulterior object, — that of obtaining possession of Spain herself, — seemed

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easy of accomplishment. An impotent monarch sat upon the throne of Charles the Fifth; a corrupt minister occupied the place of Cardinal Ximenes; a crowd of vain, ignorant, intriguing nobles, composed the court; and every department of the administration of the country was withering, under the blight of the most glaring venality. A numerous, profligate, and (comparatively speaking) intelligent priesthood bound this mass of corruption together, and kept the lower orders of Spain in perfect ignorance of the fall their country had experienced in the scale of nations.

Portugal was scarcely in a better condition than her neighbour, and her fate seemed to hang upon the same thread; for the protection of England, which had served to shield her so long as aggression was to be apprehended only from Spain, could, it was supposed, be of little avail, should that country fall under the dominion of the French emperor.

The extraordinary deterioration that had taken place in the armies of both these powers, since the days of Philip the Second and Emanuel of Portugal, can only be accounted for by the demoralized state of the upper ranks of society in those despot-ruled, priest-ridden countries. The Spanish army, in particular, held out no one of the usual excitements to enterprise. The profligate nobles, who surrounded the throne of a weak race of kings, had long been accustomed to reserve for themselves all the posts of trust and emolument, as well of the army as of the government; and, closing the door of promotion to merit of every kind (as well within as without the pale of their order), filled up the inferior situations with their numerous dependents and hangers-on, the illegitimate branches of their houses, and

such other persons as possessed the means of bribing them, or pandering to their vices. Indeed, without the aid of the powerful lever, money, even the grandee himself could not depend upon the permanence of the situation, — that is, if it were a lucrative one, — which he too had only obtained through the polluted channel of bribery; for, if once removed from the focus of corruption, some intriguing rival was sure to take advantage of his absence to gain over the minister by similar means to those he had used, and get appointed to his place.

Such, was the demoralization that pervaded all classes in this debased country; and Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace, the favourite of the imbecile Charles, the paramour of his queen, and the prime minister of Spain, was the high priest who officiated at this altar of venality.

What, therefore, could be expected from an army prostrated at the foot of so despicable a deity? — an army whose officers, of all ranks, were corrupt, ignorant, and devoid of emulation — whose soldiers were ill-paid, ill-clothed, and uninstructed? Nevertheless, up to the period of the French invasion (and it is a circumstance that speaks highly for the military capabilities of the Spaniards) the troops were obedient to their superiors and faithful to their king; and doubtless they would have remained so, after their fearful struggle for independence commenced, had not the misconduct of their leaders (with few exceptions) been so apparent, that national vanity could attribute the repeated disasters which befel their armies to no other cause than treachery on the part of the generals who led them; and thus arose amongst the Spanish soldiers a want

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of confidence in their officers, which continues even to this day.

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On the other hand, at the commencement of the desolating war of which Spain was about to become the theatre, the army of Napoleon was perhaps at its highest state of discipline and perfection. The wild impulse infused into the ranks of the republican armies by the sudden change from absolute rule to unbridled liberty, had received an increase of force from the hand of the military despot who now governed Imperial France and directed its concentrated strength towards one object; for whilst the love of country, of liberty, and independence had stimulated the victors of Fleurus and Jemappes, the love of glory alone, excited those of Austerlitz and Jena; and the *sans culottes* bands of Dumourier and Jourdan, which, even in the days of undisciplined enthusiasm, had equally set at nought the boasted theories of the Aulic Council and the well-practised tactics of the parade of Potsdam, had, under the tuition of the great military genius who now directed their energies, become, as it was imagined, quite invincible.

The art of war, it was maintained, had undergone a wonderful change since the advent of Napoleon. Until the appearance of that great master, whose practical lessons had overturned all former theories, the art, his parasites said, had never been perfectly understood; but, in point of fact, there was nothing new in the system of Napoleon: he acted on the sound principles adopted by Marlborough, by Frederick, and indeed by all the great generals of antiquity, but from which his adversaries had invariably departed. His whole system consisted in concentrating his forces on important points, instead of disseminating them in long lines of posts; in

concealing his intentions by keeping his plans confined within his own breast; in masking his movements by swarms of light troops when drawing near his adversaries; and in attacking vigorously when the moment for action arrived.

What little there was of novelty in his *mode* of attack was faulty; for he continued the system adopted by his republican predecessors, of pushing forward dense columns of raw recruits against the well-formed lines of the enemy, totally regardless of the loss of life which was thereby occasioned, so long as they gained their point, and this the extended position of their adversaries in most cases enabled them to do. With Napoleon's disciplined troops the object would have been equally gained at a less sacrifice of life; yet this erroneous system he pursued to the very last, regardless of the warnings of his lieutenants, who assured him that Wellington had discovered the secret of defeating his *colonnes de serrées;* and that English troops, though deployed in line, were not to be beaten by appearances, however formidable.

De Beauchamp. Campagne de 1814-15.

The armies of Napoleon possessed, nevertheless, advantages over those of the other powers of Europe which must not be lost sight of. The lightness of their baggage when in the field, their want of camp equipage, the little necessity they had for being encumbered with a large commissariat establishment,—all consequences of their carrying the war into, and unceremoniously appropriating to themselves the resources of, other countries,—enabled them to move with extraordinary celerity; an advantage to which every other consideration was sacrificed. And though this system of living upon the enemy, or upon his allies—for the distinc-

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tion was merely nominal in the eyes of the French emperor,—tended materially to increase the horrors of war to the inhabitants of the countries which were the scene of hostilities; yet it answered Napoleon's purpose, by bringing matters to a speedy issue.

When, however, his armies came to endure the privations of the Spanish war, the want of these necessary comforts and establishments were severely felt; and indeed Napoleon's campaigns against the Austrians, in 1796 and 1805, would have terminated fatally for him, notwithstanding the invariable success that attended his operations in the battle field, had his adversaries shown more fortitude, and persevered in the struggle.

The soldiers of no other nation, perhaps, would so readily have submitted to the privations which those of France were thus occasionally called upon to bear; but it was found at last that they did not differ so materially from other people but that there was a limit to their endurance. In other respects, however, the French are peculiarly suited to make good soldiers: they possess high courage; great personal activity and mental resources; sobriety, which keeps them easily within the bounds of discipline; a buoyancy of spirits that makes them undergo fatigue, and bear privations without complaining; a stock of vanity that enables them to keep up their spirits under defeat; and an inordinate love of fame, which leads them to undertake the most daring enterprises.

A long course of uninterrupted successes had led the French troops to consider themselves invincible; and so indeed they had been found by all who had hitherto attempted to resist them. They regarded their emperor with a feeling bordering on

adoration; for his star had never yet turned pale before an adversary; and up to this period, the princes and even kings whom he had made (many of them of scarcely less military reputation than himself) had not ventured to express that dissatisfaction at a restless ambition, which, when sated with honours, and gorged with plundered riches, they began to feel both irksome and blamable.

Such were the troops with whom the victor of Assye, with the "shopkeeper" army of England, was about to dispute the palm of victory.

Treaty of Fontainebleau.

A secret treaty, entered into between France and Spain for the partition of Portugal, was made the pretext for the entrance of the French armies into the Peninsula. The only excuse the unoffending kingdom of Portugal had given for this unwarrantable act, was a tardy compliance with the demands of the French emperor to seal her own ruin by closing her ports against Great Britain, arresting all English subjects resident in Portugal, and confiscating every description of English property throughout the kingdom. But had a readier obedience than was evinced, been rendered to these despotic orders, the fate of Portugal would have been the same: her subjugation had already been decided on; and no explanations, no concessions, no acts of submission, could have averted her fate.

By the treaty of Fontainebleau, it was agreed that the northern portion of Portugal, with Oporto as its capital, should be formed into a monarchy for the King of Etruria*; who, in return, was to cede his Italian possessions in full sovereignty to Napoleon. Alemtejo and the Algarves were to be

* The son of a daughter of Charles IV. of Spain.

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The iniquity of the Spanish minister in acceding to this treaty, was only to be surpassed by his imbecility. Knowing, as he did, that the demands made by Napoleon on Portugal were mere pretexts for the monstrous aggression he contemplated, it is astonishing that Godoy should have supposed faith would be kept with himself, by one who thus manifested so utter a contempt for every feeling of honour towards others. The pithy proverb of his own country, that "honour and profit will not keep in the same sack," ought to have put him on his guard against one so utterly unprincipled. He foolishly imagined, however, that Napoleon had no other objects in view than to compensate the King of Etruria for the dominions of which he purposed stripping him in Italy; and, with inconceivable generosity, to conquer a principality to bestow on him, Godoy, in return for the permission granted for the march of the French troops through Spain! And, labouring under this fatal delusion, Napoleon's legions were suffered to cross the Pyrenees, to desolate his country with seven years of bloodshed, rapine, and extortion.

17th Oct. The signatures to the treaty of Fontainebleau were scarcely dry ere the French troops were put in motion; and so rapid were their movements, that Junot, to whom the command of the army destined to effect the subjugation of Portugal was

entrusted, reached Alcantara on the 17th November.

From thence he issued a proclamation to the Portugueze, stating the objects and beneficent intentions of the great Napoleon in thus despatching him to save their country from the "tyrant of the seas."—"Their prince having declared war against the English," this curious document continues, "they were called upon to make common cause with the brave and well-disciplined army he was leading to effect their deliverance." By way of corollary to the philanthropic problem thus laid down, the proclamation further declared, that any Portuguese, not being a regular soldier, who should take part in any armed assemblage, was to be forthwith shot; as also any individual whatever who might be instrumental in exciting the people to take arms against their French deliverers.

On the 19th November the French troops entered Portugal. There was no force of any kind to oppose them; and they continued to advance with the utmost celerity, hoping to reach Lisbon in time to prevent the embarkation of the royal family: the Prince Regent having declared to the French and Spanish governments that he should remove with his court to Brazil, in the event of a French army crossing the frontier of Portugal.

Such, however, was the inertness of the government, such the treachery by which the prince was surrounded, that his intentions were well nigh frustrated; for Junot reached Abrantes, distant only 90 miles from Lisbon, ere any notice had been received that he had even crossed the frontier. In the midst of the terror and confusion occasioned by this unlooked-for intelligence, the Portugueze

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ships were hastily prepared for sea, for even the precaution of keeping them in readiness had been neglected.

The offer of the English admiral * to enter the Tagus with his fleet and co-operate in the defence of the capital, was declined, as likely only to furnish the enemy with a pretext for treating Lisbon as a conquered city; a pretext of which, however, they soon showed they stood in no need. At length, on the 27th of November, the royal family embarked; but even then there seemed a prospect of their falling into the hands of their ruthless enemies; for a gale of wind came on, which rendered the bar at the river's mouth impassable. It continued the whole of the following day; and on that day Junot would have reached Lisbon, but for some unexpected difficulties encountered in crossing the river Zezere. Fortunately the weather moderated on the morrow; and the Portugueze fleet, spreading its sails before a favouring breeze, soon gained the wide ocean, — the only barrier that now offered a sure protection against the insatiable ambition of the mighty Emperor of France.

From the heights above Lisbon, Junot saw the ships bear off the prey he had so eagerly coveted. The French troops entered the capital of Portugal unopposed; the frontier fortresses of the king-

Nov. 30.

dom and the forts on the Tagus were surrendered on the first summons; and the proud inheritance of the Braganzas fell, without the slightest struggle, to the son of a Burgundian vine-dresser at the head of a handful of half-famished, foot-sore conscripts! †

* Sir Sidney Smith.

† Most of the troops who entered Lisbon with Junot belonged to 3d battalions recently raised.

Such was the renown of the French arms, such the pitiable state of Portugal. CHAP. XII.

In furtherance of Napoleon's deep-laid project of seizing upon the whole Peninsula, the greater part of the Spanish army had been marched into Portugal, on the plea of aiding the French to carry into execution the provisions of the secret treaty of Fontainebleau; but the flower of the Spanish troops had, even before that, been sent out of the kingdom: one corps, commanded by General O'Farrill, to Tuscany; another to the north of Europe, under the Marques de la Romana,—an officer who had served with much distinction under his relative, General Ventura-Caro, in the war of the French revolution, and was justly considered one of the best officers in the Spanish army. Spain being thus left almost destitute of troops, Napoleon no longer thought it necessary to preserve the mask of hypocrisy; and, in two months from the date of Junot's entering Lisbon, it was announced by proclamation to the people of Portugal, that the Prince of Brazil having abandoned the kingdom, the Emperor of the French had decided on taking it under his protection, and appointed Junot (soon after created Duke of Abrantes) his lieutenant. 1807. 1808. Feb. 1.

This announcement was speedily followed by the appointment of a council of government, consisting of the most notorious traitors that could be collected amongst the nobles who had not accompanied the prince to his translantic dominions, and by the imposition of an extraordinary war contribution of a hundred millions of francs on the Portugueze people, to carry out the great emperor's plan for ameliorating their condition,—a striking

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proof, certainly, as stated in the proclamation, that "he loved them as he loved his French vassals."

This abrupt announcement of the abrogation of the treaty of Fontainebleau filled the court of Madrid with astonishment and dismay. But the rancorous disputes which a short time previously had broken out between the weak monarch of Spain and his profligate queen on the one side, and their eldest son the Prince of Asturias (afterwards Ferdinand VII.) and his satellites on the other, already gave such disquietude to the *prince-expectant* of the Algarves, that he did not venture to remonstrate with Napoleon at this breach of faith: in fact, he began to see that the only safety either for himself or his weak master was in flight; the bold project of offering resistance never once entered his pusillanimous imagination. Troops nevertheless were required, even to effect the removal of the royal pair from their capital; and framing, therefore, a paltry excuse for withdrawing the Spanish army from Portugal, he wrote to Junot, requesting it might forthwith return to Spain.

Junot, however, was too old a plotter himself to become the dupe of such a creature as Godoy; and excepting a weak division of Spanish troops in the south of Portugal, who did not wait for his permission, not a man was suffered to depart.

Before Napoleon had made known his resolve with regard to Portugal, large bodies of French troops had been poured into Spain: first on the plea of supporting the army of Junot, and afterwards on various equally futile pretences; amongst others was urged that of undertaking the recovery of Gibraltar. The treaty of Fontainebleau furnished an opening for this irruption, and the court

of Madrid was in no condition to remonstrate at the *number* that entered; which, taking advantage of the omission of a direct stipulation on that point, was so considerable as soon to spread over the whole of the northern and eastern provinces of the kingdom.

But pitiable as was the state of helplessness to which these unresented acts of aggression proved the government of Spain to be reduced, it might nevertheless have been expected to take some steps to save the fortresses of the kingdom from falling into the hands of the French. Their commanders, however, were left without instructions, or with such vague orders as only to perplex them; and, in consequence, by the middle of March, these "faithful allies" of Spain had possessed themselves of all the principal strongholds of the frontier provinces; scrupling not to employ force, where treachery, bribery, and every other means failed.

The news of the seizure of the citadel of Pampluna (the first direct outrage committed by the French) reached Madrid nearly at the same time as the intelligence of Junot's proclamation to the Portugueze, which set aside the secret treaty of Fontainebleau. The wretched Charles and his duped minister could no longer, therefore, shut their eyes to the real designs of the French Emperor, who, his schemes being ripe for execution, had now to frame some excuse for meddling with the affairs of Spain, and effecting his long meditated purpose. The humbleness of the court of Spain furnished him with no better than that of affecting great indignation, that the negotiation for the marriage of the Prince of Asturias with a member of his family had not been followed up with becoming solicitude; to which the terrified Charles

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replied, that there was nothing he more earnestly desired than to forward this union. But there was no sincerity in this declaration, since (considering the terms he was on with his son) he could not but perceive, that whether this marriage took place or not, *his* ruin was inevitable; he lost no time, therefore, in retiring to his country palace at Aranjuez, where he imagined he should experience less difficulty in effecting his contemplated flight to Seville, with the view of embarking for Mexico.

The guards were ordered from Madrid, to afford protection to the court whilst the hurried preparations for this projected journey were making. The Prince of Asturias, and his brother, the Infante Don Carlos, vehemently opposed this determination to emigrate; the former, especially; for, flattering himself he stood high in favour with Napoleon, in consequence of a secret correspondence into which he had been drawn, he hoped to bring about the deposition of his father, if he could compel him to remain; and, on the other hand, he feared that the escape of Charles to his American dominions, even if *he* were not forced to accompany him, (of which there seemed some probability,) might occasion the loss of those rich countries to the crown of Spain. His enmity to Godoy rendered Ferdinand at this time extremely popular with almost all classes of Spaniards; and his partisans had, therefore, little difficulty in stirring up the fickle populace of Madrid to resist the contemplated flight of the royal family. They flocked accordingly to Aranjuez for that purpose; a tumult ensued; the death of Godoy was called for, as the instigator of the proposed emigration; the troops on whom he had calculated for protection (having

been gained over by Ferdinand's friends) refused to fire upon the populace; and as the only means left to preserve the life of his worthless favourite, the king at length issued a decree, dismissing him from all his employments, and declaring that he should be brought to trial.

At first this announcement seemed to satisfy the people; but two days after, on Godoy's endeavouring to make his escape, the tumult broke forth with increased violence, and he would probably have fallen under the knives of the infuriated mob, but for the interference of the Prince of Asturias, who, at the urgent entreaty of the king, went forth to save him. Ferdinand succeeded in allaying the irritation of the populace, by declaring, on the part of his father, that the culprit should suffer the punishment due to his crimes. It is generally supposed that, as the price of his son's interference, Charles consented to abdicate his throne; for, on March 19. that same evening, he made a formal resignation of it in his favour, in presence of Ferdinand himself, his ministers, and the chief officers of his court; and also by public proclamation announced his "free and voluntary" abdication.

Ferdinand's first acts sufficiently prove how completely he had deceived himself with regard to the feeling entertained for him by Napoleon. He gave orders that the French troops, now moving rapidly on Madrid, should be received with every mark of friendship; and directed that the Spanish corps, which, in obedience to the instructions of Godoy, had quitted Portugal, should forthwith return to that country, and be again placed under the orders of Junot. He also reinstated the ministers who had so ill served his father.

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Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, whom Napoleon had despatched to Spain, as the fittest agent he could employ to terrify the court of Madrid into the snare he was preparing, reached Aranda de Duero on the day the disturbances first broke forth at Aranjuez. From thence he announced that the emperor, his master, had decided on visiting Madrid; and on learning the result of the insurrection, he himself pushed on for the Spanish capital by forced marches, and entered it on the 23d of March.

The forced abdication of Charles was a great point gained by the wily Emperor of the French; since it gave him the option of acknowledging it as a free act or not, as might best suit his purpose. In fact it constituted him the arbitrator between the father and son; and, like the monkey doing justice between the two cats, he determined to appropriate to himself the whole of the disputed spoil.

Murat ably seconded him in these views: he declined to acknowledge Ferdinand until Napoleon's pleasure was known; and sent a body of French troops to protect, that is, to *secure*, the dethroned monarch at Aranjuez. Napoleon meanwhile maintained the most impenetrable reserve as to his views and intentions.

Charles, once more his own master, — or rather, no longer in dread of his son, — formally protested against the decree of abdication, which he declared had been extorted from him by fear; his life, as well as that of the queen, having, he asserted, been threatened; and he now appealed to "the great man who had already shown himself his friend" — meaning Napoleon — "to decide in the matter as

he thought proper." The queen at the same time stated it to be "the earnest desire of Charles and herself to retire somewhere in the vicinity of France, where they could end their days in peace and quietness."

Every thing thus favoured Napoleon's designs. All these acts of Charles and his consort were carefully concealed from Ferdinand, lest becoming too decidedly alarmed, he should turn restiff on his hands; for, like a young colt, he was to be brought to bear the bit, by a mixture of menace and soothing.

Though disappointed at not being at once acknowledged as King of Spain by Napoleon, Ferdinand felt reassured by Murat's protestations of his master's great regard for him; and led fully to believe that the French Emperor was actually on his way to Madrid, he acquiesced in the proposal of sending his brother Don Carlos to meet his august visitor. The next degrading act he was persuaded to commit, was to send the sword of Francis the First to Napoleon, who, he was assured, would be highly gratified by such a compliment. If the proud trophy of the victory of Pavia had been restored by more reputable means, French vanity might have received some solace for the centuries of mortification it had endured; but, as an able historian of the Peninsular war has aptly observed, France was far more dishonoured by the circumstances under which the sword of her monarch was recovered, than by the manner in which it had been lost.

Southey, vol. i. 187.

Whilst these preliminary acts of degradation were performing, French troops had been poured into Spain in such numbers, as not only to hem in

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the royal family on every side, but also to obtain complete military possession of all the country lying between the Spanish capital and the frontier of France. Napoleon was thus sure of obtaining his prey by some means or other : but as the employment of force would still have been impolitic, fresh acts of duplicity were resorted to, to effect his purpose ; and Savary, Duke of Rovigo, was despatched to Madrid to carry out the infamous intrigue which Murat had so ably commenced.

It would lead us too far from the bounds we have prescribed to ourselves, to follow, step by step, the tortuous track by which Napoleon and his agents led the whole of the royal family of Spain into the toils prepared for them. The most barefaced lies on the one side, the most unheard-of weakness on the other, led Ferdinand to leave his capital, and, after many pauses of doubt and apprehension, to cross the frontier of his dominions and trust himself to the honour of Napoleon. He found the French Emperor at Bayonne ; where, that it might appear Ferdinand's visit was quite unlooked for, no preparations had been made to receive him. Napoleon invited him to dinner, and during their brief repast, seems to have measured his guest's intellect to a nicety ; for, at its conclusion, he sent Savary to inform him that he must renounce the crown of Spain, not only for himself, but for all the other members of the royal family.

In the course of the discussion to which this unexpected announcement led, the kingdom of Etruria was offered as a kind of bribe to obtain Ferdinand's compliance with Napoleon's demands. The resolute refusal of the Spanish prince to listen to this humiliating proposal, is the only instance of firm-

ness which marked his eventful career; and, perhaps, for this show of determination, his advisers deserve all the honour.

Thus far, Napoleon had acted as if he considered Charles's abdication a free and voluntary act; but now, finding Ferdinand more obstinate than he had anticipated, the prince was treated as a delinquent who had forcibly deposed his father; and Charles and his queen were sent for, as more willing tools to work with. Godoy also (burning with rage against his countrymen) was released from his confinement, brought to Bayonne, and restored to office; and, resuming his power over the infatuated king, readily brought him to subscribe to Napoleon's demands. Accordingly, Charles ceded all his rights to the crown of Spain to his "beloved friend the Emperor Napoleon;" and threats soon overcame the hesitation manifested by Ferdinand to confirm this renunciation, as affecting his own rights and those of the rest of the royal family. May 5.

This was the last act of the farce of negotiation. The royal family was hurried into the interior of France, and Napoleon conceived he had now but to appoint a puppet king to take possession of the throne of Spain. But even before the imbecile Charles had put his hand to the deed which made over his rights to the crown to the French Emperor, the Spanish people had manifested a spirit of resistance which convinced Napoleon the satrap he proposed appointing to govern Spain would have no easy task in bringing the country under subjection. The departure of Ferdinand from Madrid had awakened great anxiety in the public mind; and his lengthened journey and prolonged absence, the daily increasing assumption of

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authority on the part of Murat, the imposing attitude of his troops, and the cavalier manner in which he treated the local government, began at last to lead the Spaniards to suspect the plot which was carrying on against the royal family and their national independence.

Castillian pride could ill brook such indignities; and impelled by that self-confidence which is the most marked characteristic of the nation, the cloak-enveloped populace of Madrid stood with unsheathed knives waiting but some fresh insult to fall upon the intrusive foreigners whom they had ever regarded with a jealous eye, and on whom they now thirsted to take vengeance for their unparalleled treachery.

Murat was not blind to this growing feeling of hostility; and well aware that the projects of his master, when fully developed, would give fresh cause for dissatisfaction, he hurried on the crisis, hoping, by the terrible example he purposed making, to strike such terror into the Spaniards as would deter them from any future attempts at resistance. Every disposition was made in accordance with this plan. The compulsatory departure of the Queen of Etruria, and the Infante, Don Francisco de Paula, afforded the occasion for the two parties to have recourse to arms. The populace of Madrid, without plan and without leaders, raised the cry of "Death to the French," and rushed upon their well-disciplined opponents. The result of such a contest could not for one moment be doubtful.

May 2. French troops poured into the city from all sides, and a horrible carnage ensued. Nor did this premeditated butchery terminate when order had been restored; for numbers of the inhabitants that same afternoon were dragged before a military tribunal,

and, without the form of a trial, were marched to the place of execution and mercilessly shot; — a cold-blooded doom, which was reserved, seven years after, for the instigator of these atrocious proceedings himself. *

But though the tumult in the capital had been promptly quelled, the roar of the French artillery became the signal for insurrection throughout the country. In most of the provinces the peasantry rose *en masse*, demanding arms; *juntas* † of representatives were elected, and a firm determination was evinced to resist the perfidious intruders to the uttermost. But troops, leaders, arms, and money — all the sinews of war — were wanting; and so hopeless appeared the impending struggle, that few of those placed in situations of authority, entered heartily into the national cause; whilst, to their disgrace be it recorded, many of the degenerate nobles of Spain sided openly with the enemies of their country.

It was, however, impossible to repress the enthusiastic feeling of patriotism that pervaded all other classes of Spaniards. Those who attempted to do so, fell, in most cases, victims to their temerity; and, as unfortunately happens with those who endeavour to steer a middle course in times of turmoil, many worthy Spaniards, whom want of confidence in the resources of their country, rather than want of love for it, deterred from avowing their principles, paid with their lives this ill-timed

* Murat, driven from the throne of Naples early in 1815, landed some months afterwards on the coast of Calabria, hoping to incite the wild inhabitants of that province to take up arms in his favour; but deceived in his expectations, he sought refuge in the mountains; was seized, dragged before a *military tribunal*, and shot, 13th of October.

† Assemblies.

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1808. hesitation; and, in fact, any one in office who ventured to have an opinion different from that of the mob, was considered an *afrancesado* *, and sacrificed to the blind fury of the multitude.

After the general excitement of the populace had in some degree subsided, the Junta of Seville, which, from the wealth and importance of that city, not less than its comparative security from attack, claimed a supremacy over the other pro-

June 6. vincial assemblies, issued a formal declaration of war against the Emperor Napoleon, in the name of the Spanish nation; — a declaration which was received with acclamation in every part of the Peninsula.

The energy thenceforth displayed by the Spanish nation, offers a remarkable contrast to the apathy with which it had viewed the first proceedings of the French; but the same self-confidence that had led to the massacre at Madrid, now again became most glaringly apparent. Envoys were despatched to England from different provinces, demanding assistance; but instead of the aid of a body of disciplined troops, which was most wanted, such was the belief in their own strength, that arms and ammunition only were asked for.

General Castaños †, who commanded the Spanish troops in the "*Campo de Gibraltar* ‡,"—one of the most upright, and, as he afterwards proved himself, one of the most talented of the Spanish generals, — saw, however, from the first, that his country did not possess within itself the means of resisting the vast power of Napoleon. He had early divined the

* A partisan of the French.
† Now Duke of Baylen.
‡ District round Gibraltar.

projects of the French Emperor; and even before the outbreak of the populace of Madrid, had opened a communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the lieut.-governor of Gibraltar, with a view to obtaining a safe retreat for any members of the royal family who might be able to escape the toils spread for them: and now, clearly forseeing that the aid of Great Britain alone could rescue his country from French usurpation, he entered into a negotiation with the governor of the English fortress, for the aid of a body of troops, refusing the offer of the vice-royalty of Mexico, made to him by Napoleon. At the same time he prepared to defend Andalusia with such forces as he could collect; and Cadiz, which fortunately had been saved from falling into the hands of the enemy, by the murder of its traitor-governor Solano, furnished him with an excellent base of operations for this purpose.

Meanwhile the invaders had been successfully resisted in various parts of the Peninsula. They had been repulsed from Gerona and Valencia, and, whilst the storm was gathering in the south, were engaged in desperate struggle at Zaragoza. On the other hand, wherever the undisciplined Spanish bands had been drawn out to meet the enemy in a pitched battle, defeat had been the natural consequence. Such was the case at Cabezon and Medina del Rio Seco; and this last-named victory opened the road to Madrid to the intrusive king Joseph Bonaparte, who had hitherto been unable to venture to take possession of his slippery throne. So decisive, indeed, did Napoleon consider the battle of Rio Seco, that in calculating what further resistance the Spaniards could offer, he contemptu-

July 14.

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1808. ously observed, "Spain has now some 15,000 men left, and some old blockhead to command them." Never, however, was the fallacy of his prognostications more completely, nor so immediately, proved; for in the course of a few days arrived the mortifying news of the battle of Baylen, and surrender of Dupont's army; that of Joseph's flight from Madrid, and the abandonment of the siege of Zaragoza quickly followed; and ere long he received intelligence that gave him, perhaps, yet greater uneasiness than all these untoward events combined, — namely, the arrival of a British force on the coast of Portugal. For he saw that henceforth bribery and treachery would be of no avail, and that the sword alone could effect the subjugation of the Peninsula.

July 19.

Junot's position in Portugal had become somewhat critical from the moment the disturbances at Madrid were known in that country. The exactions, cruelties, and sacrilegious proceedings of the French had long been goading the Portugueze to resistance; and Napoleon's lieutenant now became aware, that unless his countrymen succeeded quickly in quelling the insurrection in Spain, he himself would very soon have full employment to repress the rising indignation of the Portugueze.

Accordingly, to meet the threatening storm, he strengthened the garrisons of the different fortresses, and collected the remainder of his army round Lisbon, leaving Oporto occupied by General Bellesta's division of the Spanish army, placed under his command. No sooner, however, did intelligence of the real state of his country reach the Spanish general, than he arrested the French governor of

June 6.

Oporto, and marched his troops to the assistance of the patriots.

On receiving the news of this defection, Junot immediately disarmed the rest of the Spanish troops serving under his orders, and secured them on board hulks in the Tagus: and now, equally apprehensive of attack from the British fleet if he left Lisbon, and of insurrection throughout Portugal if he did not, he made a tardy attempt to conciliate the Portugueze troops, by placing them, in respect to pay and rations, on the same footing as his own. He called upon them at the same time to join in the defence of their country against the English, promising to convey to them the lessons he had himself received from the great Napoleon, and teach them how to conquer. But the Portugueze turned a deaf ear to his call: they were destined to acquire the useful knowledge he offered to impart, under a more perfect master in the art.

The north of Portugal being now freed from French control, the inveterate hate the inhabitants bore their cruel oppressors was not long in showing itself. Melgaço was the first place that raised the standard of the Braganzas, and the example was followed simultaneously by almost every town throughout the provinces of *Entre Duero-e-Minho* and *Tras os Montes.* June 9.

At Oporto the populace nominated a Provisional Junta of Supreme Government, placing at its head the Bishop, Dom Antonio de St. José è Castrò. It would have been difficult to have selected a more able man, or better patriot, in the whole of Portugal; and the duty now imposed on him required all his abilities and love of country to discharge; since June 19.

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he found himself at the head of a government without funds, unsupported by troops, surrounded by traitors, and within a few days' march of a powerful enemy.

Under these difficult circumstances, the Bishop's attention was first given to the delicate task of repressing the insubordination which had invested him with nominal authority; for the sudden transition from servitude to freedom had been attended with many excesses, the populace conceiving that the day of retribution had arrived for all those whom they had suspected of being favourable to the enemies of their country; — a notion that it was dangerous, in the first instance, to combat: and the inhabitants of all classes, mistaking the declaration of freedom for the conquest of it, gave way, with characteristic vapouring, to the most extravagant boastings and puerile rejoicings; "and men who ought to have been practising at drill, or erecting batteries and digging trenches, were beating drums, ringing bells, and wasting powder in empty demonstrations of victory."

Southey, i. 452.

The Bishop at length succeeded in restoring some kind of order; and immediately occupied himself in raising contributions for the support of a body of troops, and making other preparations to resist the enemy. Deputies were also sent to England to ask for succours; and a good understanding was established with the juntas of the neighbouring Spanish provinces.

June 22.

The insurrection soon spread to Coimbra, within 120 miles of Lisbon, where a small garrison of French troops fell into the hands of the Portugueze. A few days afterwards, a body of insurgents from that city proceeded against the little fortress of

Figueira da Foz, situated at the mouth of the Mondego. The garrison of this place (through a neglect very unusual on the part of the French) being provided with provisions for only 24 hours, was obliged to surrender to this tumultuous rabble, composed mostly of Coimbra students. Its capture proved eventually of great importance, as it commanded the landing-place at the mouth of the Mondego.

So little had these events been anticipated by the French governor-general, that but a short time previously he had sent a force of 4000 men to the south of Portugal, to cause a diversion in favour of Dupont's invasion of Andalusia, by threatening Cadiz; and another division of equal strength, under General Loison, had also been despatched from Lisbon to Almeida, with the view of co-operating with the army of General Bessières in the north of Spain, and, if a favourable opportunity presented itself, of seizing upon Ciudad Rodrigo. Thiebault, p. 112.

The news of the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Oporto, and the insurrection which immediately followed that event, caused, therefore, the greatest embarrassment to Junot, who, afraid, under any circumstances, to weaken further the garrison of Lisbon, despatched orders to Loison to proceed instantly from Almeida to Oporto, establish himself in that city, and take the command of the province of *Tras os Montes*.

In pursuance of these orders, Loison left Almeida on the 17th June, by a rapid march reached Lamego in four days, and crossing to the right bank of the Douro at Regoa on the morning of the 5th, pushed on the same afternoon to Mezam-frio. Thus far he had encountered no opposition; and

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1808. Oporto, now distant but two days' march, seemed already within his grasp. He proposed halting for the night at Mezam-frio; but in the course of the afternoon received information that his advanced guard was held in check by a large body of armed peasants, who had taken post at Amarante; and that another insurgent force had fallen upon his rear-guard at Regoa.

Doubtful of being able to force his way to Oporto under these circumstances, and alarmed at the prospect of being cut off from Almeida, should he fail in an attempt to do so,—the French general determined to retrace his steps without a moment's delay. He fell back accordingly to Regoa, experiencing considerable loss in so doing; recrossed the Douro on the following morning, and, covered in some measure by the river during the rest of his march, continued his retreat more leisurely, though still pursued and harassed by the insurgents.

To screen in some measure the failure of his attempt upon Oporto, Loison, on drawing near Almeida, diverged from the direct road to that place, and proceeded with one division of his corps to Guarda, to put down an insurrectionary movement in the neighbourhood of that city; but on

June 30. arriving there, he received a despatch from Junot (the only one which reached him of twenty-five that had been sent), containing pressing orders for him to return to Lisbon. The news of the surrender of Dupont, and a report of the arrival of an English fleet, conveying 10,000 men, at the mouth of the Tagus, having alarmed the French governor of Portugal for the safety of Lisbon.

June 28. In a council of war, assembled by Junot on the

receipt of the news of these alarming events, it had been agreed that the best dispositions which, under existing circumstances, could be made for the defence of Portugal were, to leave garrisons only in the fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche; to assemble the rest of the army round Lisbon, keeping advanced posts at Leyria, Thomar, Santarem, Obidos, &c.; to defend the capital to the last extremity; and if forced to abandon it, to retire upon Elvas and into Spain. To enable them to effect this latter part of his plan, it was moreover determined to occupy Setuval and the left bank of the Tagus as long as possible. Thiebault, p. 127.

Loison, in obedience to the orders received at Guarda, proceeded immediately to Almeida; and having made the necessary arrangements for the security of that place, commenced his march towards Lisbon on the 3d July, having with him a force of nearly 3500 men. A large body of insurgents was drawn up at Guarda to dispute his return to that town, but it was dispersed with great ease and greater slaughter; and, burning and destroying whatever lay upon his line of march, this most sanguinary of all Junot's inhuman lieutenants reached Santarem on the 11th July. Meanwhile Junot, having recovered from his alarm for the safety of Lisbon, now directed Loison to form a junction with the divisions of Generals Kellerman and Margaron, and march by Thomar to Alcobaça, to destroy an English force which was reported to have effected a landing in the vicinity of that place: this done, he was ordered to quell an insurrection which had broken out at Leyria, Thiebault, p. 51

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and proceed thence to Coimbra, to bring that important city under subjection.

Ere Loison reached Abrantes, however, the part of these instructions relating to Leyria had

July 17.

already been carried into execution by General Margaron; and as no landing had been effected by the English, he was proceeding to march upon Coimbra, when he received orders to repair with all speed to Lisbon, the English fleet having again shown itself at the mouth of the Tagus.

In a few days Junot's apprehensions on that score were again quieted; but alarmed, on the other hand, at the extent of the insurrection, now spreading to Alemtejo, — through which province his only secure line of retreat lay, should he be obliged to abandon Lisbon, — he directed Loison to cross the Tagus and disperse the Alemtejo insurgents; re-victual Elvas; seize upon Bajados, if circumstances favoured such an enterprise; and then recross the Tagus at Abrantes or Santarem, and march upon Coimbra, to be ready to fall upon any English troops that might be landed on the coast of the north of Portugal.

The force sent with Loison on this expedition amounted to at least 7000* men. It crossed the Tagus on the 25th of July, and directed its march by Vendas novas upon Evora, which was the focus of the insurrection in Alemtejo. A mob of peasants aided by a small body of Spanish troops, who attempted to dispute the entrance to the city, were quickly dispersed; and on the plea this resistance furnished, the place was treated as if carried by assault, and

* Seven and a half battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and eight guns. — *Thiebault.*

given up to pillage. The French boast of having in this "affair" put 8000 of the insurgents *hors de combat*, made 4000 prisoners, and captured all their artillery. Thiebault, p. 165.

The first part of Loison's mission was considered, therefore, as accomplished; and, proceeding on, he reached Elvas on the 3d of August. Finding that fortress thoroughly prepared for defence, he had no occasion to weaken his corps by reinforcing its garrison; and on the following day he made a reconnoissance towards Badajos. The apparition of the English fleet off Figueira again, however, occasioned a sudden order to be despatched from Lisbon for Loison's recall, and deterred him from attempting any thing against the Spanish fortress: he set off accordingly on his return, without a moment's delay, and, by a rapid march, reached Abrantes on the 9th of August. August 5.

It was no vain alarm which had this time caused Junot to recall his lieutenant in such haste, an English force having actually commenced disembarking in Mondego bay. But though intelligence of this event reached the French commander on the 2d of August, yet not until the 6th did he despatch General Laborde with a reinforcement of a brigade of infantry to the point of attack; directing him to take the command of the advanced guard, composed of Thomière's brigade, cantoned in the neighbourhood of Obidos, and to hold the English in check until he could collect the remainder of his scattered forces and make dispositions to attack them. August 1.

General Laborde, on leaving Lisbon for this purpose, took the road to Villa Franca, and reached Candeiros on the 9th, — the day on which Loison's

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corps arrived at Abrantes. The force thus placed at the disposal of Laborde consisted of the brigade of General Brenier (two strong battalions of the 70th regiment), with which he marched from Lisbon, and that of General Thomières, composed of two regiments (two light infantry battalions and one Swiss) distributed between Peniche, Obidos, and Alcobaça, besides several squadrons of cavalry and five guns; and therefore, on the lowest calculation, amounted to 5000 men, exclusive of any portion of General Charlot's brigade of three battalions, which was distributed partly on his line of march; one battalion being at Rio Mayor*, the others at Santarem and Abrantes.

The corps under Loison, which, as we have already stated, could not, on leaving Lisbon, have been less than 7000 men, may possibly, by the losses occasioned as well by the rapidity of its march in excessively sultry weather as by its encounters with the insurgents, have been reduced to 6500; and Junot had yet between eight and nine thousand men at his disposal, wherewith to garrison Lisbon and the forts of the Tagus, and march to the support of his advanced corps, when the plans of his adversaries should be clearly developed.

Such was the amount of force†, and such the plan of defence, with which Junot purposed to meet the British attack. It will at once be seen

* It would be absurd to suppose that the battalion of this brigade stationed at Rio Mayor would have been left in the rear on Laborde's advance. That general's division may, therefore, be reckoned at near 6000 men, on the authority of the French themselves.

† The French force in Portugal, on the 15th of July (including the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida), is stated by Thiebault to have amounted to 26,533 men of all arms.

that, notwithstanding the repeated warnings he had received of impending danger, and the ample time he had been allowed to make suitable dispositions to repel the threatened invasion, he was nevertheless found with his divisions so scattered as not to be able to effect a junction of his different corps to attack his adversary, for three weeks. That he was not himself attacked in half that time, was no fault of the enterprising opponent against whom he made these faulty dispositions.

CHAPTER XIII.

SPANISH DEPUTIES ARRIVE IN ENGLAND. — THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DETERMINES TO ASSIST THE SPANIARDS. — SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY IS APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE FORCE COLLECTED FOR THIS PURPOSE. — HE RECEIVES HIS INSTRUCTIONS, AND PROCEEDS TO CORK. — SAILS FROM COVE, AND PRECEDES THE FLEET TO CORUÑA. — EXAGGERATED ACCOUNTS OF THE SUCCESSES OF THE PATRIOTS. — PROCEEDS TO OPORTO, AND THENCE TO THE MOUTH OF THE TAGUS, TO CONFER WITH ADMIRAL SIR C. COTTON: — DECIDES ON DISEMBARKING THE ARMY AT MONDEGO BAY. — REJOINS THE FLEET OF TRANSPORTS, AND HEARS OF THE APPOINTMENT OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO THE COMMAND. — PREPARES TO LAND.

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THE first deputies from the provincial juntas of the north of Spain reached England early in the month of June. With a degree of exaggeration and self-confidence most truly characteristic of their country, these delegates represented the national armies as numerous and well disciplined; the peasantry as animated to a man with the most fervent patriotism, and as requiring but arms, ammunition, and money, to enable them to drive the treacherous subverters of their independence across the Pyrenees: of troops, they said, they stood in no need.

The British government took, however, a more sober view of the state of affairs in Spain; for though, as was observed by an eminent statesman*, "we had yet every thing to learn concerning that country," yet it was obvious that little could be expected from the unassisted exertions of a nation which, during five months,

* Mr. Windham.

had tamely submitted to see successively its strongholds treacherously seized upon; its king and royal family kidnapped; its revenues plundered, laws defied, religion scoffed at, and finally its government usurped:—such a nation could be but ill prepared to rush single-handed into a contest with a nation like France, under such a ruler as Napoleon.

Even had the energies of Spain, like those of its powerful enemy, been directed by a single mighty hand; still such a struggle, considering the miserable condition to which that country had been reduced, would have presented but little chance of success; whereas the very fact of Spain being yet further weakened by divided councils, (as evinced by the arrival of deputies from various provinces all broaching differing projects,) showed how utterly hopeless must be the result of two such ill-matched combatants.

The time, moreover, was particularly favourable to Napoleon; since, freed from wars in every other part of the Continent, he was at liberty, if necessary, to bring his whole strength to bear upon his weak and prostrate adversary; and the assistance which the small and despised army of England could furnish, seemed far too contemptible to be taken into consideration by one at whose command hundreds of thousands were put in motion.

England, nevertheless, persevering in her firm resolve to combat the ambitious designs of Napoleon wherever a field for so doing presented itself, and despairing of being able to rouse the great powers of Europe to further exertion, eagerly embraced the opportunity afforded by this call for assistance from Spain; determining, at the same time,

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to afford more effectual aid than the vanity of that nation allowed it to think was required.

But never, perhaps, was a contest commenced with less chance of ultimate success; and had we known as much of the character of the Spaniards then, as experience afterwards taught us, it is very doubtful whether the country would have allowed its ministers to play so high a stake, even in the cause of that most highly prized of human prerogatives, freedom. It was fortunate, therefore, considering the result, that we knew but little of Spain, and less of her inhabitants; and the determination of the British ministry to afford assistance to the "*Patriots*" was greeted with applause by all ranks and all parties.

Whilst every encouragement was consequently given to the spirit of resistance manifested in Spain, as well by an immediate declaration of a cessation of hostilities between the two countries, as by a liberal compliance with the demands made for arms and money, the British government collected a force to proceed to the coast of Spain, to be ready to act wherever its services might be most beneficially employed; and, fortunately for England, we may say indeed for the world, the command of the expedition about to be thus, somewhat quixotically, sent in search of adventures was, at the instance of Lord Castlereagh, entrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

The extraordinary military talents displayed by the conqueror of Assye, though they had neither sufficiently fixed the attention of the nation at large, nor, as the event soon proved, been duly appreciated by the most *exalted personages* of the realm, had not been overlooked by the talented nobleman

above named, who, at the time of which we write, held the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and the immovable firmness of this eminent statesman at a later period of the Peninsular war, when more timid politicians saw in the prolonged contest but a useless sacrifice of blood and treasure —and a set of self-styled patriots scrupled not to allude in the strongest terms of vituperation to the services rendered by the British troops, and to hold up to animadversion the conduct of their gallant leader, — enabled Sir Arthur to carry out his well-digested plans, and to lead his army to the performance of a series of achievements for which we should in vain seek a parallel in the pages of our history.

These facts it is necessary to record thus early, since the opposition eventually manifested in England to the continuance of the war; the outcry raised at the loss of life which every battle necessarily occasioned; and the certainty that any reverse, however unimportant, would furnish an occasion seriously to embarrass his supporters at home; frequently compelled our great commander to forego opportunities of obtaining important results, and obliged him to carry on his operations with a degree of caution, which his adversaries, educated in a school where it was laid down as a rule that success must be obtained at any price, have not failed to ascribe to slowness and timidity.

The appointment of Lieut.-General* Sir Arthur Wellesley to the command of an expedition "to be employed on a particular service," was announced

* Sir Arthur obtained the rank of lieutenant-general on the 25th of April, 1808.

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to him by the Commander-in-chief, H. R. H. the Duke of York, on the 14th of June. The force placed under his orders consisted of eight battalions and four companies of infantry (the greater part of which was yet to be collected at Cork), and a division of about 4800 men under General Spencer*, which was already hovering about the south coast of Spain.

The task of closing his duties as secretary for Ireland, gave Sir Arthur full occupation during the short time it was likely would elapse ere he should be called upon to embark, and obliged him to remain at Dublin, and leave the arrangements for brigading, embarking, and provisioning the troops to Major-General Hill†, the next senior officer present with the expedition. Nevertheless, contemplating the probability of the troops remaining for some time embarked in crowded transports, his ever lively solicitude for the health and well-being of those under his command, led him to make various suggestions tending to avert the evil consequences which might result from such inconveniences, — suggestions which were, however, anticipated by the kind-hearted, distinguished officer to whom they were addressed; and our readers will, doubtless, be gratified to be furnished with some extracts from the letters of Sir Arthur at this period, showing the estimation in which he already held one who was destined to share so largely in the triumphs of his brilliant career.

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* Afterwards Sir Brent Spencer, G.C.B.

† General Lord Hill, G.C.B. &c. &c. &c.

"*To Major-General Hill.*

"Dublin Castle, 23d June, 1808.

"MY DEAR HILL,

"I rejoice extremely at the prospect I have before me of serving again with you; and I hope that we shall have more to do than we had on the last occasion on which we were together.* Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 23.

"I propose to leave town for Cork as soon as I shall receive my instructions from London. I understand that every thing has sailed from England which is to be with us; and the horses belonging to the Irish commissariat will be at Cork, I hope, before the transports shall have arrived in which they are to be embarked. Let me hear from you, if you learn any thing respecting them.

* * * * *

"Pray let me hear from you, and acquaint me with all your wants, and whether I can do any thing for you here."

Again, on the 25th of June, Sir Arthur writes to General Hill, —

"I have now to request that you will make arrangements with the agent of transports, that the soldiers embarked may have fresh provisions and vegetables every day; and that the stock of provisions in the transports may be kept up to the original quantity which each is capable of containing. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 25.

"I also think it very desirable that the soldiers should have permission to go ashore as they may wish, under such regulations as you may think proper; and that the regiments should be sent ashore and exercised in their turns.

"I request you to arrange these matters with the agents of the transports, which can easily be done by a good management of the ships' boats."

The following letter to Brigadier-General the Hon. C. Stuart†, will still further show Sir Arthur's solicitude for the comforts of the troops.

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* The expedition to the North of Germany, in 1806.

† The present Marquis of Londonderry, G.C.B. &c. &c.

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"Dublin Castle, 25th June, 1808.

"My dear Charles,

"I enclose some papers which I have received respecting the state of the transports at Cork. The troops are certainly too much crowded; and I recommend those which can be quartered within one day's march of Cork may be landed, unless it be certain that we shall go immediately. The troops would be on board before I should get to Cork, if they should be landed and marched only one day's march into the country; and they would certainly benefit by this arrangement.

"Believe me, &c.,

"Arthur Wellesley."

Sir Arthur's "instructions" did not reach him until the 2d of July. They were to the effect that the force under his orders was to be employed "in counteracting the designs of the enemy, and in affording to the Spanish and Portugueze nations every possible aid in throwing off the yoke of France." They pointed out at the same time that, as the deputies from the northern provinces of Spain did not desire the co-operation of British troops, but rather that their efforts should be directed to expel the French from Portugal, as calculated to effect a powerful diversion in their favour, it was deemed expedient that his attention should be particularly given to that object.

They further directed that the armament should make for Cape Finisterre; while Sir Arthur himself, preceding it in a fast-sailing frigate, should go to Coruña, and obtain information of the actual state of affairs both in Spain and Portugal, to enable him to judge of the propriety of undertaking an operation against the Tagus, either with his own corps singly, or in conjunction with that of General Spencer; and, in the event of his being of opinion that such an operation could not be

undertaken without further reinforcements, he was instructed to endeavour to obtain permission from the provincial government of Galicia to enter the port of Vigo, to await the arrival of a corps of 10,000 men, which had been ordered to be prepared for service to meet this contingency, and would be ready to proceed to join him, if required, in about three weeks. General Spencer's corps was also to be directed to proceed to this rendezvous.

"In the rapid succession in which events might be expected to follow each other, situated as Spain and Portugal then were, *much*"—the instructions continued—"*must be left to his judgment and decision on the spot.*"

Sir Arthur arrived at Cork, and assumed the command of the armament collected there on the 6th of July. Two battalions had been added to its strength; but a sufficient number of transports had not reached Cove to contain the whole of the troops; and those already embarked were much too crowded; neither had a cavalry regiment*, which had embarked in England to join the expedition, yet arrived, nor had sufficient provision been made for the accommodation of the sick.

Making the best arrangements he could under such circumstances, he informed the Secretary of State that it was his intention to wait for the dragoons and the additional transports required, until the 9th; but if by that day they had not arrived, he should sail with what was already collected, without further loss of time.

* 20th light dragoons.

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The wind, however, continuing adverse, the transports were all collected and troops embarked before an opportunity offered for the sailing of the expedition; and Sir Arthur announced his state of preparation in the following letter to Lord Castlereagh: —

"Cove, 10th July, 1808.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 10.

"My dear Lord,

"The wind is still contrary, but we hope it will change so as to sail this evening. We are unmoored, and shall not wait one moment after the wind may be fair.

"I see the people in England complain of the delay which has taken place in the sailing of the expedition; but, in fact, none has taken place; and even if all had been on board, we could not have sailed before this day. With all the expedition which we could use, we could not get the horses of the artillery to Cork till yesterday, and they were immediately embarked; and it was only yesterday that the 20th dragoons arrived, and the ships to contain the 36th regiment and a detachment of the 45th, which arrived yesterday evening and embarked.

"Your instructions to me left London on the Friday evening, and I was at Cork on the following Wednesday, which is as much expedition as if the instructions had come by the post."

The armament sailed from Cove on the 12th of July; and the Crocodile frigate, in which Sir Arthur was embarked, having quitted the fleet as soon as it had cleared the coast of Ireland, reached Coruña on the 20th.

The British general immediately proceeded to confer with the provincial junta of Galicia, assembled there; from whom he gathered that the whole of Spain, excepting the kingdoms of Navarre and Biscay, were in arms against the French; that detachments of the enemy had been destroyed by the patriots in various parts of the kingdom, though no positive information could be given as to the details of these occurrences; whilst, on the other

hand, it was certain that the united armies of Castille and Galicia had on the 14th been defeated by Marshal Bessières at Rio Seco; in consequence of which, although the Spaniards were represented to have retired in good order, the French had acquired the command of the course of the Douro, and were in a situation to interrupt the communication between Galicia and the southern and eastern provinces of the kingdom.

The junta expressed, however, no anxiety for the safety of the province, and no desire to receive the assistance of British troops; maintaining that with arms and money (which had been furnished) they could send any number of men they pleased into the field.

The successes of the Spaniards and their means of resistance being thus grossly exaggerated, whilst the signal defeat of their army at Rio Seco (the battle which, it will be remembered, Napoleon said would seat his brother on the throne) had, on the other hand, been slurred over as an unimportant affair, induced Sir Arthur to think that the French emperor's object would now be to establish himself firmly in the northern provinces, before he again carried the war into the heart of Spain; and as this could only be accomplished by invading and retaining possession of the Asturias, he directed the attention of the British government to that important point, recommending that an endeavour should be made to prevail upon the Asturians to receive a body of English troops, and that our squadron on the north coast of Spain should be reinforced, to enable it to check effectually any attempt of the French to reach the Asturias by sea.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 21.

With respect to the state of Portugal, the in-

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formation Sir Arthur obtained at Coruña was scarcely more correct. Junot was represented to have collected 12,000 men at Lisbon, and as holding Almeida and other points with 3000 more; whilst a Portugueze army was stated to be at Oporto, a corps of 2000 Spaniards on the march to join it from Galicia, and a Spanish army of 20,000 men to have taken post at Almaraz to cut off Junot's communication with Madrid.

General Spencer's corps, he learned on more trustworthy authority, had, after the capture of the French fleet in Cadiz bay, proceeded to Ayamonte, at the mouth of the Guadiana, to hold in check a force despatched by Junot to effect a diversion in favour of Dupont's invasion of Andalusia.

The junta strongly advised Sir Arthur not to attempt to land at Lisbon, nor in the neighbourhood of the French army, as he would thereby lose the advantage of the co-operation of the Spanish and Portuguese troops at Oporto; and recommended that he should disembark either at that place or at Vigo, and, reinforced by these allies, advance upon Lisbon.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 21.

"It is impossible for me to decide upon this or any other matter," Sir Arthur writes, in concluding a long letter to Lord Castlereagh, "till I know more of the situation of affairs. I should have no doubt of success, even without General Spencer's assistance or that of the allies, if I were once ashore; but to effect a landing in front of an enemy is always difficult, and I shall be inclined to land at a distance from Lisbon."

Sir Arthur rejoined the fleet off Cape Finisterre on the 22d; and proceeding immediately to the mouth of the Douro, reached Oporto on the 24th. The Portugueze army, which the junta of Galicia had represented as assembled there, amounted, he

found, to about 1500 regular troops, some militia volunteers, and peasantry, all badly armed and equipped. There were also 300 Spanish infantry; but the corps of 2000 men of that nation, which was stated to have marched from Galicia, had not arrived, and was not expected. Coimbra, however, he was informed, was occupied by a corps of 5000 regular troops (including 300 cavalry), and a body of 12000 peasantry, mostly unarmed.

Vague and contradictory reports were in circulation as to the result of the military operations in Spain; but the British commander had already seen enough of Spanish affairs to discover that it was "impossible to learn the truth."

At Oporto Sir Arthur received a letter from Admiral Sir C. Cotton, acquainting him that the fort of Figueira, at the mouth of the Mondego, had been occupied by a detachment of marines from the fleet under his command, and recommending that the troops should be landed either there or at Peniche. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 2.

The admiral at the same time expressed a wish that Sir Arthur should confer with him previous to undertaking any operation, and for this purpose proposed that he should leave the transports to windward of the Mondego, and come down himself to the cruising ground of the fleet at the mouth of the Tagus.

From the Bishop of Oporto, who, as we have already stated, was at the head of the junta of that city, the British commander obtained a promise that 150 horses for the remount of his cavalry, and 500 mules, fit either for draught or carriage, and intended for the transport of musket ammunition, entrenching tools, provisions, camp equipage, &c., should be at Coimbra by the time the army would be disembarked, if he decided on landing at Mon-

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dego Bay; and an arrangement was also entered into by the prelate for the supply of fresh meat for the troops, and of forage and grain for the horses and mules belonging to the English army.

Having effected these desirable arrangements in the course of the 24th, Sir Arthur rejoined the fleet on the following morning; and after giving directions for it to proceed to Mondego Bay to await his return, and for the troops to make every preparation for landing, he proceeded to confer with the admiral in compliance with his suggestion. On his passage to the mouth of the Tagus, he received despatches from General Spencer, by which he learnt that that officer (who, he rather expected to find, had rejoined the admiral) had landed his corps at Puerto de Santa Maria (a town on the north side of the Bay of Cadiz), purposing to remain in Andalusia. On joining Sir Charles Cotton, therefore, Sir Arthur's first care was to send orders to General Spencer to re-embark his corps immediately and proceed with it to the Tagus, apprising the junta of Seville of the motives which had induced his Majesty's ministers to authorize him to transfer General Spencer's force to Portugal, and of his own reasons for thinking that the interests and objects of the Spanish nation would be most effectually forwarded by carrying into execution the orders he had received on that head. But, in the event of General Spencer's corps being actually engaged in active operations, the relinquishment of which would in that officer's judgment be detrimental to the Spanish cause, he was directed to disregard this order and carry out the operations in which he might be engaged.

Sir Arthur's reasons for thinking that General

Spencer's corps would be more beneficially employed in Portugal than in Andalusia were fully and clearly detailed in a private letter to that officer — an extract from which we subjoin — of the same date as the official communication conveying his orders on the subject.

"*To Major-General Spencer.*

"H. M. Ship Crocodile, off the Tagus, 26th July, 1808.

"My dear Sir,

* * * * *

"In addition to the reasons stated in my public letter, I have to mention to you that, from all I have heard, I think there is reason to believe that Bonaparte is not now very strong in Spain, and that he has not at his command the means of reinforcing his troops sufficiently to strike any blow which can have a permanent effect. It is obvious that Dupont, to the southward, does not think himself sufficiently strong for Castaños, otherwise he would not halt and take up a defensive position. Even supposing that we should deem it expedient eventually to return and carry on operations in the south of Spain, it is not probable, from the general state of the French, that any great misfortune can happen before we return.

"In the meantime the Spaniards will acquire strength and experience; and I must observe, that nothing we can do can be so useful to them as to get possession of and organize a good army in Portugal.

"On the other hand, if the efforts of the Spanish nation should fail, and if the French are now able to obtain possession of Cadiz, I do not think the presence of your corps would be of much avail to prevent the occurrence of this misfortune; while its presence here is of the utmost importance, to enable me to perform the operation intrusted to me, the success of which would be a great benefit to Great Britain, — even if all should unfortunately fail."

It will be seen, by the preceding extract, that Sir Arthur already perceived that Dupont's attempt to obtain possession of Cadiz had miscarried. To halt and take up a defensive position, considering the circumstances and nature of the country, was

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of itself equivalent to a defeat; and the British commander judged rightly, therefore, in supposing that General Spencer's corps could no longer be of use in Andalusia; whereas, from the more correct accounts he had *now* obtained of the strength of the French army in Portugal, its junction with the force under his orders became of paramount importance.

The result of Sir Arthur's conference with Sir Charles Cotton was the abandonment of the projected attack upon the defences of the Tagus; the obstacles in the way of such an operation being deemed of too formidable a nature to admit of their indulging the least hope of its being attended with success. The landing places in the several bays that indent the north coast of what is termed the Bay of Lisbon are not only small and insecure, but were protected by forts and batteries, which, owing to the shallowness of the water, the ships of war could not approach near enough to silence. The proximity of the enemy would further have tended to increase the embarrassment attendant on a disembarkation in that quarter under such circumstances; and with respect to a landing on the coast south of the Tagus, it appeared to Sir Arthur that such an enterprise would occasion a disjunction of his force, which might be attended with bad consequences to one if not both divisions. He determined, therefore, to concentrate his force as speedily as possible, and effect a landing at Mondego Bay; which, excepting in the immediate vicinity of the fort of Peniche (occupied by the enemy), was the nearest place to Lisbon on the coast north of the Tagus where such an operation could be undertaken. Even there, indeed, a land-

ing was not unattended with difficulties in the best of weather, and during the prevalence of certain winds it was altogether impracticable.

Having come to this decision, Sir Arthur hastened to rejoin his armament in Mondego Bay, and make arrangements for its immediate disembarkation. When arrived off Figueira, he received July 30. despatches from the English government, dated only three days after his departure from Cork, informing him, that in consequence of the receipt of intelligence from General Spencer representing the French force in Portugal to be much greater than they had previously been led to believe, it had been determined to reinforce his army with a corps of 5000 men, composed of two brigades of infantry under Generals Acland and Anstruther, and two companies of artillery, which force would proceed without loss of time to join him off the Tagus; and that a farther reinforcement of a corps of 11,000 men (which had just returned from Sweden under Sir John Moore) would also be despatched to join him, as soon as the troops had been refreshed and the transports revictualled.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 15.

The motives for sending so large a force, besides the reason above alleged, were explained to be,—first, to provide effectually for an attack upon the Tagus; and, secondly, to have such an additional force disposable, beyond what might be absolutely required for that operation, to admit of a detachment being made, either to secure Cadiz, if it should be threatened by the force under Dupont, or to co-operate with the Spanish army opposed to that corps of the enemy, if circumstances should be favourable to such an operation.

The secretary of state's despatch further inti-

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mated, that it was conceived the force thus about to be placed at the disposal of Sir Arthur would be sufficient to undertake both operations at the same time; but he was directed to consider the attack upon the Tagus as the first object to which he was to give his attention, though it was to be suspended if, previous to the arrival of the whole of the troops now directed to join him, it should be necessary to send a force to Cadiz to place that important fortress out of the reach of immediate danger.

In the event of an attack upon the defences of the Tagus being deemed unadvisable, the next object pointed out for Sir Arthur's consideration was the most favourable part of the coast of Portugal, between Peniche to the north of the Tagus and Setubal (St. Ubes) to the south, on which a position could be taken by the British army where its intercourse with the interior might be securely opened, and from whence it might afterwards move against the enemy; — endeavouring, if possible, not only to expel him from Lisbon, but to cut off his retreat towards Spain.

Excepting the precise limitation of the extent of coast whereon a landing was proposed to be effected, the project Sir Arthur had already determined on executing was in strict conformity with the instructions from which we have made the preceding extracts; for the projected attack on the Tagus had already been abandoned as unadvisable, and the contemplated co-operation of a British corps with the army of Andalusia, though against his judgment, was, as we have seen by his letter to General Spencer, provided for, should that officer "be engaged in active operations, the relinquishment of which would be detrimental to the Spanish

cause." To have allowed General Spencer's corps to remain inactive at Puerto de Santa Maria would have been absurd, — he had therefore very properly ordered it to join him; and the intelligence that now reached Sir Arthur from Spain left no doubt of the propriety of the decision he had come to on this subject; for the inability of the enemy's corps under Dupont to resist the Spaniards, which his penetration had foreseen, was now fully proved by the surrender of the French army to that of General Castaños; and since Andalusia was thus cleared of the enemy, there could be no possible occasion for the co-operation of General Spencer's corps. Sir Arthur wrote therefore to the admiral, to request that if any of the various fleets having on board the ordnance stores for his army, General Spencer's corps, or the reinforcements now announced as coming from England, should go to the mouth of the Tagus, he would order them to Mondego Bay, where he announced it to be his intention to disembark the force already with him on the 1st of August. He also requested Sir Charles Cotton to allow the Alfred, 74, belonging to his fleet, to remain with his armament as long as possible, with a view of attacking the fort of Peniche, the army not being provided with artillery suited to such a purpose.

Bayleu. July 19.

July 30.

A rumour had reached the army as early as the 28th of June, that Sir Harry Burrard was about to leave England with considerable reinforcements to assume the command of the expedition, and apprehensions begun to be entertained that the disembarkation might consequently be delayed until the arrival of that officer; and immediately on the return of Sir Arthur on the 30th, the fact of his

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supercession was communicated to him by Lord Burghersh, who had just arrived from England; though the official intimation of this event, dated on the same day as Lord Castlereagh's last despatch — that is, *only three days after Sir Arthur's departure from Cork!*—had not yet reached him.

This announcement made, however, no alteration in Sir Arthur's plans, which will be best communicated to our readers by laying before them his private letter detailing them to Lord Castlereagh, and wherein also he points out the steps necessary to be taken for the future preservation of Portugal.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 1.

"H. M. S. Donegal, 1st August, 1808.

"My dear Lord,

"I have nothing to add to my public letter of this date, excepting to tell you I have reason to believe General Spencer's account of the French force in Portugal is exaggerated. I intended to make the attack with my own corps, aided by the Portuguese, if it should have turned out that he could not join me, according to my orders of the 26th of July, until I received your letter of the 15th, in which you announce the reinforcements; and I shall now march on, of course, as soon as one of the corps shall arrive.

"Pole and Burghersh have apprised me of the arrangements for the future command of this army; and the former has informed me of your kindness towards me, of which I have experienced so many instances that I can never doubt it in any case. All that I can say upon the subject is, that whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to insure its success; and you may depend upon it that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of the success.

"The government will determine for me in what way they will employ me hereafter, whether here or elsewhere. My opinion is, that Great Britain ought to raise, organize, and pay an army in Portugal, consisting of 30,000 Portuguese troops, which might be easily raised at any period; and 20,000 British, including 4000 or 5000 cavalry. This

army might operate on the frontiers of Portugal in Spanish Estremadura, and it would serve as the link between the kingdoms of Galicia and Andalusia: it would give Great Britain the preponderance in the conduct of the war in the Peninsula; and, whatever might be the result of the Spanish exertions, Portugal would be saved from the French grasp. You know best whether you could bear the expense, or what part of it the Portuguese government would or could defray; but if you should adopt this plan, you must send every thing from England, — arms, ammunition, clothing and accoutrements, ordnance, flour, oats, &c. These articles must find their way to the frontier partly by the navigation of the Douro and Tagus, and partly by other means.

"Believe me, &c.

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"*Viscount Castlereagh.*"

CHAPTER XIV.

FAULTY ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE COMMAND OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL.—SIR A. WELLESLEY DECIDES ON COMMENCING OPERATIONS, WITHOUT AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS.—HIS REASONS FOR TAKING THIS STEP.—THE ARMY DISEMBARKS.—ARRIVAL OF GENERAL SPENCER'S CORPS.—DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME, AND INCONVENIENCES TO WHICH THE BRITISH COMMANDER WAS SUBJECTED.—INTERVIEW WITH THE PORTUGUEZE AUTHORITIES.—THE ARMY MOVES FORWARD TO LEYRIA—IS JOINED BY THE PORTUGUEZE TROOPS.—EXTRAORDINARY PROPOSAL OF THEIR GENERAL.—SEPARATION OF THE TWO ARMIES.—POSITION OF THE FRENCH FORCES.—AFFAIR AT OBIDOS.—BATTLE OF ROLIÇA.—OBSERVATIONS ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE BELLIGERENTS UP TO THIS PERIOD.

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A GENERAL of ordinary stamp, placed in the position in which Sir Arthur Wellesley now found himself, — namely, saddled with the responsibility of commencing an operation attended with peculiar difficulties, in the prosecution of which he would be liable, every moment, to be superseded in the command *by no less than six senior officers** (for

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* Extract from a memorandum, dated "Horse Guards, 20th July, 1808:"—

* * * * * *

"His Majesty has further been pleased to direct, that Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple shall have the chief command thereof, and that Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Burrard be second in command; when the staff of this army will consist as follows:—viz.

"Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, commander of the forces.
— Sir Harry Burrard, second in command.
— Sir John Moore.
— Honourable John Hope.[1]
— Mackenzie Fraser.
— Lord Paget.[2]
— Sir Arthur Wellesley."
&c. &c. &c.

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[1] Afterwards created Lord Niddry; and, in 1816, succeeded his brother as Earl of Hopetoun.

[2] Now Marquis of Anglesey.

such were the arrangements made for the future command of the army, which were now communicated to him),—would doubtless have shrunk from taking upon himself so great a weight of responsibility, by sheltering himself under the excuse of a want of specific instructions;—for the instructions with which Sir Arthur had from time to time been furnished, from the peculiar circumstances of the country about to be made the seat of war, no less than from the scattered state of the different corps of which his army was to be composed, were unavoidably vague and indefinite; in some respects, indeed, they were even contradictory.

However, the latest despatch received by Sir Arthur from the secretary of state expressly stated, that the instructions with which he had been previously furnished were to be put into execution without awaiting the arrival of the general appointed to the future command of the army; and

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The army thus proposed to be collected and placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple consisted of the following corps:—

	Cavalry.	Artillery.	R. Staff Corps.	Infantry.	Total.
Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wellesley's corps, already on the coast of Portugal	394	226	-	8,123*	8,743
Major-General Spencer's corps, on the south coast of Spain	-	245	45	4,503	4,793
Brigades of Brigadier-Generals Acland and Anstruther, and other reinforcements on their passage from England to the Tagus	640	191	-	4,164	4,995
Lieutenant-General Sir J. Moore's corps, about to leave England	562	694	50	9,947	11,253
Total	1596	1356	95	26,737	29,784

* Deducting a veteran battalion embarked with the corps, but ordered to be sent to Gibraltar.

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this authority he considered quite sufficient to warrant his commencing the delicate operation, which, resting entirely on his own judgment, he had already determined on undertaking.

Many reasons urged Sir Arthur to carry his project into effect without further delay. In the first place, there existed the necessity for taking advantage of wind and weather for disembarking the troops and stores without risk; in the next, that of profiting by the absence of an enemy's force to oppose his landing. The probability of discouraging the Portugueze by any appearance of timidity was also to be avoided; and, lastly, it was evident that the arrangements for furnishing the army with supplies, and for obtaining the means of transport for its stores, ammunition, &c. could be much more readily completed on shore than by remaining on board ship.

Moreover, the surrender of Dupont's corps, by freeing Andalusia from enemies, had rendered the services of the (Spanish) army of that province available elsewhere; and it was clear, therefore, that Marshal Bessières' corps in the north of Spain, notwithstanding its success at Rio Seco, would now be too fully engaged in protecting Madrid (laid open to the army of Castaños) to think of succouring Junot; so that Sir Arthur, for some time at all events, might safely calculate on having but the French force actually in Portugal to encounter, and on the arrival of the expected reinforcements he hoped to find himself sufficiently strong to undertake their expulsion from the country.

In the meanwhile, to keep Junot in uncertainty as to the real point of attack, it had been arranged with Sir Charles Cotton that he should make a de-

monstration with the fleet against the forts on the Tagus; and this probably had the effect, as we have noticed, of delaying the departure of Laborde from Lisbon until the 6th of August.

Until reinforced by General Spencer's corps, Sir Arthur did not, however, consider his force sufficiently strong to commence an offensive movement; but from all he had heard, and the arrangements made in consequence, he had every reason to believe that both it and the two brigades of Generals Acland and Anstruther would join him shortly, and he determined therefore to land the force he had at hand without further loss of time.

The troops accordingly commenced disembarking on the 1st of August. Sir Arthur established his head quarters on the 2d at Lavaos, and immediately placed himself in communication with the civil and military authorities of the country; addressing also a proclamation to the Portugueze people, explaining the objects his Britannic Majesty had in view in sending a fleet and army to their assistance,— namely, to rescue their country from the French, and restore the government of their lawful prince.

The disembarkation of the army was not effected without much difficulty; for even in the best of weather the waves break heavily upon this coast, exposed as it is to the full sweep of the Atlantic, and at this time it did not happen to be particularly propitious: it was not therefore until the 5th that the whole of the troops, artillery, stores, and ammunition were safely landed, and on the evening of that day General Spencer arrived.

This officer, with great judgment, had embarked his corps at Puerto de Santa Maria, the moment

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he heard of the surrender of Dupont; as Cadiz being thereby placed out of danger, he rightly concluded that the force under his command might be beneficially employed elsewhere; and without having received Sir Arthur's instructions to that effect, sailed at once to the Tagus, where he found the order directing him to proceed to Mondego Bay. The transports with his corps arrived during the two following days (6th and 7th August), and the troops commenced landing from them as soon as they cast anchor; so that by the evening of the 8th, Sir Arthur found himself at the head of a body of men which he judged of sufficient strength to warrant his undertaking a forward movement.

But though the junction of General Spencer's corps had thus happily taken place at an earlier period than could reasonably have been expected, and the disembarkation of the whole army had been effected without interruption from the enemy, yet, during the anxious period of this tedious operation, various other cares had devolved upon the British commander, in consequence of the very inefficient state of the civil departments of the army. That of the commissariat in particular was found to be very incomplete, notwithstanding Sir Arthur's earnest representations on the subject whilst the expedition was fitting out, and it now became necessary to reorganize it completely. The officers of this department were not by any means sufficiently numerous; and though full of zeal, had little experience in the field duties they were now called upon to perform. They were also, for the most part, perfectly ignorant of the language of the country, and the difficulties they had to encounter were consequently much increased. Nor

were those difficulties few; for not only was transport to be provided for carrying the indispensable stores, camp equipage, &c. of the army, but also for the conveyance of a certain quantity of provisions to accompany it on the march, the country not furnishing a sufficiency of the requisite supplies.

The inconvenience arising from a like deficiency of officers was also sensibly felt in carrying on the service of the civil department of the ordnance; one clerk of stores (who was also paymaster), and five conductors of stores, being all who had been provided.

Sir Arthur's reply to the representations of the commanding officer of artillery (Lieut.-Colonel Robe*) on this subject, places in a strong light the very great disadvantage experienced in the British service by the ordnance corps being removed from the control of the general officers commanding armies in the field; for though "fully concurring" with Colonel Robe "in considering the establishment insufficient for the performance of all the duties required of it," yet he did not feel himself authorized to make any addition to it, even *pro tempore*, until the sanction of the Board of Ordnance could be obtained; and the inconvenience resulting from this constant reference to England came to be yet more severely felt on various

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 8.

* The late Colonel Sir William Robe, K.C.B., K.T.S., &c. This officer, equally distinguished by his zeal, gallantry, and professional abilities, commanded the royal artillery throughout this short campaign; and again, at a later period of the war, until disabled by a severe wound received at Cabeçon during the retreat from Burgos.

To the private correspondence of this gallant officer, which has been kindly placed in the authors' hands, they are indebted for much interesting information, embodied in the present work.

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other occasions, during the progress of the Peninsular war.

From these instances of the inexperience or ignorance of those charged with the direction of such matters at home, some idea may be formed of the difficulties against which Sir Arthur Wellesley had to contend, — difficulties of which his adversaries, clothed in such cases with despotic power, knew nothing.

The want of the means of transport came now to be so sensibly felt, that when the army marched it was found necessary to leave behind the *guns* of General Spencer's corps.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug.8.

"Let no one ever prevail upon you to send a corps to any part of Europe without horses to draw their guns," Sir Arthur feelingly writes to Lord Castlereagh: and even the guns of his own corps he would also have been obliged to leave, but for the horses of the Irish commissariat, that had been embarked at Cork; of which he quaintly observes in another letter to the secretary of state,

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug.16.

"They have great merit in their way as cast-off horses of dragoons, and Irish cart-horses bought for 12*l.* each; but are not fit for an army that, to be successful and carry things with a high hand, ought to be able to move."

The difficulty of obtaining information upon which any reliance could be placed, was scarcely less than that experienced in procuring beasts of burden to carry the requisite supplies for his army: — though reports were infinitely more abundant than mules.

Thus, on the 4th of August, Sir Arthur writes to Sir Charles Cotton from Lavaos, —

"I had heard a report that a detachment of the French army had crossed the Tagus, and I entertained some apprehensions for the fate of the Spanish detachment in Alentejo; I am now happy to find, from such good authority, that it has returned to the northward."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 4.

And again on the same subject to Lieutenant-Colonel Brown at Coimbra:—

"The French, who had crossed the Tagus on the 26th (July), had retired to this side of the river before the 31st. You may tell the gentlemen at Coimbra, and the Bishop, that this is certain."

The reports referred to in these extracts related to the movements of General Loison's corps, which we have seen was actually at Elvas (130 miles from Lisbon) on the day Sir Arthur thus wrote to say it was on the right bank of the Tagus.

Two days after writing these letters, he was undeceived as to the return of Loison; but by another extract, which we give below, seems to have been led to believe that a Spanish army had entered Alemtejo to co-operate with the insurgents of that province, whereas but a few hundred Spanish troops had been present at the rout of Evora.

"*To Lieut.-Colonel Trant.**

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 6.

"Lavaos, 6th August, 1808.

"My dear Sir,

* * * * *

"I was apprehensive that the Spaniards in Alentejo would suffer when I heard that the French detachment had crossed the Tagus; but I was in hopes that they had not time to effect any thing of importance when I heard they had returned before the 31st (July). I hope now that the Spaniards retreated in good time, and that they have lost only their rear guard.

* Lieutenant-Colonel Trant, at this time a captain in the Royal Staff Corps, and afterwards Sir Nicolas Trant, K.C.B., was attached to the Portugueze army.

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"There is nothing so foolish as to push these half-disciplined troops forward; for the certain consequence must be, either their early and precipitate retreat if the enemy should advance, or their certain destruction. I am determined not to move a man of my army till I am fully prepared to support any detachment I may send forward. . . ."

Sir Arthur seems, however, very soon to have ascertained the true value of these reports; for in a letter written to Sir Harry Burrard to await his arrival, he says, in allusion to the little positive information he is able to impart —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 8.

"When you shall have been a short time in this country, and shall have observed the degree to which the deficiency of real information is supplied by the circulation of unfounded reports, you will not be surprised at my want of accurate knowledge upon these subjects."

On the 7th of August Sir Arthur repaired to Montemor o Velho to confer with Dom Bernardim Freire, commanding the Portugueze troops at Coimbra, on the movements of their respective forces; when it was agreed that Leyria should be their point of concentration, and that they should march thence, in conjunction, upon Lisbon. General Freire stated, however, that his troops would not be able to reach Leyria until the 10th, and repeated a proposal which had originally been made to Sir Arthur during his visit to Oporto — that the Portugueze troops should be fed during the march to Lisbon by the British commissariat!

To this extraordinary proposal Sir Arthur returned a direct refusal; nevertheless it could not but have led him to conclude that the resources of the country through which their proposed route to the Portuguese capital lay, must be already completely exhausted; and it tended consequently to confirm him in the resolution to march by the

coast road, whereby his army would be enabled to draw its supplies from the storeships.

Another advantage the adoption of this line presented was, that the reinforcements hourly expected under Generals Acland and Anstruther would more readily be able to effect a junction, without retarding the advance of the army.

On the day following that on which Sir Arthur concerted this combined movement with General Freire, he addressed a letter to Sir Harry Burrard, whose arrival to assume the command might shortly be looked for, to impart to that officer all the information he had received regarding the state of the war in Spain and the insurrection in Portugal, as well as to acquaint him with the plan he proposed adopting to carry the instructions of the British government into effect. The following extracts from this letter will serve to show what Sir Arthur's views were, and the extent of information he had received up to the moment he was about to commence operations against the enemy.

" *To Lieut.-General Sir Harry Burrard, Bart.*

" Lavaos, 8th August, 1808.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 8.

" Sir,

* * * *

" The enemy's force at present in Portugal consists, as far as I am able to form an opinion, of from 16,000 to 18,000 men; of which number there are about 500 in the fort of Almeida, about the same number in Elvas, about 600 or 800 at Peniche, and 1600 or 1800 in the province of Alentejo, at Setuval, &c.; and the remainder are disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and are in the forts of St. Julien and Cascaes, in the batteries along the coast as far as the Rock of Lisbon, and in the old citadel of Lisbon, to which the enemy have lately added some works.

" Of the force disposable for the defence of Lisbon, the enemy have lately detached a corps of about 2000 men under General Thomières, principally, I believe, to watch

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my movements, which corps is now at Alcobaça; and another corps of 4000 men under General Loison was sent across the Tagus into Alentejo, on the 26th of last month: the object of which detachment was to disperse the Portuguese insurgents in that quarter; to force the Spanish corps, consisting of about 2000 men, which had advanced into Portugal as far as Evora from Estremadura, to retire; and thus to be enabled to add to the force destined for the defence of Lisbon the corps of French troops which had been stationed at Setuval and in the province of Alentejo. At all events, Loison's corps will return to Lisbon, and the French corps disposable for the defence of that place will probably be about 14,000 men, of which at least 3000 must be left in the garrisons and forts on the coast and in the river.

"The French army under Dupont in Andalusia surrendered, on the 20th of last month, to the Spanish army under the command of General Castaños; so that there are now no French troops on the north side of Spain.

"The Spanish army in Galicia and Castille, to the northward, received a check at Rio Seco, in the province of Valladolid, on the 14th July, from a French corps supposed to be under the command of General Bessières, which had advanced from Burgos.

* * * * * * * *

"Nothing of importance has occurred in that quarter since the 14th of July; and from this circumstance I conclude that the corps of Marshal Bessières attacked the Spanish army at Rio Seco solely with a view to cover the march of King Joseph Bonaparte to Madrid, where he arrived on the 21st of July.

* * * * * * * *

"In respect to Portugal, the whole kingdom, with the exception of the neighbourhood of Lisbon, is in a state of insurrection against the French; their means of resistance are, however, less powerful than those of the Spaniards. Their troops have been completely dispersed; their officers had gone off to the Brazils, and their arsenals pillaged, or in the power of the enemy. Their revolt, under the circumstances in which it has taken place, is still more extraordinary than that of the Spanish nation.

"The Portuguese may have, in the northern parts of the kingdom, about 10,000 men in arms, of which number 5000 are to march with me towards Lisbon; the remainder, with a Spanish detachment of about 1500 men which came

from Galicia, are employed in a distant blockade of Almeida, and in the protection of Oporto, which is at present the seat of government.

* * * * * * * *

"The whole of the corps placed under my command, including those under the command of General Spencer, having landed, I propose to march on Wednesday. I shall take the road by Alcobaça and Obidos with a view to keep up my communication by the sea coast, and to examine the situation of Peniche; and I shall proceed towards Lisbon by the route of Mafra, and by the hills to the northward of that city.

"As I understood from the secretary of state that a body of troops under the command of Brigadier-General Acland may be expected on the coast of Portugal before you will arrive, I have written to desire that he will proceed from hence along the coast of Portugal to the southward; and I propose to communicate with him by means of Captain Bligh, of the Alfred, who will attend the movements of the army, with a few transports having on board provisions and military stores. I intend to order Brigadier-General Acland to attack Peniche, if I should find it necessary to obtain possession of that place; and if not, I propose to order him to join the fleet stationed off the Tagus, with a view to disembark in one of the bays near the Rock of Lisbon, as soon as I shall approach sufficiently near to enable him to perform that operation.

"If I imagined that General Acland's corps was equipped in such a manner as to be enabled to move from the coast, I should have directed him to land at Mondego, and to march upon Santarem, from which situation he would have been at hand either to assist my operations, or to cut off the retreat of the enemy, if he should endeavour to make it either by the north of the Tagus and Almeida, or by the south of the Tagus and Elvas. But as I am convinced that General Acland's corps is intended to form a part of some other corps which is provided with a commissariat; that he will have none with him, and consequently that his corps must depend upon the country; and as no reliance can be placed upon the resources of this country, I have considered it best to direct the General's attention to the sea coast.

"If, however, the command of the army remained in my hands, I should certainly land the corps which has been lately under the command of Sir John Moore at Mondego, and should move it upon Santarem."

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A copy of the foregoing letter was at the same time sent to Sir Hew Dalrymple, as it entirely depended upon the direction of the wind, whether this officer or Sir Harry Burrard first arrived to take the command out of Sir Arthur's hands.

The instructions to Captain Bligh, of H.M.S. Alfred, under whose charge the fleet of storeships and victuallers was placed, directed him "to take them down the coast of Portugal, and endeavour to keep up a communication with the army during its advance on Lisbon;" and for this purpose Sir Arthur acquainted him that it was his intention to reach Leyria on the 11th, and Alcobaça by the 12th or 13th. At the same time he observed, it would be advisable that the fleet should not appear off the coast before the evening of the 12th, lest the enemy should thereby become apprized of the intended route of the British army.

Leyria, it may be necessary to observe, was the point of bifurcation of the roads leading to Lisbon by Santarem and Alcobaça; the former again branching into two a few miles beyond Leyria, and offering a third (and the best) route to the capital, by way of Candeiros and Otta. From Leyria also, a road is directed by Thomar on Abrantes, proceeding thence into Spain by way of Elvas. From these circumstances it is a point of considerable importance in a military point of view; and until it was passed, the enemy could not be certain of the route by which the British army intended to operate.

Sir Arthur's arrangements being now finally completed, the advanced guard of the army, under Major-General Fane, moved forward on the morning of the 9th towards Leyria, supported

by the brigades of Generals Hill and Ferguson. Major-General Hill was directed to take up a position with this force at St. Gião, and push on a reconnoitring party to Leyria. Should that place be occupied by the enemy, he was further instructed not to dispossess them of it that afternoon; but if, on the other hand, it was unoccupied, he was to obtain possession of it with a small advanced party, and support it with his whole corps at as early an hour as possible in the morning, and then take up a position in advance of Leyria.

It will have been perceived, by the extracts we have given from Sir Arthur's letter of 8th August to Sir Harry Burrard, that he was still uninformed of the precise movements, strength, and positions of the enemy's corps; for it will be recollected that on the 9th (the day on which the English army moved forward) Loison, by his rapid march from Elvas, had reached Abrantes, and Laborde's corps, which left Lisbon on the 8th, was at Candeiros, a march only in rear of the advanced brigade of the French army under General Thomières at Alcobaça. Leyria consequently was still unoccupied by the enemy, and this important strategical point thus fell accidentally into the hands of the British general.

The contemplated junction of Loison's and Laborde's divisions had by this circumstance, for the present, been frustrated; and from the difficult nature of the intervening country, it could only now be accomplished by a concentric retrograde movement on the southern side of the *Serra* de Monte Junto*.

On the 10th, Sir Arthur moved with the main

* Chain of mountains.

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body of the army to Lugar, within eight miles of Leyria; from whence he again wrote to Sir Harry Burrard, in consequence of the receipt of letters from Mr. Stuart* and Colonel Doyle, stating the probability of Marshal Bessières profiting by the inefficiency of the army of Galicia, to detach a corps to Portugal in aid of Junot. Sir Arthur had formed too correct a judgment of the state of affairs in Spain, to allow himself to be persuaded of the probability of this movement; nevertheless, he urges it to Sir Harry Burrard, as an additional reason for taking up the position at Santarem with the expected reinforcement, as suggested in his former letter, as from thence "he would not only be in the best situation to support his (Sir Arthur's) operation, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy, but if any reinforcements of French troops should enter Portugal, he would be in the best situation to collect his whole force to oppose it."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 10.

Writing on the same day, in reply to Mr. Stuart, Sir Arthur enters more fully into his reasons for doubting the probability of the French being able at that moment to undertake this operation.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 10.

"I do not think that Bessières will venture to make a detachment towards this country till King Joseph Bonaparte shall be in safety at Madrid, or shall have made good his retreat into France, upon which it is said that he had already set out on the 29th of last month.

"In either of these cases, I think it probable that an effort will be made to reinforce Junot, which, however, will be opposed by many natural obstacles in this country, as well as by the forces in Spanish Estremadura, through which province I conclude the reinforcement will pass, rather than through the Portuguese provinces of Tras os Montes and Entre Minho e Duero. At all events, I hope to bring to a conclusion the operations with the conduct of

* Lord Stuart de Rothesay, G.C.B.

which I am entrusted, before this reinforcement can enter Portugal; and if I should not, I have reason to expect that 15,000 men will soon arrive here under the command of Sir Harry Burrard, who will be more than a match for Junot and Bessières together."

By another paragraph of this letter, which we shall extract, it appears that Sir Arthur, though still possessing no precise information of Loison's movements, formed a correct opinion of what would be the object of that general on learning that the English army had effected its landing.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 10.

"This general (Loison) left Lisbon on the 26th July, with 4000 or 5000 men (I believe before he knew that we were arrived on the coast), crossed the Tagus, and attacked at Evora a Spanish detachment of about 1000 men from the province of Estremadura, which had entered Alentejo, and some Portuguese peasants and troops, whom he entirely defeated. The object of this march appears to have been to relieve the garrison of Elvas, which has been effected, and to give a check to the insurrection in that part of Portugal.

"Loison was at Elvas on the 3d of August, and he is now expected, and his arrival apprehended in all parts of Portugal; but I imagine that *he will hasten back to oppose me.*"

On the 11th Sir Arthur established his head quarters at Leyria, where, on the following day, he was joined by Dom Bernardim Freire with the Portugueze army, amounting to about 6000 men, who placed himself voluntarily under the British general's orders. The magazines of provisions collected here, (to protect which Sir Arthur had been repeatedly urged by the Portugueze authorities to advance, stating that they had been formed for the use of the English troops,) were now claimed by Freire as intended exclusively for the use of his army, and they were consequently given up to him without hesitation. This piece of duplicity showed how little dependence could be placed on, and

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what slight assistance was likely to be received from, the Portugueze authorities — civil and military; but now the extraordinary demand which had been originally made at Oporto, and repeated at the interview between Sir Arthur and Freire at Montemor o Velho, viz. that the British commissariat should supply the Portugueze troops with bread, was again brought forward; General Freire declaring that unless it was acceded to, it would be impossible for his army to co-operate with that of Sir Arthur.

Setting aside the unreasonableness of this proposal, Sir Arthur does not seem to have formed so high an opinion of the Portugueze army as to consider it worth its bread; and Freire's demand was therefore peremptorily declined.

The Portugueze general had, however, a secret motive for making a demand so perfectly preposterous that he knew it must be rejected. He had now ascertained the strength of the English army; and deeming it quite inadequate to the task of expelling the French from Portugal without some hard fighting, was extremely solicitous to adopt a plan of operations which would allow him to take a less prominent part in the contest than that which had been allotted to him in the original project. The proposal he now brought forward on this subject was, that as the British commissariat could not feed the Portugueze army, it should move independently upon Santarem, with a view of cutting off the retreat of the French! Thus, amongst other absurdities, proposing to adopt a double line of operations, whilst the enemy were effecting a movement of concentration in their front.

Sir Arthur's opinion of this singular project will be best given in his own words, as conveyed in a letter to Lieut.-Colonel Trant, dated Calvario, half-past 4 P. M., 13th August.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 13.

"As to General Freire's plan of operations, I do not see what purpose it is to answer, in view to the result of the campaign; and I certainly can never give my sanction to any thing which appears so useless, and so crudely digested, so far as even to promise to communicate with or aid the person who is carrying it into execution.

"I have one proposition to make to General Freire, — that is, that he should send me his cavalry and his light infantry, and a corps of 1000 regular infantry, to be employed as I choose, and I engage to give these men their bread; and for meat, wine, and forage, they shall fare as well as our troops. If he will accept of this proposition, let the troops join me to-morrow at Alcobaça; if he does not, I beg that he will carry on such operations as he thinks proper.

"I shall execute the orders which I have received from my government, without the assistance of the Portuguese government; and General Freire will have to justify himself with the existing government of Portugal, with his Prince, and with the world, for having omitted to stand forward upon this interesting occasion."

The Portugueze general, fearful perhaps of the obloquy that would attach to his conduct if the handsome offer contained in this letter were refused, consented to leave with Sir Arthur the portion of his force which he had engaged to feed: persisting nevertheless in his project of cutting off the French army of, as he supposed, 18,000 men, with the residue of the Portugueze troops, amounting to about 4000.

It was from motives of policy, rather than with any expectation of assistance, that Sir Arthur was desirous a Portugueze force should accompany the British army on its march to Lisbon. But before leaving Leyria, he represented to General Freire

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the utter hopelessness of his being able to hold the French in check; and proposed to him, rather than undertake so hazardous an experiment, that he should remain at Leyria during the advance of the British, and wait in security the issue of the impending contest.

This latter piece of advice seemed so very judicious to Dom Bernardim, that he unhesitatingly adopted it, and we shall hear no more of him until the military operations were concluded; when he again came forward, anxious to take a prominent part in the diplomatic arrangements consequent to the battle of Vimeiro.

Before accompanying the British further in their advance towards Lisbon, it will be necessary to notice the movements which had taken place amongst the different divisions of the French army up to this period.

Thiebault, p. 177.

On the 10th of August General Laborde, learning that the English had not moved towards Abrantes (as seems to have been expected by the enemy), advanced with his corps from Candeiros to Alcobaça, where he was joined by the brigade of General Thomières; and, on the following day, in conformity with Junot's instructions, he reconnoitred the road to Leyria and the position of Batalha. Finding, however, that Leyria was occupied by the English, and the junction of Loison's corps with his own thereby prevented, and considering that the position at Batalha was far too extensive for his division alone to occupy, he remained at Alcobaça; and on the night of the 13th, learning that the British continued to advance, he retired to Obidos, throwing part of a Swiss battalion into Peniche (which had been withdrawn by Tho-

mières), and on the following day, leaving only a rear guard of six picked companies at Obidos, he continued his retrograde movement to Roliça, taking up a position on some strong ground in the neighbourhood of that village, and detaching three companies on his right towards Cercal, to endeavour to open a communication with Loison.

Loison meanwhile, from the exhausted state of his troops, had been obliged to remain a day at Abrantes to refresh them. On the 11th he again advanced, and reached Thomar; where, learning that Leyria was occupied by the English, he saw that he should now have to make a very circuitous march to effect the prescribed junction with Laborde. Accordingly he fell back to Torres Novas on the 12th, and reached Santarem on the 13th. Here the jaded condition of his troops again forced him to halt for a day; but he continued his march on the 15th, taking with him the 4th light infantry regiment of Charlot's brigade, and leaving in its stead the Hanoverian legion (which he probably imagined could not be depended upon against the English) to garrison the town. On the 16th he moved forward to Alcoentre, where he was joined on the following morning by Junot, who, assuming the command, directed his march on Torres Vedras, and reached that place on the 18th.

On the morning of the 14th of August the British army entered Alcobaça, its general still remaining without any correct information of Loison's movements; for, writing from thence to Captain Bligh, after mentioning his intention of attacking the enemy if they continued at Obidos, he adds, "I should think that they would stay, as

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 14.

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I imagine Loison has joined the detachment which was here with about 5000 men."

On the 15th the army continued its forward movement to Caldas, about three miles short of Obidos; which place, as we have stated, was occupied by Laborde's advanced guard, consisting of six picked companies. As the possession of Obidos was of importance with a view to his future movements, Sir Arthur determined to occupy it forthwith; and accordingly a detachment, consisting of four companies of the 60th and 95th (rifle regiments), was ordered to dislodge the enemy. This was effected after a trifling resistance, but in the eagerness of pursuit, some of our riflemen incautiously following the enemy several miles beyond the town, were attacked by a vastly superior force, which attempted to cut them off from the main body of the detachment. Their comrades in the rear perceiving this, advanced eagerly to their support; and it was not without much difficulty that General Spencer, who had galloped to the front on learning what had taken place, was enabled to effect their retreat to Obidos.

This affair, though evincing great gallantry on the part of our troops, caused Sir Arthur some little annoyance, as may be seen by the allusion made to it in the following extract from a letter to Lord Castleragh.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 16.

"The affair of the advanced posts of yesterday evening was unpleasant, because it was quite useless; and was occasioned, contrary to orders, solely by the imprudence of the officers, and the dash and eagerness of the men: they behaved remarkably well, and did some execution with their rifles."

The army was obliged to halt at Caldas on the 16th to allow the commissariat to come up, and

also to enable it to receive supplies, which were landed from the fleet at Nazareth; the nature of the country for some distance to the southward precluding any direct communication with the shipping. Here Sir Arthur received information that Loison's corps, 5000 strong, was at Rio Mayor, fifteen miles on his left. Concluding, therefore, that he would endeavour to effect an immediate junction with Laborde, Sir Arthur determined to bring the latter to action without loss of time, in the hope of again defeating their purpose.

The range of hills whereon Laborde had taken post is a little in advance and to the left of the village of Roliça, and though by no means elevated, possesses a perfect command over all the country to the north; for a sandy plain, partially clothed with olive-trees, extends from its foot to the base of the rocky isolated mound, crowned by the old Moorish fortress of Obidos, — a distance of about six miles. Laborde's position, though strong in front, was not, however, tenable against so superior a force as that which was now advancing to attack it, being hemmed in to the southward and eastward by lofty mountains, which, if left undefended, enabled an enemy to possess himself of the passes in his rear and cut off his only line of retreat; for the sea, distant but 10 or 12 miles to the west, prevented escape on that side, and even between it and the village of Roliça the country was wooded and impracticable. Here, nevertheless, the French general had drawn up his army, with the seeming intention of disputing the further advance of the English. His force amounted to about 5000 men*, of whom 500

* Sarrazin, Napier, and the Duke of Wellington's despatch all state Laborde's force to have been 6000 men; Thiebault says 1900,

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were cavalry; and he was in the momentary expectation of being joined by Loison with between 6000 and 7000 more.

The English army broke up from Caldas at daybreak on the 17th of August, and, forming three columns, advanced against the enemy's position. The right column, consisting of 1200 infantry and 50 cavalry of the Portugueze corps left under Sir Arthur's orders by General Freire, was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Trant, who received directions to turn the enemy's left, and penetrate into the mountains in his rear. The left column, commanded by Major-General Ferguson, and composed of a brigade of infantry, three companies of riflemen, and a few dragoons, was destined to ascend the mountain ridge on the eastern side of the valley and turn the right of the French position: this division was also directed to keep a look-out on its left for Loison's corps, of whose movements Sir Arthur had at length received more correct information than heretofore; — so far at least that he heard it had "moved towards Alcoentre on the night of the 16th," whereas he was actually there on that day. The centre column, consisting of four brigades of British infantry, 400 Portugueze light infantry, the remainder of the cavalry, and two brigades of artillery, was destined to attack the position of the enemy in front.

Thiebault, p. 191.

The whole moved forward together; the centre column, after passing Obidos, breaking into three columns of attack, driving in the enemy's advanced posts, and marching straight upon their position.

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and Sherer 5000. Our reason for also estimating it at the last number will be seen by a reference to the note giving a statement of the strength and distribution of the French army at page 346.; and it is to be borne in mind that the enemy had thrown 400 or 500 men into Peniche.

Laborde, perceiving that both flanks of his army were on the point of being turned, and that it might therefore be cut off from its only line of retreat if he waited to receive this front attack, retired by the passes in his rear to the lofty ridge of Azambugeira, about a mile to the south, where he drew up his forces to await the onset of the British. This retrograde movement of the enemy was executed with great order and celerity; and from the want of cavalry, the British general was unable to inflict any loss upon them.

The position now taken up by Laborde extended along the crest of the before-mentioned mountain, which stretches east and west through the country, falling very abruptly to the south; so steeply, indeed, that the summit of the ridge can be gained only by following the deep gulleys or watercourses that furrow its rough and coppiced sides. The heads of most of these passes expand in form of a fan towards the table summit of the mountain; and at these points the French troops were posted, prepared to throw in a murderous fire of musketry and grape when, breathless and disordered by the difficulties of the ascent, the heads of the attacking columns should show themselves and attempt to deploy.

The British advanced against this formidable position in the same order as before; the column of Portugueze being directed to make a wide movement to their right, to gain a pass on the extreme left of the enemy's position, and General Ferguson to advance along the hills bounding the valley to the east, to turn the right, whilst four columns were formed to move up the passes directly in the enemy's front. The right column of the centre

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attack was composed of the light companies of Major-General Hill's brigade and the 5th regiment; the next of the 29th, supported by the 9th regiment; and the two others of the 45th and 82d.

It was not intended that these attacks should be made on the front of the enemy's position until the flank columns had shown themselves on the heights, and again alarmed the French general for his communications; but the difficulties experienced by the Portugueze and General Ferguson's columns were greater than had been looked for: the progress of the latter especially had been much impeded by having to cross a deep ravine, which, intersecting the chain of mountains transversely, was not discovered until the troops were actually arrived upon its edge; and the passage of this obstacle not only occupied more time than had been calculated upon for the column to reach its destination, but led to its taking for some time a wrong direction, thereby occasioning yet further delay.

In consequence of the unforeseen difficulties which thus retarded the march of the flank columns, the attacks upon the enemy's front took place long before any alarm was excited for their line of retreat.

The first column which reached the crest of the mountain was that led by the 29th regiment. It advanced through a shower of bullets with the greatest intrepidity; but ere it could gain sufficient space to form, was vigorously charged by the enemy, driven back, and suffered a great loss, its brave leader, Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. G. A. F. Lake, being amongst the slain, and 50 or 60 men remaining in their adversary's hands. The regiment repulsed, but not daunted, soon rallied, and returned to the attack, supported by the 9th, which in the sanguinary conflict that ensued also lost its co-

lonel.* These two gallant corps eventually succeeded in making good and maintaining their footing on the table-land, in spite of Laborde's repeated efforts to dislodge them; and the column composed of the 5th regiment and flank companies of Hill's brigade soon after making its appearance on their right, divided the enemy's attention. This column forced its way up the side of the mountain with no less intrepidity than its predecessor, and now bore its full share in the action. Nevertheless, the result of the conflict still seemed doubtful; for the enemy, profiting ably by his temporary numerical superiority, persisted obstinately in his attacks, hoping to dislodge the assailants before they could obtain further support; but at length the appearance of Ferguson's column moving along the heights approaching the right of the French position, warned Laborde that it must be abandoned, and he lost no time in withdrawing his left wing (which being thus hotly engaged at a distance from his line of retreat, which was in rear of his right, would be the most exposed to danger) under shelter of the centre. This he effected with great ability, covering his retrograde movement by repeated charges of cavalry. At the village of Azambugeira he again deployed his infantry, and attempted to make a stand; but a vigorous charge led by Major-Gen. Spencer dislodged the enemy from this position, and after several other attempts to rally, they were finally, driven from the field with the loss of two guns; — the only trophies the British had to show of their hardly earned victory, for the want of cavalry prevented any prisoners being made.

* Colonel Stewart. He died of his wounds on the following day.

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In his official letter to the secretary of state giving an account of the action, Sir Arthur does ample justice to the gallantry of his troops.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 17.

"I cannot," he says, "sufficiently applaud the conduct of the troops throughout this action. The enemy's positions were formidable; he took them up with his usual ability and celerity, and defended them most gallantly. But I must observe, that although we had such a superiority of numbers employed in the operations of this day, the troops actually engaged in the heat of the action were, from unavoidable circumstances, only the 5th, 9th, 29th, and the riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of Major-General Hill's brigade; being a number by no means equal to that of the enemy. Their conduct, therefore, deserves the highest commendation."

The loss sustained by the British army was 479, in killed, wounded, and missing. That of the enemy has been variously estimated; but even according to Thiebault it amounted to 600. The following letter from Sir Arthur to Lord Castlereagh gives a very different account; and, as far as regards the number of killed, he who remained master of the battle field must certainly have had the best means of judging; though of the amount of the wounded he could make but a rough guess from the reports collected from others, which doubtless in this instance were greatly exaggerated.

"Lourinha, 18th August, 1808.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 18.

"My dear Lord,

"My despatch of yesterday and of this day will inform you of the state of affairs here. I never saw such desperate fighting as in the attack of the pass by Lake, and in the three attacks by the French on our troops in the mountains. These attacks were made in their best style, and our troops defended themselves capitally; and if the difficulties of the ground had not prevented me from bringing up a sufficient number of the troops and of cannon, we should have taken the whole army.

"They say that the French lost 1500 men, which is a large amount; but I think they had more than 6000 men in the action.

"As soon as Anstruther shall be landed, I shall give you a good account of the remainder of the French army; but I am afraid I shall not gain a complete victory; that is, I shall not entirely destroy them, for want of cavalry."

The death of Colonel Lake was communicated to the relatives of that gallant officer in a letter which does Sir Arthur no less honour than the brilliant action from which he had just issued the victor.

"Lourinha, 18th August, 1808. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 18.

"My dear Borough,

"I do not recollect the occasion upon which I have written with more pain to myself than I do at present, to communicate to you the death of your gallant brother-in-law. He fell in the attack of a pass in the mountains, at the head of his regiment, the admiration of the whole army; and there is nothing to be regretted in his death, excepting the untimely moment at which it has afflicted his family*, and has deprived the public of the services of an officer who would have been an ornament to his profession, and an honour to his country.

"It may at the moment increase the regret of those who lose a near and dear relation to learn that he deserved and enjoyed the respect and affection of the world at large, and particularly of the profession to which he belonged; but I am convinced that however acute may be the sensations which it may at first occasion, it must in the end be satisfactory to the family of such a man as Colonel Lake to know that he was respected and beloved by the whole army, and that he fell — alas! with many others — in the achievement of one of the most heroic actions that have been performed by the British army.

* * * *

"Believe me, &c.

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"*R. Borough, Esq.*"

The movements of the British general, from the period of his landing up to the battle of Roliça, have not escaped criticism. At home, there were

* General Lord Lake, the father of Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, had died early in the year.

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not wanting those who accused him of hurrying forward the operations merely to gratify his own personal ambition; whilst his adversaries, accustomed to receive *positive* instructions; to be invested with despotic power over the country wherein they were employed; and who knew nothing practically of the difficulties attendant on a disembarkation; the tediousness of such an operation; the necessity it imposed of making arrangements for the supply and transport of provisions, &c.,— have blamed Sir Arthur for the *dilatoriness* of his movements: and, as regards the battle of Roliça, have censured him for attacking Laborde's formidable position in front, when his object would have been equally gained, and at a comparatively slight loss, had he awaited the result of the demonstration on his adversary's flanks.

Could Sir Arthur have calculated on Loison's marching from Alcoentre (where he was on the night of the 16th) towards Torres Vedras, instead of to the support of Laborde, such criticism would not, perhaps, be unjust; since then, indeed, he might have leisurely awaited the result of the march of the Portugueze and Ferguson's columns to turn the flanks of Laborde's position. But as he could not reckon on the enemy's movements being so totally devoid of *ensemble*, he naturally, we may suppose, concluded that Loison's corps would effect its junction with Laborde's in the course of the 17th, and that no time was therefore to be lost in dislodging the latter from his strong position ere he could receive such an accession of strength as would render it altogether inattackable; for the two French corps together would have been nearly equal in amount to his own force,

exclusive of the Portugueze, whom he found nearly useless.

If, however, for the moral effect alone which this action produced on the soldiers of the contending armies, the success that attended it cannot but be considered cheaply purchased at the sacrifice of life which it occasioned. The daring attack, and the obstinate bravery with which it was persevered in, at once undeceived the French as to their enemies being formidable only at sea; and the successful result of the contest inspired the untried soldiers of England, on the other hand, with confidence in their own powers and in the ability of their general.

CHAPTER XV.

JUNOT RESOLVES ON CONCENTRATING HIS FORCES AND ATTACKING THE ENGLISH ARMY. — MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH. — DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED BY SIR ARTHUR IN OBTAINING CORRECT INFORMATION. — THE ENGLISH ARMY AGAIN MOVES TOWARDS THE COAST TO COVER THE LANDING OF GENERAL ANSTRUTHER'S BRIGADE. — SIR ARTHUR PURPOSES ADVANCING BY THE COAST ROAD TO TURN THE FRENCH ARMY. — ARRIVAL OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR HARRY BURRARD, WHO DISAPPROVES OF THE PROPOSED ADVANCE. — POSITION OF THE ENGLISH ARMY. — BATTLE OF VIMEIRO. — SIR ARTHUR PROPOSES TO PURSUE THE BEATEN ENEMY, BUT SIR HARRY BURRARD ORDERS A HALT. — REFLECTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. — ARRIVAL OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR HEW DALRYMPLE TO ASSUME THE COMMAND.

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AFTER the action of Roliça, Laborde fell back to the Quinta de Bugagleira, where he was joined by a small detachment which he had sent into the mountains on his right to endeavour to open a communication with Loison; but not feeling secure in his new position, he continued his retrograde movement throughout the night, sending his artillery round by the high road to Torres Vedras, but retiring with the rest of his troops by the pass of Runa to the strong position of Montechique, about twenty-five miles from the field of battle.

Junot meanwhile had come to the tardy resolution of trusting Lisbon and the forts of the Tagus to their own resources for a short time, and proceeding to the scene of action with what further troops remained at his disposal. Leaving therefore seven battalions to garrison Lisbon, Belem, Cascaes, St. Julien, and the other forts and batteries of the Tagus, to occupy Almada and the left bank of the river, and to guard the Spanish troops detained

prisoners in the hulks, he marched from Lisbon on the 16th with a regiment (two battalions) of grenadiers, a battalion of the 82d line, a regiment of cavalry, and ten guns, and proceeded to Sacavem. There, leaving this force under the command of General Thiebault to follow him as fast as it could, the French commander-in-chief pushed on to Alcoentre, where he joined Loison early on the following morning, and directing the march of his corps upon Torres Vedras reached that place, by way of Cercal, on the 18th.

At Torres Vedras, Junot resolved to concentrate the scattered divisions of his army; and accordingly, he despatched orders to Laborde, now in the rear at Montechique, to move forward and join him immediately, and to Thiebault to press his march with the reserves. The former effected his junction on the following day (19th), the latter on the 20th; and all the troops which could be spared to take the field being at length collected, the army received a fresh organization; the brigades of Generals Brenier and Thomières being formed in one division under Laborde, those of Solignac and Charlot in a second under Loison. Kellermann took the command of the reserve, consisting of four battalions of grenadiers, and Margaron of the cavalry; the whole amounting to near 16,000 men (of whom 1600 were cavalry) and twenty-one guns.*

* It is impossible to ascertain, with any degree of exactness, the amount of the French force employed in the different operations of this campaign; Thiebault, who as chief of the staff of the French army, is of course considered by his countrymen as the best authority on this point, having rendered his accounts as confused as possible, for the evident purpose of preventing the detection of his mistatements. Thus, he speaks of regiments when his object is to make the amount of the French appear large,—for instance, when stating the force left to

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The British army passed the night of the 17th at Villa Verde, a short distance beyond the field

garrison Lisbon, &c.; but is very careful to explain that it was only a particular battalion of any named regiment, when desirous of representing the armies opposed to the English in the field as small as possible.

But though no reliance whatever can consequently be placed in his returns, yet even he is obliged to admit that on the 15th of July the French force in Portugal amounted to 26,533 men; for the incontrovertible fact of 24,735 having embarked on board English transports to be conveyed to France, ensured the detection of any gross misrepresentation.

The following table is drawn up to show the distribution of the French troops (on the authority of General Thiebault) when Junot marched from Torres Vedras to attack the English army at Vimeiro.

The strength of the different regiments is calculated on a return made preparatory to the embarkation of the French army; deductions being made for the losses sustained by those corps which were employed on the expedition into Alemtejo and were engaged at Roliça, and also from all the regiments of *the line*, on account of their grenadier companies being formed into distinct battalions. — R. signifies at Roliça, A. with the expedition into Alemtejo, D. furnishing detachments to the garrisons of the fortresses.

Division.	Brigade.	Regiments.	Strength.
Laborde.	Brenier.	2d Light Inf. 3d Batt. } 1st Prov. Reg.	700 D.
		4th ditto 3d ditto } of L. Inf. R.	900 D.
	Thomières.	70th Line, 1st and 2d ditto R.	1850 *
		86th Line, 1st and 2d ditto A.	1700 D.
Loison.	Solignac.	12th Light Inf. 3d ditto } 2d Prov. Reg.	1120
		15th ditto 3d ditto } of L. Inf. A.	1150
	Charlot.	32d Line 3d ditto - -	700 D.
		58th Line 3d ditto - A.	900
		82d Line 3d ditto - -	750
	Kellermann.	4th Swiss 1st ditto - R.	580 D.
	Margaron.	4 Battalions of Grenadiers - (½ A.)	2800
		4 Regiments of Cavalry - - - D.	1600
		Artillery and Engineers, &c. - -	900
		Total at Vimeiro	15,650
On the left bank of the Tagus		31st Lt. Inf. 3d Batt. } 3d Prov. Reg.	669
		32d ditto 2d ditto } of Lt. Inf.	999
Left to garrison Lisbon, Belem, Cascaes, St. Juliens, &c., and to guard the Spanish troops on board the hulks		47th Line 2d ditto - -	1150
		66th ditto 3d ditto - -	889
		26th ditto 3d ditto - -	350 †
		12th ditto 3d ditto -	830
		Legion du Midi - - - A.	488
At Santarem - -		Legion Hanoverienne - - - -	523
Garrisons of Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche, composed of detachments of different corps - - - - - -			2137 ‡
Remainder of the Cavalry - - - - - -			200
ditto Artillery - - - - -			186
In Hospital — wounded in Alemtejo and Roliça included - -			1652
Strength of French army on 21st Aug. - - - -			25,723
Killed in Alemtejo, Algarve, and Beira - - -			610
Killed at Roliça - - - - -			200
Strength of French army on the 15th July - -			26,533

* This regiment left France 2358 strong; and mustered 2294, including 560 sick and wounded, on embarking at Lisbon.

† This regiment was only 480 strong on leaving France.

‡ This includes nearly the whole of the 2d battalion of 2d Swiss regiment.

of battle; where, learning that the transports with Anstruther's brigade had joined the fleet of victuallers off Peniche, and disappointed in the amount of assistance rendered by the Portugueze corps serving under his orders, Sir Arthur abandoned the original object he had entertained of pushing on to Torres Vedras, and moved again towards the coast, reaching Lourinham on the 18th.

The extraordinary difficulty experienced by the English general in obtaining information of the enemy's movements is here again clearly shown by his correspondence; for writing on the 18th to Lieut.-Colonel Gordon *, military secretary to H. R. H. the Duke of York, he says, — "General Loison joined General Laborde at Torres Vedras last night, and they retreated this morning at daylight; and General Junot, with a small corps from Lisbon, arrived at Torres Vedras at an early hour this day;" whereas, so ill-concerted were the movements of the French, that Laborde, in falling back upon the position of Montechique, had actually crossed the route by which Junot with Loison's corps was marching on Torres Vedras from Alcoentre.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 18.

This difficulty of procuring information respecting the enemy, arose principally from the superiority of the French in cavalry; which, Sir Arthur states, "covered the whole country, and patrolled frequently up to the position of the British army."

Another passage in the above quoted letter to Lieut.-Colonel Gordon shows, however, that Sir Arthur clearly foresaw Junot would collect his force as expeditiously as possible to dispute the

* Lieutenant-General Sir J. W. Gordon, G.C.B., Quarter-Master General.

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further advance of the British towards Lisbon, and he was consequently anxious to preserve, if possible, the advantage of acting on the offensive. On the 19th the English army drew nearer to the coast, to cover the disembarkation of Anstruther's brigade, taking post at Vimeiro. The landing was effected in the course of that night, eight miles north of Maceira, and the brigade joined the army early on the following morning. In the course of the same day (20th) General Acland's brigade arrived, and received orders to disembark immediately.

By these reinforcements the army under Sir Arthur's orders, including the Portugueze, amounted to near 19,000 men, and it was his intention to move forward on the following day. He had at length obtained correct information respecting the situation of the French army, (the scattered corps of which were at last collected at Torres Vedras), and aware of the great strength of the position it occupied, purposed turning it by moving along a road that keeps along the coast, passing near the village of Silveira, and so gaining Mafra in the enemy's rear with his advanced guard, while the rest of the army occupied a strong position which presents itself along the left bank of the river San Lorenço, a few miles short of that place. Orders were accordingly given for the march of the army at daybreak on the following morning: an ample stock of ammunition was ready to move with it, and a supply of provisions for nine days.

In considering the prudence of this step (which afterwards came to be seriously questioned), the peculiar circumstances in which the British army was placed, not less than the nature of the country, the scene of operations, must be kept in view. For it is to be recollected, in the first place, that

the British general had no long lines of communication to preserve, his magazines being with the fleet. So long, therefore, as he kept near the coast, he was sure of obtaining supplies, even if the country altogether failed in furnishing any; and he guarded against any temporary interruption of his intercourse with his storeships, by carrying nine days' provisions with the army. It is also to be borne in mind that he had every reason to believe the army under his command was well able to defeat any force the enemy could bring against it, even in a chance field of battle; whilst, on the other hand, he knew the ground his army would have to traverse between the coast and Torres Vedras was peculiarly well suited to his projected movement, not only from its being much broken, and consequently unfavourable to the movements of cavalry (in which arm he was deficient), but also from its offering several strong positions perpendicular to the line by which the French must have advanced to attack him during his flank march. In fact, it is evident that the French general, supposing he had remained in his position at Torres Vedras on the 21st, could not have obtained intelligence of the flank march of the English army ere it had passed the Zizandra, and was actually nearer Mafra than he himself was; and he would therefore have been placed on the horns of a most unpleasant dilemma,—namely, that of having to choose between a rapid retreat by the direct route over the Serra de Montechique to save Lisbon, or, an attack on the English army during its march, when it would have the advantage of choosing its ground; and unless successful in this latter operation, (the chances of which would have been so

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much against him,) the certainty of finding himself completely cut off from Lisbon.

Had Junot, as Sir Arthur considered most probable, decided on the retreat to cover Lisbon, or had he even succeeded in reaching Mafra before the English army, still the British commander would have gained some of the advantages he sought,— viz. that of fighting the battle he foresaw was inevitable on ground with which he was thoroughly acquainted*, and so close to Lisbon that a victory rigorously followed up would have prevented the French from crossing the Tagus. The English army, on the other hand, in case of defeat, would not have been worse off than if beaten at Vimeiro, or, in fact, any where else with the sea in its rear.

The *actual determination* of Junot to seek the English on the 21st must have led to the unconditional surrender of his army, had Sir Arthur's proposed plan of operations been carried into effect; since, whilst the French in one long column were approaching Vimeiro by the narrow defile of Torres Vedras, the English would have been turning that town by the more practicable country towards the coast. Junot would thus have lost his own communications without gaining those of his adversary, and the only road open to him to retreat by would have been that to Almeida; but without supplies, through a country in arms against him, and hard pressed in rear by the British, he would have found it utterly impossible to reach that place.

* Sir Arthur had excellent maps of the country near Lisbon, which had been made by order of Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir C. Stuart, when that officer commanded a British force in Portugal some years previously.

It seems, therefore, in every point of view, that the project of Sir Arthur was based on the soundest strategical principles; and the following extracts from his letters show how sanguine he was of success.

To Lord Castlereagh he writes from Vimeiro, on the 20th,—

"Anstruther is on shore, and I expect him in camp every moment. I shall be near Mafra to-morrow. The enemy have their advanced guard in front of Torres Vedras, and the main body of their army collected in the rear of that town. I understand that they have got together every thing that Portugal can afford." Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 20.

And, on the same day, to Captain Bligh of H.M.S. Alfred, Sir Arthur writes,—

"I propose to march to-morrow towards Mafra. I shall be glad if you will be off Ericeira to-morrow evening. I shall contrive to communicate with you either to-morrow or next day, and to fix on the next place of rendezvous. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 20.

"I apprehend no accidents; but I should like to keep the transports for a few days, in case of the occurrence of any. They might also be useful in turning any position the enemy might take in the neighbourhood of the Rock of Lisbon."

Unfortunately, however, after every arrangement had been made for carrying the projected movement into effect, Sir Harry Burrard, one of the officers so injudiciously appointed to supersede the general who had been entrusted with the planning and commencement of the delicate operation of driving the enemy out of Portugal, arrived in the roads. Sir Arthur immediately proceeded on board the ship in which Sir Harry was embarked, to make his report of what had already been done, and state his plans for the future operations of the army; but Sir Harry, without any other information than that furnished by his predecessor, at once

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decided on not moving from Vimeiro until the arrival of Sir John Moore's corps.

In vain Sir Arthur urged the delay (a week at least) that this would occasion — the risk incurred by trusting to the weather for the disembarkation of the troops, stores, &c., as the season advanced — the consumption of the supplies brought from England, which would be the unavoidable consequence of so long a halt — the advantage they should forego of acting on the offensive — the opportunity such a respite would give the enemy of fortifying their positions round Lisbon, &c.; Sir Harry, it seems, had formed his opinion that the force already collected was unequal to the operation Sir Arthur had undertaken, and it was not to be shaken by any arguments.

Sir Arthur therefore relanded, and gave the reluctant counter-orders for the march of the army on the morrow. Of the vexation he experienced at his plans being thus thwarted, we may judge from a letter written early on the morning of the 21st to Lord Castlereagh: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 21.

"Sir Harry Burrard will probably acquaint your lordship with the reasons which have induced him to call Sir John Moore's corps to the assistance of our army. . . . . You will readily believe, however, that this determination is not in conformity with my opinion; and I only wish that Sir Harry had landed and seen things with his own eyes before he had made it."

The army, though, as we have before stated, mustering near 19,000 men including the Portugueze, comprised but 470 cavalry, and of that small number only 210 were English.

The British infantry was formed into eight brigades, under Major-Generals Hill and Ferguson, and Brigadiers Nightingall, C. Craufurd, Fane,

Bowes, Acland, and Anstruther. The Portugueze acted in a separate body under Lieutenant-Colonel Trant. The cavalry of the two nations was divided into four squadrons.

The ground occupied by the British army at Vimeiro, though not presenting to the eye a very marked position, was nevertheless admirably suited to the purpose for which it had been selected. A range of high hills, whereon were posted six brigades of infantry, forming the right and centre of the British army, stretches inland from the coast, bending in a northerly direction towards the village of Vimeiro. This ridge is about a mile and half in extent; it presents a fine bold slope to the south, on which side attack might be expected, but falls abruptly elsewhere, and to the east and north its foot is bathed by the rivulet of Maceira. Vimeiro stands in a deep valley, on the eastern side of this stream, which, after pursuing a northerly course for about half a mile, winds round to the west, (leaving the village that gives it its name on the right bank), and empties itself into the sea at the back of the British position. An isolated mound, which projects somewhat beyond and is under the command of the heights occupied by the centre and right of the army, screens Vimeiro to the south, and on its table summit were posted the brigades of Fane and Anstruther, with two demi-brigades of artillery; and this part may be considered the original left of the British position. The cavalry and reserve artillery were placed under shelter of this hill, on the bank of the Maceira; the Portugueze, commissariat, &c. in the more immediate vicinity of Vimeiro.

The front of the position thus occupied by the

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British army extended in a slanting direction from the coast, rather refusing its left to the enemy posted at Torres Vedras; and beyond this flank, at the distance of about three miles, a range of round-topped hills stretched in a northerly direction towards Lourinham, along the summit of which is conducted the road to that town from Torres Vedras. At about two miles again in rear of the position, another range of hills, sweeping inland from the coast, meets this first-named chain in the vicinity of the village of Pragança; and across this range, roads proceed from Vimeiro and Maceira to Lourinham. The summits of both these chains of hills are nearly flat, and quite open; so that from the British position the movements of an enemy could be distinctly seen, in whatever direction he might be approaching; and, consequently, his attacks could be readily anticipated, particularly as the intervening country is much wooded and intersected by deep ravines, presenting great difficulties to the movements of troops. Most of these ravines opened at right angles into a more defined valley, which came down from the east, at the back of the village of Vimeiro. It is evident, therefore, that whilst an enemy would be obliged to make a very wide movement to turn the left of the British army, posted, as we have described it, it, on the contrary, from the centrical position it occupied, was enabled to effect a change of front with great facility, to meet an attack on any point that might be threatened. The ground was further highly favourable for the defensive, being of such a nature as to oblige an enemy to make his attacks without concert and mutual support.

During the night of the 20th, Sir Arthur received intelligence that the enemy were in motion; but

from his inferiority in cavalry the reports of the patroles could not be otherwise than vague, and their information uncertain. Nevertheless, he thought it highly probable that if he did not attack the enemy on the morrow, he should be himself attacked; and prepared for the conflict accordingly by strengthening the right of his position, which, judging from the enemy's manner of patrolling on the preceding days, he expected would be the point of attack. About 8 o'clock in the morning, however, heavy bodies of the enemy's cavalry were descried moving along the range of heights traversed by the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham; and it became obvious, therefore, that the enemy's intention was to turn the left of the British position and attack it in rear. Major-General Ferguson's brigade was immediately directed to cross the ravine at the back of the right of the British position, and take post on the hills between Vimeiro and Lourinham; and this movement was successively followed by the brigades of Generals Nightingall, Acland, and Bowes. At the same time the Portugueze corps, supported by Crawfurd's brigade, took post on the road leading from Maceira to Lourinham, on the left of Ferguson; and General Hill's brigade, on the extreme right of the army (and now the only brigade remaining on the heights westward of Vimeiro), closed upon the centre, occupying the ground vacated on his left.

By this movement of inversion the army effected a complete change of front; the hill occupied by Fane and Anstruther's brigades having become the right centre, instead of the extreme left of the position, and the ground which Junot had expected to find but feebly occupied was now de-

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fended by five brigades of the English army and six pieces of artillery.

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The French army had broken up from Torres Vedras on the evening of the 20th, and marched all night; yet it was 6 o'clock on the following morning ere it cleared the defile by which the road to the north of Portugal winds through the mountain range that stretches westward from the great Serra de Monte Junto along the right bank of the Zizandra. The French cavalry then moved forward by the road to Lourinham, crowning the heights to the eastward of the British position, to cover the march of their infantry. Junot, informed by his parties that three lines of fires were visible the preceding night, stretching from the coast, northward, imagined that the right of our army rested on the sea and was flanked *by all the fleet;* he consequently decided on assailing what he considered the centre and left of our position, and accordingly General Laborde was directed to attack the troops posted on the hill in front of Vimeiro with the 2d brigade of his division under General Thomières, whilst the 1st, commanded by General Brenier, crossed the valley which comes down at the back of the village, to take our position in reverse, interrupt the line of retreat on Lourinham, and force our army back upon the sea. A regiment of cavalry supported both of these attacks, and the two brigades of Loison's division followed their movements at a short distance; the remainder of the cavalry and Kellermann's four battalions of grenadiers being kept in reserve.

Thiebault. p. 194.

The French commander, who intended the attacks of Laborde and Brenier to be made simultaneously, appears to have been quite unconscious

of the difficult nature of the ground the troops of the latter would have to traverse to reach their prescribed destination; and though Laborde's column had to advance through an equally wooded country to approach the British position, yet the road it took, by winding along the spine of a low ridge that terminates at Vimeiro, avoided the difficult ravines which the other had to cross to gain the English left. Laborde's attack therefore took place while Brenier's brigade was yet entangled in a deep, wooded gulley, upwards of a mile off on the right.

On the other hand, the wooded and furrowed nature of the country screened the movements of the enemy's columns after they descended from the heights on which they were originally drawn up to the eastward of the British position, and the want of cavalry rendered it impossible to follow their after movements; but Sir Arthur judged rightly in supposing that no alteration in the enemy's plans could be made after their columns had once moved from the plateau, and his confidence on this point inspiring his troops with a similar feeling, they waited patiently to pour their fire upon the enemy's attacking columns when their heads should issue from the dark pine woods which covered their approach.

Laborde's attack upon the position occupied by the brigades of Fane and Anstruther in front of Vimeiro was made in several columns. His troops advanced with great resolution; but whilst received in front by destructive vollies of musketry and Shrapnel's case, they were unexpectedly taken in flank by the artillery of Acland's brigade, which, in following the movement of Ferguson and Night-

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ingall to oppose the attack of Brenier on our left, perceived the advantage their position offered for opening a fire upon Laborde's columns on the opposite side of the valley.

Thiebault, p. 196.

Junot observing the immediate check produced by this unlooked-for attack, directed Loison to move forward the first brigade of his division to Laborde's assistance, and with the other to follow the movement of Brenier, directed against the English left. Laborde, thus reinforced, again formed three columns of attack, and advanced against the British centre, leading himself the principal column. His troops ascended the steep acclivity whereon our troops were posted, in spite of the showers of grape poured upon them by our artillery; but on reaching the crest of the hill, a volley from the 50th regiment threw them into confusion; and that gallant corps following up its advantage with the bayonet, completed the enemy's overthrow. They wheeled about and fled in the greatest disorder.

The enemy's column directed against the right of this position, where three regiments of Anstruther's brigade were posted, was repulsed with equal intrepidity, being charged in front by the 97th regiment and taken in flank by the 52d; and the enemy's third column, which endeavoured to penetrate by a road that led along the northern side of the hill into Vimeiro, was as gallantly driven back by the 43d light infantry.

Thiebault, p.197.

While these attacks were in progress, Junot, perceiving the execution done by Acland's brigade, ordered two of the grenadier battalions of his reserve to support Laborde, by charging with the bayonet the troops which thus took him in flank. In vain, however, these picked battalions, advancing to

within 200 yards of the English guns, attempted to deploy; our artillery opened upon them with grape, and, in a few minutes, more than 200 of the enemy were stretched upon the field.

The broken French columns retired with the utmost precipitation; and the detachment of the 20th light dragoons, taking advantage of their disorder, dashed in amongst them, and did much execution. The French commander-in-chief was on the point of being captured; but the enemy's cavalry came up in time to save him, and, charging vigorously in its turn, inflicted a severe loss upon our weak squadrons, which had pushed on much too far in the pursuit, and their gallant leader* was left dead upon the field.

Thiebault, p. 199.

General Kellerman, with the remainder of the French reserves, now came up to the support of Laborde's discomfited columns; but they were in no condition to renew the combat, and as Fane's and Anstruther's brigades had received orders not on any account to quit their position, the action ceased altogether on this part of the field: seven of the enemy's guns and a great many prisoners (amongst them the commander of one of the battalions of grenadiers) remaining in the hands of the victors.

Whilst the battle was thus hotly engaged on the centre of the British position, General Brenier's brigade, as we have already noticed, was yet entangled in the ravines which obstructed its march to assail our left; and General Solignac, who had been ordered to its support, with the view of avoiding similar difficulties, made a wide movement to his right, to turn the intricate valley that separated

* Lieut.-Colonel Taylor, of the 20th light dragoons.

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him from the range of hills, by which he hoped to take the English army in flank and rear.

This circuitous movement was not executed until the attack on our centre had been finally repulsed; and when Solignac reached the ground where he hoped, in conjunction with Brenier, to fall upon the isolated wing of the English army, he found, to his astonishment, three lines of infantry drawn up to receive him, but could see nothing of Brenier.

Major-General Ferguson's brigade, composed of the 36th, 40th, and 71st regiments, was in first line, barring the road from Lourinham to Vimeiro, with either flank resting on a deep ravine; that of Brigadier-General Nightingall was in second line, a short distance in rear; and those of Bowes and Acland remained in column, ready either to move up to the support of the others, or to form to their right, should an attack be threatened on that flank. Crawfurd's brigade and the Portugueze were at the same time moving along a ridge parallel to and about a mile to the left of that occupied by these four brigades, thus menacing the right flank and rear of the enemy's advancing column.

Solignac, notwithstanding the fearful odds against him, advanced resolutely to the attack. He was supported by a formidable body of cavalry, and doubtless momentarily expected to see Brenier's column emerge from the wooded ravines on the left to his support. The imposing appearance of the enemy's veteran troops made, however, no impression on the gallant bands drawn up to meet them, which waited only until they were sufficiently near to charge with the bayonet. The French immediately gave way, and were vigorously pur-

sued. Their general in vain attempted to arrest the march of the English with his cavalry: he was severely wounded, and obliged to leave the field, and three guns were captured.

Our troops continued to press forward, at every step presenting a more formidable front, and gaining upon the enemy's left flank; for the ridge by which they were advancing widened gradually as it approached the summit of the chain of hills along which lay the enemy's line of retreat, and the regiments of the rear brigades, profiting by this circumstance, came up and took their place in the first line, as space for their formation was thus afforded.

The rugged character of the country on the enemy's left obliged them, hard pressed as they were, to continue their retreat along the more level and open ground on the summit of the ridge. Now this ridge, as we have before noticed, meets the chain of hills that stretches between Lourinham and Torres Vedras at a right angle; and it is obvious, therefore, that the enemy's right could only rejoin the rest of their army by making a very considerable detour. Sir Arthur, whose rapid glance at once perceived the critical position in which the enemy's army was placed by this eccentrical retreat of its right wing, immediately conceived the masterly project of cutting it off from Torres Vedras, by pushing forward the right wing of the British army towards that place, and seizing upon the defile through which lay their line of retreat on Lisbon. But, as Sir Harry Burrard had landed during the action, — though from praiseworthy motives of delicacy he had declined, under such circumstances, assuming the command, — Sir Arthur, now that the battle was gained, felt it incum-

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bent upon him to submit the measures he purposed adopting to reap the full fruits of his victory, to his superior officer. He rode up, therefore, to Sir Harry; and pointing out to him that the enemy, repulsed at all points, were retiring in the utmost confusion, and that the right of our army was several miles nearer Torres Vedras than they were, proposed to move the three brigades of Hill, Fane, and Anstruther by the direct road from Vimeiro to that place, whilst, with the other five British brigades and the Portugueze troops, he should follow the broken columns of the enemy's right; adding, that there were twelve days' provisions in the camp, and plenty of ammunition for another battle.

Sir Harry Burrard, however, thought the proposed movement of too hazardous a nature, and, with the enemy flying before him, adhered to his opinion of the night before, that the English army was not sufficiently strong to cope with the French: he therefore desired Sir Arthur to halt the troops on the ground they occupied.

Meanwhile Ferguson, following up his advantage over the beaten troops of Solignac, had, by pressing constantly on their left flank, at length succeeded in driving them over the summit of the ridge along which they were retreating, into a ravine on its northern side (*i. e.* towards Lourinham), capturing the rest of their artillery. The 71st and 82d regiments were at this time rather in advance of the other corps, in a hollow near the village of Pragança, where they were halted to secure the captured guns and make fresh dispositions to attack Solignac's brigade in its disadvantageous position. Whilst thus situated, Brenier's

column, having at length overcome the difficulties it had encountered on its march, taking the direction of the firing, suddenly issued from a wooded ravine, and fell upon the right flank of the two English regiments; which, completely taken by surprise, retreated in some disorder, leaving two of the captured guns in the enemy's hands. Rallying, however, on reaching more favourable ground, they returned to the combat, drove the French brigade before them with great loss, and made its general prisoner.

General Thiebault, on whom the command of the enemy's right wing now devolved, drew off Brenier's brigade as expeditiously as possible along the southern face of the ridge, leaving Solignac's disordered troops on the opposite side; so that Ferguson's further advance would have completely cut off the latter from the rest of the French army; but just as that general was on the point of reaping the fruits of his able movements, arrived Sir Harry Burrard's ill-judged order to halt.

General Ferguson, on receiving this unwelcome order, instantly despatched his aide-de-camp to make known to Sir Arthur the strait in which he had placed Solignac's brigade, which he conceived would be obliged to surrender if he were permitted to continue his movement in advance. Sir Arthur, taking this officer with him, again rode up to Sir Harry Burrard; and, explaining to him the relative situations of Ferguson's and Solignac's corps, once more urged him to adopt the plan before proposed of following up the victory.

Sir Harry had in the interval been confirmed in his idea of the inexpediency of that project by the

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opinions of Brigadier-General Clinton*, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray†, and other officers of his personal staff, and Sir Arthur was unable to instil any of his own ardour into his more cautious superior and his advisers; and, despairing of fortune again smiling upon one who received her favours so reluctantly, he turned round, and dryly observed to an officer of his staff, "Well then, we may now amuse ourselves in shooting red-legged partridges."

We may judge of the bitter feeling of disappointment with which Sir Arthur saw the glorious opportunity that had presented itself of bringing the contest to a close thus suffered to escape, by several passages in his correspondence. We shall, however, make but one extract from a letter giving an account of the action to H. R. H. the Duke of York, wherein he openly expresses his opinion on the subject.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 22.

"I think if General Hill's brigade and the advanced guard‡ had moved upon Torres Vedras as soon as it was certain that the enemy's right had been defeated by our left, and our left had pursued their advantage, the enemy would have been cut off from Torres Vedras, and we should have been at Lisbon before him; if, indeed, any French army had remained in Portugal."

After carefully and impartially weighing all that has been said and written on both sides in this matter, we cannot but admit that there was ample cause for the feeling of dissatisfaction which the rejection of his proposed plans produced not only in Sir Arthur, but in the entire army; for, while considering this subject, we must lose sight of what

* The late Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, G.C.B.
† Lieutenant-General Sir George Murray, G.C.B.
‡ Fane and Anstruther's brigades.

afterwards actually occurred, and draw our conclusions only from what might, we may almost say *ought*, to have happened, on a view of the relative state of the two armies at the close of the battle.

The French commander had collected all his available means to oppose the English, as Sir Arthur always had predicted; had seized the advantage of being the party to attack, which Sir Arthur had vainly proposed to deprive him of; and had, nevertheless, sustained a signal defeat, and lost nearly all his artillery. But although the French army had suffered severely, yet no one ever imagined that it had been so thoroughly beaten as to lead its commander to make the immediate proposals he did for the evacuation of Portugal; neither could it have occurred to honourable minds (the English generals being at that time *new* in the ways of their opponents) that Junot might be anxious to propose terms which would insure *his baggage* a safe passage to France by sea, rather than expose it to the risk of capture during a rapid retreat through Portugal.

It was therefore to have been expected that if merely driven back to their position of the morning, the enemy would thenceforth adopt the strictly defensive system, which the difficult nature of the country between Torres Vedras and Lisbon particularly favoured; and that if they were not *immediately* attacked there, they would turn the delay to account by bringing up a fresh supply of artillery from Lisbon, and by fortifying their already formidable positions. Moreover, a protracted contest presented other chances in the enemy's favour; for, whilst the possession of Lisbon insured their supplies, our army, occupying an exhausted coun-

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try, would have been altogether dependent on the fleet for every thing of which it stood in need. Its operations would consequently have been cramped, (particularly objectionable in offensive warfare) in order to maintain its communication with the sea; and the approach of autumn rendered even the resources of our floating magazines very precarious. The additional 10,000 men of Sir John Moore's corps would have still further increased the difficulties of the army on this head; and without this reinforcement (considering the change which even a week's delay would have occasioned in the relative positions of the two parties), our army would no longer have been strong enough to dislodge an enemy of nearly equal strength from a naturally defensible country that he had been allowed time to fortify.

On the other hand, supposing the difficulties about supplies had been overcome, and that Sir John Moore's corps had joined the army at Vimeiro sooner than could reasonably be expected, then, the road to Almeida being left open to the enemy, their retreat might have been effected without crossing the Tagus if our army succeeded in penetrating to Lisbon by the coast road; and if, on the contrary, changing its line of operations, our army turned the strong positions of the French, and moved upon Santarem, then ample time would have been afforded them to evacuate Lisbon, cross the river, and gain Elvas. Lastly, by delay Junot might have been enabled to receive reinforcements from Spain, for the accounts received of the affairs of that country were such as to lead to the belief that they might be looked for.

On every account, therefore, it was ill-judged to

let slip the opportunity which presented itself at the close of the battle of Vimeiro of intercepting the enemy's retreat upon Lisbon. The cases we have supposed, and the reasons we have adduced, were all foreseen and pointed out by Sir Arthur *at the time;* but Sir Harry Burrard imagined that Junot had been so rash as to attack with only a portion of his army, and, unacquainted with the nature of the country, thought that the enemy's superiority in cavalry was such as to forbid any advance until further reinforcements arrived. These, however, are poor excuses; for the risk of allowing a victorious army, only half of which had been in action, to follow up a discomfited enemy, whose reserves had all been engaged and that had lost nearly all his artillery, can be but very slight; and, to obtain the results which were in view, ought to have been incurred if even ten times greater.*

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

The French admit having lost 1800 men and ten guns in their ill planned and worse executed attack; but as fourteen pieces of their artillery were brought into our park after the action, it is more than probable that a proportionate addition should be made to their "hors de combat," the amount of whom Sir Arthur estimated at near 3000. The want of cavalry and the orders against advancing prevented many prisoners being made, but a large quantity of ammunition was captured. The loss of the British army was 720, killed, wounded, and missing.

Thiebault, p. 202.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 22.

* The battle of Marengo may, perhaps, be quoted as an instance of the danger of following up a beaten enemy whose cavalry is superior; but the case is not in point, for it was the unpardonable *manner* in which Zach advanced that enabled Bonaparte to snatch the victory from him.

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Sir Arthur's report of the action was forwarded to the secretary of state by Sir Harry Burrard, accompanied by the following letter, bearing that officer's honourable testimony to the services rendered by his predecessor.

"Maceira, 21st August, 1808.

"My Lord,

"The report which I have the honour to enclose to your lordship, made at my request by Lieut.-General Sir A. Wellesley, conveys information which cannot but prove gratifying to his Majesty.

"On my landing this morning, I found that the enemy's attack had already commenced; and I was fortunate enough to reach the field of action in time to witness and approve of every disposition that had been and was afterwards made by Sir A. Wellesley: his comprehensive mind furnishing a ready resource in every emergency, and rendering it quite unnecessary to direct any alteration.

"I am happy on this occasion to bear testimony to the great spirit and good conduct displayed by all the troops composing this gallant army in this well-contested action.

"I send this despatch by Captain Campbell*, aide-de-camp to Sir A. Wellesley, no person being better qualified to give your lordship information.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"H. BURRARD.

"*Viscount Castlereagh.*"

Sir Harry's command was, however, but of brief duration; for in the course of the night of the 21st, Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived and superseded him. Thus, in the short space of four and twenty hours, the command of the army had been held by three officers. It was well that such reprehensible arrangements did not lead to disastrous results.

* Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.

CHAPTER XVI.

VACILLATING CONDUCT OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER. — JUNOT CALLS A COUNCIL OF WAR. — GENERAL KELLERMANN ARRIVES AT THE BRITISH HEAD QUARTERS TO PROPOSE A SUSPENSION OF ARMS. — OBJECTIONS OF SIR A. WELLESLEY TO THE ARTICLES PROPOSED. — HE SIGNS THE ARMISTICE. — THE BRITISH ADMIRAL OBJECTS TO THE STIPULATION REGARDING THE RUSSIAN FLEET. — INSTRUCTIONS DRAWN UP BY SIR A. WELLESLEY FOR THE OFFICER CHARGED WITH THE NEGOTIATION OF A TREATY. — CONVENTION OF CINTRA. — AMENDMENTS MADE IN IT AT THE INSTIGATION OF SIR A. WELLESLEY. — IT IS RATIFIED BY SIR HEW DALRYMPLE WITHOUT THE PROPOSED ALTERATIONS BEING MADE. — ALLUSIONS TO THE EVENTS IN THE CORRESPONDENCE OF SIR A. WELLESLEY. — REMONSTRANCES OF THE PORTUGUEZE GENERAL, AND OPINION OF THE BRITISH ARMY WITH REGARD TO THE CONVENTION. — SIR HEW DALRYMPLE PROPOSES TO SEND SIR A. WELLESLEY TO THE ASTURIAS. — SIR ARTHUR COMMUNICATES HIS VIEWS FOR THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN SPAIN TO LORD CASTLEREAGH, AND SUBMITS HIS SENTIMENTS AS TO THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF REGENCY IN PORTUGAL TO THE BRITISH COMMANDER. — DETERMINES TO RETURN TO ENGLAND.

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IMMEDIATELY on Sir Hew Dalrymple's landing on the morning of the 22d, Sir Arthur Wellesley represented to him the necessity for advancing, entering at some length into his reasons for entertaining this opinion. Sir Hew replied, that having but just arrived, he was unable to form any judgment of the matter; but soon afterwards, Sir Arthur having urged the necessity of moving forward to Lieutenant-Colonel Murray (the quartermaster-general of the army), that officer went to Sir Hew, who, after a short conference, acquiesced in Sir Arthur's proposal, directing Lieutenant-Colonel Murray to follow Sir Arthur, and desire him to make preparations for the advance, and issue what orders he thought necessary for it.

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This occurrence showed a great want of tact in the new commander-in-chief (setting aside any imputation on his judgment), and was any thing but flattering to Sir Arthur; the natural inference to be drawn from it being that the opinion of a much younger officer, and one who had only recently joined the army, was more highly considered than that of the general who had so ably and successfully conducted the operations of the army up to this period.

From that moment Sir Arthur seems to have foreseen how matters were likely to be conducted; and circumstances shortly afterwards occurred which led him to doubt whether the diplomatic talents of the new commander-in-chief were of a higher order than those he had hitherto displayed in his military capacity.

The French army having been suffered to retreat without molestation through the difficult pass of Torres Vedras (an operation which, even under such advantage, it did not completely effect until the morning after the battle), Junot again possessed all the facilities he had enjoyed previous to making his attack, either for disputing the advance of the English on Lisbon, or for retiring on Elvas or Almeida; and he immediately held a council of war, to consider the best course to be adopted under existing circumstances.

Thiebault, p. 204.

Laborde, who seems to have been not only the most talented, but also the most *disinterested* of the French generals, proposed to retire by Castel Branco and Guarda on Ciudad Rodrigo, and join Marshal Bessières; a project which imposed on them the sacrifice of their artillery and baggage. To this the other generals called to the consult-

Sarrazin, p. 32.

ation strongly objected; and it was ultimately decided that Kellermann should repair to the British head quarters, to propose a suspension of arms, with a view to arranging the terms of a treaty for the evacuation of Portugal. General Kellermann accordingly proceeding on his mission, reached the British outposts* on the afternoon of the 22d, and sent in a flag of truce to say he wished to speak with General Wellesley, whom he imagined to be still in command of the army.

Sir Arthur, to whom this message was conveyed, forthwith communicated it to the newly-arrived commander-in-chief, asking him if he (Sir Arthur) should proceed to the outposts, and speak to General Kellermann. Sir Hew replied in the negative; adding, that the French general had desired to speak to *him*, the commander of the army, and that he would receive him at Sir Arthur's quarters, where he was to dine.

General Kellermann was therefore conducted to Vimeiro; and, after being closeted some time with the British commander-in-chief, Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Arthur Wellesley were sent for, to whom the object of the French officer's mission was communicated, Kellermann himself repeating the same, and afterwards reading from a paper a memorandum of the wishes of the French commander-in-chief. The three British generals, after some conversation with Kellermann, withdrew into an inner room, to deliberate on the propositions of

* A ridiculous circumstance occurred on this occasion. The fears of a Portugueze officer coming with a despatch from General Freire having magnified Kellermann's escort (advancing in an opposite direction) into the whole French army, he rode full gallop into the English camp, announcing that the enemy were close at hand, which occasioned a general turn out.

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which he was the bearer; but the paper from which he had read the wishes of Junot was not before them, Sir Arthur having declined taking it from the French general, conceiving that the negotiation then going on should be simply for a suspension of hostilities.

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

The British officers, (though actuated by very different motives,) having come to the unanimous opinion that it was advisable to allow the French to evacuate Portugal by sea, Sir Arthur mentioned the reasons which had led him to decline taking the paper from Kellermann; observing that no objection existed to granting a suspension of arms for forty-eight hours, for the purpose of negotiating a convention to obtain the object proposed, yet that it was contrary to all precedent, in the present stage of the business, to admit any discussions on points of detail. Sir Hew Dalrymple viewed the matter differently, conceiving that as long as they agreed on the material point, namely, to allow the enemy to evacuate Portugal by sea, it was useless to "drive them to the wall upon a point of form." Sir Arthur's objection was therefore overruled, and the negotiation entered into; and in the course of the evening the following treaty, though termed a "suspension of arms," was finally agreed upon:—

(*Translation.*)

"Head Quarters of the English Army,
22d August, 1808.

"*Suspension of Arms agreed upon between Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., on the one part, and General of Division Kellermann, Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, &c. &c. &c. on the other, &c. &c. &c.*

"*Art.* 1. There shall be a suspension of arms from this date, between the armies of his Britannic Majesty and his I. and R. Majesty Napoleon I., for the purpose of negoti-

ating a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army.

"*Art.* 2. The generals commanding the two armies, and the commander of the British fleet off the Tagus, will fix the time and place to discuss and conclude the said convention.

"*Art.* 3. The river Zizandra will form the line of demarcation between the two armies. Torres Vedras will not be occupied by either.

"*Art.* 4. The general commanding the English army will undertake to include the armed Portugueze in this suspension of arms, and for them the line of demarcation shall be from Leyria to Thomar.

"*Art.* 5. It is agreed provisionally, that under no circumstances shall the French army be considered prisoners of war; that all those belonging to it shall be conveyed to France with arms and baggage, and private property of every description, of which nothing shall be taken from them.

"*Art.* 6. No individual, whether Portugueze or French, or of a nation in alliance with France, shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct; he shall be protected, his property respected, and shall be at liberty to leave Portugal within a fixed time, and with whatever belongs to him.

"*Art.* 7. The neutrality of the port of Lisbon shall be admitted for the Russian fleet; that is to say, when the English army or fleet shall have possession of the city or port, the said Russian fleet shall not be molested during its stay, nor stopped when it may wish to sail, nor be pursued after it may have sailed, excepting only at the expiration of the time established by the maritime laws.

"*Art.* 8. All the artillery of French calibre, as also the horses of the cavalry, shall be conveyed to France.

"*Art.* 9. This suspension of arms shall not be broken without a previous notice of forty-eight hours.

"*Additional Article.* The garrisons of the places occupied by the French army shall be included in the present convention, should they not have capitulated before the 25th of the present month."

The first article of this treaty which occasioned discussion in the course of the negotiation was that relating to the *property* the French were to be permitted to carry off with them, which was ex-

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plained by Kellermann to mean only "military baggage and equipments."

The next, was that respecting the Russian fleet, which it was first proposed should be allowed to return to the Baltic without obstruction. Sir Arthur gave it as his opinion, that the French ought not to be allowed to stipulate for the Russians at all; but the article as it now stands was subsequently proposed by Kellermann, and permitted to remain in the treaty, on the understanding that if disapproved of by the English admiral it must be struck out.

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

Sir Arthur pointed out to Sir Hew that the claim put forth in this article for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon might be made by the Russians on their own account, or by the Portugueze in their favour, but not by the French. The British commander viewed the matter differently, conceiving that as the question was in fact understood by Kellermann to be referable to the admiral, it was unimportant whether this agreement was in the treaty or not. It was, however, of the very greatest importance, on several accounts. Firstly, because it admitted a right which the French did not possess, — that of negotiating for the Russians: secondly, because it gave them something to concede, and consequently something to demand; and this was the French diplomatist's object, for in point of fact they would unhesitatingly have sacrificed the whole Russian fleet to preserve one of their own baggage waggons: and thirdly, because the admission of so indefinite an article furnished not only a pretext for procrastination, but an excuse, if required, for annulling the whole treaty.

The last point of discussion related to the length

of time during which the suspension of hostilities should last; Sir Arthur proposing to limit its duration to forty-eight hours only, whereas Sir Hew preferred the proposal of General Kellermann, that it should be unlimited in the first instance, but followed by a limited suspension of forty-eight hours when either party should wish to put an end to it. This appeared very objectionable to Sir Arthur on various accounts; namely, as regarded the state of the resources of the British army; the state of the season; the *tone* in which the convention should be negotiated; and above all, on account of Kellermann's threats of the Russians co-operating with the French, if the British admiral refused his consent (which Sir Arthur maintained he was sure he would) to the article respecting their fleet. For if there was any foundation for those threats, it was most important, in the event of the negotiations being eventually broken off, that a period of eight and forty hours should not be allowed to the French to equip and prepare the Russians before our army could resume its operations. All these objections, strongly urged by Sir Arthur, were unavailing; Sir Hew conceiving that it was rather to the advantage of the British army to gain time to allow Sir John Moore's corps to join, still persisting in the opinion that our force was not sufficient to cope with the enemy, though the step they had now taken was a tacit admission they could not make a stand against the force to which they were already opposed.

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

When the terms of the suspension of arms had been thus generally settled, General Kellermann, who was dictating the fair copy of the instrument to those who were writing it, asked, with a view to

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inserting the name of the British negotiator in the title, who was to sign it. Sir Hew Dalrymple replied, he would; but on the French diplomatist observing that such a proceeding would be a breach of the rules invariably observed in such matters, and proposing that Sir Arthur should put his name to it, Sir Hew proceeded to the inner room, where Sir Arthur was, and asked whether "he had any objection to do so." Sir Arthur replied, that "he would put his name to any paper Sir Hew wished him to sign;" and when the instrument was finally drawn up, having read it over, he gave it to the British commander-in-chief to peruse, remarking that "it was an extraordinary paper." To this observation Sir Hew replied, "it contained nothing but what had been settled;" and Sir Arthur, suffering his notions of the deference due to a military superior to outweigh all other considerations, signed a paper to many points of which he had urged and still held the strongest objections; thus, unfortunately, making himself appear to be the negotiator of a treaty which eventually called forth just and very general reprobation; and not until all the circumstances came to be fully explained, was the cloud removed which for a time overshadowed his fair fame.

The erroneous construction that might be placed upon what he had been induced to do, merely from a sense of the deference due to the wishes of a superior officer, seems very soon to have occurred to Sir Arthur; indeed, almost immediately after having put his name to the armistice, he unequivocally declared to one of his staff, that "he would rather have lost his right hand than have signed it;" and early on the following

morning, when relating to Colonel Torrens * the occurrences of the preceding evening, he stated that "he had signed the armistice by the desire of Sir Hew Dalrymple, although he totally disapproved of many points in it, and of the tone of the language in which it was drawn up."

All the letters, official as well as private, written by Sir Arthur at this period, evince an anxious and very excusable desire to remove the impression that he was the negotiator of this armistice. In reference to this subject he says, in writing to Captain Malcolm of H.M.S. Donegal,—

"One of the consequences" (of the victory of Vimeiro) "has been a suspension of arms between the French and us, preparatory to the evacuation of this country by them; the conditions of which I signed last night. Gurwood Despatches, &c. Aug. 24.

"Although I signed these conditions, I beg that you will not believe that I entirely approve of the manner in which the instrument is worded.

"You will receive a public letter from me upon this subject to-day, &c."

And in the official letter thus referred to he writes,—

"I have the honour to inform you, that an agreement for the suspension of hostilities between the British and French armies, preparatory to the arrangement of a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the latter, was signed last night *by the direction of the commander-in-chief.*"

While the negotiations for a suspension of arms had been going forward at the British camp, the French army had fallen back from Torres Vedras to the strong positions of Montechique and Mafra; and Junot himself, with the reserves, returned to Lisbon on the evening of the 23d. On the morning

* The late Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Torrens, K.C.B.

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of that day the British army moved by its left to Ramalhal, where Sir Hew Dalrymple established his head quarters. He was there visited by the Portugueze general, Dom Bernardim Freire, who rightly conjecturing that from a suspension of arms having been concluded, the fighting must be all over, now came to the front to express his extreme dissatisfaction that any agreement of the kind should have been entered into without his having been consulted. The British commander assured him that no disrespect was intended, and that no time should be lost in furnishing a copy of the conditions of the armistice for his consideration; Dom Bernardim promising in return to send a confidential officer to communicate thereupon with Sir Hew. This officer came accordingly to the British head quarters, and advanced numerous objections to the armistice, particularly to the article which stipulated that his countrymen should not be molested for their political conduct. It appearing, however, to Sir Hew that the chief cause of dissatisfaction arose from no reference having been made to the Junto of Oporto, he observed that a mere provincial assembly could not be acknowledged as the government of Portugal, which, in fact, no where existed; and moreover, that no reference was had to the French and English governments, the armistice being a purely military measure, and one which admitted of no delay. But as nothing satisfactory could possibly result from this kind of communication, Sir Hew requested this officer would urge General Freire to state in writing any observations he had to make upon the armistice, promising that they should be favourably considered in the progress of the negotiations.

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

On the night of the 24th Lieut.-Colonel Murray, who had been sent from Vimeiro early on the morning of the 23d to communicate the terms of the armistice to Sir Charles Cotton, returned to head quarters with the verbal refusal of the admiral to subscribe to the article stipulating for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon for the Russian fleet. Sir Arthur now, therefore, urged Sir Hew Dalrymple to give the French commander-in-chief immediate notice of his intention to resume hostilities at the expiration of the period of forty-eight hours from that time, and recommended him to move the army forward without further delay. Sir Hew thought, however, in consequence of some conversation which had passed between Colonel Murray and the aide-de-camp of Junot who had accompanied him to the British fleet, that good faith required the forty-eight hours should be reckoned from the time the French general might be made acquainted with the English admiral's sentiments; but he so far acquiesced in Sir Arthur's proposal as to despatch Lieut.-Colonel Murray to Lisbon, on the evening of the 25th, to communicate the admiral's dissent to the article regarding the Russian fleet, and to notify to Junot that the suspension of arms would be at an end at noon on the 28th, unless a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French should be agreed to before that day; and he authorized Lieut.-Colonel Murray (should the French general manifest a desire to renew the negotiation for a convention on the basis of the articles of the armistice, omitting that relating to the Russian fleet) "to enter upon and conclude" such a con-

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vention, according to the terms specified in a memorandum furnished by Sir Arthur Wellesley.

The following is the comprehensive memorandum referred to; which, it will be perceived, had been drawn up for Lieut.-Colonel Murray's guidance (though not given to him) when he was about to proceed to the British admiral:—

"Ramalhal, 23d August, 1808.

"I. It would be very desirable to instruct Colonel Murray, at an early hour this day, to urge the admiral to have communication with the Russian admiral, in which the latter should be informed, that whatever might be the result of the negotiations between Sir Hew and the Duc d'Abrantes, the Russian fleet should not be molested if they conducted themselves as they ought in a neutral port, and took no part in the contest.

"II. If the admiral should consent to this arrangement in favour of the Russians, and the Russians should be satisfied upon this point, the French commander-in-chief should be pressed upon the following points in the negotiation for the convention.

"1st. The fort of Peniche to be evacuated in two days; the forts of Elvas and La Lippe in four days; the fort of Almeida in five days. The French army to cross the Tagus, and evacuate Lisbon and all the forts on the Tagus, in four days from the signature of the convention; and to be prepared to embark in seven days, or as soon afterwards as the British commander-in-chief may appoint.

"The British army, in the mean time, to have the use of the port of Lisbon and the navigation of the Tagus.

"2dly. The mode of paying for the hire of the transports to be settled.

"3dly. The ports to be settled to which they are to go. Rochefort or L'Orient would answer best, as being the greatest distance from Spain and the Austrian frontier.

"4thly. Security to be required for the transports going to the ports appointed, and for the return of the transports; as fifty of those sent with the army of Egypt were detained in France.

"5thly. Some mode to be devised to make the French generals disgorge the church plate which they have stolen.

"6thly. An exchange of prisoners to be settled.

"7thly. There are no horse transports; and the French must be permitted to leave commissaries to sell their horses or to hire vessels to transport them to France, but certainly not the cavalry itself."

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry

The chief object of the foregoing paper was "to get the Russians out of the hands of the French;" and it seemed to Sir Arthur to be a matter of indifference what arrangement was made respecting the Russian fleet, provided it was not allowed to return to the Baltic. It was his opinion, indeed, that the best arrangement which could be made on this head was to leave it in the port of Lisbon on the ground of its neutrality, since two events might then occur, either of which would place it in our hands; namely, a declaration of war by Russia against the Spaniards and Portugueze, or the re-entry of the French into Portugal. Meanwhile, the presence of an English squadron off the Tagus would effectually prevent its escape.

It had from the first occurred to Sir Arthur that a convention with the French for the evacuation of Portugal, would give the Russians the benefit of the neutrality of the port of Lisbon; since, while negotiations were pending, the British fleet could not enter the Tagus to attack the Russians, and as soon as the forts which defend the river and anchorage were given up by the French, the Portugueze flag (which must then be hoisted) would have afforded them protection.

On the 26th Sir Arthur drew up a memorandum for the future operations of the army, according to a plan suggested by Sir Hew Dalrymple. In this it was proposed, should Junot not show himself ready to negotiate, to move forward the main body of the army on the morrow to the heights in front of Torres Vedras, to be in readiness to commence

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operations the moment the period fixed for the duration of the suspension of arms should expire; and on the 28th this portion of the army was to march by its left to Sobral, whilst the troops of Sir John Moore's corps (which arrived in Maceira roads on the 25th) were to be landed as expeditiously as possible, and collected at Ramalhal, preparatory to a general attack on the French position at the Cabeça de Montechique on the 30th, the dispositions for which were all arranged. But, on the night of the 26th, Sir Hew received letters from the French commander-in-chief and Lieut.-Colonel Murray that caused these movements to be suspended. The despatch from Lieut.-Colonel Murray announced that "Junot had agreed to continue the negotiation without reference to the article of the armistice relative to the Russians; and that the suspension of hostilities would terminate at a particular hour named, unless by that time the negotiation in which he was engaged with General Kellermann should be brought to a conclusion." The letter from Junot on the contrary, admitted of the interpretation that though he agreed to continue the negotiation on the basis of the armistice, omitting the article relating to the Russian fleet, yet that he should still consider his negotiation with the English general as depending on the result of one about to be opened between the British and Russian admirals; and with respect to the duration of the suspension of arms, the letter gave Sir Hew clearly to understand that the French commander looked upon it as prolonged indefinitely.

Sir Hew Dalrymple, perceiving what he considered "an appearance of guile" on the part of the French commander-in-chief, summoned Sir

John Moore and Sir Arthur Wellesley to a consultation early on the following morning (27th). At this meeting, the latter strenuously urged the necessity of breaking off the negotiation at once, if the article of the armistice respecting the Russians were not expunged; and it was eventually decided that he should frame a letter of "further instructions" to Lieut.-Colonel Murray. In this letter Lieut.-Colonel Murray was directed to call upon General Kellermann "to explain and reconcile the difference between his statement and that contained in Junot's letter, and to break off the negotiation, and come away within the period limited for the suspension of hostilities, if this explanation should not be satisfactory." Lieutenant-Colonel Murray was further directed to inform General Kellermann, that "it was desirable General Junot should transmit through him (Lieutenant-Colonel Murray) any further communication he might have to make to Sir Hew Dalrymple."

This letter was carried to Lisbon by Lord Fitzroy Somerset* on the evening of the 27th; on which day the commander-in-chief issued a general order (from which we take the following extract) expressing his approbation of the conduct of the army, and admiration of the skill with which the operations had been conducted by Sir Arthur Wellesley:—

"GENERAL ORDERS.

"Head Quarters, Ramalhal, 27th August, 1808.

"The rapid and skilful march performed by the army commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, marked

* Lieutenant-General Lord F. J. H. Somerset, K. C. B., Military Secretary to the commander of the forces; at that time a Lieutenant in the 4th dragoons, and A. D. C. to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wellesley.

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in its progress by the talent of the general and the gallantry of the troops, and terminated by a victory greatly glorious to both, seemed to have accomplished the immediate object in view, without further operation in the field.

"Should that expectation be disappointed, the army will again advance, greatly augmented by the arrival of troops much more valuable from their composition than their numbers; and if by these means there will remain less opportunity for the army at large to acquire renown by the encounter of an army so greatly inferior in force, there will be greater occasion to display patience and cheerfulness under such privations as the exhausted state of the country and other circumstances must necessarily produce."

On the 28th the army moved forward in conformity with the plan before alluded to; Sir Arthur, with the main body, marching towards Torres Vedras, while two brigades and such of Sir John Moore's troops as had landed remained at Ramalhal with head quarters. On the morning of the 29th, Sir Arthur Wellesley and the other lieut.-generals of the army were summoned to Ramalhal, to deliberate on the terms of a convention which had been entered into between Lieut.-Colonel Murray and General Kellermann, and ratified by Junot on the 28th.

The principal provisions of the convention laid before this meeting were as follow*:—

"*Art.* 1. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the French troops shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.

"*Art.* 2. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage: they shall not be considered as prisoners of war; and on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve.

* At this meeting, the words in italics were substituted for others contained in the original draught of the treaty; and the passage between brackets was added at Lisbon (as were several others in the articles which are not given here) after the treaty had been sent back for revision.

"*Art.* 3. The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, &c.

"*Art.* 4. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun.—All other artillery, arms, &c. to be given up, &c.

"*Art.* 5. The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and the carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospital; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its account as the commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of all their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

"*Art.* 6. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is, however, fully understood that the means of conveyance for horses at the disposal of the British commander-in-chief are very limited. Some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon.

"(*The number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed* 600, *and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed* 200.) At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

* * * * * *

"*Art.* 11. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army, &c.

"*Art.* 12. *The forts of St. Julian, the Bugio, and Cascaes shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention.*

"Lisbon and its citadel, &c. shall be given up on the embarkation of the 2d division of the French army.... The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmella, as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them, &c.

"*Art.* 14. Should there arise any doubt as to the meaning of any article, it shall be explained favourably to the French army.

"*Art.* 17. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their em-

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ployments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders: they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French government, &c."*

It will at once be perceived that in drawing up the foregoing articles, the memorandum furnished by Sir Arthur Wellesley had nearly been lost sight of; and at the meeting of general officers to whom the convention was now submitted, several important alterations were consequently made, — viz. The article (No. 5.) respecting property was placed on a proper footing; that is to say, the French were to be allowed to carry off only their military equipments, and were to restore property of all descriptions which had been taken from the churches or the inhabitants of Portugal; and that part of it giving security to the purchasers of property from the French was cancelled.

The 6th article was altered, the French being left to find transport for their own cavalry; and by the 12th, as now amended, the French were required to evacuate immediately all the forts on the right bank of the Tagus as high up as Belem.

Sir Arthur also urgently pressed upon Sir Hew Dalrymple that the French should be required to evacuate Lisbon, and to cross the Tagus forthwith, according to the plan recommended in the memorandum handed to him on the 23d; but this pro-

* A separate convention was entered into on the 3d of September, between Sir C. Cotton and Admiral Seniavin, by which the Russian fleet in the Tagus was surrendered to the British, to be held in deposit until six months after the conclusion of peace between the two nations. The officers and seamen were to be sent to Russia at the expense of Great Britain, without any stipulation as to their future service.

posal was overruled by the commander of the forces. CHAP. XVI.

The convention thus altered was sent back to Lisbon on the 29th, but Sir Arthur was by no means satisfied with it even in its amended form; and these meetings of general officers, which, though not considered as councils of war, differed in reality very little from them, convinced him that the operations of the army under such a system could never be satisfactorily conducted. His opinions on this subject, and on the consequent policy of getting rid of the French by a convention, are clearly expressed in the following letters:— 1808.

" *To Captain Pulteney Malcolm, H.M.S. Donegal.* Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 29.

" Torres Vedras, 29th August.

" My dear Malcolm,

" Captain Dalrymple arrived this morning with the convention signed by General Kellermann and Colonel Murray; but it was so objectionable in many parts, that a meeting of the general officers was called to deliberate upon and settle the alterations to be made in it, which meeting I attended. The result of the meeting was a proposal to make certain alterations, which I acknowledge I do not think sufficient, although the treaty will answer in its amended form. In the mean time the army remains on its present ground, very much against my opinion.

" I am afraid that I am so much connected with the credit of this army, that I cannot remain with it without falling as it will fall. If I could be of any use to men who have served me so well, I would stay with them for ever; but as matters are situated, I am sure that I can be of no use to them. I am convinced they cannot render any service, and I have determined to go home immediately.

" At the same time I must say that I approve of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal, because I see clearly that we cannot get them out of Portugal otherwise, under existing circumstances, without such an arrangement; and we should be employed in the blockade or siege of the places which they occupy during the season in which we ought and might be advantageously employed against the

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French in Spain. But the convention by which they should be allowed to evacuate Portugal ought to be settled in the most honorable manner to the army by which they have been beaten; and we ought not to be kept for ten days on our field of battle before the enemy (who sued on the day after the action) is brought to terms.

"I am quite annoyed on this subject."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Aug. 30.

"*To Viscount Castlereagh, Secretary of State.*

"Camp north of Torres Vedras, 30th of August.

"My dear Lord,

"A convention signed by General Kellermann and Colonel Murray, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, was brought here yesterday morning; but it was not ratified by the General, in consequence of his finding some fault with it. It was altered, but not as I thought it ought to have been, and was returned to Junot yesterday afternoon. In the mean time, the army has halted in its position; with the only difference, that we have a corps in Torres Vedras, instead of three miles from that town. In short, in ten days after the action of the 21st, we are not further advanced, or indeed, as I believe, so far advanced, as we should and ought to have been on the night of the 21st.

"I assure you, my dear lord, matters are not prospering here; and I feel an earnest desire to quit the army. I have been too successful with this army ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation with satisfaction to the person who shall command it, and of course not to myself. However, I shall do whatever the government may wish."

Sir H. Dalrymple's Memoir, &c.

At noon on the 29th*, the period fixed for the suspension of hostilities having elapsed, without bringing the negotiation to a conclusion, the British commander availed himself of this circumstance to push his advanced guard beyond Torres Vedras and establish his head quarters in that town; and early on the morning of the 31st Sir Arthur Wel-

* Lieutenant-Colonel Murray had been authorized to prolong the term of the suspension of arms for twenty-four hours if necessary, and it had accordingly been extended to the 29th at noon.

lesley's corps marched by its left to Sobral, in front of the enemy's position at Cabeça de Montechique. When arrived within a short distance of that place Sir Arthur received a message from the commander-in-chief, acquainting him that the convention had been returned, and desiring to see him with the other general officers to take it into consideration; but conceiving that he could not reach Torres Vedras in time to attend this meeting, he did not proceed there, and the convention was consequently ratified by Sir Hew Dalrymple without his being present. * He afterwards heard with some surprise that scarcely any of the alterations made at the meeting of the 29th had been adopted.

Immediately that the convention had received the signature of the British commander-in-chief, a notification of the same was made to the Portugueze general, who, though he had not stated his sentiments and wishes in writing, as requested by Sir Hew Dalrymple, now complained that himself and nation had been very cavalierly treated in the matter, — seeming to imagine that the English army had merely been sent to fight for the Portugueze, whilst they were to judge when the time had arrived for entering into terms of accommodation.

The truth is, Dom Bernardim, like a cur that had run away from danger when it was at hand, thought to impose on the world by barking most vociferously now that a good stout fence afforded him protection; and accordingly he declared that

* This convention, though negotiated at Lisbon and ratified by the British commander at Torres Vedras, obtained the name of the "Convention of Cintra," from Sir Hew Dalrymple's despatch accompanying it being dated from that place, which became his head quarters on the 2d of September.

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the French had been far too favourably treated; that the Portugueze were in a condition to make them render an account of all the crimes they had committed; and, in fine, that not having been either consulted or privy to the negotiation, he considered himself free from all responsibility respecting the treaty, and formally protested against it.*

The convention was regarded with scarcely less dissatisfaction by the British army than by the Portugueze general, though from totally different causes; the one regretting that it had not been allowed to settle the contest in the field, the other that he had not been permitted to share in the labours of the cabinet.

From the numerous private letters lying before us on this subject, we shall venture to make an extract from one written by an officer of rank, to show the strong feeling entertained by the army on this subject.

"Sobral, 1st September.

"I do not know enough of the terms of the convention to detail particulars; but I fully believe that if Sir Arthur Wellesley's army had been left alone, we should have been now in Lisbon, with every Frenchman a prisoner. His (Sir A. W.'s) negotiation would have been at the sword's point."

On the 3d of September, the general officers who had served with the army from the time of its landing at Mondego Bay, anxious to manifest the high esteem and respect they bore towards Sir Arthur Wellesley, begged his acceptance of a piece of plate of the value of 1000 guineas.† In his

* This was on the 4th of September; but two days afterwards Dom Bernardim expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the explanation given by Sir Hew Dalrymple; and so the matter ended.

† This amount was afterwards considerably increased by the subscriptions of Brigadier-Generals Acland and Anstruther, and of the field officers present at the battle of Vimeiro.

reply to the letter conveying this flattering proof of the satisfaction his conduct had given, Sir Arthur returns a suitable compliment to the donors; saying, "I have a pride in the reflection that as I should not deserve, *so I should not possess*, your regard, if I had not done my duty; and with these sentiments, and those of respect and affection for you all, I accept of that testimony of your esteem and confidence which you have been pleased to present to me."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 3.

The immediate object for which the expedition had been sent to Portugal having been attained, Sir Hew Dalrymple, in conformity with a desire expressed by Lord Castlereagh, proposed to avail himself of Sir Arthur's services by sending him on a mission to the Asturias, which province, it was generally supposed, presented greater advantages than any other part of the Peninsula for carrying on ulterior operations against the common enemy. Sir Arthur's reasons for declining this somewhat extraordinary mission will be found in the subjoined extract from a letter to Lord Castlereagh, wherein he also gives his opinion as to the best method of conducting the war in Spain. This portion of his letter, being of great interest, we give entire; though it must be borne in mind that Sir Arthur's notions with respect to the Asturias were formed on information which proved to be incorrect in many particulars.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 5.

After apprizing Lord Castlereagh of the defective information they possessed relative to the affairs of Spain, but stating his belief that the French army at that moment in the Peninsula amounted only to about 40,000 men under the command of Bessières in the vicinity of Vittoria, he proceeds to observe,

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that the enemy's being reinforced must depend on the state of affairs in other parts of Europe, — taking it for granted that if the attention of the French government were not called to other quarters, their army in Spain would very soon be increased to a large amount. Nevertheless, from all he had heard of the resources of Spain, he expresses his doubts whether it would be practicable for the enemy to carry on operations with a larger (collected) force than 40,000 men, though they might have several corps employed on distinct lines of operations, or on the same line as their main army, in the protection of convoys, &c.

He next adverts to the force of the Spaniards; drawing as correct a picture of their armies as if he had already served a campaign with them.

"I really know nothing that they have in the shape of an army capable of meeting the French, excepting that under General Castaños. General Cuesta has some cavalry in Castille; General Galluzo some more in Estremadura; and Blake's army of Galicia may in time become an efficient corps. But these armies of peasantry, which in Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia have cut up French corps, must not be reckoned upon (at least at present) as efficient armies to meet the French troops in the field. It is most probable that they will not, and indeed cannot, leave their provinces; and if they could, no officer could calculate a great operation upon such a body.

"I doubt not that, if an accurate report could be made upon their state, they want arms, ammunition, money, clothing, and military equipments of every description; and although such a body are very formidable and efficient in their own country, and probably equal to its defence, they must not be reckoned upon out of it; and in any case it is impossible to estimate the effect of their efforts. In some cases equal numbers will oppose with success the French troops; in others, 1000 Frenchmen, with cavalry and artillery, will disperse thousands of them; and no reliance can be placed on them in their present state.

"The result then of my information of the present state of the Spanish force to be opposed to the French is, that

there are about 25,000 men under Castaños now ready, and about the same number under Blake in Galicia, upon whom you may reckon as efficient troops. All the rest may become so, and may be useful in different ways even at present; but you must not found the arrangement for a great military operation on their utility or efficiency. I understand that government has promised 10,000 men to Castaños; and I have no doubt whatever that a corps well equipped, consisting of about 15,000 men, including a proportion of British cavalry and artillery, would be highly useful to him. This would make his army 40,000 men, of which the British corps would be the best troops that could be found anywhere; and this army, aided by the insurrection from the other kingdoms of Spain, would be the operating army against what I have supposed to be the French operating army. This British corps should advance from Portugal, to which kingdom it would be in the mean time a defence.

"You should leave in Portugal a British corps of 5000 men, to be stationed at and in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, with probably a small garrison at Elvas. The object of stationing this corps in Portugal is to give strength to the government which you will establish here, and to render it independent of the factions and intrigues by which it will be assailed on all sides.

"You ought to send to Lisbon, in the quality of king's ambassador, a discreet person, who could superintend the management of the affairs of this country, particularly the expenditure of the money which you must supply for its wants, and its application to the purposes for which it will be given, — viz. to provide a military defence.

"The next consideration is the employment of the remainder of the army now in Portugal, amounting by estimate to about 10,000 men, with an additional corps of 10,000 men assembled and ready in England, and some cavalry. I acknowledge that I do not think the affairs of Spain are in so prosperous a state as that you can trust, in operations within that kingdom, the whole disposable force which England possesses, without adopting measures of precaution which will render its retreat to the sea-coast nearly certain. Besides this, I will not conceal from you that our people are so new in the field, that I do not know of persons capable of supplying, or if supplied of distributing, the supplies to an army of 40,000 men (British troops) acting together in a body. Even if plenty could be expected to exist, we should starve in the midst of it for

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want of due arrangement. But the first objection is conclusive. We may depend upon it, that whenever we shall assemble an army, the French will consider its defeat and destruction their first object, particularly if Buonaparte should be at the head of the French troops himself; and if the operations of our army should be near the French frontier, he will have the means of multiplying, and will multiply, the numbers upon our army in such a degree as must get the better of them. For the British army, therefore, we must have a retreat open, and that retreat must be the sea.

"Our operations carried on from Portugal and the north of Spain would, as you truly observe, involve us in a line of operations much too long. The retreat would be difficult, if not impossible.

* * * * * *

"The only efficient plan of operations in which the British can be employed, consistently with this view (its secure retreat to the sea) is upon the flank and rear of the enemy's advance towards Madrid by the issue from the Asturias. If it be true, as is stated by the Asturian deputies in London, that their country is remarkably strong, and that it is secure from French invasion; if it be true that the ports of Santander and Gijon, the former particularly, are secure harbours in the winter; and if their walls can give to both or either the means of making an embarkation, even if the enemy should be able to pierce through the mountains, the Asturias is the country we should secure immediately, in which we should assemble our disposable force as soon as possible, and issue forth into the plains either by Leon or the pass of Reynosa. The army could then have a short, although probably a difficult communication with the sea, which must be carried on by mules, of which there are plenty in the country; it could co-operate with Blake's Gallician army, and could press upon the enemy's right flank and rear, and turn his position upon the Ebro, which it is evident he intends to make his first line.

* * * * * *

"There remains now to be considered only the operations of the Sicilian corps, consisting of 10,000 men. . . . . If the Spaniards should be able to make any head against the French on the left of their line in Catalonia, and on the Lower Ebro, this corps might reinforce that part of the Spanish insurrection, keeping its retreat always open to

the sea. This, however, would be very difficult, the French being in possession of Barcelona; and probably the siege of that place, aided by the insurgents of Catalonia, would be the most this corps would perform.

* * * * * *

"The result of all these operations, which for the present must be distinct, would be to confine the French to their line of the Ebro for the present, and eventually to oblige them to retire upon their own frontier. Time would be gained for the further organization of the Spanish government and force. . . . . As for preventing the retreat of the French from Spain, it is quite out of the question. They have possession of all the fortresses on this side of the Pyrenees, through which mountains there are not less than forty passes by which troops could march.

* * * * * *

"In respect to your wish that I should go into the Asturias to examine the country and form a judgment of its strength, I have to mention to you that I am not a draftsman, and but a bad hand at description. I should have no difficulty in forming an opinion and a plan for the defence of that country, provided I was certain that it would be executed. But it will be an idle waste of my time, and an imposition upon you, if I were to go into that country with the pretence of giving you, or any general officer you should employ there, an idea of the country; and it would be vain and fruitless to form a plan for the defence of the country which would depend upon the execution of another. . . . . Under these circumstances I have told Sir Hew Dalrymple that I was not able to perform the duty in which you had desired I should be employed; that I was not a topographical engineer, and could not pretend to describe in writing such a country as the Asturias. . . . . I hope you will not believe that I feel any disinclination to performing any service in which you may think I can be of use to you; and that I have discouraged the idea of employing me on that proposed, solely from my incapacity of performing it as it ought to be performed, and from a certainty that you were not aware of the nature of the service which you required from me when you wrote to Sir Hew Dalrymple."

By this truly able paper it will be seen how correct were Sir Arthur's views regarding the projects of the French; how true his estimate of the degree

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of support to be expected from the Spaniards. In fact, whilst treating of the Spanish troops he appears already to have foreseen the adoption of that guerrilla system, which, whilst gaining them such ill-merited reputation, relaxed the bands of discipline, and thinned the ranks of their regular army. To the adoption of the suggestions for the government of Portugal contained in this letter, may be also ascribed the *temporary* regeneration of that country; the advantages resulting from which were soon apparent in the formation of a respectable national army.

But Sir Arthur, while thus imparting to others his valuable ideas for the future conduct of the war in the Peninsula, saw that with the army, as then commanded, his services would not be duly appreciated, and in a private letter to Lord Castlereagh, of the same date as the preceding, he says,—

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 5.

"It is quite impossible for me to continue any longer with this army; and I wish, therefore, that you would allow me to return home, and resume the duties of my office. . . . . You will hear from others of the various causes which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the military and other public measures of the commander-in-chief, but with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away; and the sooner I go the better."

In replying to a letter from the Bishop of Oporto containing memoranda of certain points which his lordship wished the commander-in-chief of the British army should consider in negotiating with the French, Sir Arthur takes the opportunity of setting himself right with the prelate, and thereby with the Portugueze nation, as to the share he had taken in the negotiations. The conclusion of this

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letter bears testimony to the good services rendered by the bishop to the common cause.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 6.

"I have thought proper to trouble your lordship with this detailed account of the share which I have had in these transactions, in order that your lordship may not attribute to me the omission to apprise you of their nature, which I am convinced was only accidental. But as I consider myself and the army which I commanded to be particularly obliged to your lordship, such an omission would have been unpardonable in me; and I am happy to take this opportunity of relieving myself from the imputation of it by apprising your lordship of the mode in which they were carried on, and of the share which I had in them."

The worthy prelate, whose good services in the common cause were thus handsomely acknowleged, though a staunch patriot and zealous churchman, was not a person to be satisfied with the degree of power conferred by the episcopal crosier; and the Junto of Oporto, of which he was the head, being equally unwilling to resign the government of the country, an attempt was made, through the medium of an agent of the British government (Baron Dacken), to induce the commander of the English army to write a letter expressing his wish that the bishop and Junto of Oporto should continue to exercise the supreme authority with which they had accidentally been invested. The reasons urged for this underhand proceeding were, that the French had a strong party in the capital, and that it was in too disturbed a state to be suited for the seat of government; and such a step, taken by the English general, it was affirmed, would overcome any opposition on the part of the Portugueze.

Sir Hew Dalrymple set his face decidedly against this intrigue; but nevertheless it, and the ambitious pretensions of other parties, caused him considerable embarrassment at this anxious moment; for

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being directed by his instructions to appoint a regency, consulting such leading Portugueze as had given proofs of fidelity to their sovereign, he scarcely knew, surrounded as he was by intrigues, and unacquainted with the country, where to turn for advice. The simplest course that presented itself was to call together the members of the council of regency appointed by the prince on his departure for Brazil; but several of them were known partizans of the French (the president had even fled the country), and to have restored these persons to authority would have been contrary to the interests of both Great Britain and Portugal. In case of necessity, the British commander was authorized to assume himself the reins of government; but to this measure he was naturally averse to have recourse until others of a less despotic nature had been tried; and anxious to steer a middle course in this dilemma, he proposed adopting a plan suggested by General Hope, namely, to proceed to the arrangement of the government without any reference whatever to existing local interests, by nominating a regency composed of such members of the council appointed by the prince as had not disqualified themselves by their adhesion to the French, and filling up the vacancies by persons of his own selection.

Sir H. Dalrymple's Memoir, p. 302.

Sir Arthur saw at once that such a mode of proceeding would add greatly to the embarrassments of the new government, and proposed to Sir Hew to adopt the plan he had himself meditated taking, as communicated in a letter to Lord Castlereagh; namely,—

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 9.

"To have issued a proclamation, and to have called the regency appointed by the prince to re-assume their

functions, with the exception of the members (by name) who had been confidentially employed by the French; and in the same proclamation to have desired the remaining *true* members of the regency to fill up the vacancies by election, according to the powers given to them of electing successors to vacancies by the very act which appoints them.

"I should then have exerted the influence which I should have undoubtedly had at this moment over them, to induce them to elect the Bishop of Oporto and others who it is important should belong to the government; and thus the government would have been legally constituted, without the unnecessary interference of a foreign power."

A modification of this plan was eventually adopted; two members of the council nominated by the prince, who had not disqualified themselves by their intercourse with the French, resuming their functions, and another, who had been especially named to fill up any vacancy that might occur, being added. These three completed their number to five by the election of two others, one of whom was the Bishop of Oporto.

On the 9th of September, while this important measure was under consideration, Sir Hew Dalrymple proposed to Sir Arthur that he should proceed on a mission to Madrid. Sir Arthur, however, in his reply, expressed no desire to be so employed, though stating at the same time his wish to render himself as useful as possible to the officer under whose command he might be serving. He felt that a mutual confidence was wanting between the commander-in-chief and himself; and such being the case, that it would not only be difficult to arrange any plans with the Spanish authorities for their future operations, but that whatever plans they might arrange would not be carried into execution.

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Meanwhile the treaty for the evacuation of Portugal had been dragging along "its weary length." The forts of the Tagus had been given up on the 2d Sept., and the castle of Belem on the 10th; the first division of the French army embarked on the 11th; on the 12th the citadel of Lisbon was occupied by a British garrison; and by the 6th Oct.* the Portugueze soil was altogether freed from its invaders.

Elated at their success in negotiation, Junot and his lieutenants endeavoured to take full advantage of the extraordinary stipulation their diplomatist had had the address to insert in the treaty, — that "if any doubt should arise as to the meaning of any article, it should be explained favourably to the French army;" their proceedings being characterized by a mixture of the most shameless rapacity and comic impudence. "The ingenuity of man," as stated by the British commissioners† appointed to carry the convention into effect, "could not provide against French cavil and ingenuity of misconstruction;" and "their conduct throughout was marked with the most shameful disregard of honour and probity." The national museum and library were plundered; the treasure in the public deposit was seized; the horses of the Prince Regent and numerous pictures from private galleries were carried off; the church plate they had plundered was melted into bars as well to prevent its being identified, as to facilitate its exportation!

* A considerable delay took place in the surrender of Elvas, in consequence of a bombastic demonstration of the Spanish General Galluzo to besiege the place, after the convention with the English had been signed.

† Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Proby and Major-General Beresford, now Viscount Beresford, G.C.B.

The firmness of the British commissioners caused the restitution of most of these and many other valuable objects; but their duty had been rendered peculiarly difficult and unpleasant, as well by the admission of the above quoted incautious article of the treaty, as by the neglect of Sir Arthur's recommendation, "that some means should be devised to make the French generals disgorge the property they had stolen."

The active operations of the army being, for a time, brought to a close by the deliverance of Portugal, Sir Arthur Wellesley applied to the commander-in-chief for permission to return to England, with a view to resume his duties as chief secretary for Ireland. His request being acceded to, Sir Arthur gave up his command in the army, and forthwith repaired to Lisbon. The subjoined letter, written to Lieutenant-Colonel Murray on the eve of his departure, explains the circumstances which called particularly for his return to Ireland at this moment, and shows what were his feelings in regard to the coldness of manner with which he imagined his advice had been received by the commander of the forces.

"I do not conceal from you that I am not quite satisfied with our situation; but nothing should have induced me to go away, if I had thought there was the smallest prospect of early active employment for the army; and I should not go now if my poor friend Mr. Trail * were not dead, and if it were not necessary that I should be in England, if possible, to know whether I am to retain my office or to resign it, and if there were a probability of another early opportunity of going home. I intend to return as soon as I can.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sep. 19.

* * * * * *

* Mr. Trail had performed Sir Arthur's duties as chief secretary in Ireland during his absence.

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"In regard to matters personal to myself, I shall not enter into them; I wish that Sir Hew had given me credit for a sincere desire to forward his views, whatever they might be; and I think I could have been of much use to him, as I believe I have been to other officers under whose orders I have served. He is the only one of whom I have not been the right-hand for some years past; and at the same time I must say, that I felt the same inclination to serve him that I had to serve the others."

CHAPTER XVII.

DISSATISFACTION EXPRESSED IN ENGLAND AT THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA. — EMBARRASSMENT OCCASIONED TO THE GOVERNMENT BY THE NON-ARRIVAL OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE SAME. — RUMOURS AFFECTING SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY'S REPUTATION. — NUMEROUS PETITIONS CALLING FOR INVESTIGATION INTO THE TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. — A BOARD OF INQUIRY IS ORDERED TO ASSEMBLE. — ITS REPORT. — OBSERVATIONS THEREON. — IT IS ORDERED TO RE-ASSEMBLE, AND GIVE A DECIDED OPINION ON CERTAIN POINTS. — THE KING EXPRESSES HIS DISAPPROBATION OF SIR H. DALRYMPLE'S CONDUCT. — SIR A. WELLESLEY RESUMES HIS DUTIES AS CHIEF SECRETARY FOR IRELAND, AND HIS SEAT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. — PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT. — SIR ARTHUR IS APPOINTED TO TAKE THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY IN PORTUGAL.

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THE announcement of the "convention of Cintra" was received throughout England with the most unqualified dissatisfaction; the brilliant successes which attended the early operations of the army having excited a general expectation of their leading to a very different result. Following, likewise, so closely upon the capitulation of Baylen, the terms now granted to the French army of Portugal were quoted as offering a humiliating contrast to those imposed by the victorious Spaniards on Dupont's corps; and the refusal of the British admiral to agree to the armistice on which the convention was based, assuredly, in some measure, justified the public in presupposing that a certain degree of blame was imputable to the English generals.

The first account of the suspension of hostilities reached England as early as the 4th of September, and was communicated to our government by the

Cobbett's Parl. Deb. vol. xii. 971.

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Portugueze minister in London, who had received a copy of the armistice from the Provincial Junta of Oviedo; but it was not until the 16th of that month that Sir Hew Dalrymple's despatch, announcing both the armistice and convention, was received,—a circumstance which occasioned considerable embarrassment to the government; for the Opposition press, seizing the opportunity thus afforded of placing matters in the most unfavourable light, carried away public opinion ere the organs of the Ministry could either officially contradict or offer any thing in extenuation of the statements made by their opponents. The public assumed, therefore, that blame must exist somewhere; and meetings were held throughout the country to petition the throne to institute inquiry, and bring the delinquents to punishment.

Galled at this vexatious circumstance, the government directed Sir Hew Dalrymple to repair forthwith to England to explain his conduct. This order he received on the 28th Sept., at which time Sir Arthur Wellesley was already on his passage home, where he arrived on the 4th of October.

Immediately on landing, Sir Arthur became aware of the misconception that generally prevailed as to the part he had taken in the negotiations, in consequence of his name being affixed to the armistice; a misconception which was likely to be confirmed in the public mind by an inadvertent "inaccuracy of expression" in Sir Hew Dalrymple's official despatch; for the words used by that officer might be construed to imply that Sir Arthur had been altogether the negotiator of the treaty for the suspension of arms.

On reaching London, therefore, he deemed it

necessary to explain by letter to the secretary of state, that the armistice, though bearing his name, was negotiated and settled by the commander of the army in person, and signed only by him at his excellency's desire. At the same time, he manfully stood forward to take his share of the blame which might be attached to the commander of the forces with regard to the general provisions of the convention, by expressing his concurrence with him in the opinion, that "on the 22d of August it was expedient the French army in Portugal should be allowed to evacuate that kingdom with their arms and baggage, and that every facility for this purpose should be afforded them;" since they had been allowed to resume their formidable position in front of Lisbon, and thereby to recover all the advantages they possessed previous to the battle of Vimeiro, for prolonging their resistance.

Gurwood. Despatches, London, Oct. 6.

This letter, though easing in some degree the shoulders of Sir Hew from the blame of the armistice and convention, placed a heavy weight on those of Sir Harry Burrard; since it attributed the expediency of concluding an armistice with the enemy on the 22d, to an error in judgment on his part, in not following up the victory of the day before.

In the meanwhile, from the numerous conflicting statements put forth by the press, the public excitement becoming every day more intense, his Majesty decided on causing the whole circumstances connected with the armistice and convention to be investigated by a board of general officers; and Sir Harry Burrard, and such other officers serving with the army in Portugal whose evidence was considered material to the elucidation of the subject, were forthwith ordered to return to England.

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The Board* assembled accordingly at the Royal College at Chelsea on the 14th November, and, in conformity with its instructions, proceeded "to make inquiry into the conditions of the late armistice and convention concluded in Portugal; and into all the causes and circumstances (whether arising from the previous operations of the British army or otherwise) which led to them; and into the conduct, behaviour, and proceedings of Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple, and of any other officer or officers who may have held the command of the troops in Portugal, and of any other person or persons, as far as the same were concerned with the said armistice and convention."

The occurrences which led to the armistice and convention (as far as Sir A. Wellesley was connected therewith) having already been narrated in the course of these pages from the evidence given before this Court of Inquiry, we shall abstain from entering into the dry details of its proceedings: suffice it to say, that after a most full investigation, in the course of which the three generals who had successively commanded the army in Portugal called upon numerous witnesses to support the different views and opinions expressed in their respective statements, the court, on the 22d of December, made a report to his Majesty to the following effect: —

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

"That it appears that the operations of the army under Sir Arthur Wellesley, from his landing in Mondego Bay, the 1st of August, until the conclusion of the action at

* The board of inquiry consisted of General Sir D. Dundas, K.B., president; Generals the Earl of Moira (the late Marquis of Hastings), Peter Craig, Lord Heathfield (General Elliot, the defender of Gibraltar), Lieutenant-Generals the Earl of Pembroke, K.G., Sir George Nugent, and Oliver Nicholls, members.

Vimeiro, the 21st of August, were highly honourable and successful, and such as might be expected from a distinguished general at the head of a British army of 13,000 men, augmented on the 20th and 21st to 17,000, deriving only some small aid from a Portuguese corps (1600 men), and against whom an enemy not exceeding 14,000 men in the field was opposed.

"It appears a point on which no evidence adduced can enable the board to pronounce with confidence, whether or not a pursuit after the battle of the 21st could have been efficacious; nor can the board feel competent to determine on the expediency of a forward movement to Torres Vedras, when Sir Harry Burrard has stated weighty considerations against such a measure. Further, it is to be observed that so many collateral circumstances could not be known in the moment of the enemy's repulse as afterwards became clear to the army, and have been represented to the board.

* * * * *

"It appears the convention of Cintra, in its progress and conclusion, or at least all the principal articles of it, were not objected to by the five distinguished lieut.-generals of that army; and other general officers who were on that service, whom we have had an opportunity to examine, have also concurred in the great advantages that were immediately gained to the country of Portugal, to the army and navy, and to the general service, by the conclusion of the convention at that time.

"On a consideration of all the circumstances, as set forth in this report, we must humbly submit our opinion that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject; because, however some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the convention in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieut.-Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well, &c."

This report seemed studiously worded to avoid giving any opinion at all on the points for the consideration of which the Board had been more especially convened; namely, the expediency of concluding the armistice and convention. But it put forth a manifest absurdity in regard to the pursuit

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of the enemy after the action of Vimeiro; for, if the Board approved of all Sir Arthur Wellesley's proceedings up to the close of that battle, how could it consistently maintain that the troops which had been marched forward from the Mondego expressly to bring the enemy to action, should not be allowed to follow up that enemy after he had sustained a signal defeat? It could not for one moment be supposed that the French general (considering the highly defensible country in his rear) would have been so rash as to become the assailant before he had collected all his disposable force, particularly as a period of three weeks had elapsed since he heard of the landing of the English. That the enemy had, therefore, brought all his available troops into the field, is a conclusion that every one must have drawn, even without a tittle of evidence being necessary to support it. But, in point of fact, the statement made by Sir Arthur to the board on this subject did not rest on any of the "collateral circumstances which afterwards became clear to the army:" his eye had been accustomed to estimate the strength of armies in the field; and though, from the peculiar nature of the ground, he rather *under-rated* the force of the enemy at Vimeiro*, he nevertheless was well aware that all their disposable means had been brought against him, and that Junot had staked Portugal on the issue of that day's contest. This was his opinion *at the time;* and it received confirmation from the French commander's immediate proposal to evacuate the country, after being foiled in his attempt to "drive the English into the sea."

* Sir Arthur estimated the enemy's force in action at Vimeiro at 14,000 men, including 1300 cavalry.

It was likewise the opinion of all the general officers examined by the Board, who were present at Vimeiro (excepting only Sir Harry Burrard), that had the enemy been closely followed up, they would not have been able to cross the Tagus; and though it is most true that Junot's despair of being able to prolong the contest with any chance of success came only to be known after negotiations had been entered into, yet if a victorious general is to refrain from pursuing a beaten enemy until the evidence of his own eyes receives corroboration by his adversary's admission of defeat, how can he ever reap the full fruits of victory?

The "weighty considerations" stated by Sir Harry Burrard "against the forward movement to Torres Vedras" were based on error, — the consequence, chiefly, of a want of knowledge of the country which was the scene of operations. For the superiority of the enemy in cavalry, whereon, in his opinion, the principal objection to the pursuit of their broken columns rested, had availed them little in the action itself, and would have been of still less service to them afterwards, the ground between the field of battle and Torres Vedras being steeply broken, much intersected, and partially wooded, and in fact in every way unfavourable to the employment of that arm in large bodies, and in large bodies only could it have arrested the eager pursuit of the British infantry. Moreover, the enemy's horse was scattered about the wide field of battle in small detachments; and in so wooded a country much time would have been required to collect it so as to act with effect in checking the English right wing, to keep open their line of retreat; and

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while so employed their own right wing would have been exposed to certain destruction.

The doubt implied by Sir Harry Burrard (and apparently entertained by the Board of Inquiry), whether the right of the British army was actually nearer to Torres Vedras than the enemy's left, was equally without any good foundation.

That Sir Hew Dalrymple did not apprehend danger, nor contemplate insuperable difficulties from a forward movement, was clearly proved by his ordering the army to advance on the 23d; though he fell into error in supposing that by the line of operations Sir Arthur Wellesley adopted, all the strong positions had been left in the hands of the enemy, the contrary being the fact; and furthermore, had Sir Arthur on landing taken the high road to Lisbon by Santarem (as Sir Hew thought he ought to have done), he must not only have weakened his force to be brought against the enemy in the field, in order to keep open his communication with the Mondego, (which, after all, the enemy's cavalry would have broken in upon), but he would have experienced much difficulty, or a considerable delay, in receiving the reinforcements under Generals Anstruther and Acland. Nor is it by any means clear that while the British were advancing towards Lisbon by way of Santarem, the French, screened by the impassable Serra de Monte Junto, might not have made a push to the northward by Alcoentre, and fallen upon our communications at Leyria, (perhaps even upon Sir J. Moore's corps disembarking at the Mondego); and thus have secured a safe retreat into Spain by Almeida, or the means of carrying on the war in the north of Portugal.

The report of the Court of Inquiry gave as little

satisfaction to his Majesty as to the English nation; and accordingly the Board was ordered to re-assemble, and give a decided opinion whether, under all the circumstances which were in evidence before them, and considering the relative situations of the two armies on the 22d and 31st of August respectively, they thought the armistice and convention advisable; and if so, whether the terms on each occasion were such as ought to have been agreed upon.

The Board met accordingly on the 27th of December, when it was agreed that each member should give his opinion in writing on the two points to which their attention was especially directed. The Earl of Moira alone condemned the armistice; but the same nobleman, the Earl of Pembroke, and Lt.-General Nicholls disapproved of the convention. The former expressed his opinion at some length, stating that though an armistice, simply for a short suspension of arms, might not have been objectionable, yet the terms granted were such as established the whole principle of the after convention, to which he strongly objected both on military and political grounds.

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

As this very objection to the armistice had been offered by Sir Arthur Wellesley when it was originally proposed, he having expressed his opinion to Sir Hew Dalrymple that the negotiation should not be allowed "to extend to other objects than the mere suspension of hostilities," the opinion of the Board must be considered as *unanimously approving* of the part he had taken in regard to the armistice; and with respect to the convention, though it can scarcely be questioned that the French would have submitted to more humiliating terms had a higher

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tone been assumed at the commencement of the negotiations, that less difficulty would have been experienced in carrying the treaty into effect had such been the case, and that an error was committed in making stipulations for other parties (the Spaniards and Portugueze), who not having been consulted, might have seriously embarrassed the British commander by refusing to fulfil the agreements to which he stood pledged; yet, considering the convention as a purely military transaction, it must be admitted that, on a view of the posture of affairs on the 22d August, the French army had a right to claim to be allowed to withdraw from the country. The enemy had been suffered to re-occupy formidable positions between our army and Lisbon, and had the means of retiring upon others in front of that city; they might have destroyed the Russian ships and been joined by 6000 men of that nation; they possessed the power of retreating either upon Elvas or Almeida, where they might have held out until reinforcements could reach them; and lastly, if driven to desperation, they might have destroyed Lisbon, and thereby inflicted a degree of misery on the Portugueze nation not to be put in comparison with the injury done by carrying off the riches of her churches and monasteries. Nevertheless, had Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice been followed, by insisting that the French should cross immediately to the left bank of the Tagus, much even, if not all, of their sacrilegious plunder must necessarily have been "disgorged;" and if the Portugueze could have recovered their church-plate and candlesticks, they would have expressed but slight dissatisfaction at those articles of the convention which seemed to trench

upon their political rights and national independence. CHAP. XVII.

In fine, the results of the convention of Cintra were, that 25,000 French troops, having a retreat open to them, were quietly ejected from Portugal by a force scarcely superior in amount; that the capital was saved from impending destruction; the fortresses of the kingdom were given up without the loss of time and life, which their forcible reduction would have occasioned; 6000 Spanish troops were released from prison to join their countrymen in arms; a Russian squadron was placed in our hands, thereby releasing our fleet from a tedious and precarious blockade; and both our fleet and army were rendered available for immediate service elsewhere; and it is a consideration which must not be lost sight of, that the delay of a few months in effecting the deliverance of Portugal might have been attended with most fatal consequences. 1808.

The opinion expressed by the majority of the Board of Inquiry seems to have been formed solely on a consideration of the military merits of the case as we have given them, and was not in accordance with that of his Majesty, who very justly considered that the unauthorized admission into military conventions of articles directly affecting the interests and feelings of the natives of the seat of war, was likely to be attended with much danger, and might, when incautiously framed, lead to the most injurious consequences; and although admitting that no further military proceeding was necessary, his Majesty now repeated the disapprobation which had already been expressed at Sir Hew Dalrymple's conduct when the treaties were first laid before him.

Letter to H. R. H. the Com-in-Chief. Jan. 18. 1809.

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Although censure thus fell solely upon Sir Hew Dalrymple, and that certainly upon points which in no way affected his military reputation, yet the opinion of the Board of Inquiry was generally supposed to convey an indirect censure upon Sir Arthur Wellesley; for it was argued, if Sir Harry Burrard was justified, under all circumstances, in ordering the army to halt and await the arrival of reinforcements, the inference is, that his predecessor in the command must have advanced with inadequate means against the enemy. Sir Arthur was soon, however, afforded an opportunity of clearing his reputation from this stigma: a motion having been made in the House of Commons by Lord Henry Petty to the effect, "that the convention of Cintra had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country, the causes of which appear to have arisen from the misconduct of his Majesty's ministers," Sir Arthur, in an able speech delivered on this occasion, completely removed the erroneous impression which had gone abroad, of his having rashly commenced operations in Portugal, with the hope of gaining all the credit of expelling the enemy from that country before the officers appointed to supersede him could arrive.

Annual Register, 1809.

Cobbett's Parl. Deb. vol. xii. 928.

During the debate which took place on this occasion, Mr. Canning paid a well-turned compliment to the gallant general; declaring that the only accusation which could be brought against him was "that of *having excited those proud hopes* which were afterwards unfortunately disappointed."

Ibid. vol. xii. p. 970.

On Sir Arthur's return to England, he had resumed the duties of chief secretary for Ireland, that office having been kept open for him at the express request of his ever-firm friend, the Duke of

Richmond*, then lord-lieutenant; and on the termination of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry he repaired to Dublin. But Parliament having re-assembled early in January he returned to London; and on the 29th of that month, being in his place in the House of Commons, the speaker communicated to him the thanks of the House for the distinguished services he had rendered in Portugal in the most gratifying terms; prefacing his speech by observing, that "amidst the contending opinions which prevailed upon other questions, the public voice had been loud and general in admiration of his splendid achievements."

A similarly flattering acknowledgment of his services was communicated to him in a resolution of the House of Lords, as well as to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the army, who had so nobly seconded him.

In the course of the session, Sir Arthur distinguished himself by the delivery of several able speeches in defence of the reputation of H. R. H. the Duke of York, at that time a butt to the malignant assaults of a most unprincipled political faction.

In one of Sir Arthur's speeches on this subject, he bore the following handsome testimony to the conduct of the traduced prince, in his capacity of commander-in-chief of the army: —

"There was still one topic, on which he would be to blame if he did not say a few words; he alluded to the state of the army under his (Sir Arthur's) command last summer. He must say, that never was there an army in

Cobbett's Parl. Deb. vol. xii. 189.

* Charles Lennox, fourth Duke of Richmond, whose death, under very distressing circumstances, in Canada, in 1819, deprived that country of one of the most enlightened governors that ever directed its affairs.

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a better state, as far as depended on the commander-in-chief; and he must further declare, that if the army had not performed the service for which it was destined, the blame would not have rested with the commander-in-chief, but with him; and whatever enthusiasm his troops had felt, was the result of the example and discipline afforded by the illustrious person at the head of the army."

As secretary for Ireland, Sir Arthur necessarily took part in the debates relating to the affairs of that country, and in the course of the session brought forward several measures tending to confer lasting benefit upon his native land. Amongst others, "a bill to amend and reduce into one the several acts for raising and training the militia of Ireland;" and "an act for the further extension of inland navigation" in that country. But the military operations in the Peninsula since his departure having been attended with unfortunate results, public opinion pointed out the victor of Vimeiro as the fittest person to restore the lustre of the British arms; and accordingly, resigning the post of secretary for Ireland, and his seat in the House of Commons, Sir Arthur prepared again to assume the command of the army in Portugal.

It will be necessary, ere proceeding with the narrative of the victorious career of our Great Captain, to describe the general features of the military operations which had taken place from the time of his leaving Portugal until he resumed the command in that country; for the unfortunate issue of the winter campaign of 1808-9 had rendered the deliverance of the Peninsula from the yoke of France a far more problematical event, than when Sir Arthur first landed at the Mondego.

CHAPTER XVIII.

STATE OF SPAIN AFTER THE EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH. — FORMATION OF THE SUPREME JUNTA OF GOVERNMENT, — POSITIONS OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH FORCES. — COMMENCEMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. — NAPOLEON PLACES HIMSELF AT THE HEAD OF HIS ARMY. — THE SPANIARDS ARE DEFEATED AT ESPINOSA, BURGOS, AND TUDELA. — AN ENGLISH ARMY ADVANCES INTO SPAIN FROM PORTUGAL UNDER SIR JOHN MOORE, AND A CORPS LANDS AT CORUÑA UNDER SIR DAVID BAIRD. — SIR JOHN MOORE REACHES SALAMANCA. — PERPLEXITIES AND HESITATION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER. — HE AT LENGTH CONCENTRATES HIS ARMY, AND ADVANCES AGAINST MARSHAL SOULT. — REACHES SAHAGUN. BUT RETIRES ON HEARING OF THE MARCH OF NAPOLEON FROM MADRID. — RETREAT OF THE ENGLISH TO CORUÑA.

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THE capitulation of Baylen and convention of Cintra cleared nine tenths of the Peninsula of its invaders; but the want of a supreme government, and of permanency in the command of the British army in Portugal, caused the happy moment for profiting by this state of affairs to be lost.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had written to Lord Castlereagh immediately after the convention of Cintra, "If I were in Sir Hew Dalrymple's situation, I would have 20,000 men at Madrid in less than a month;" and it was Napoleon's opinion that a British force of double that amount at Espinosa (Nov. 10th) "might have balanced the fortune of war." Had the bold step of moving upon the Spanish capital been taken, much good might undoubtedly have been effected: a government could have been formed there, which, supplied with funds and otherwise countenanced by Great Britain,

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Sept. 1.

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would at once have been acknowledged as supreme by the different provincial juntas of the kingdom; and the Spanish armies might then have been properly armed, disciplined, and organized,—have been placed in positions where they might have been of use, and under generals who could be trusted with the command of them.

Unfortunately, however, the Spaniards were left to manage their own affairs at this important juncture, and a valuable time was consequently lost in the squabbles of the provincial assemblies for authority, and in their disputes about forms of government. Their armies meanwhile remained in the most deplorable want of every necessary to render them effective, and under the command of officers whose sole merit was their political influence. Nor did the mischief end there; for each junta considered the army raised within the limits of its jurisdiction, as placed under its exclusive control and as destined for its particular protection. As little concert, therefore, could be expected in their plans for resisting the common enemy, as dependence placed on their troops when brought into the field; and, considering the state of destitution in which the Spanish armies were suffered to remain, it speaks highly for the patriotism of the people that men were to be found willing to join their ranks.

The French meanwhile held their ground behind the Ebro, still retaining possession of the greater part of Biscay and Navarre, and portions of Aragon and Catalonia. Their force, at this period, amounted to about 60,000 men, and was daily receiving reinforcements.

At length, after upwards of two months had

been lost in deciding upon the description of government best suited to the times, a central junta, composed of delegates from the different provincial assemblies, was installed at Aranjuez; of which Count Florida Blanca was elected president. The deputies who composed this supreme junta of government, though generally upright, honourable men, had no knowledge of each other, but little of the world, and still less of the duties principally required of them. They were also, for the most part, hampered with instructions by those who sent them, and thus were called upon to overlook the general good in watching local interests. Instead of occupying themselves in correcting the abuses and drawing out the resources of the country, their time was engaged in issuing proclamations, stating that the fate of Europe depended upon their energy; and whilst their armies remained half-clothed, badly armed, ill-fed, and unpaid, they were enacting laws to benefit the ex-Jesuits, and establishing tribunals for the trial of persons accused of treason. Sep. 26.

The Spanish armies, at the commencement of October, amounted nominally to 130,000 men. They occupied different segments of an extensive semicircle drawn round the French. Thus the Galician army, under General Blake, was on the extreme left, extending from Bilbao towards Burgos, where the Conde de Belveder took post with the army of Estremadura; a wide interval occurred between this army and that of the centre (Andalusia,) under Castaños, the head-quarters of which were at Soria; and on the right, in advance of Zaragoza, were the united bands of Valencia and Aragon. A fifth army was blockading Barcelona, and a

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body of 10,000 men was kept in reserve at Madrid. An English force was momentarily expected to enter the field on the side of Old Castile to co-operate with the armies of Galicia and Estremadura; but the advantages recently gained over the enemy—their repulse from Valencia, the successful resistance offered to them at Zaragoza, and, above all, the failure of Dupont in Andalusia — had raised the national vanity so much beyond even its ordinary level, and engendered so presumptuous a confidence on the part of the Spanish leaders, that it was considered a waste of time to wait for further assistance, and they commenced their operations accordingly.

The dread entertained by the government of giving itself a master, as well as the mutual jealousies of the generals themselves, prevented the appointment of a commander-in-chief to the armies; but, to supply this want, Don Francisco Palafox was sent to them as the representative of the Supreme Junta, with power to control their operations; and in conformity with his instructions, he repaired to the head-quarters of the veteran Castaños, who being the only one of the Spanish generals then at the head of an army, that did not partake of the general self-confidence, it was considered might require urging over the precipice that awaited them.

The disasters of their armies began with that of Blake, — their best; for in it were embodied the veteran troops of Romana, lately returned from the Baltic.* This general commenced operations

* This corps, which, to get it out of the way of learning what was passing in Spain, Napoleon had sent to the north of Europe, succeeded, by the aid of the English fleet in the Baltic, in effecting its escape from Denmark, and returned to its native land in October, 1808.

towards the end of October; but foiled in an attempt to get in rear of the enemy's right, and cut them off from the great road to Bayonne, he was obliged to abandon Bilbao. Again resuming the offensive in the mountains of Biscay, after some hard fighting he sustained a signal defeat at Espinosa, on the 10th of November. He attempted to collect his scattered forces and make another stand at Reynosa to cover his principal magazines; but the forces moving against him were too powerful to be withstood, and his army dispersed in all directions without waiting the attack. This premature defeat of Blake's army somewhat disconcerted the projects of Napoleon, whose intention had been to allow it to penetrate so far in rear of the French army as to insure its being completely cut off.

The French Emperor, on learning the reverses experienced by his troops in the Peninsula, determined to pour across the Pyrenees all the forces he could spare from France, Italy, and Germany, take the command of them himself, and effect its entire subjugation. Three corps of the grand army, placed under the orders of Marshal Lefebvre, were accordingly despatched to enter Spain on the side of Navarre; whilst another corps, under General St. Cyr, penetrated by the Eastern Pyrenees into Catalonia; and orders were sent to the different ports, directing Junot's corps to take the shortest route to Bayonne the moment it landed from the English vessels transporting it from Portugal.

Mém. sur les Op. Mil. des Fran. 1808-9, p. 12.

By these arrangements, before the end of October, the French army on the Ebro amounted to 150,000 men. Napoleon himself arrived at Vittoria

Ibid. p. 12.

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to assume the command on the 5th of November, and expressed some displeasure at his projects having been thwarted by the first check given to Blake. The plan he now adopted was to pierce the centre of the Spanish line, isolate the two wings, and then fall with overwhelming numbers on the left, and force it back upon the sea. In conformity with this project, Soult advanced on Burgos with the 2d corps, completely routed Count Belveder's army in the neighbourhood of that city on the 10th, and pushed on towards Reynosa to cut off Blake's retreat. As we have before stated, that general, pursued by Marshal Lefebvre, who had defeated him at Espinosa on the 10th, did not wait to be attacked by the superior forces now brought against him; and Soult, sending a division of his corps to occupy Santander, scoured the eastern mountains of the Asturias with the rest of his forces, and then took post behind the Carrion.

The day following the defeat of the Estremaduran army at Burgos, a large body of the enemy's cavalry had been pushed on towards Valladolid; it being currently reported that an English force had reached that city. Having, however, satisfactorily ascertained that no English troops were within a week's march of it, Napoleon (whose head quarters were moved to Burgos on the 12th) calculated that if the same presumptuous confidence which had directed the operations of the Spanish armies of the left, guided the councils of those yet remaining intact, he should have ample time to effect their destruction before the looked-for English auxiliaries could take part in the conflict. Fortune singularly favoured him; for not only

were the armies of Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia collected in one body to be destroyed at one blow, but the prudence of the general at their head was neutralized by the rashness of the representative sent by the Central Junta to control him.

The force assembled under Castaños amounted to about 40,000 effective, that is to say, armed men; and had taken post at Calahorra, ready to act upon the communications of the French if they advanced on Madrid. Napoleon directed Marshal Lannes, with a corps of 30,000 men, to advance directly against this force along the right bank of the Ebro; whilst Ney, with the 6th corps, moved from Burgos by way of Soria to gain its left flank and rear.

Castaños, penetrating the design of the enemy, fell back on the 22d to Tudela; and unwilling to engage his inexperienced troops in a general action, and especially in an open field, purposed to continue retiring as the enemy advanced, and so, by drawing them to the south, give time for the English to enter the field, — but Palafox insisted upon fighting. On the morrow, therefore, they accepted battle; the Spanish centre was pierced; and Palafox, who has taken post with the Aragonese on the right, was amongst the first of the fugitives. The troops of Andalusia, forming the left wing of Castaños' army, offered an unavailing resistance; and, after behaving with great steadiness throughout the day, retreated from the field in good order; but during the night, they also were seized with a panic, and fled with disgraceful precipitation. The small number of fugitives of this wing who could be kept together, reached

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Calatayud on the night of the 25th; the right wing and centre fled for refuge to Zaragoza. If Ney had not stopped to pillage Soria, the destruction of this army would have been complete.

Mém. sur Op. 180. 89, p. 16.

On the 22d of November Napoleon left Burgos with his guards, and on the following day reached Aranda de Duero. He waited at this place until he heard of the successful result of Lannes' operations; and then, relieved from all fear of interruption on his flanks and communications, and joined by the 1st and 4th corps of his army, pushed on towards the Spanish capital.

The French Emperor seems to have imagined that Madrid had been fixed on as the point of concentration for the English army, now advancing by three widely separated routes to the assistance of the Spaniards, and, doubtless, calculated that they were not so near at hand as events soon proved them to be; otherwise, having nothing further to apprehend from the Spanish armies, he would have considered it more advantageous to attack our scattered divisions in detail, than to give them time to concentrate whilst he advanced against Madrid: for the English once defeated, he well knew that city would be too dispirited to offer resistance.

We must now go back for a short period to follow the movements of the British army.

As soon as the evacuation of Portugal by the French army had been effected, the British commander in that country (in pursuance of directions from the English government) began to make preparations for despatching a portion of his force into Spain; but not until the 6th of October did final instructions reach him on this head, when or-

ders were received appointing Lieut.-General Sir John Moore to the command of the troops destined "to co-operate with the Spanish armies in the expulsion of the French from that kingdom;" and he was apprized that the force placed under his orders for this service was to consist of 21,000 men of the army in Portugal, and a corps of 13,000 men under Lieut.-General Sir David Baird, which was to be landed at Coruña.

The general whom the government had thus selected to command the British troops destined to co-operate with the Spanish armies, enjoyed the reputation of a gallant soldier and excellent officer—a man of cool courage in the moment of danger, of sound judgment in times of difficulty; and this reputation had been earned during a long series of meritorious services in Corsica, the West Indies, Holland, Egypt, and Sicily. By the army Sir John Moore's merits as a tactician and disciplinarian were considered of the first order; but hitherto no opportunity had been afforded for the display of his talents in directing the operations of an army in the field; and some, who were aware of his peculiar frame of mind, were by no means so sanguine of his success as those who judged of his qualifications for command merely from the good service he had done as a general of brigade. Sir John Moore was constitutionally of a desponding nature, had a great dread of responsibility, and entertained a high opinion of the talents of the French generals of the revolution; and it may be fairly questioned whether such characteristics were suited to the commander of the army, under the difficult circumstances in which it was now called upon to act. Unfortunately too these feelings were likely to be more fully

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developed on the present occasion, from an impression on the general's mind that he was acting under an administration which had no very friendly feeling towards him.*

The instructions with which Sir John Moore was furnished recommended him to consult the Spanish generals, and arrange with them the plan of campaign to be adopted; leaving it with him to decide, from what they might conjointly resolve, whether the whole of the troops proceeding from Portugal should enter Spain by land, or whether the artillery and infantry—altogether or in part—should be sent to the north coast of the Peninsula by sea. At the same time they pointedly forbade "his force being partially committed with the enemy."

Sir John Moore very wisely determined not to risk any portion of his force by sea at that boisterous season of the year; but he fell into the unaccountable error of dividing his army, and marching it into Spain by four different routes, sending the whole of his cavalry and all his artillery (excepting a brigade of light guns) by one which made a circuit through the heart of the Peninsula. Had this been done to expedite the march of his army across the mountain barrier which divides Portugal from Spain and bring it sooner into action, some excuse might be found for this wide dislocation of his force; but no such reason existed. For though his three columns of infantry were directed so as to form a junction at Ciudad Rodrigo, yet they could not undertake any operation until joined by

* In consequence of the unsatisfactory result of the expedition to Sweden, with the command of which Sir J. Moore had been entrusted.

the cavalry and artillery, sent (under General Hope) round by Talavera and Madrid; and as a brigade of infantry necessarily accompanied this column to serve as an escort to the guns, neither the cavalry nor artillery could advance beyond a foot pace.

Sir J. Moore to Lord Castlereagh. Oct. 27.

The British commander, in accounting for this division of his force, stated that all the roads leading out of Portugal, excepting that by Elvas, were reported to be impracticable for artillery, both by the Portugueze themselves and by the English officers sent to examine them. But this excuse, whilst casting blame on the officers of his staff, does not exculpate the general himself; for he ought surely to have known that Junot, at a far more inclement season of the year, had entered Portugal with his entire army, by way of Alcantara, Castel Branco, and Abrantes; and also, that Loison's corps had marched to and fro with guns and cavalry between Lisbon and Almeida. This primary error of separating his infantry from his artillery and cavalry, caused the failure of the campaign.

Sir J. Moore to Lord Castlereagh. Oct. 9.

From the neglect of the generals who had commanded the army in Portugal since the convention of Cintra, in forming magazines upon the different roads and collecting the means of transport, it was eight days from the time of receiving his orders before Sir John Moore was able to move forward any portion of the force placed under his command; but by dint of great exertion the major part of his troops were in motion by the 18th October. Notwithstanding, however, that the infantry marched by three different routes, thereby facilitating the issue of supplies and affording conveniences in other respects, yet no portion of it reached Salamanca until the 13th November; thus employing at least

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eight days more than Junot's army—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—had taken to march from the same place to Lisbon by *one* road, in the most inclement weather, and partly through an enemy's country.*

It may be said, in excuse for this dilatoriness, that since the infantry could not act until the cavalry and artillery, moving by a more circuitous route, had effected their junction, there was no occasion to press the march of the former; but this only renders more apparent the error of sending them by different roads.

Sir John Moore himself left Lisbon on the 27th of October, and with his advanced guard reached Salamanca on the 13th of November. There he heard of the defeat of the army of Estremadura, an event which the utmost celerity on his part could not have prevented; though, had the proper dispositions for the march of his army from Portugal been made before he was appointed to the command of it, and had the Spanish authorities of Galicia not thrown impediments in the way of the landing of Sir David Baird's corps, great blame would certainly have rested with the commander of the British forces, if they had not been all collected and brought into line with the Spaniards, before the conflict began.

The news of the defeat of the Spanish army at Burgos was quickly followed by intelligence that the French were in possession of Valladolid, distant only twenty leagues from Salamanca. Sir John Moore at first thought of falling back upon Ciudad Rodrigo; but this latter piece of information natu-

* Junot's army marched from Salamanca to Lisbon, by Alcantara, in nineeen days, including a delay of two at the passage of the Zezere.

rally awakened great anxiety for General Hope's corps, which was not expected to reach Arevalo until the 25th of the month. He decided therefore on halting the different divisions of his infantry at Salamanca as they came up, and on remaining there as long as possible, to afford what protection he could to his cavalry and artillery during their flank march to join him. Shortly afterwards he ascertained that, though the enemy's cavalry had been at Valladolid, none of their infantry had yet passed Burgos. This intelligence quieted in some degree his apprehensions of being attacked before all the widely separated corps of his army would be collected; but from the general tenour of his correspondence at this period, it was evidently his settled opinion that there was no chance of successfully resisting the force brought against Spain, and that reverses must be expected.

Meanwhile the arrival of Sir David Baird's corps on the scene of action had been unfortunately retarded through the wish of the Junta of Galicia to send it to the Asturias. The fleet which conveyed it to Coruña reached that port on the 13th of October; but none of the troops were allowed to land until an order to that effect was obtained from the central government. This was not procured until the 22d; and the extraordinary difficulty experienced in procuring mules, and in making other commissariat arrangements, occasioned a further delay of six days, so that no part of Sir David's corps could be put in motion before the 28th. It then marched off by brigades, as quickly as the means of transport could be procured; but not until the middle of November did the advanced guard reach Astorga. On his way from Coruña, Sir David heard

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of the defeat of the armies of both Blake and Belveder; and two days after his arrival at Astorga, he was informed that parties of French cavalry were scouring the level country in his front to the very gates of Benavente. He determined, therefore, not to advance beyond Astorga until the whole of his corps was collected; and this, it was calculated, could not be effected before the 4th of December.

Thus, whilst Baird was slowly closing up his long column at Astorga, and Hope was assembling his corps in the vicinity of Madrid, Moore, who by the 24th of November had at length collected all the troops which marched through the north of Portugal — 13,000 infantry, a brigade of light guns, but not a single troop of dragoons,—remained paralyzed at Salamanca. He could not advance into the level country in his front, for the want of cavalry and artillery; he could not move to his left to join Baird, without exposing Hope's column to destruction; nor to his right to join Hope, without incurring the risk of being altogether separated from Baird. Not having either a cavalry post or a Spanish picket between his corps and the enemy, he knew not when he might be attacked if he remained where he was; and he could not fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo, as he felt disposed to do, lest, by abandoning Salamanca, he should give the enemy possession of the only road by which Hope could retreat into Portugal; for as soon as that general crossed the Guadarrama mountains, he could no longer calculate on preserving the circuitous communication by which he had advanced from that country.

Such was the hazardous position of the three English corps at the moment that Napoleon, having effected the destruction of the last Spanish army,

was preparing to move forward from Burgos with an overwhelming force. Had the prudent counsel of Castaños been followed, the British army, notwithstanding the defeat of Blake and Belveder's corps, and its own dilatory, ill-concerted movements, might still have been concentrated in time to render some assistance to the Spaniards; but the rash resolve of Palafox to receive battle in the plains of Tudela placed it in a situation of extreme peril, since the destruction of the collected bands of Andalusia, Valencia, and Aragon freed Napoleon from all fear for his flanks and communications, and thus placed a vast accession of means at his disposal, wherewith to fall upon and crush the scattered English corps in detail. Fortunately, the French emperor's sources of information were yet worse than those of the British commander; and instead of marching rapidly on Salamanca, he took the road to Madrid.

The disastrous news of Castaños' defeat, reached Sir John Moore on the 28th of November, and decided him to retreat as quickly as possible into Portugal. He wrote therefore to General Hope, who had crossed to the north side of the Guadarrama mountains on the previous day, to press the march of his corps by Peñaranda and Alba de Tormes, to join him either at Salamanca or Ciudad Rodrigo, according to circumstances; and deeming the junction of Sir David Baird's corps with his own now "quite impracticable," ordered that officer to fall back upon Coruña, embark there, and proceed to the Tagus. He wrote also to Lord Castlereagh (to whom he had already expressed his opinion that "if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be in vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal"), stating

Sir J. Moore to Lord Castlereagh. Nov. 29.

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that "if landed at Cadiz, he thought the British army might still be useful, if the Spaniards got an able man at their head and were able to collect in the south."

Sir J. Moore to Mr. Frere. Nov. 27.

Sir John Moore, anticipating the defeat of Castaños, had written to Mr. Frere*, soon after his arrival at Salamanca, to ask his opinion of the course to be pursued in the event of the occurrence of that disaster: "whether he should fall back upon Portugal," or "march upon Madrid and throw himself into the heart of Spain, and thus run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish nation."

Mr. Frere to Sir J. Moore. Aranjuez, Nov. 30.

Mr. Frere's answer did not reach the general until some days after his orders had been sent to Baird to retreat, — a measure which above all others the minister deprecated. He thought also that should a retreat eventually become necessary, the whole army ought to fall back upon the mountainous country about Astorga. The firm resolution expressed by the inhabitants of Madrid to defend their city to the last, induced Mr. Frere, however, to urge Sir John Moore to advance as speedily as possible to cover the capital.

Perhaps, had the British commander decided on this measure when he first arrived at Salamanca, a different turn might have been given to the campaign. If, directing General Hope to move at once upon Madrid, he had marched his body of infantry towards the same point by Peñaranda and Avila, the mountains which cover the capital to the north might have been gained before the enemy had forced the passes; and there, joined by the Spanish army left for their defence, the remains of

* Mr. Frere had recently been appointed British minister to the Spanish government.

those of Estremadura and Andalusia might have been rallied, and a respectable force been thus assembled to make head against the French; and if the risk of leaving Sir David Baird's corps to follow this movement was too great (though on reaching Salamanca it would have had the road to Ciudad Rodrigo open to retreat by if hard pressed), it might have been directed to form a junction with the Spanish army collecting in the vicinity of Leon, keeping its retreat open on Coruña.

Sir John Moore's own corps ran no danger of losing its communications in the progress of these operations; for on gaining the valley of the Tagus, retreat was open to it either by way of Badajos on Lisbon, or by Merida on Seville; and on reaching Madrid it would have secured a far more eligible line of operations than even the one by which it was communicating with Portugal, namely, that based on Cadiz and Gibraltar. A project of this kind seems to have suggested itself to Sir John Moore before he heard of Castaños' defeat; but the distance of Baird's corps on his left, and the want of cavalry and artillery with his own, were insuperable objections, in his opinion, to undertaking such a movement at that time; and now it was decidedly too late, the French having forced the pass of Somosierra on the 30th of November, and being in full march on Madrid.

The receipt of Mr. Frere's letter (written after he had heard of the loss of the battle of Tudela) made no alteration in Sir J. Moore's plans, he having already decided on remaining at Salamanca to afford time for General Hope's corps to effect its junction; and that general's corps having

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reached Alba de Tormes (distant but four leagues from Salamanca) on the 4th of December, its junction might be considered secure. Every preparation was accordingly made for the retreat of the army to Ciudad Rodrigo; but on the morrow, the British commander-in-chief hesitated, in consequence of "finding that considerable hopes were entertained from the enthusiastic manner in which the people of Madrid resist the French."* He wrote therefore to Baird, directing him to suspend his retreat to Coruña, and signified his intention of remaining at Salamanca until he heard further, "when he should be guided by circumstances." On the following day he gained more confidence, and Baird was ordered to return to Astorga; and soon after a communication was opened with Romana, with a view of obtaining his co-operation in a forward movement.

Sir J. Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Dec. 5.

Dec. 6.

The information which led Sir John Moore thus to alter his plans came to him through various channels. It was communicated by the civil and military juntas of Madrid, by the Duke del Infantado, and by the British minister, who sent his letters by one† who, he explained, could, as an eye-

* He should have said, *were described as preparing to resist.*

† Colonel de Charmilly, a French refugee, holding a commission in the English service.

We are aware that it is the opinion of the army generally, that the interference of Mr. Frere in this matter was very reprehensible, and that his remonstrances led Sir J. Moore, in a great measure, into the difficulties which afterwards encompassed him. We are bound to confess that we can coincide in this opinion so far only, as to think that Mr. Frere's zeal for the public service led him to pass the bounds of his duty; that the style of his correspondence was too dictatorial; the furnishing Col. de Charmilly with instructions, which in a measure made him the judge of Sir J. Moore's actions, most injudicious; and the proposal of having that officer examined before a council of war, (though certainly intended solely to relieve the commander of the army from responsibility) both derogatory to Sir John Moore and repugnant to the feelings of the whole army. But it is quite clear that Mr. Frere's

witness, describe the state of the capital. By all the British commander was urged either to march immediately on Madrid and join the armies of Castaños and San Juan, or to fall upon the rear of the French army and cause a diversion in favour of the capital.

But the British general, though he had been joined by Hope's corps since the 4th, and believed up to the 9th that Madrid continued to hold out, nevertheless still remained inactive at Salamanca until the 13th of December. The truth is, Baird had commenced his retreat immediately on the receipt of Sir John Moore's letter of the 28th Nov.

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interference had no influence on Sir John Moore's operations; for on the 10th of December the general wrote to Lord Castlereagh, —"There is, however, a chance; and whilst there is that, I think myself bound to run all risks to support it. I am now differently situated from what I was when Castaños was defeated. I have been joined by General Hope, the artillery, and all the cavalry; and my junction with Sir D. Baird is secure. . . . Madrid, though it has capitulated, must still engage a considerable part of the enemy's force. Saragossa is also a considerable diversion; and the collections forming in the south cannot be neglected: all his force cannot thus be directed against me."

From the foregoing extract it will be seen that the accusation brought against Mr. Frere, of deceiving the general through the incorrect information he furnished, falls to the ground; for all the reasons here enumerated by Sir John Moore for his advance *actually existed*. That the information supplied by the British minister was not always good, there can be no question; but he furnished the best he could obtain, leaving Sir John Moore to judge for himself of its value; and the general should have had better means of collecting intelligence of what was going forward in his front than the minister, who, being attached to the Supreme Junta, was obliged to reside at Aranjuez, and follow the movements of that body afterwards to the south. In justice to Mr. Frere it must further be admitted that, when offering advice, he offered also to take upon himself all the responsibility of the measures be proposed. This, we admit, was stepping out of his place, and his offer was most properly declined by the officer to whom his Majesty had entrusted the command of the army, —although the minister's opinion of what the Spanish nation was capable of performing, was sufficiently proved in the end to be the correct one.

On the other hand, considering the excitement, we may almost say *provocation*, which the tone of Mr. Frere's correspondence could not but give rise to in the mind of a high-spirited officer, it is impossible to read Sir John Moore's letters in reply thereto without entertaining the highest respect and admiration for his character.

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directing him to fall back on Coruña; and some of his troops were already half way to that place before he received the order to suspend their retrograde movement: he had therefore to countermarch every regiment, and every string of mules bearing provisions for his army, between Astorga and Coruña, which necessarily occupied much time, and he was not able to reassemble his entire corps at Astorga until the 13th of December; and as Sir John Moore did not consider it safe to move forward with his own corps until Baird's was ready to advance and form a junction, nine days had been irreparably lost by his hasty determination to retreat on hearing of the loss of the battle of Tudela.*

Sir David Baird received the order to return to Astorga at Villa Franca on the 7th December; and in writing to Sir John Moore on the following day he recommended that, in the event of their being obliged to retreat, Sir John Moore should join him, and that their united forces should retire upon and defend Galicia, drawing their supplies from England; while Romana, occupying the Asturias on their left, could re-form the disorganized army of Blake; and another Spanish army might easily be raised in the country in their rear. This plan was feasible enough: the country is extremely defensible; and Coruña, Vigo, and Ferrol offered the means of pouring in supplies by one of the best roads in Spain, which runs through the heart of the province, communicating with the two first named of those ports. But independent of these latter advantages, it could hardly be supposed that the

* General Hope's corps was in a position to move forward on the 4th of December, and on that day Baird's would have been all collected at Astorga but for the counter order sent to him on the 28th of November.

most populous province of Spain was not able to furnish the means of subsisting 30,000 additional souls.*

This recommendation of Sir David Baird had probably some weight in determining Sir John Moore's plans, by diminishing his anxiety about his communication with Portugal; and accordingly, on the 13th (the British commanders being then aware that Madrid was in the hands of the enemy), the army collected at Salamanca was at last put in motion, and directed upon Valladolid, where Sir John hoped to arrive on the 15th, and to which place Baird was directed to follow him as expeditiously as possible by way of Benavente. On Dec. 14. reaching Alaejos, however, an intercepted letter from Berthier to Soult determined the British commander to change his plans, and endeavour to strike a blow on the corps of Soult, isolated on the enemy's right, before it could receive support.

The enterprize was ably conceived, but the time for carrying it into effect had already gone by; for a partial success in that quarter could now have but slight influence on the issue of the campaign; and as Sir John Moore himself was fully impressed with the idea that nothing could be done to afford the Spaniards material good, and that his ultimate retreat was inevitable, he risked by this project being cut off from Galicia, without promising himself any great result even if successful. By his

* "When this proposal was made, the question of a defence of Galicia was very different from what it became when we were marching rapidly through the country, with an enemy pressing upon our rear..... When this suggestion was offered, our strength was unimpaired, our equipments perfect, and the great body of the French was occupied with Madrid. Between the 8th of December, when the letter was penned from Villa Franca, and the 29th, when we retreated through Astorga, much might have been done to improve our situation." — *Lieut.-Colonel Sorrel's Notes on Campaign of* 1808-9, p. 42.

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present plan, however, the junction with Baird* would be sooner effected in consequence of the northerly direction given to his operations; and accordingly Sir John Moore, moving by way of Toro, on the 18th reached Castro-nuevo, within a day's march of Baird, who had arrived at Benavente on the 16th; and on the 20th the two corps continuing to advance, united at Mayorga. On the morning of that day a cavalry affair took place at Sahagun highly creditable to the British; and on the 21st the army moved forward to that place. A Spanish force of about 7000 effective men, under the Marques de la Romana, took post at the same time at Mansilla, to draw the attention of the enemy to their right.

At Sahagun information was received that the enemy continued to occupy the line of the Carrion with a corps of 16,000 men, the greater part of which was posted at Saldaña. The French force, however, far exceeded that amount; for Soult becoming apprized of the vicinity of the English by the capture of one of his cavalry posts at Rueda on the 12th, had drawn towards him the divisions of Laborde and Loison, of the 8th corps, which were in advance of Burgos, directing them to take post at Carrion.

Mém. sur les Op. Mil. en 1808-9, p. 23.

Dispositions were made to attack the enemy earyl on the 24th; and the troops had actually moved forward on the night of the 23d, when information arrived that Soult had received the reinforcements above alluded to, and that a large French army had left Madrid, and was marching northward, either

Remarks on Operations, &c., by Brig.-Gen. H. Clinton.

* The cavalry of General Baird's corps (three regiments under Lord Paget) not having left Astorga when the order to fall back on Coruña was received, were, at Sir J. Moore's request, sent from thence to join him at Salamanca, and reached Toro on the 9th of December.

to Valladolid or Salamanca, to cut the line of retreat of the British army. The attack on Soult was of course abandoned, and an expeditious retreat to Astorga decided upon.

Sir John Moore had but little time to spare; for the enemy's advanced guard of cavalry had passed Tordesillas before his rear guard had moved off from Sahagun. Fortunately the portion of the English army which fell back by way of Benavente succeeded in reaching that place before the enemy: from thence the retreat was continued rapidly; and, by still greater good fortune, the whole army arrived at Astorga before Soult, for the shortest road from Saldaña to that place, by Mansilla and Leon, had been left to the Spanish corps of Romana, which had neither destroyed the bridge on the Ezla, as was requested, nor defended the passage of the river, as was, rather unreasonably, expected.

Napoleon had carried the pass of Somosierra by a charge of cavalry on the 30th of November, and obtained possession of Madrid after a mere demonstration of resistance on the 4th of December. The intelligence he there received from all quarters led him to believe that the English army was retiring into Galicia; and fully persuaded that it would not halt until it had regained the sea, he satisfied himself with sending some troops after it as far as Avila and Segovia, on the north side of the Guadarrama mountains: nor was it until the 21st of December that he learnt how completely he had been misled by the information of his parties, and that Sir John Moore, so far from retiring, was actually marching to attack Soult. He expressed much vexation at having been thus drawn to Madrid; but lost not a day in despatching a formidable force, con-

Belmas, vol. i. p. 43.

Memoirs of Rovigo, vol. ii. pt. 2. p. 17.

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sisting of his guards, the 6th corps, part of the 1st, and a large body of cavalry, towards Benavente; hoping to reach that place before our army could fall back and recover its communications on hearing of his movements, and that he should thereby cut it off from both Portugal and Galicia.

Memoirs of Rovigo, vol. ii. pt. 2. p.17.

The French Emperor himself left Madrid on the 24th, and proceeded with all possible expedition to Benavente. The advanced guard of his cavalry reached the Ezla in front of that city, on the evening of the 28th, a few hours only after the last British troops had crossed the river. The bridge had been rendered impassable, but early on the following morning a regiment of chasseurs of the imperial guard forded the stream, and fell impetuously on the rear guard of the English army, hoping thereby to delay its retreat, until other troops could be brought up. But Napoleon's chosen squadrons were quickly repulsed, leaving their general (Lefebvre Donouettes) in the hands of our cavalry. The enemy soon, however, collected in great force, and Benavente having been abandoned, pressed forward towards Astorga without further opposition.

Napoleon set out from Benavente in pursuit, still indulging the hope that Soult's corps would have reached Astorga before the English army. After proceeding a few miles he was overtaken by a courier bearing important despatches from France. A gloom overspread his countenance as he hurriedly perused them; and with slackened speed he thoughtfully continued his journey. Another disappointment awaited him. At Astorga he was joined by Soult, who, though he had experienced little difficulty in driving Romana before him from

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Mansilla and Leon, had not succeeded in intercepting the retreat of the English.

Napoleon now made known to his army that Austria, taking advantage of his absence, had assumed a hostile attitude, and that it was necessary he should again lead his invincible legions into Germany. Ordering Soult, therefore, to continue the pursuit of the English, and placing the 2d and 6th corps, two divisions of the 8th, and a large force of cavalry under his command for that purpose, he turned back from Astorga and took the road to France, followed by the imperial guard.

At Astorga the English army fell in with that of Romana, and in the mountainous country beyond that place it was fully expected a stand would be made. The measure had been suggested by the British minister, had been pronounced practicable by Sir David Baird, and had been announced as intended to the Marquis of Romana. In fact a more defensible country than that which presents itself towards the confines of Galicia could scarcely be found anywhere. Contrary, however, to the hopes of the army, and to the general opinion of his lieutenants, the British commander ordered the retreat to be continued.

It is unnecessary for us to follow it minutely; suffice it to say on this painful subject, that from the precipitancy with which it was conducted, it became necessary to destroy large magazines of provisions and ammunition, to abandon the sick and wounded, to throw away waggon-loads of treasure, and even to sacrifice some pieces of artillery; whilst from the constant marchings by day and night, the inclemency of the weather, the difficult nature of the roads, and above all the irregularity and un-

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certainty in the supply of provisions, the reins of discipline became relaxed to a lamentable degree, and great irregularities were the consequence. The army reached Coruña in thirteen days from Astorga, including a halt of three at Lugo, where battle was offered to the enemy; being nine days less than it had taken Sir David Baird's corps to march from Coruña to Astorga when unopposed by any obstacles.

From the correspondence of Sir John Moore it is evident that he never intended making a stand in Galicia. Fully persuaded that the south of Spain was the quarter from whence alone the war could be safely conducted, he probably hoped by a rapid retreat to the sea, to be able to embark and reach Cadiz in time to save Andalusia. And so far as thinking that the south of Spain — geographically considered — was the best quarter for continuing the war, we cannot but agree with him, notwithstanding the subsequent successful defence of Portugal; for Cadiz and Gibraltar there offered two secure points of retreat, and the lofty sierras Morena and Nevada, stretching from sea to sea, and projecting into the heart of Spain on the side of La Mancha, served as a vast advanced work of those fortresses; not only adding to their means of defence, but securing to them the supplies of the fertile kingdoms of Granada, Seville, and Cordoba, as well as those furnished by our fleets. These mountains present the further advantage of being, in their whole extent, pierced by but three roads suited to military purposes, and these are far apart and divergent. And after all, Andalusia exercises greater influence over the defence of Portugal than Portugal does over that of Andalusia.

But though Sir John Moore had made up his mind so long beforehand to embark the army from Galicia, his indecision as to the particular port, once more placed it in jeopardy; for until he arrived at Lugo he had not determined whether Vigo or Coruña should be the point of embarkation. All the transports consequently remained at the former port, where they had been assembled, and whither two brigades of the army under General Craufurd had proceeded from Celada by way of Orense; but the rest of the troops now marched to Coruña, and arrived there three days before the vessels to receive them could get round from Vigo. In the meantime the French army came up, and it was necessary to fight an action to secure the embarkation.

On the battle field the British general was once again in his proper place. His dispositions to receive the enemy were skilful; his cool courage inspired perfect confidence; and victory crowned the hero with a laurel wreath, as death was writing the name of Moore on the glorious page already inscribed with those of Nelson, Wolfe, and Abercrombie.

The enemy were repulsed at all points; and Sir David Baird having been severely wounded, General Hope, on whom the command devolved, embarked the army in the course of the following night, and returned with it to England.

CHAPTER XIX.

PROSPECTS OF THE BELLIGERENTS AT THE OPENING OF THE YEAR 1809. — OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES. — INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY MARSHAL SOULT. — THE BRITISH MINISTRY DETERMINE TO REINFORCE THE ARMY AT LISBON. — SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN PORTUGAL. — POSITIONS OF THE FRENCH ARMIES. — PLAN OF OPERATIONS. — PASSAGE OF THE DOURO. — DISASTROUS FLIGHT OF MARSHAL SOULT.

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THE year 1809 opened gloomily upon Spain: the disorganized armies were flying in all directions, without a prospect of their ever again assuming an embodied form; and a fine English army, without having made an effort to assist them, was, with equal rapidity, seeking the shelter of its ships. To resist 200,000 Frenchmen, directed by their invincible emperor, seemed indeed a task beyond the patriotism of Spain and Portugal to accomplish, even when supported by all the power of the British empire; and dismay prevailed, not only throughout the Peninsula, but even amongst the most zealous advocates of her cause in our own country.

The unlooked-for departure of Napoleon to lead fresh armies into Austria improved but little the aspect of affairs. Joseph once again, seemed firmly seated on the throne of Spain. The siege of Barcelona had been raised, and Catalonia subjugated by the dispersion of the army of that province on the Lobregat; the city of Zaragoza, which had been again invested, could not be calculated upon

to offer a protracted resistance; the mountain barrier of Andalusia could be little depended on to check the invaders, when its defence was entrusted to the troops who had fled from a regiment of lancers at the pass of Somosierra; and Portugal, now nearly abandoned to her own resources, held out as slight a hope of offering an effectual resistance to the common enemy. In fine, the French emperor, giving orders to his marshals to march on Coruña, Lisbon, Cadiz, and Valencia, returned to France with the firm conviction that "the war in Spain was concluded."

But Napoleon, like the generality of our countrymen, had mistaken the character of the Spanish nation, though he differed most completely from us in his estimation of it. The French ruler conceived that the Spaniards, like other southern nations with which he was better acquainted, wanted the constancy and firmness of purpose so necessary to support them under the accumulation of miseries he had brought upon them, and thence concluded that their enthusiasm would prove but ephemeral. We, on the contrary, had, in the first instance, regarded this unlooked-for enthusiastic love of country as a manifestation of actual strength to resist their oppressors, regardless of the sadly disorganized state of the government, and the deplorable ignorance as well as absolute helplessness of the people; and it was only after the bold attempt to rally Spain against her invaders had miscarried in the miserable way we have seen, that the British ministry awoke to a sense of the reality. They then discovered that 28,000 men had been engaged in an enterprize for which three times the number would barely have sufficed; and that, in fact, to

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Further resistance seemed now, however, nearly hopeless. Our army had been withdrawn at the very moment when its services might have been turned to the best account; for, relieved from its presence, the French marshals were actively engaged in executing the parting orders of their emperor. Soult had, in pursuance of his instructions, driven the English army to its ships, and occupied himself in bringing Galicia under subjec-
Jan. 13. tion, preparatory to his invasion of Portugal; Victor, after destroying the vanguard of the Andalusian army under Venegas at Ucles, drove it, a dispirited mass of fugitives, and with the loss of its artillery, into the mountains of Murcia; Lefebvre, after chasing the Spanish army of the centre, under Gal[illegible], across the Tagus, pursued it to Truxillo, where, seized with a panic, general and soldiers fled to the Sierra Morena without waiting to be attacked; and such was the complete dispersion of this corps, that only 1000 men could be collected at Zalamea.

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta was sent by the Central Junta to supersede the imbecile Galluzo, and General Cartaojal relieved the Duque del Infantado from the command of the army of Andalusia. Fresh bands of peasants were again collected and brought into the field; but the newly-appointed

generals were not more successful in their operations than their predecessors.

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Cartaojal imprudently resumed the offensive against Sebastiani (who had succeeded Marshal Lannes); and, descending into the plains, was outmanœuvred, brought to action in a most unfavourable position at Ciudad Real, and completely routed. March 17

Cuesta, equally rash, also left the mountains in quest of Marshal Victor. He drew up his army without any judgment in the plains of Medellin; was abandoned by his horse, and sustained a most complete defeat, losing 10,000 men and all his cannon. March 28.

But though entire success thus crowned the operations of Victor and Sebastiani, and nothing but a mere rabble could now be collected to dispute the passage of the Sierra Morena, yet the fate of Dupont seems to have rendered both those generals timid in following up their victories. Indeed, the force under the command of neither of them exceeded in amount that of the corps which had been compelled to surrender at Baylen; and thus the retreat of the English army into Galicia, by drawing after it so large a portion of the French force, had certainly been attended with the good effect of saving Andalusia from invasion.

A short time after the battle of Medellin, Victor's corps was considerably augmented by the junction of General Lapisse, who, after making a demonstration against Ciudad Rodrigo, had proceeded by the Puerto de Perales and Alcantara to Merida; and it soon became evident that Victor's views were directed towards Portugal; further breathing time was thus given to Cuesta.

During the early period of these operations in

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For fifty-three days did these heroic peasants defend themselves, though contending against the combined scourges of famine, pestilence, and the

Feb. 20. sword; and at last surrendered to Marshal Lannes nothing but a pile of smoking ruins.

At the opposite extremity of Spain Marshal Soult, having, after the embarkation of the English army, made himself master of Coruña, Ferrol, and Vigo, and driven Romana into the mountains, prepared to invade Portugal.

It was accordingly arranged that whilst he entered that kingdom on the side of Galicia, Lapisse and Victor should favour his operations by threatening it simultaneously in the direction of Almeida and Elvas; and that when Soult should have obtained possession of Lisbon, the two other corps should unite and move upon Andalusia.

In pursuance of his part in this plan, Soult, early in February, marched with a corps of 30,000 men from Santiago to Tuy, leaving Ney with 20,000 to hold Galicia in subjection. Below Tuy the French marshal had hoped to effect the passage of the Minho; but, foiled in his attempt, he was obliged to ascend the stream to Orense, from whence he moved upon Monterey and Chaves, by this circuitous march losing much valuable time. Near the former place a combined force of Spaniards and Portugueze had taken post under the indefatigable Romana and

Dom Francisco da Silveira; but the disheartened Spanish troops scarcely waited to be attacked, and fled to the eastward, upon which the Portugueze fell back on Chaves.

The disposition shown to defend this place occasioned a further delay of several days in Soult's operations. It surrendered only on the 11th March; so that upwards of a month had elapsed from the time of his leaving Santiago before he had made himself master of the frontier town of Portugal.

Leaving his sick and wounded (to the number of 1400) at Chaves, with a small garrison for their protection, the French marshal moved towards Braga. Bernardim Freire, who, notwithstanding his proved incapacity during the preceding campaign, was still entrusted with the command of the principal Portugueze army, had fixed his head-quarters at that city; but this same general, who but a few months before had talked of cutting off Junot's army with 5000 undisciplined Portugueze, now, with more than double that force at his command, suffered the enemy to march unopposed through the difficult passes that cover the approaches to Braga and Oporto. His indignant countrymen most unjustly accused him of treason, for want of capacity was his only crime; and the unfortunate Freire fell under the knives of an infuriated mob. Baron Eben, a Hanoverian officer in the English service, was appointed by acclamation to the unenviable command of the tumultuous rabble assembled for the defence of Braga, which in the course of a few days amounted to little short of 25,000 men. Eben took up a position about a league in advance of the city, where he was attacked on the 20th March; but scarcely awaiting the enemy's onset,

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his army dispersed yet quicker than it had collected. Braga offered no resistance; and after halting three days to establish another hospital and make other necessary arrangements, Soult proceeded on to Oporto, and arrived before that city on the 28th of March.

A number of field works had been thrown up far in advance of the city, and a vast, disorderly multitude had been assembled within it; but such a system of defence, even if the works had been distributed with judgment, was ill suited to the circumstances of the moment. The French advanced to the attack early on the following morning; and having, though with some loss, carried a post, which took the greater part of the lines in reverse, a panic seized the Portugueze, and in less than an hour the enemy were in possession of the city.

March 29. Thus at the very time that the entrances into Andalusia had been thrown open by the victories of Ciudad Real and Medellin, the subjugation of Portugal seemed on the eve of being accomplished; for the national armies had been scattered in all directions, and the British corps of 10,000 men left under Sir John Cradock when Moore marched into Spain, was concentrated at Lisbon in readiness for immediate embarkation.

Soult, however, alarmed at the loss of the hospitals he had established in his rear, and ill informed of the strength of Cradock's corps in his front, hesitated to advance on Lisbon until he could obtain intelligence of the movements of Lapisse and Victor, and his hesitation at this critical moment saved Portugal.

The unfortunate result of Sir John Moore's operations, from which far too much had been expected,

nowise relaxed the zeal of the British ministers, whatever may have been their anxiety respecting the fate of Spain. They had nobly embarked in the contest, and were determined to persevere in sustaining it, notwithstanding the obstacles thrown in their way by a factious Opposition.

At this time the possession of Cadiz was a favourite project of the British government, to serve as a base for operations in the southern part of Spain; but the Supreme Junta having refused to admit into that city a small corps of troops despatched from England under Major-General Sherbrooke, that officer landed it at Lisbon, and thereby increased the force under Sir John Cradock to about 15,000 men; and it was in a short time augmented to 20,000, by troops sent from England under Major-General Hill and other able officers.

When it became known in Portugal that our government had determined to strengthen the small British force already there, the greatest joy was diffused throughout the country, whose entire population breathed hatred to the French name; and the Regency, casting aside every feeling of jealousy and distrust, freely proposed that the command and complete control of the Portugueze army should be placed in the hands of a British general. They were desirous that Sir Arthur Wellesley should accept of this appointment. He, however, declined the office; and it was conferred on Major-General Beresford, an officer well qualified, as the event most fully proved, for the important trust. He arrived at Lisbon early in March; and having fixed his head-quarters at Thomar, commenced with great vigour and ability the herculean task of creating an army out of the chaos of unpromising materials

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around him. Several British officers were in the first instance appointed to the Portugueze army, and the number was afterwards largely increased, until the staff and most of the superior situations were held by Englishmen, and a complete British organization was effected.

The credit of pointing out Portugal as the basis of all operations in the Peninsula, is due to Sir Arthur Wellesley. Many circumstances favoured his views, which he alone had the sagacity to discover; — such as the defensive nature of the country; the docility of its inhabitants, and their military qualities; the advantages afforded by Lisbon for landing provisions and stores for the supply of a British force; together with the facility there would be of withdrawing the army, should it be compelled to abandon the country.

Before leaving London to assume the command of the army in Portugal, Sir Arthur Wellesley laid before ministers a short memorandum, in which he stated that he "had always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, whatever should be the result of the contest in Spain; and that in the meantime the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French."

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Mar. 7.

His views had been that the Portugueze military establishments, upon the footing of 40,000 militia, and 30,000 regular troops, ought to be revised; and that in addition to these troops his Majesty's force in Portugal should consist of 20,000 men, including 4000 cavalry; but that at the present juncture, looking to the inefficient state of the Portugueze army and other circumstances, he recommended that the British force should not be less than 30,000 men, with a large body of artillery.

Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from Portsmouth on the 16th April with a fresh breeze, and narrowly escaped shipwreck at the back of the Isle of Wight the same night. Lord Londonderry thus describes the event:—"It might be about midnight, or rather later, when Captain Collier of H. M. ship Surveillante burst into the cabin, entreating us to rise without delay, for that we were on the eve of shipwreck. As may be imagined, we lost no time in leaping from our cots, and mounting the deck; when a very awful as well as alarming spectacle presented itself. In striving to pass a bank which runs out from St. Catherine's Point into the sea, the ship missed stays; this occurred again and again, each failure bringing us nearer and nearer to danger; and now, when we looked abroad, the breakers were to be seen at about a stone's throw from the bow. There was not an individual amongst us who anticipated any other result than that in a few minutes, at the farthest, the vessel would strike; but we were deceived. The wind, which had hitherto been blowing on shore, suddenly changed, and we were at once relieved from a situation, than which the whole progress of our lives had not before brought us into any more uncomfortable."

Narrative of the Peninsular War.

On the 22d of April, the frigate anchored in the Tagus; and Portugueze enthusiasm was at its height when Sir Arthur's arrival became known. A general illumination took place, and every possible demonstration of joy was exhibited by the inhabitants of Lisbon. But the Regency testified their confidence in the former deliverer of the country in a more gratifying manner, by appointing him marshal-general of the armies of Portugal, which gave him authority to employ the Portu-

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gueze troops upon any operations in which he might think proper to engage.

It was very satisfactory to the new commander-in-chief to find that considerable progress had already been made in organizing and disciplining the Portugueze troops to the number of 15,000 men, who looked up to their British officers with respect and confidence, — an earnest of good conduct in the field. Hardy, patriotic, and brave, the Portugueze make excellent soldiers; but decay and corruption had so long prevailed in the Portugueze army, that nothing short of the complete regeneration now in progress could have raised it from the mire in which its latent energies were sunk.

At this period, the two French armies menacing Lisbon were thus stationed: — Marshal Soult's, 24,000 strong, lay at Oporto, with its advanced posts on the Vouga; and that of Marshal Victor, amounting, since the junction of Lapisse, to about 30,000 men, was in possession of the Guadiana, head-quarters being at Merida.

Of the Spanish armies the only one at hand to operate in conjunction with the British force was that under Cuesta, the remains of the army of Estremadura, which had been for some time re-assembling at Llerena, after the defeat and dispersion near Medellin. It was now said to exceed 30,000 men.

In the meantime Sir Arthur Wellesley was diligently engaged in preparing to make a forward movement. The commissariat was once more placed in order; requisitions were made for the necessary transport; and the troops witnessed with great satisfaction the rapid progress of measures which indicated active operations.

The British general had determined on taking the offensive; and he had the option of attacking either Soult or Victor. He would have preferred moving towards the latter, if Soult had not been in possession of the important city of Oporto, and of a very fertile province. Besides, a movement upon Victor would require to be concerted with Cuesta, and thereby occasion a loss of much valuable time. These considerations made him resolve to march northward and fall suddenly upon Soult.

Having relieved Sir John Cradock of his command on the 27th of April, Sir Arthur Wellesley lost no time in moving the army from Leyria and Alcobaça. Accordingly 17,000 British and 6000 Portugueze troops were directed upon Coimbra; while a brigade of British infantry and two regiments of cavalry, amounting to 2700 men, were detached under Major-General Mackenzie to occupy, in conjunction with a corps of 7000 Portugueze, the towns of Abrantes and Santarem; lest Victor, hearing of Sir Arthur's advance towards Oporto, should seize the opportunity to bear down upon Lisbon by way of Alemtejo. Thus posted, the allied troops would command the fords of the Tagus, with the advantage of holding a position whence they could not easily be driven by the enemy; and Sir Arthur had already guarded against their succeeding in any attempt to cross lower down the river, by taking measures to have all the boats secured on the first alarm.

Such a movement on the part of Victor was not, however, greatly to be apprehended; as Cuesta would thereby be left in his rear, and thus embarrass his operations, besides cutting off all com-

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munication with the interior of Spain, unless he were to leave a strong corps to maintain it, a measure which his strength would scarcely justify.

At this time General Cuesta anxiously sought to draw the British commander into a combined operation against Victor; but in answer to Cuesta's proposal, he alleged the inability of the Portugueze troops, in their present state of organization and discipline, to protect Portugal against the further attempts which might be made upon it by the disciplined troops of France, who were already in possession of an important part of the kingdom. In a letter, written on the 29th of April, Sir Arthur disclosed his plans to the Spanish general; which were, to march against Soult, and, if successful in his endeavours to drive the enemy from the north of Portugal, he should march forthwith towards Elvas, and co-operate in any plan which might be agreed upon for the attack of Marshal Victor. In the meantime, a detachment from the garrison of Elvas was directed to take the field; and, in conjunction with a similar detachment from Badajos, act as a corps of observation in that quarter. Sir Arthur strove to impress upon Cuesta that, in the actual situation of affairs, to gain time, preserve their troops, and maintain such valuable positions as they still possessed, ought to be the objects of the allied commanders; and that, until they should all be at liberty to co-operate in a vigorous attack upon the enemy, his acquiring possession of a little more of the open country was a matter of no material consequence.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 29.

Distrusting Spanish prudence, and as it was of the utmost importance that Cuesta should hazard

nothing while the British army was operating in the north of Portugal, Sir Arthur wrote to Don Martin de Garay, a member of the Supreme Junta, urging the necessity of keeping the Spanish generals tranquil, and of their preserving "a strict defensive position in all quarters." Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Apr. 29.

Marshal Soult had been for some time inactive at Oporto, awaiting intelligence from Lapisse and Victor, in ignorance that the former had marched from Old Castile to the Guadiana. His situation was now become dangerous; for besides the attack of the British army, which threatened him from the south, a Portugueze corps under Silveira was on the Tamega to his left. This general, after having possessed himself of Chaves, where 1300 of the enemy fell into his hands, posted himself at Amarante, in the hope of being able to hold the bridge at that place, and thus cut off Soult from his best line of retreat. Besides being disquieted by the position of Silveira's corps, the French had in their rear, towards the Minho, some bands of armed Spaniards; of little strength, it is true, but capable of creating much annoyance.

The British general's object was to throw a strong corps upon Soult's left at Amarante, previous to the advance of the main body from Coimbra upon Oporto. He thus hoped to be able to envelope the French marshal, and capture the whole of his corps. Marquis Londonderry's Narrative, vol. i. 320.

Soult, although ignorant that the British were moving upon Coimbra, felt the necessity of restoring the communication by Amarante, and detached General Loison with 6000 men to attack Silveira, whom he defeated on the 2d May, and drove across the Douro to Lamego, establishing himself on the left bank of that river.

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This intelligence, which reached Sir Arthur Wellesley at Coimbra on the 4th, did not induce him to alter his plan of operations, although it necessarily limited his expectations from its prosecution. Marshal Beresford was therefore despatched with a strong division from Coimbra, on the 6th, to march upon Vizeu and Lamego, in order to gain the Tamega, and if possible intercept the retreat of the French army by Amarante; and a division under General Hill was directed to march to Aveiro, and embark there in boats for Ovar, to turn the enemy's flank on the Vouga, and prevent any protracted resistance on that river.

On the 9th, the main body of the British army marched from Coimbra; and on the 11th, the advanced guard of the French, consisting of 4000 infantry and some cavalry, was discovered strongly posted above Grijou. An attack on their left turned that flank; and they were closely pursued, many being killed or taken.

Hearing that his advanced guard had been repulsed, Marshal Soult caused the whole of his troops which were on the left bank of the Douro to cross that river, after which the floating bridge at Oporto was destroyed. He also caused all the boats in the vicinity of the city to be collected and secured on the northern side of the river.

It was now of great consequence that the army, which reached the Douro on the 11th, should cross over and act in concert with Marshal Beresford; but boats were requisite for this purpose, and there seemed little prospect of obtaining any. Besides, Soult was in force on the opposite bank, ready to prevent such an enterprise; and believing Loison to be in possession of the bridge of Amarante, by

which his retreat was secured, the marshal appeared in no hurry to march.

The Douro, a rapid river, three hundred yards wide, near Oporto, would, even without the presence of an hostile army on the opposite bank, have been a formidable obstacle, and created much delay, unprovided as was the British army with boats, or any visible means of getting across. But the difficulty was only a spur to the British general. Having observed a large unfinished building encompassed by a high stone wall on the opposite side of the river a little to the right of the town, it struck him as offering a good defensible post, could he contrive to transport a small body of infantry over the stream to occupy it. He stood at this moment on the summit of the Sarea hill, which rising boldly from the river nearly opposite Oporto, enabled him to survey the city and its environs. It was evident that the French were about to go off, as he could perceive horses and baggage moving along the main road towards Valongo, as also clouds of dust, indicating the march of troops. The enemy had few guards near the river, and those were distant from each other.

The Douro, winding round the base of the Sarea hill, forms a considerable curve; so that the river for some space is not visible from the city, the Sarea, surmounted by its convent, interposing so as to bound the view. At this place Wellesley determined to attempt the passage, if any boats could be obtained. Marshal Soult (as was subsequently ascertained) stood at the same moment gazing upon the river from the windows of his house, which commanded a fine view; and confident that all was safe, and that he had only to quit the city

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when it suited his convenience, enjoyed the supposed dilemma of his opponent; little imagining that Wellesley would have the temerity to attempt crossing in face of one of the most experienced and able generals in the French army.

Colonel Waters *, an active and daring staff officer, having discovered a small skiff, which had been brought from the other side in the preceding night by a man of Oporto, persuaded two or three peasants who were standing by, to go with him across the river. Unseen by the enemy, Waters accomplished his object, and returned with three large boats which he had found on the opposite side. In the mean time some cannon had been taken up to the Sarea convent, and judiciously placed so as to command the river, and likewise the enclosed space around the unfinished building intended for a seminary, already spoken of as standing on the opposite bank. A division under Major-General John Murray was ordered to proceed three miles higher up to Barca de Avintes, and effect the passage there if possible.

About ten o'clock on the morning of the 12th May, an officer and seventy-five soldiers of the Buffs entered the first boat that had been brought to the proper point for crossing; while all around stood in mute and breathless expectation. "Let the men cross," was Sir Arthur's brief command. The other boats quickly followed, and the seminary was gained without any alarm having been excited. For a few minutes longer the general stillness was uninterrupted; but presently the beating of drums, and the rumbling of artillery issuing from the city, showed that the English soldiers in the seminary

* Major-General Sir J. Waters, K.C.B.

had been seen; and bodies of infantry were observed approaching to make prisoners of the rash intruders, who by this time had received a reinforcement. A fierce attack was now made upon the handful of British, which was gallantly resisted; but Major-General Paget fell, severely wounded. The command then devolved on Major-General Hill, a man of that calm courage so requisite at such a moment, who plied the assailants with his musketry; while the cannon on the Sarea vomited forth destruction amongst them, and swept the flanks of the seminary. The boats still continued to furnish reinforcements; but the enemy gave them full occupation. As yet there was no appearance of Murray's division on the right, and the result of the bold undertaking still continued doubtful, when troops were observed crossing lower down from Villa Nova; some citizens having taken advantage of the enemy's surprise to push a few boats over to General Sherbrooke's division, part of which effected the passage, and got into the city, when loud shouts, and the waving of handkerchiefs from many windows, denoted that the French had abandoned the lower town.

Altogether the scene was at this time most imposing: what with the roar of cannon reverberating amongst the rocks, the constant rattle of musketry, the shouts of the soldiers and inhabitants, the river now thickly covered with boats carrying their scarlet freight; one of the most exciting and extraordinary exhibitions was produced that the imagination can conceive.

At length the head of Murray's division was seen, and three battalions were now with Hill in the seminary enclosure; which, commanding the road to Valongo, enabled them to pour a destructive

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fire on the enemy's columns as they passed in hurry and confusion. Pressed in rear by Sherbrooke's infantry, and exposed when leaving the city to a fire from the seminary and to the guns on the Sarea hill, the French suffered a heavy loss, which would have been greatly increased, had Murray boldly pushed forward and taken advantage of their confusion and dismay. Their rear guard was, however, repeatedly charged by a squadron of the 14th dragoons belonging to his division, led on by Brigadier-General Charles Stewart* and Major Hervey†, which did much execution. The latter officer lost an arm on this occasion.

Thus terminated this brilliant exploit, which was accomplished with the small loss of 120 men; that of the enemy amounted to about 500. Five guns were taken in the field, and fifty more, with a quantity of ammunition and stores, were found in the arsenal; and several hundred sick remained in the French hospitals.

Universal rejoicing reigned that evening in Oporto, whose inhabitants, like those of the rest of Portugal, detested the French. Sir Arthur Wellesley was established in the house from which Soult had fled, where every preparation had been made for the marshal's dinner, which was enjoyed by the new occupant and his staff with infinite gusto.

Meanwhile Marshal Beresford had not been inactive. It will be recollected that he left Coimbra on the 6th for Lamego. As he approached the Douro the enemy fell back, and there was some skirmishing with the rear guard. Loison continued

* The present Marquis of Londonderry, G.C.B.
† The late Colonel Sir Felton Hervey, K.C.B.

his retreat towards Amarante upon the 11th, on which day Silveira advanced from Villa Real. The French outposts were driven in on the 12th; and Loison abandoned Amarante the day following without an effort to maintain that important post, and took the road to Guimaraens. Soult did not hear of these events until he was midway between Valongo and Peñafiel on the 13th, where he destroyed his guns and ammunition preparatory to following a mountain path to Guimaraens, where he fell in with Loison.

Learning the direction taken by Soult after divesting his army of all encumbrances, Sir Arthur Wellesley judged what had been the result of Beresford's operations, and sent him orders in consequence to make for Chaves; at the same time directing General Murray on Peñafiel, while the rest of the army marched towards the Minho in two columns. Beresford had, however, with much judgment, anticipated his orders and reached Chaves, but too late; for Soult, having also destroyed the ammunition and abandoned the artillery of Loison's division, had carried his army by great exertions, and in spite of the badness of the weather, over difficult mountain paths; and forcing his way across bridges guarded by bodies of Portugueze, was already in advance of Braga, and had saved his army.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who quitted Braga on the 16th, arrived at Salamonde before Soult's rear guard, which covered the passage of his army by the Ponte Nova and Saltador bridges over the Cavado river, had retired. Although strongly posted, it scarcely awaited an attack, and fled to the Ponte Nova, where a fresh formation was attempted; but

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the English artillery coming up, committed fearful ravages in the disordered ranks of the enemy; and when the pursuers had leisure to look around them, they were astonished at the havoc made in so short a time.

The usual acts of cruelty and rapine marked the progress of Soult's disorganized force in this retreat; and many an unhappy straggler from it fell a sacrifice to the vengeance of the exasperated peasantry.

The retreat of the French was continued by Montalegre and Ginzo upon Orense; but no further opportunity occurred of inflicting any injury upon them, as it was impossible for an army marching with its cannon and equipments to overtake a flying enemy moving without encumbrance of any kind. The French reached Orense on the 19th, destitute of guns, stores, ammunition, and baggage — exhausted and dispirited; having lost 6000 men since they marched from that place ten weeks before. Thus was a parallel furnished to the Coruña retreat of the year before; but in this instance no victory solaced the hardy veteran at the termination of his toils: the soldiers of Soult had nothing to cheer them.

Unwilling to break the thread of the operations just narrated, we have forborne to notice an extraordinary conspiracy that existed in the French army while at Oporto, directed against their leader, who was suspected of seeking to seat himself on the throne of the Braganzas. How far the conspiracy may have extended, and what were really the intentions of the *Philadelphes*, it is impossible to say. Sir Arthur Wellesley was applied to by some of the ringleaders, and had even interviews with two

or three individuals; but he could not be prevailed upon to enter into their views as set forth to him, and nothing resulted. No satisfactory explanation of this mysterious affair has ever appeared; and we feel disposed to doubt that a man like Marshal Soult could ever have entertained the project ascribed to him by the malcontents, — at a time too when his master Bonaparte was at the zenith of his power, and when no Frenchman imagined it possible that any effectual resistance could be offered to his will.

But to resume the narrative. When the British general found that Soult had directed his retreat from Montalegre upon Orense, he stopped short in the pursuit, and ordered his troops, who were suffering from over-exertion during very bad weather, to retrace their steps to Oporto. He was anxious to recruit their strength previous to marching towards the Tagus, where his presence was necessary; letters from General Mackenzie having been received on the 19th, announcing that Alcantara had been taken by the enemy.

Previously to recording the interesting operations in which the British army became engaged after the expulsion of Soult from Portugal, we may mention that the Spanish leaders in Galicia and Asturias had been of late very active and successful in their enterprises; a combined Spanish and Portugueze force, aided by two British men of war, having compelled Vigo to surrender on the 27th of March, when 1300 prisoners, a great quantity of stores, and the military chest of the second corps fell into the hands of the captors. Romana also, on the 17th of April, surprised a French post at Villa Franca del Bierzo, and took 800 men. Ney's

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corps, which had charge of the north of Spain, had now therefore a difficult task to keep down Spanish enterprise; and the arrival of Soult's disorganized force was hailed with satisfaction by his brother marshal, and for some time the two corps co-operated against the patriot bands in those parts, which gave them much occupation. But to give in detail the secondary operations during this contest when remote from the main scene of action, does not fall within our province; neither were they commonly pregnant with any great degree of interest to the English reader, although, from keeping a considerable force of the enemy employed, they were undoubtedly of material importance to the success of the cause.

CHAPTER XX.

THE ENGLISH ARMY RETURNS TO COIMBRA. — MOVEMENT OF MARSHAL VICTOR. — SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY MARCHES TO THE TAGUS. — HIS PLAN FOR THE CAMPAIGN. — VICTOR WITHDRAWS ACROSS THE TAGUS. — POSITIONS OF THE FRENCH AND ALLIED ARMIES. — MARSHAL BERESFORD DETACHED TO THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF PORTUGAL. — JUNCTION OF THE BRITISH AND SPANISH ARMIES. — BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

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HAVING thus, in the short period of ten days from the time of leaving Coimbra, driven Soult's army — a mass of fugitives — into Galicia, and thereby reanimated the sinking courage of the Portugueze, Sir Arthur Wellesley led his wearied troops back to that place, where he allowed them a few days' respite previous to marching them towards the Tagus.

In planning the campaign, he considered the defeat of Victor as his primary object, although the position of Soult at Oporto required that the country should be relieved from the pressure and menace of his presence in that city; and he now prepared to act vigorously in conjunction with Cuesta for the following up of his own admirable plan of operations. But unhappily the Spanish general was old, self-willed, and ignorant of the science of war; and Sir Arthur found him incapable of comprehending the principles upon which his own views of proceeding were founded. Fortunately he had so far attended to the wishes of the British general as not to hazard any considerable portion of his force

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in *Spanish* enterprises against the enemy, although he did not keep it altogether quiet. His troops were scattered about, occupying various posts on the north side of the Sierra Morena, head-quarters being at Fuente de Maestre, keeping retreat open upon Seville by the great road from Badajos.

In the meantime, Marshal Victor, who was still in Estremadura, had attempted no operation of importance. He waited to see the effect of the movement against Soult. Thus, upon hearing of the British advance towards Oporto, he passed the Guadiana on the 13th May, and pushed forward a division under Lapisse to gain possession of Alcantara — on the chief communication between Estremadura and Portugal. Colonel Mayne maintained that post with 2000 Portugueze infantry and a few guns; but after some resistance was forced to retreat, having failed in an attempt to destroy the bridge. Lapisse immediately crossed the Tagus, and pushed his patroles into Beira towards Castel Branco; but intelligence of Soult's reverses speedily induced him to recross the river, and Victor's army soon after retraced its steps in the direction of Merida. Colonel Mayne then advanced, and again established himself at Alcantara. During the absence of the French from Merida, Cuesta had caused the castle of that place to be invested; but his attempt upon it was unsuccessful. Victor now placed himself at Torre-Mocha, a central point between Alacantara, Truxillo, and Merida. Here, however, he was disquieted by reports of the collection of some Spanish bands in the upper valley of the Tagus, which threatened his bridge at Almaraz: he despatched, therefore, a division of his army for its protection.

Perceiving that Victor intended nothing of a serious nature by his recent movement, Sir Arthur Wellesley slackened the march of his troops, who reached the vicinity of Abrantes between the 7th and 12th June. A reinforcement of 5000 men having recently arrived from England, and authority having been granted by the British government to extend the operations of the army into Spain, "beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portugueze frontier," Sir Arthur trusted that in combination with Cuesta, whose army was now estimated at 38,000 men, a severe blow might be inflicted on Victor. He considered that the French armies in Asturias and Galicia under Ney, Soult, and Kellermann, would find sufficient employment in the north of Spain to prevent their detaching largely to the assistance of Victor; and that if he were to be reinforced by one or even two of those corps, the allied British and Spanish armies would still be too strong for him.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 8.

Several causes now concurred to delay the commencement of operations against Victor: the troops were sickly, and required rest after so long a march; equipments of various kinds were wanted; the military chest was empty; and finally a plan for ulterior proceedings had to be settled with General Cuesta, an impracticable old man. No bad consequences arising from the unavoidable delay were then apparent, although subsequently it was found that time was of great value to the French.

That Sir Arthur Wellesley had sanguine expectations of a successful result to his operations, is evinced by the following paragraph from a letter to Sir John Villiers, the British minister at Lisbon, written at Abrantes.

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Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 11.

"My despatches announce a reinforcement of seven battalions besides Craufurd's corps, for which I believe I may thank you; and I have besides authority to extend my operations beyond the provinces immediately adjacent to the Portuguese frontier, provided 'I shall be of opinion that my doing so is material to the success of my operations, and not inconsistent with the safety of Portugal.' So that the ball is now at my foot, and I hope I shall have strength enough to give it a good kick. I should begin immediately, but I cannot venture to stir without money. The army is two months in arrear; we are over head and ears in debt everywhere; and I cannot venture into Spain without paying what we owe, at least in this neighbourhood, and giving a little money to the troops."

The plan of the British general was to march from Abrantes to Plasencia, with a view, if Victor were not very rapid in retreating, of seizing the bridge of Almaraz, which would place him between the Spanish and British armies, and cut off his retreat in the direction of the capital; but Sir Arthur vainly sought to convince General Cuesta that this plan alone could be attended with any decided result. Upon this subject he writes thus to Mr. Freire, the British minister at Seville: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 13.

"I can only say, that the obstinacy of this old gentleman (Cuesta) is throwing out of our hands the finest game that any armies ever had; and that we shall repent that we did not cut off Victor when we shall have to beat the French upon the Ebro. With such a letter, however, as Colonel Bourke's before me, I could not but yield the point to General Cuesta, which I hope will convince the Spanish government of my sincere desire to be of service to them."

It must have been a great trial for the British general's temper, thus to be compelled to forego his own brilliantly conceived and well-digested plan, in order to act upon the narrow views of a man like Cuesta; but too weak to effect any thing alone against Victor, he was without a remedy. His choice lay between following the Spaniard's wishes

and a total inaction. Strongly impressing, therefore, upon General Cuesta the necessity of concentrating the Spanish army in some strong position, where it might be secure from any effort of the enemy until the British force should be at hand to support it, Sir Arthur determined to march on Badajos the moment his money and stores should arrive. In a letter to Lord Castlereagh, he writes—

"My correspondence with General Cuesta has been a very curious one, and proves him to be as obstinate as any gentleman at the head of an army need be. He would not alter his position even to secure the safety of his army, because he supposed that this measure might be injurious to himself; notwithstanding that this alteration would have been part of an operation which must have ended in the annihilation of Victor's army if he stood our attack, or in his retreat through the mountains to Arzobispo, with the loss of all his cannon and baggage, if he went away. Gurwood. Despatches, &c. June 17.

"I hope I acted right in giving way, more particularly as the operation was to be carried on in Spain, and the argument urged to me was, that the safety of Cuesta's army depended upon my compliance. The best of the whole story is, that Cuesta, in a letter of the 27th May, which I did not receive till after I had written to him to propose my plan of operations, proposed to me the same plan with very little alteration."

The plans of General Cuesta we need not take the trouble to specify, as they were not destined to be put in execution; for Marshal Victor, aware that his position between the Tagus and Guadiana was very insecure, and having received authentic intelligence of Soult's flight into Galicia, determined to retire across the Tagus. But as a preliminary measure, in order to guard against interruption from the troops posted at Castel Branco, he sent a strong division to make a demonstration upon Alcantara on the 10th June, and Colonel Mayne unwittingly seconded his views by blowing up, as

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was expected, a portion of the bridge; after which the French division retired.

About the middle of June, Victor began to withdraw his troops from Estremadura across the Tagus, by the bridge of Almaraz. Cuesta followed, without effecting any thing against the retreating army, and fixed his head-quarters at the Puerto de Mirabete, opposite Almaraz, having a division of his army at Arzobispo, some miles higher up the river.

At the end of June, the several armies and corps of the French in Spain were situated as follows:—Ney's corps was still in Galicia, but arrived at Astorga in the middle of July; that of Mortier was at Leon; Soult's at Zamora; Kellermann's at Valladolid; Suchet's at Zaragoza; St. Cyr's blockading Gerona; the army of Victor, 28,000 strong, at Talavera de la Reyna; Sebastiani's corps of 12,000 men, destined to support Victor, had withdrawn from Ciudad Real, and was near Toledo; and King Joseph's guards, with Dessolles' division, amounting to about 13,000 men, were at Madrid.

Of the allied armies, Cuesta, having again assembled 38,000 men, was on the Tagus, at Almaraz; Venegas, with 18,000, was approaching Aranjuez; and the British army, 22,000 strong (including 1000 Portugueze of the Lusitanian legion), having broken up from Abrantes on the 27th of June, was moving upon Plasencia, in order to co-operate with the Spanish armies, and, if possible, drive the French to the northward of the capital.*

* We give the numbers on both sides as estimated by Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was not likely to be very far wrong. Some writers make Sebastiani 20,000 strong. It is not probable that he had more than 12,000 men.

It is necessary to observe, that the British general was not aware, until after he had commenced his march on Plasencia, that Soult had quitted Galicia; and that Mortier and Kellermann, instead of being in Asturias and Biscay, had moved to the southward.

Thus, to meet the attack of 22,000 British, and 56,000 chiefly raw and undisciplined Spanish troops, the enemy could concentrate 53,000 Frenchmen upon the Tagus.* In the above statement of the force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, we have not included the reinforcements shortly expected from Lisbon, amounting to near 8000 bayonets; as the leading brigade, under Brigadier-General Robert Craufurd, only left that city on the 28th of June, and did not reach the army until the day after the battle of Talavera.

It was originally intended by Sir Arthur Wellesley, that the Portugueze troops under Marshal Beresford should accompany him into the vale of Plasencia; but about the middle of June advice was received that the northern frontier of Portugal was threatened by the French, which induced Sir Arthur to despatch Beresford towards the Douro. That general finding, however, that nothing was to be apprehended in the north, halted his troops upon the eastern frontier of Portugal, and soon after took post in the vicinity of Almeida.

The state of the war in Germany at this period, as well as the prospects in Spain, prompted Sir Arthur Wellesley to urge forward the combined operations on which he had entered; and he con-

* It will be seen presently that a powerful force was collecting under Soult in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, to operate on the left flank and rear of the allies; but Sir Arthur was ignorant of this when he advanced upon Plasencia.

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sidered the means of the allies as adequate to the object in view.

The British army marched by both banks of the Tagus upon Plasencia, where it was united on the 10th of July; when Sir Arthur Wellesley lost no time in seeking a conference with General Cuesta, to concert their future operations. The Marquis of Londonderry, then Brigadier-General Stewart, who accompanied Sir Arthur to the Spanish camp, draws a striking picture of what he observed on that occasion. Owing to the guides having lost their way, Sir Arthur did not reach the camp until after darkness had set in, when a review of Cuesta's troops took place by torch light.

Marquis of Londonderry's Narrative, vol. i. 382.

"As the torches were held aloft, at moderate intervals from one another, they threw a red and wavering light over the whole scene, permitting, at the same time, its minuter parts to be here and there cast into shade; whilst the grim and swarthy visages of the soldiers, their bright arms and dark uniforms, appeared peculiarly picturesque as often as the flashes fell upon them. Then there was the frequent roar of cannon, the shouldering of firelocks, mingled with the brief word of command, and rattling of accoutrements and arms, as we passed from battalion to battalion. All these served to interest the sense of hearing to the full as much as the spectacle attracted the sense of sight. Nor was old Cuesta himself an object to be passed by without notice, even at such a moment and under such circumstances as these. The old man preceded us,— not so much sitting on his horse as held upon it by two pages, at the imminent hazard of being overthrown whenever a cannon was discharged, or a torch flared out with peculiar brightness; indeed his physical debility was so observable, as clearly to mark his total unfitness for the situation which he then held. As to his mental powers, he gave us little opportunity of judging; inasmuch as he scarcely uttered five words during the continuance of our visit; but his corporal infirmities alone were at absolute variance with all a general's duties, and showed that he was now fit only for the retirement of private life."

His lordship describes the men as stout and hardy-looking, but evidently undisciplined; few battalions presenting the appearance of any thing but raw levies.

And this was the general, and these were the troops, who were to stand on the day of battle beside the British, and contend with the legions of France! Truly, it required no second sight to foretel that such an army never could prevail against the French; and, no doubt, Sir Arthur Wellesley had sad misgivings when he placed it, but a few days afterwards, on the British right, at Talavera.

The plan proposed by the British general was, for the principal attack upon the enemy's posts on the Alberche to be made with the united force of the two armies; while a detachment of 10,000 men moved towards Avila, to turn the enemy's right; and, in the event of Sebastiani's corps being compelled to cross the Tagus, that Venegas should also pass that river either at Aranjuez or at Fuente-Dueña, and threaten Madrid. By this plan it was expected that the British army and that of Cuesta would be brought to bear upon the enemy at the same time with the force under Venegas, and in such a manner as should prevent his concentrating to act against either. From the situation of the two Spanish armies, one being in La Mancha and the other in Estremadura, they were necessarily separated, and could neither join nor hold any military communication excepting by Talavera and Toledo, owing to the difficulties of the country; and it was obvious that, unless the enemy should be alarmed for the safety of the capital by one of the armies, he would fall with

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the whole of his collected strength upon the other. To divide his attention, and constrain him to keep his force separated, was therefore Sir Arthur's plan.

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. Dec. 9.

In this view, Venegas was ordered by Cuesta to march by Tembleque, Tarancon, and Fuente-Dueña to Arganda, where he was expected to arrive on the 22d of July, — the day appointed for the arrival of the combined British and Spanish armies at Talavera; and if he were prevented reaching that place by the opposition of the enemy, the object of the operation was gained by keeping one of their corps employed; while, if opposed by a corps too strong for him, his retreat was always open to the mountains of Cuenca.

General Cuesta wished for the detachment for Avila to be taken from the British army, a proposal which was declined, on the ground that to act with advantage the British troops must be kept united; Sir Arthur observing, that the detachment might with more propriety and advantage be made from the Spanish army, which was already more numerous than was required for the operations on the Alberche, or than would be found convenient in reference to its discipline.

Unable to prevail on Cuesta to make a large detachment, Sir Arthur was compelled to accept of two battalions of infantry, and a few cavalry, which the Spaniard offered to unite with Sir Robert Wilson's Portugueze brigade, to operate against the enemy's right by marching upon Arenas, and thence to Escalona, on the Alberche. Had Cuesta agreed to detach 10,000 men, as was proposed, Sir Arthur would have requested that this force should be placed under the Duque de Alburquerque, in accordance

with Mr. Frere's desire, his own inclination, and the general wish of the Spaniards.

We gather from Sir Arthur's letters at this period that the Junta was jealous of Cuesta's power, and feared that his influence at the head of so large an army might render him independent of control, if it did not induce him to seek the subversion of the existing government, which was therefore anxious to see the military power placed in other hands. It is also evident that the British general returned from the conference with strong suspicions that all those around Cuesta were not "good men and true;" and certainly the letters afterwards intercepted showed the enemy to be well acquainted with the plans and movements of the allies, but there was no absolute proof of treachery.

It appears that the plan of operations was settled with General O'Donoju, chief of the staff to the Spanish army; and that Sir Arthur Wellesley had no conversation whatever with Cuesta, as the latter declined to speak French.

Early in July Sir Arthur became aware that Soult's corps was at Zamora: it was represented to be weak and inefficient, and that Kellermann had arrived at Valladolid. He therefore instructed Marshal Beresford to watch the enemy's movements closely, and to provide for the defence of the Puerto de Perales. It may here be requisite to inform the reader that the mountains which separate Leon from the valley of the Tagus are only practicable for artillery by two passes, namely, those of Perales and Baños. For the defence of the latter a detachment of Spanish troops had been obtained from Cuesta; and Sir Arthur had now reason to consider his left flank well secured, for not only

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were the passes occupied, but Marshal Beresford at Almeida, and the Duque del Parque in advance of Ciudad Rodrigo, having between them little short of 20,000 men, were both charged to co-operate in the protection of those passes. But the French had by that time a force assembled to the northward of the mountains sufficient to overawe Beresford and del Parque, of whose presence Sir Arthur was as yet wholly unconscious.

The British army had scarcely commenced its march towards Plasencia, when it began to suffer for want of provisions and the means of transport, both of which the Supreme Junta had assured Sir Arthur should be supplied in abundance; and confiding in the solemn promises he had received, being still but imperfectly acquainted with the character of the Spanish authorities, Sir Arthur had boldly moved forward in dependence upon the national faith. But immediately after crossing the Spanish frontier, he found that he must trust to the exertions of his own commissariat alone for supplies. Moreover the English commissaries, who were sent out to procure provisions for the troops, met with many difficulties from the local magistracy; and at length Sir Arthur saw the necessity of giving notice to General Cuesta that he would only co-operate with the Spanish army until it should have secured the passage of the Alberche and opened a communication with the army of Venegas, which was supposed to be approaching the Upper Tagus, and would therefore be in great danger if operations were not proceeded with.

Anxious to secure his junction with the Spanish army, Sir Arthur Wellesley marched from Plasencia on the 17th July, having determined to cross the

Tietar river at the Venta de Bazagono, and move on Oropesa. For the passage of the Tietar two companies of the Royal Staff Corps under Captain Tod, an able officer, constructed a bridge in a very ingenious manner, with materials obtained by pulling down an old house, and felling some fine trees in a wood three miles distant. "Uniting intelligence with labour, he contrived, without other aid than a few hatchets and saws, in one day to throw a solid bridge over the Tietar," and no delay was occasioned to the army; whereas Victor had wasted many days in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus to form a bridge at the same place. The troops passed the Tietar on the 18th, and arrived on the 20th at Oropesa, where the desired junction with Cuesta's army was effected.

Napier.

The following sketch of a general-in-chief, by the Earl of Munster, will amuse our readers: —

Campaign of 1809. Earl of Munster.

"On the 21st the two commanders-in-chief dined together; and in return for the military spectacle Cuesta had given Sir Arthur, the British troops were drawn out in the evening for his inspection. The mounting on horseback to proceed to the review, showed how ill fitted was Cuesta for the activity of war. He was lifted on his horse by two grenadiers, while one of his aides-de-camp was ready on the other side to conduct his right leg over the horse's croup, and place it in the stirrup! Remarks were whispered at this moment, that if his mental energy and activity did not compensate for his bodily infirmity, Sir Arthur would find him but an incapable coadjutor. The general passed along the line from the left to the right, just as the night fell; and we saw him put comfortably into an antiquated square-cornered coach, drawn by nine mules, and proceed to his quarters."

Sir Robert Wilson marched with the Lusitanian legion, 1000 strong, and two Spanish battalions, towards the Upper Alberche, and arrived at Escalona on the 22d July. On the same day, Victor's outposts were compelled to retire from Talavera

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by the advance of the allied armies, and the enemy concentrated behind the Alberche; Victor having altered his line of retreat from the Madrid to the Toledo road, in order to secure his junction with Sebastiani. Sir Arthur Wellesley had a narrow escape on that day: whilst reconnoitring, a three-pound shot was fired at him with so good an aim, that it cut a bough from a tree close to his head. On the 23d, Sir Arthur was urgent with Cuesta for an attack, as the French were conceived to be in a dangerous situation behind the Alberche; he even put his own troops in motion towards the enemy; but the Spaniard was averse to the measure, and insisted on postponing it till the following day. The British army was indignant at this unseasonable delay, when an opportunity offered of fighting under, what were considered, advantageous circumstances; and our historians have not failed to echo the outcry against Cuesta. But we find from a note* appended to Sir Arthur Wellesley's "Memorandum of Operations" during the campaign, that the Spanish general did not deserve all the censure which was

* "All the discussions upon this subject, and the misrepresentations, show the difficulty of serving the British public, and the small degree of satisfaction which any foreign officer has in co-operating with the British troops. General Cuesta chose to delay the attack to the 24th, for which delay there were not wanting good and valid reasons; but no such reasons are conceived or are allowed to exist. A lie is invented and circulated, viz. that the 23d was Sunday; and then Sir Arthur Wellesley is abused for being the author of the lie. There was, however, one curious circumstance attending this transaction, which shows the nature of the war in Spain, and the deficiency of intelligence by the Spanish general officers; and that is, — that although Sir A. W. suspected it on the evening of the 22d, and made preparations accordingly, it was not positively ascertained till the morning of the 23d that the whole French army was at Cazalagas; and yet the videttes of the outposts were within shot of each other, and the narrow river of the Alberche alone divided the armies!!! The French must, in the night of the 23d, have acquired from our army the knowledge of our intended attack."—*Gurwood.*

heaped upon him; and indeed Sir Arthur considered it fortunate to have "dislodged the enemy without a battle, in which the chances were not much in our favour."

Gurwood. Despatches, Memorandum of operations.

The opinion of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that "there were not wanting good and valid reasons for the delay," prevents us from expressing more than our regret that the reasons, whatever they may have been, should have existed. The odds were so great against Victor, that an attack upon him, had he awaited it, must have been attended with such a result as would in all likelihood have produced a different termination to the campaign. We shall make some further observations upon this subject after detailing the subsequent operations.

Victor remained tranquil in position throughout the whole of the 23d, and the British troops lay down that night consoled for their disappointment by the prospect that at dawn on the 24th they would be led against the enemy. The aged and feeble Spanish general had excited the derision of our soldiers that day, by arriving in a coach and six to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's position with their own active chief. Incapacitated by age and debility from fulfilling the duties of a commander, it was a mockery to send such a man to contend with alert and enterprising French generals. The old Spaniard was brave, it is true, but beyond personal courage he does not seem to have possessed a single quality which gave him a claim to command at a period so momentous.

Before day-light on the 24th the allied columns were in motion to pass the Alberche; but no French vidette gave the alarm. The enemy had withdrawn in the night towards Toledo. Cuesta

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followed the retreating army; but Sir Arthur Wellesley adhered to his determination of not passing the Alberche, being still without provisions, and also knowing, that unless the subsistence of his army was assured, no possible advantage could arise from the pursuit of the enemy. Besides, he had now seen enough of the Spaniards to satisfy him that he had already done all, and more than the true interests of the cause warranted. He, therefore, kept his army at Talavera, and maintained communications with Wilson at Escalona, and with the Spanish army in advance.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had consented to march as far as the Alberche, chiefly to relieve Venegas from danger — that commander being supposed to be threatening Madrid, and occupying the attention of Sebastiani, — was far from suspecting that the Supreme Junta, after having assented to the plan of operations as agreed upon by the allied generals, had secretly directed Venegas not to perform his part, but to remain inactive; prompted by some petty views connected with the maintenace of its own power. Sebastiani was not slow to perceive that Venegas, whom he was watching near Madrilejos, intended to be harmless; deceiving him, therefore, he withdrew rapidly to Toledo, where he left 2000 men as a check upon the Spanish corps, and with the remainder of his troops joined Victor. Joseph also, who had learned on the 22d that the allies were at Talavera, and that Sir Robert Wilson (whose force was much exaggerated) occupied Escalona, left Madrid immediately with the whole of his guards and reserve except 3000 men, who remained in the Retiro, and marched on Cazalegas; having previously sent orders

for Soult to move with all haste on Plasencia. Finding that Victor had retreated, he descended the Guadarrama river and joined that marshal on the 25th. Thus near 50,000 Frenchmen with 90 pieces of cannon were concentrated behind the Guadarrama.

Meanwhile, Cuesta was presumptuously pursuing the French army, expecting to be immediately in possession of Madrid. On the 25th he himself reached Sta Olalla, while another column marched on Torrejos; here, however, his outposts were attacked on the morning of the 26th; and the Spanish general, finding he had now advanced too far, prudently began to fall back towards his British allies. Foreseeing the consequences likely to arise from Cuesta's folly, Sir Arthur Wellesley had moved two divisions of infantry under General Sherbrooke, and the whole of his cavalry over the Alberche to Cazalegas, in readiness to support the Spaniards, and communicate with Sir Robert Wilson, who continued at Escalona.

The situation of the allied armies was now exceedingly critical; but still Sir Arthur was not aware how thickly the clouds were gathering beyond the mountains on his left. As early as the 30th June, Soult, then at Zamora, received a communication from Napoleon, written near Ratisbon, appointing him to command the 2d, 5th, and 6th corps; which he was ordered to concentrate, and then to act vigorously against the British army. "Wellesley," said he, "will probably advance by the Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him." Soult was at that time ignorant of the

Napier, vol. ii. 378.

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British general's designs; but having reason to suppose that he was about to operate in the valley of the Tagus, in concert with the Spanish army, he proposed to Joseph that a strong corps should assemble at Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, and menace Lisbon; a plan whereby the English army would be compelled to retire into Beira. Thus, instead of straining every nerve to collect a formidable force, and follow up with all possible rapidity the decisive plan directed by Bonaparte, Soult wished Joseph to sanction the half measure of constraining Wellesley to abandon any plan he might have conceived of operating against Victor.

It is true that Marshal Soult had his difficulties to contend against; and perhaps Napoleon's plan was easier ordered than executed. Ney, for instance, refused compliance when directed to move on Zamora, alleging that it was imprudent to uncover Astorga and Leon: when, however, the march of the British army on Plasencia became known, and it was seen that Sir Arthur Wellesley had no intention of acting north of the Douro, that marshal was induced to approach Zamora, leaving some dragoons to protect Astorga and Leon. Towards the middle of July, Soult found that he could bring the three corps into active operation; but Napoleon's orders continued to be disregarded, while the project of capturing Ciudad Rodrigo, and then investing Almeida, preparatory to threatening the communications of the English army with Lisbon, continued to be urged upon Joseph; who, on his part, was not gifted with sufficient military capacity to see the advantages to be derived either from his brother's plan or that proposed by Soult. He assented, however, to the views of the latter;

but wished him to detach 10,000 men to assist Kellermann and Bonnet to seize the Asturias, in order to facilitate the communication with France; a proposition which was resisted by Marshal Soult.

By the arrival at Salamanca of the 5th corps under Mortier, Soult had assembled near that city an army of between forty and fifty thousand men, at the moment (18th July) when the British troops were crossing the Tietar to form a junction with Cuesta; and yet from no quarter did a hint of this formidable concentration, which threatened his rear, reach Sir Arthur Wellesley, although both Marshal Beresford and the Duque del Parque were so near.

We left General Cuesta in full retreat on the 26th. On the morning of that day, the French, suddenly passing the Guadarrama, drove the Spanish cavalry out of Torrejos and pursued them to Alcabon. General Zayas had here drawn up 4000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and eight guns on a plain, and offered battle. Latour Maubourg advanced with his cavalry in a line parallel to that of the Spaniards, and a cannonade commenced; but, the head of a column of French infantry appearing in sight at that moment, the Spaniards broke, and fled in disorder towards Sta Olalla, vigorously followed by the enemy's horsemen; the panic would doubtless have spread through the whole Spanish army, but for the courage and promptitude of Alburquerque, who, coming up with a division of 3000 fresh cavalry, checked the enemy, while Cuesta retreated in great confusion towards the Alberche.

A little more enterprise on the part of the

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French would have produced a complete rout amongst the Spaniards; and as it was, the consequences must have been far more serious, had not General Sherbrooke marched out from Cazalegas, and interposed his divisions between the flying Spaniards and the enemy.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who witnessed the confusion existing beyond the Alberche, and saw the danger which threatened the Spanish army should it remain exposed to an attack, with the Alberche in its rear, pointed out to General Cuesta a position at Talavera which he entreated him to retire upon and occupy. He had now seen sufficient of the Spanish army to know, that, excepting when very strongly posted, it could not possibly withstand an attack from the French. But the old man was obstinate, as usual, and persisted in remaining where he was, and the destruction of his army seemed inevitable. The following morning, however, perceiving that General Sherbrooke was drawing off his divisions, Cuesta yielded to the solicitations of his able coadjutor, and the Spanish troops were withdrawn to the ground selected with admirable foresight, as calculated to secure the undisciplined Spaniards against the efforts of the French veterans.

The position now occupied by the allied armies was about two miles in length, extending perpendicularly from the Tagus, whereon the right rested, in front of Talavera. This part of the ground was covered with vines and olive trees, and much intersected by banks and ditches; and the town itself was partly walled. The centre was more open, but the left terminated favourably on a bold and commanding height, overlooking a val-

ley about 600 yards wide, which separated the left of the position from the Sierra de Montalban, a range of rocky mountains. Posted on the right, the Spaniards were completely hidden from the enemy by trees, which, with the banks, walls, and ditches in their front, effectually sheltered them from a cannonade. The approach to Talavera by the Toledo road was defended by a heavy battery in front of a church which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All the avenues of the town were defended in a similar manner. The town was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish infantry was formed in two lines, sheltered from attack by the obstacles which the ground presented. General Hill's division stood on the extreme left, and was placed *en echellon* upon the commanding height above mentioned. The point of junction of the two armies was intended to be secured by a redoubt on an elevated spot of ground; this was not completed, but afforded cover for eight or ten guns. Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell was posted here with a division of infantry, supported in his rear by General Cotton's brigade of cavalry and some Spanish horse. The space between General Campbell's division and the left of the position, was occupied by Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke's division, composed of the guards, King's German legion, and General Cameron's brigade.

Previously to the complete occupation of the position of Talavera on the evening of the 27th July, Major-General Mackenzie's and Colonel Donkin's* brigades of infantry remained in advance, posted in a wood near the Casa de Salinas, supported by a

* General Sir Rufane Donkin, K.C.B. and G.C.H.

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brigade of light cavalry, drawn up on the plain. About three o'clock in the afternoon, some French light infantry made a rush through the wood and surprised the British posts; two columns of the enemy's infantry followed closely, and falling with great impetuosity upon the British, separated the two brigades, which were principally composed of young battalions, and threw them into confusion. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had ascended a tower immediately in their rear, fortunately observed them falter, and descended just in time to avoid being captured, as with difficulty he threw himself on his horse in the midst of the affray. In the mean time the 45th regiment and some companies of the 5th battalion of the 60th showed a steady front, and checked the enemy. The brigades, supported by the cavalry, then crossed the plain, falling back gradually upon the left of the position taken up by the combined armies. General Mackenzie's brigade then took post in second line behind the guards; while Colonel Donkin drew up his brigade upon the hill on the extreme left, and completed the occupation of the position. The cavalry was formed in column behind the left of the line.

Sir J. Jones, Account of the War, &c. vol. i. p. 226.

Placed in order of battle, the British troops, including those of the German legion, somewhat exceeded 19,000 men, with 30 guns. The Spanish force numbered 34,000, with 70 guns. The French had 50,000 men, all veteran troops, and 80 pieces of cannon. King Joseph commanded in person, assisted by Marshals Jourdan and Victor.

Following close upon the British rear-guard, a small body of French dragoons rode nearly up to the Spanish line, when an entire division of 5000 men, posted behind almost insurmountable obstacles,

supposing themselves about to be charged, and believing that the British cavalry under General Cotton had moved off, threw down their arms and fled to the rear; the Spanish artillery and ammunition waggons, amounting to more than one hundred, followed their example, and spread confusion and dismay for miles around.* Thus was a wide gap made in the line. Fortunately Sir Arthur Wellesley was near the spot, who immediately ordered up some English cavalry to flank the main road, which had the effect of stopping the disorder that was widely spreading through the Spanish army; and a fire of musketry being opened by those Spaniards who remained, the enemy lost some men and then retreated in disorder.

Sir J. Jones, vol. i. p. 227.

Victor was not slow to perceive that the possession of the hill whereon, as we have noticed, the British left rested, would enable him to command the whole of our position. It presented a steep and rugged face towards the enemy, which led probably to its being but feebly occupied, indeed the summit was altogether unoccupied. This was observed by Victor, who ably conceived the project of seizing it by a sudden assault. Accordingly, on the evening of the 27th, just as twilight began to render objects indistinct, he directed Ruffin's division to attack, Villatte to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German legion, but without engaging seriously. The enemy mounted the steep acclivity with the dash and boldness of French troops; but Colonel Donkin's brigade gave them a

* General Cuesta was so indignant at this dastardly behaviour, that, after the action, he caused the division to be decimated, and it was only by much entreaty from Sir Arthur Wellesley that he consented to decimate again those on whom the lot had fallen, actually executing six officers and about thirty men.—*Sir John Jones.*

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warm reception, and succeeded in repelling the first troops that mounted the hill; but this weak brigade could not defend every part, and many of the French turned its left, and gained the summit in rear. General Hill was at that moment moving up to reinforce Donkin with the 48th regiment, and while giving orders to its colonel, was fired at from above. Conceiving the shots to have come from some English stragglers, he rode smartly forward, accompanied by Brigade-Major Fordyce, and found himself immediately surrounded by the enemy. Fordyce was killed, but General Hill set spurs to his wounded charger at the instant when a French grenadier laid hand on his bridle, and happily escaped in the confusion. On getting clear, he rode down the slope, and falling in with a portion of the 29th regiment, returned with it upon the enemy, and a bold rush being made, the French were forced over the crest of the hill.

Having thus succeeded in driving off the enemy, General Hill proceeded to post the 29th and 48th regiments, together with a battalion of detachments; these, with Donkin's brigade, presented a good front against a renewal of the attack. His dispositions were scarcely made ere another body of the enemy, forming part of Ruffin's division, which had missed its way in a ravine, joined the first assailants, and a dense mass again pushed vigorously up the hill, a demonstration being at the same time made upon the Germans, posted a little lower down. The contest now was fierce, and continued for some time at close quarters, illuminated alone by the flashes of the musketry; but a stout charge once more prevailed, and the French were driven down the declivity with heavy loss.

There was little repose on either side that night; for successive alarms and constant firing, chiefly occasioned by the Spaniards, created frequent disturbance, and banished sleep. Sir Arthur, surrounded by his staff, slept wrapped in his cloak, on the open ground in rear of the 2d line, about the centre of the British army, and by occasionally asking the hour, showed he looked for the coming day as anxiously as any around. He was on horseback with his staff just before daylight, and rode slowly towards the height upon which the left rested, where he arrived as dawn appeared and enabled him to see the opposite side of the ravine, covered with black, indistinct masses. The enemy were once more formed for attack, and soon after the day broke, opened a heavy cannonade, under cover of which two columns were seen moving rapidly towards the British left. They advanced with their accustomed gallantry, but were met with such steady and determined courage by the regiments under General Hill, that to get firm footing on the high ground was impossible. Nevertheless the enemy persevered; and on both sides, in consequence of the broken nature of the ground, the fight was maintained by small parties. It was seen from the first that the French columns were inadequate to the task; and at length, after an immense sacrifice of life, the whole hurried back in the greatest disorder. The British loss was also very severe. General Hill was amongst the wounded.

Earl of Munster, p. 215-223.

An interval of some hours occurred after the repulse of this attack, during which the enemy were seen deliberately cooking and eating their dinner, while the British could only look and long; having,

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alas! nothing to cook. They lay down, however, and got some rest. A streamlet which flowed at the bottom of the ravine that divided the hostile armies was visited by the soldiers of both; and it was a singular sight to observe men who had just been contending in fierce strife, amicably interchanging such rough courtesies as the occasion permitted: but brave men ever respect, and even love, a gallant foe.

In the mean time, Sir Arthur Wellesley was strengthening himself to the left. He moved his cavalry nearer to that part of his position, and placed two regiments rather forward in the valley. Alburquerque also brought his horse thither. To observe the hills beyond his left, Sir Arthur obtained from Cuesta, Bassecourt's division of infantry, which was posted so as to check the enemy's light troops, who seemed inclined to move round in that direction.

Mid-day saw the French again forming their columns of attack. At this anxious moment Sir Arthur was seated on the summit of the hill, whose possession had been the object of such deadly strife, watching with intense attention the threatening movements of the enemy, when Colonel Donkin rode smartly up, and briefly announced to him that a Spanish staff-officer had just arrived from the right, bringing the startling information that Cuesta was betraying the English army. Sir Arthur seemed to reflect for one short moment, and then, without comment, without a question, without even turning his head, composedly observed, "Very well — you may return to your brigade," and continued his anxious occupation. A few minutes afterwards he was again on horseback, for all speculation as to the part of the allied position the enemy were about

to assail, was set at rest by the simultaneous advance of four huge columns, covered by the fire of all their artillery. Leaving a few divisions to observe the Spaniards, at least three-fourths of the enemy's army were moving across the space which separated it from the British, preceded by a cloud of skirmishers. It was evident, therefore, that a general attack upon the whole of the British line was their object. From the extreme right of the French, two divisions descended into the great valley, one of which moved forward to attack the British left, while the other directed its march to approach the mountain beyond. Some cavalry followed these divisions. Sir Arthur Wellesley now deemed it time for his cavalry to share in the honour of the day, and therefore directed Major-General Anson's brigade, composed of the 23d light dragoons and 1st German hussars, to charge the French infantry. These regiments came forward gallantly, but arriving at the brink of a ravine, their formation was broken, and the charge failed of effect; nevertheless their brave bearing, and the dashing spirit displayed by the 23d, checked the enemy's advance, and his projected attack in that quarter was relinquished.

While these events were passing in front of the left, the division of General Sherbrooke* in the centre, and that of General Campbell† on the right, were attacked with great violence. Against the latter the French came on in a single dense column; as it approached, the skirmishers disappeared from its front, and immediately afterwards a deadly fire was poured into it; every shot, from

* The late Lieutenant-General Sir J. Cope Sherbrooke, G.C.B.
† The late Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Campbell, G.C.B.

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its proximity, taking effect. After some vain endeavours to advance against the steady fire of this part of the line, the unwieldy mass was shaken and forced back. Seizing the opportunity now afforded, a portion of Campbell's division charged the enemy's cannon, and captured ten guns. The French tried to rally, but again faltered, then turned and went off in confusion, exposed to the play of eighteen pieces of British artillery collected in two batteries by Lieutenant-Colonel Robe, which did great execution. The routed column was harassed in its retreat by a regiment of Spanish cavalry. Mackenzie's brigade, and two battalions of Cuesta's infantry, assisted in this repulse of the enemy.

But the main struggle was near the centre of the British position, where, for a short time, the issue was doubtful, owing to the impetuosity of the guards, who having followed too far when the enemy were driven back, left a wide gap in the line. At that moment their support coming forward, the troops which had been repulsed faced about, and the French batteries opening their fire, the guards retired in disorder, and the Germans on their left being also thrown into confusion, the enemy pressed on and penetrated the British line. Now was the critical moment of the battle. But Sir Arthur Wellesley had marked the loose advance of the guards, and foreseeing the consequences, withdrew the 48th regiment from the left, and placed it in rear of the opening their forward movement had occasioned. Having allowed the disordered troops to pass through the intervals of his regiment, formed in open column of companies for that purpose, Colonel Donellan again wheeled the 48th into line, and advanced against the enemy, plying them as he

drew near with so well sustained a fire, that they were checked. The guards and Germans quickly rallied in rear of the 48th, and some cavalry trotting up, the French were unable to maintain themselves, and speedily went of.

Thus repulsed at all points, the dispirited legions of the enemy retired to the ground they had occupied before the battle; having sustained a loss of nearly 10,000 men, including two generals. The British loss was also very severe; Generals Mackenzie and Langwerth were killed; Hill, Henry Campbell, and Alexander Campbell were wounded; and the total number hors de combat was 5350.* Sir Arthur Wellesley received two bullets through his clothes, and a third (fortunately a spent one) struck him in the shoulder. Two of his aides-de-camp Captains Burgh and Bouverie, were wounded by his side. The Spaniards returned a loss of 1250 men, but the correctness of their statement was doubted at the time.

In this battle Sir Arthur Wellesley, relying on the steadiness of his troops, directed them to screen themselves as far as possible from the fire of the enemy's guns by remaining in a recumbent posture behind the crest of the hill, and only exposed them to its full effect on the approach of the columns of attack; a plan he afterwards pursued on many occasions. The trophies of the battle were seventeen pieces of cannon, ten of which were taken in the

* The amount of loss in battle of a British army is always ascertained with tolerable accuracy, from the manner in which the returns are made and published: indeed, it is generally exaggerated, every regiment being anxious to figure largely in the Gazette. We have known very trifling injuries entitling officers to the envied distinction of appearing as wounded. The difference between *severely* and *slightly* wounded is well known in the army.

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field, and the remainder were left by the enemy on retiring.

This was one of the hardest contested battles fought during the war, and reflects great honour on both the French and English troops. As regards their leaders, the English general alone deserves credit; he took up his defensive ground in a most masterly manner, and maintained it by the readiness with which he met every manœuvre of the enemy. The chief error committed by his opponents was unquestionably in fighting at all. The difference between the loss and gain of a battle is immense; and, in general, fighting should only be resorted to when an object of great importance cannot be gained without incurring the risk it entails. In this instance, the French leaders knew that Soult was marching on Plasencia, where he would be in rear of the British army, and that a little dalliance maintained for a few days longer would place Sir Arthur Wellesley in a serious dilemma.

The main body of the French drew off during the night of the 28th on the road to Sta Olalla; and on the following morning their rear-guard, composed of two divisions, was alone visible. Sir Arthur Wellesley had been compelled to suffer them to go off unmolested: 14,000 jaded British troops, without provisions, could inflict no blow on the defeated enemy; and he was too strongly impressed with a sense of the inefficiency of the Spanish army to urge it singly to undertake any operation. But let us do the Spaniards justice, and state that the few troops they had *engaged* in the battle of Talavera acquitted themselves very creditably. It must also be remembered that, passively,

the Spanish army rendered considerable service by occupying the attention of some divisions of French who would otherwise have been employed in the attack of the British.

On the morning of the 29th, a troop of horse-artillery and a fine brigade of light infantry under Brigadier-General R. Craufurd joined the army, having made incredible exertions to get forward, knowing that a battle was expected to take place. In twenty-four hours they had marched a distance of upwards of fifty English miles in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying a weight upon his shoulders of between fifty and sixty pounds.

This last day's march from Naval Moral has been graphically described by an officer who shared in its fatigues, as one of the most "feverish anxiety and excitement," for long ere reaching Oropesa, the distant rolling of artillery in front plainly announced to the impatient troops that their comrades were engaged in a conflict of no ordinary kind. This, indeed, was proclaimed by the numerous fugitives they met, all declaring that the day was lost; but the continued roar of cannon cheered them with the conviction that the English army yet held its ground, and gave hope that they might still arrive in time to turn the scale.

Rough Sketches, &c. by Lt.-Col. Leach, Rifle Brig. p. 80.

In allusion to the extraordinary feat performed by this division, Colonel Napier well observes: "Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the delicacy of modern soldiers!"

But it was not alone the state of his army that prevented Sir Arthur Wellesley from making more of his victory; rumours of Soult's movement on

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Plasencia by the pass of Baños reached him on the morning of the 30th, and his present situation was therefore one of very great difficulty and danger. All around him felt this; but, recording the sentiments of the army generally, a distinguished officer has observed: "The mind of our general was, however, as we well knew, full of resources; and though most of us saw our embarrassments clearly enough, there was not an individual in the army who entertained a doubt that his talent and decision would, in due time, overcome and disperse them."

Marquis of Londonderry's Narrative, vol. i. 414.

We find from a letter written by Sir Arthur Wellesley at Talavera to Mr. Frere, that most unfounded assertions of his backwardness in pushing military operations had been made by the Spaniards, whose misconduct was not confined to the field; for the leading members of the Junta were not a whit behind Cuesta in folly: we quote the following from the letter alluded to: —

Gurwood. Despatches, &c. July 31.

"It is not a difficult matter for a gentleman in the situation of Don Martin de Garay to sit down in his cabinet and write his ideas of the glory which would result from driving the French through the Pyrenees; and I believe there is no man in Spain who has risked so much, or who has sacrificed so much to affect that object as I have.

"But I wish that Don Martin, or the gentlemen of the Junta, before they blame me for not doing more, or impute to me beforehand the probable consequences of the blunders or the indiscretion of others, would either come or send here somebody to satisfy the wants of our half-starved army, which, although they have been engaged for two days, and have defeated twice their numbers, in the service of Spain, have not bread to eat. It is positively a fact that, during the last seven days, the British army have not received one third of their provision; that at this moment there are nearly 4000 wounded soldiers dying in the hospital in this town from want of common

assistance and necessaries, which any other country in the world would have given even to its enemies; and that I can get no assistance of any description from the country. I cannot prevail upon them even to bury the dead carcases in the neighbourhood, the stench of which will destroy themselves as well as us.

"I cannot avoid feeling these circumstances; and the Junta must see that, unless they and the country make a great exertion to support and supply the armies to which the invariable attention and exertion of every man, and the labour of every beast in the country ought to be directed, the bravery of the soldiers, their losses and their success, will only make matters worse and increase our embarrassment and distress.

"I positively will not move; nay more, I will disperse my army, till I am supplied with provisions and means of transport, as I ought to be."

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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BATTLE OF ASSYE

23d Sepr 1803.

A. *march of the British to attack the enemy's left.*
B. *original position of y Enemy*
C. *position taken by the enemy to meet the threatened attack*
D. *formation of the British.*
E. *attack of Do.*
F. *attempted formation of the enemy.*
G. *attack of the British cavalry.*
H. *last attack led by Genl Wellesley*




SKETCH
of the Action at
KIOGE
Augst 27th
1807.
Herfolge
Aashoy
Kioge
Kioge Bay
Reference.
A. Position of the Danes.
B. 1st Do of the British.
C. Advance of the Brith in echellon of Regimen
D. Movement to protect the left.
E. Attack on the Danish entrenched camp.
G. Position of the Brith after the town was taken
H. Genl Linsengen's Corps
K. 2nd Posn of Do
5 Compn 95th (Rifles)
92nd R.
2nd Bn 52nd
5 Co 43rd
From Copenhagen
Scale of One Mile.
Drawn by Capt C R Scott
Litho. I. Francis St Gower St



W.M.King ex. litho. from a drawing by Cap.t C.R. Scott.

Litho.c Press, 2 Francis St. Gower St.e



W.M.King, ex litho from a drawing by Capn C.R.Scott.

Litho Press 2 Frances St Gower St



W.M.King, ex litho. from a drawing by Capn C.R.Scott.

Lithos Press 2 Francis St Gower St



W. Whing, ex. lithe. from a drawing by Capt.n C.R. Scott.

Litho.e Press, 2 Francis St.e Gower St.e



W.M.King. litho from a drawing by Capt C.R.Scott
Litho Press, 2 Frances St Gower St.

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